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The present work tries to see whether Leonardo Polo´s proposal 
expands synderesis in a way that, assuming the medieval traditional 
views, it can be the ontological basis for grounding a personalistic 
view of ethics. 
Synderesis seems to be a controversial topic. The human reality behind 
the term was touched upon by Greek and Latin philosophers but the 
term was not used in classic philosophy. It was Jerome the first to use 
this term in his commentary to Ezequiel 1:4-14. This was a theological 
treatise. Synderesis was a popular term among philosophers in the 
Middle Ages especially after Peter Lombard included St. Jerome’s 
commentary in his Sentences. Peter Lombard’s Sentences was a 
common text book in most universities and therefore synderesis 
became a compulsory and therefore well know term in medieval 
philosophy. Aquinas used it extensively as well as his commentators. 
Aquinas considered synderesis an intellectual habit responsible for the 
first principles of morality. For Bonaventura synderesis was the will’s 
inclination to do good. Ockham does not mention synderesis in his 
works. Luther in his early works mentions it but later breaks with 
tradition and no longer accepts synderesis as he defended that nature 
was totally corrupt after the original sin, and synderesis was seen as 
an unpolluted remain of the original nature which kept men aware of 
sins. From thereon the topic, with rare exceptions, was only developed 
by those who followed medieval traditions. It looks as if Leonardo 
Polo not only regains the traditional view of synderesis but makes it a 
pivotal topic in anthropology. For him synderesis becomes the innate 
habit through which the personal act of being activates all human 
faculties. Synderesis then, is at the root of all human decisions, 
because it becomes the unifying structure of the intellect and will. 
Because of this it also becomes the root of ethics because it allows 
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“The way is not from ignorance to knowledge but from 
knowledge to more knowledge”1. This Leonardo Polo quote can be a 
good introduction to this dissertation as well as to Polo’s philosophy. 
This thesis has to start with the acquired knowledge —the historical 
development of synderesis— to what may be an addition: Leonardo 
Polo’s proposal. Because he is not a well-known philosopher, it may 
be necessary to give the background of his overall philosophical work, 
so as to understand his specific proposal on synderesis. While Leo-
nardo Polo’s works show an extensive and deep conversation with 
Greek, Roman, Medieval and modern philosophers he does not ex-
plain synderesis historical development, which is discussed in the 
fourth chapter and first part of the fifth chapter.  
Polo understands synderesis as an innate habit which is respon-
sible for the knowledge of practical reason’s first principles —this is 
the classic view2— and that synderesis is the only link between the 
personal act of being and all other human faculties which, while being 
in line with the classic view is radically new in history of philosophy3. 
If this is the case, the study of this habit will help to understand all 
human activities in a deeper way; more specifically the inbuilt ethical 
content of all human decisions4. It may also help to clarify the onto-
logical foundation of a personalist ethics. Ethics is struggling to find a 
universal foundation5 that makes it objective and therefore universal 
                                                 
1“No se pasa de ignorar a saber, sino de saber a saber más”. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría 
del Conocimiento. 4, 2nd ed. (Pamplona: Ed. Univ. de Navarra, 2004), 470. Robert 
Spaemann also shares this idea: “Progress is only possible as a continuation of 
what one already knows”. “El progreso solamente es posible como continuación 
del pensamiento procedente de lo que ya se sabe”. Spaemann, R., Etica, Política y 
Cristianismo (Madrid: Palabra, 2007), 60. 
2 Cfr. Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, Irish Theological 
Quarterly, vol. 23, (1956). Ferrater Mora, J., Terricabras, J.-M., Diccionario de 
Filosofía 4 tomos, (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, S.A., 1994), 3294. 
3 Chapters IV and V on the History of Synderesis Development support this state-
ment. 
4 Humanistic sciences cannot be developed without due reference to ethics, that 
guides humans and society towards their proper end. As Simon indicates in his 
classic book: “And thus it is that those who, in opposing economic and political 
amoralism, speak of the need to submit economics and politics to ethics show only 
that they have not fully understood the irreducibly moral character of economics 
and politics”. Simon, Yves René Marie. A Critique of Moral Knowledge (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 85. 
5 There are contemporary calls to find this universality in an empirical way, as done 
by the psycologist Solomon Schwartz and Hans Küng, “Declaration Toward a 
Global Ethic, Parliament of the World’s Religions”, Chicago, 1993. Accessed June 
17, 2015. http://www.parliamentofreligions.org/_includes/fckcontent/file/toward-
saglobalethic.pdf. On these attempts we share the opinion of Agera: “In the first 
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—common to all human beings— but is also takes care of the personal 
differences6, i.e. applied to each person according to one´s endow-
ment, circumstances and destiny7. Saying it simply, synderesis could 
be the foundation of a personalist ethics which could also be seen as 
the foundation of a vocational ethics. A personalist ethics is not a spec-
ulative science, that determines in an absolute way what each 
individual has to do, but the justification that the morality of an action 
is linked to a personal vocation, not only to the three fountains of mo-
rality, or better said, that the three fountains of morality have to 
consider the personal vocation, the personal final end, which is then 
seen as a specification of the common human final end. It is true that 
the final end in general is common to all universe8 and, as such, to all 
human beings, but each person has a personal end, a personal way to 
                                                 
place, the ethical minimum eclectically culled from the ethico-religio-cultural tra-
ditions lacks a binding force any ethics needs for an inner authority. Secondly, it 
may lack the rational evidence that should reportedly (as per Küng) replace all 
authority. Thirdly, it may lack a concrete character that any ethics should possess. 
Nevertheless, in an attempt towards a quest for a universal ethic, there surely is a 
merit. It consists in the recognition that reason must listen to the great religious 
traditions, if it is not to go blind, deaf and dumb in matters pertaining to human 
existence”. Agera, C. R., “Truth of Freedom:  A Study in Ratzinger”, Journal of 
Human Values, vol. 16/2 (2010), 138. 
6 Romano Guardini’s ethics is based on a personal response to God that takes into 
account the different situations or figures of value. Guardini places the foundation 
of ethics on a fenomenological analysis that relies on religious experiences, rather 
than in an ontological and epistemological analysis, which is what Polo’s proposal 
may do. A sample of this is the following Guardini’s quotation: “It is true that in 
the relationship with Him man’s singularity stands out. God, my soul and nothing 
else. Man is essentially himself from God’s prespective and in relation with Him; 
and when he abandons God, leaves this being himself, becomes a number, in the 
attitude or a mere living being”. “Es verdad que en la relación con Él aparece el 
hombre en su singularidad. Dios y mi alma y nada más. El hombre es esencial-
mente el mismo desde la perspectiva de Dios y en relación con Él; y cuando 
abandona a Dios, se sale de ese ser el ser el con el mismo, cae en el número, en la 
actitud del mero ser vivo”. Guardini, R., Etica. Lecciones en la Universidad de 
Munich (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1999), 186. 
7 The balance between the universal and the particular in ethics was already dis-
cussed at length by Aristotle, but the specific personal free destiny and the topic of 
vocation is not present in him: “Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at 
theoretical knowledge like the others for we are inquiring not in order to know 
what excellence is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would 
have been of no use”. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103b27-1104a9. This text 
was commented by Aquinas as follows: “Dicit ergo, quod praesens negotium, scil-
icet moralis philosophiae, non est propter contemplationem veritatis, sicut alia 
negotia scientiarum speculativarum, sed est propter operationem. Non enim in hac 
scientia scrutamur quid est virtus ad hoc solum ut sciamus huius rei veritatem; sed 
ad hoc, quod acquirentes virtutem, boni efficiamur”. “He says therefore that the 
present study, moral philosophy, is not pursued for the sake of the contemplation 
of truth like the other studies of the speculative sciences, but for the sake of action. 
In this science we seek a definition of virtue not only to know its truth but to be-
come good by acquiring virtue”. Thomas. Sententia Libri Ethicorum. (Romae: Ad 
Sanctae Sabinae, 1969), Lib. 2 l. 2 n. 2. 
8 For an explanation of Aquinas’ traditional view of the universal law, and its relation 
to the synderesis cfr. Pattaro, E., “An Overview on Practical Reason in Aquinas”, 
Scandinavian Studies in Law (2005), vol. 48. 
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reach the common end, because of the diverse endowments each pos-
sesses and the free decisions one takes, because God does not give 
freedom and then micro-manages each person. So each person’s end 
may depend a lot on the free personal decisions taken by his parents, 
teachers, and other people who have shaped his body, material and 
social environment. 
Some few observations are important at this initial stage: 
a) That the purpose of this thesis is not to find the foundations 
for a personalist ethics, but to see whether Polo’s proposal regarding 
synderesis is a valid approach; 
b) That in order to be closer to Polo’s texts we have used a non-
inclusive language. It was the standard style at the place and time of 
Polo’s writings. Whenever we use the masculine it means both mas-
culine and feminine, unless otherwise stated; 
c) That though we understand morals as personal good behav-
iour, and ethics as the scientific study –philosophical study– of morals, 
nevertheless, for simplicity and because Polo does not use such dis-
tinction we shall use them indistinctively9. 
                                                 
9 Abbà seems to have used a similar distinction: “El capitulo III muestra que la ex-
periencia moral, que está en la base de toda teoría ética, requiere una teoría de la 
virtud e indica los requisitos a los que debe responder si quiere adecuarse a la ex-
periencia moral: es decir, indica que la virtud debe ser definida en referencia a la 
conducta, al ideal de vida buena y a la regla de la razón práctica”. Abbà, 
Giuseppe. Felicidad, Vida Buena y Virtud: Ensayo de Filosofı́a Moral. (Barce-
lona: Ediciones Internacionales Universitarias, 1992), 20. A different 
interpretation of both terms can be found in Ricouer as quoted by Moratalla: “Eth-
ics refers to the concrete life, to the desire, the search for happiness, while morals 
to the norms to duty. In this way ethics and morals refer to the two great ethical 
traditions, Aristotelian and Kantian”. “La ética hace referencia a la vida concreta, 
al deseo, a la búsqueda de la felicidad; la moral a las normas, al deber. Etica y 
moral asi apelan a las dos grandes tradiciones éticas: la aristotélica y la kantiana”. 
Moratalla, T. D., “P. Ricoeur, Una Antropología Hermenéutica”, in Propuestas 
Antropológicas del siglo XX. 2, ed. Sellés, J.F. (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2007), 279. Mo-
lina, following Falgueras, proposes to differentiate both terms as follows: “Pero 
prestemos atención a la distinción entre ética y moral que en su artículo Destino, 
Responsabilidad y Ética nos propone. Viene a llamar ética a aquella actividad que 
el hombre realiza desde ‘la verdad como futuro destinal humano’. La moral, por el 
contrario, surge más bien de la costumbre, de la experiencia del pasado junto a 
otros hombres. Tiene, por tanto, un origen colectivo”. Molina, F., “Conciencia y 
Destino”, in A. Garcı́a González J., and Padial Benticuaga Juan José. Autotras-
cendimiento: Homenaje Al Catedrático De Filosofı́a, D. Ignacio Falgueras 
Salinas, Por Su Jubilación. (Málaga: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad 
de Málaga, 2011), 4. Others adscribe the term Ethics to the philosophical study of 
morality, while Morals to the theologically revealed study of morality. “Según esta 
concepción, se ha llegado a calificar la ética como «civil» y la moral como «reli-
giosa»”. Sánchez-Migallón, S., Ética Filosófica: Un Curso Introductorio 
(Pamplona: Eunsa, 2008), 15. The references could multiply, so what we can learn 
from this is that one cannot take for granted how different authors understand these 
terms and that if we use them, readers may also understand them in different ways, 
so it is good to define them at the beginning. 
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d) That we are aware that there are many footnotes and that some 
are extensive. This is to facilitate easy cross-check of quotations and 
our interpretation of texts. This is especially important for those who 
have difficult access to well-stocked libraries. Also to allow Polo’s 
thought to speak directly to the reader and for this purpose we include 
the Polo’s original text in Spanish. His texts are somehow cryptic, 
even for well-read Spanish people, and therefore difficult to translate, 
which means that they can be translated in many different ways. All 
translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated; 
e) That the thesis is done having in mind a public not familiar 
with Leonardo Polo´s philosophy; so in order to fit his proposal on 
synderesis we found it necessary to explain Polo’s theoretical frame-
work; 
f) In spite of the above it is important also to indicate that we are 
not studying Leonardo Polo (1926-2013), nor his transcendental an-
thropology nor his theory of knowledge, but only his proposals 
regarding synderesis. 
We chose Leonardo Polo because, to our knowledge, he is the 
contemporary philosopher who has studied synderesis more than any 
other author; while statistics are not proper of philosophy´s method, 
they nevertheless can give an idea of the extent to which a topic has 
been dealt with. Aquinas uses the word synderesis 255 times in his 
numerous works, while Polo uses it 507 times in the books published 
up to the end of 2013.  
A more important reason is the depth and relevance of the topic 
in anthropology that Polo’s proposal has. An added reason is the few 
works which deal with this topic. While synderesis in St. Thomas and 
its commentators is well researched10, synderesis in the works of Pro-
fessor Leonardo Polo and its integration in the whole of human 
anthropology is not yet done in full as we discuss in Chapter II, Liter-
ature Review. 
Regarding Polo´s originality he has given new light to this innate 
habit as a consequence of his aim to incorporate the classic and modern 
findings in anthropology. Many of his ideas break new ground but, 
                                                 
10 Cfr. Just to cite but a few: Lottin, O. D., Psychologie et Morale aux XII et XIII 
siècles (Louvain: Gembloux, J. Duculot, 1948), vol. II, 1; Crowe, M. B., “The 
Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, Irish Theological Quarterly, vol. 23 
(1956) 151-164; Sellés, J. F., “La Sindéresis o Razón Natural como la Apertura 
Cognoscitiva de la Persona Humana a su Propia Naturaleza”, Revista Española 
de Filosofía Medieval, 10, (2003), 321-334; Langston, D.,“The Spark of Con-
science : Bonaventure’s View of Conscience and Synderesis”, Franciscan 
Studies, vol. 53, (1993); Greenwell, A. M., “Duns Scotus: On Synderesis and 
Conscience”, Lex Christianorum. Accessed June, 12 2014. http://lexchristiano-
rum.blogspot.co.ke/2011/09/duns-scotus-and-natural-moral-law.html. Accessed 
14 Nov 2014; Weber, D., “Thomas Hobbes’ Doctrine of Conscience and Theo-
ries of Synderesis In Renaissance England”, Hobbes Studies, vol. 23, 1, (2010), 
54–71; García Junceda, J. A., “La Sindéresis en el Pensamiento de Santo 
Tomás”, Augustinus, vol. 24, (1961), 7-42.  
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according to him, are in line with perennial philosophy11. Polo sug-
gests reconsidering some limitations of traditional philosophy –
limitations that are inevitable in any human enterprise. Philosophy is 
not dogma12. Polo’s proposals, according to him, expand the field of 
classical philosophy and shed light on some of the discoveries of mod-
ern and contemporary philosophers. He also points out the flaws of 
each thinker whenever necessary. He expressed this as follows: “My 
reflection starts from the real distinction between being and essence 
formulated by Thomas Aquinas, which is traditional philosophy´s last 
important discovery. In this sense, I do not consider myself a Thomis-
tic rebel, as others have been, neither a mere commentator (…) In 
short, the sense of my proposal is clear: it is to take advantage of the 
nuclear theory of Thomism. This is not to backpedal to the 13th Cen-
tury; it is possible to deal with what modern philosophy has tried to 
bring to light, but understanding it correctly, i.e. without diminishing 
metaphysics when proceeding to the enlargement of the transcenden-
tals”13. 
My hypothesis is that Polo’s Transcendental anthropology, and 
synderesis within it, can be the base for a positive and inspiring view 
of personalistic ethics. Ethics is seen not only as an ethics of norms, a 
teleological ethics based on an end already established by human na-
ture14, or on a fixed and precast way of relating to a God who has 
                                                 
11 Cfr. Falgueras, I., “Los Planteamientos Radicales de la Filosofía de Leonardo 
Polo”, Anuario Filosófico, vol. 25, (1992),.55-99. Regarding Polo’s congruence 
with classical philosophers: Corazón, R., El Objeto de la Metafísica en la Tradi-
ción Aristotélico-Tomista y en Polo (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2013). 
Yepes Stork, R., “Leonardo Polo, Su Vida y Escritos”, Miscelanea Poliana, vol. 
1, (2005). Accessed July 26, 2013. http://www.leonardopolo.net/intro.html. 
12 “Had philosophy been already done in full, had we achieved unquestionable for-
mulations agreeable to everyone, philosophy would be boring. All that could be 
done would be to transcribe a series of philosophical dogmas, as if along many 
centuries we hadn’t discovered a thing, or as if there were all-encompasing philo-
sophical dogmas. This is not so”. “Si la filosofía se hubiese hecho de una vez por 
todas, si se hubiesen logrado formulaciones inamovibles, con las que todo el 
mundo estuviese de acuerdo, sería muy aburrida. Lo único que se podría hacer es 
transcribir de manera formularia un elenco de dogmas filosóficos, como si desde 
hace muchos siglos no hubiésemos dado un solo paso adelante, o como si existie-
ran dogmas filosóficos abarcantes. No es así”. Polo, L., Introducción a la Flosofía 
(Pamplona: Eunsa, 1995), 36. 
13 “Mi planteamiento arranca de la distinción real de ser y esencia formulada por 
Tomás de Aquino, que es la última averiguación importante de la filosofía tradi-
cional. En este sentido, no me considero un tomista rebelde, como han sido otros, 
ni tampoco un comentarista. (…) En suma, el sentido de mi propuesta es claro: se 
trata de sacar partido a la tésis nuclear del tomismo. Con esto no se retrocede al 
siglo XIII, sino que es posible enfrentarse con lo que la filosofía moderna ha in-
tentado sacar a la luz, entendiéndolo en términos correctos, es decir, sin deprimir 
la metafísica al proceder a la ampliación de los trascendentales”. Polo, L., An-
tropología Trascendental I, 3rd ed. (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2010), 13. 
14 This development of an ethics based on the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, 
is not morally wrong but it is incomplete. The traditional interpretation is summa-
rised by Dewan: “Thomism is a ‘naturalism’”; Dewan, L. O., Fundamentos 
Metafísicos de la Ética (Bogotá: Fondo de Publicaciones Universidad Sergio Ar-
boleda, 2009), 22. This interpretation is linked to the consideration of metaphysics 
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already decided everything that is to be done by each individual. 
Polo’s view instead allows for ethics to become a personal challenge, 
different for each person, within a human general challenge. Ethics 
becomes an adventure of growth, moved by the freedom of a person 
in love, who can grow continuously in freedom and love, without a 
known limit. Moral life, more than a repetition of acts, becomes an 
increasing growth, a flourishing that each day can be more challeng-
ing, more fruitful and more rewarding. Moral life cannot be considered 
any longer as just mere compliance with a set of common norms –
which are good and should be there– but as a personal individual call 
to a better and ever growing fulfillment each day.  
Polo´s proposal may give this innate habit an ontological and 
structural position in anthropology, relate it with other innate habits –
mainly the habit of first principles and the habit of wisdom– and clar-
ify its function with regards to ethics. In this topic Polo does not 
evaluate his proposal with previous thinkers; he just mentions that he 
feels he adds some little contribution to what Aquinas discovered 
which may be an understatement on his part. 
We have spoken of the topic but not of the person. We shall try 
now to briefly indicate who Leonardo Polo was. 
 
2. Who was Leonardo Polo? 
Leonardo Polo Barrena was born in Madrid (Spain) in 1926. Af-
ter his undergraduate degree in Law in the Complutense University in 
Madrid, and a brief professional dedication, he decided to become an 
academic and obtained a grant to study the philosophical foundations 
of Law, which took him to Rome. He never finished his PhD in Law; 
instead he decided to do it in Philosophy, which was later published as 
Evidencia en Realidad en Descartes15. His lecturing and research life 
was almost totally spent at the recently inaugurated University of Na-
varre (from 1954 to 1996), except for the two years he spent as a 
Professor in the University of Granada (1966-68).  
His main areas of research were metaphysics, epistemology and 
anthropology. By July 2014 he had 45 books published16, and about 
74 short essays, mainly from conference papers. There are also about 
21 other unpublished works. His manuscipts and audio tapes are kept 
at the University of Navarre in the “Instituto de Estudios Filosóficos 
                                                 
being superior to anthropology. Polo shares this view on Aquinas’ anthropology 
limitations. Man cannot be interpreted with categories based on non-spiritual, nor 
on non-living things, as we shall see later. 
15 Polo, L., Evidencia y Realidad en Descartes (Madrid: Rialp, 1963). 
16 Cfr. Franquet, M. J., “La Trayectoria Intellectual de Leonardo Polo”, Anuario Fi-
losófico, vol. 29, 2 (1996). Also Esclanda R. and Sellés, J.F., Leonardo Polo: A 




Leonardo Polo” which is an institute devoted to the study and publi-
cation of his works. This year the Institute has started an ambitious 
plan to publish his complete works in 27 volumes, 9 of which are al-
ready printed and available to the public17.  
There are also two journals dedicated to him in Spain: Studia 
Poliana18 and Miscelanea Poliana19 and recently two more journals 
have published their first issue: one in Argentina, “Estudios Filosófi-
cos Polianos”20, and another in the United States “Journal of Polian 
Studies”21.  
Four websites are exclusively dedicated to studies on Polo, 
where one can find a detailed biography and some of his works: 
“www.leonardopolo.net”, and “www.unav.es/centro/studiapoliana” in 
Spain, Iter hominis22 in Brazil, and the Leonardo Polo Institute of Phi-
losophy in the United States. This was started to make the works of 
Leonardo Polo available to the English-speaking public: “www.leo-
nardopoloinstitute.org”.  
There are also several blogs by some of his disciples dealing 
with his works: e.g. “Preguntas Polianas”23, “Estudios Polianos”24, 
“Polianos”25, “El hábito de la sindéresis”26, among others. 
Several of his disciples are researching on the new lines of 
thought opened by Polo in anthropology, epistemology and metaphys-
ics as can be seen in the number of articles and the annual congress on 
his works organised by the above mentioned Instituto de Estudios 
Filosóficos Leonardo Polo27. 
While he is well-known by his former students, his work is vir-
tually unknown to the greater public and to scholars around the world. 
This can be mainly due to the difficulty of his writings and Polo’s de-
votion to research that kept him away from public and academic life. 
He himself mentions this: “The first risk was that the research project 
be stopped by lack of strength, or else, that even if it went forward, it 
were not accepted by the community of philosophers. I risked remain-
ing unpublished or published without anybody understanding me. 
                                                 




21 http://www.leonardopoloinstitute.org/journal-of-polian-studies.html  





27 García González, J. A., “Bibliografía De y Sobre Leonardo Polo”. Accessed Oc-
tober 4, 2014. http://www.leonardopolo.net/textos/biblio.htm. 
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Although, fortunately, some readers have understood the thematic and 
methodical dimensions that I am proposing for more than forty years, 
the circle of specialists who have paid attention is small. As it is clear, 
I have no cause for complaint. The situation of being a minority author 
is comfortable because it avoids headaches after the publication of a 
doctrine which has given enough of them. On the other hand, to dia-
logue with thinkers who maintain already consolidated positions, or 
school positions, rarely leads to a fruitful dialogue”28. 
For a quick English overview of his life and works the recently 
published Leonardo Polo: A brief Introduction29 and the voice “Leo-
nardo Polo” in Wikipedia30 could be a good introduction. While there 
is a growing number of studies on Polo in Spanish, there is little in 
other languages. Only one of his books has been translated into Eng-
lish31 and more recently a short essay “Why a Transcendental 
Anthropology”32. The greatest source of information and references in 
the web is the “Instituto de Estudios Filosóficos Leonardo Polo” 
started and mainained by Professor Juan Antonio García González33 
in the University of Malaga and the above-mentioned Leonardo Polo 
Institute in South Bend, Indiana. Other sources are “Philosophica: Le-
onardo Polo”34, and “Wikipedia” in Spanish35. 
Once we have explained the topic and the author, we have to 
give some background to why this topic has been chosen. 
 
                                                 
28 “El primer riesgo era que el proyecto de investigación se detuviera por escasez de 
fuerzas, o bien, que si salía adelante, no fuese aceptado por la comunidad de filó-
sofos. Me exponía de antemano a permanecer inédito o a publicar sin que nadie 
me entendiera. Aunque, por fortuna, algunos lectores han comprendido las dimen-
siones metódicas y temáticas que vengo proponiendo desde hace más de cuarenta 
años, el círculo de especialistas que le han prestado atención es reducido. Como es 
claro, esta circunstancia no es motivo de queja. La situación de autor minoritario 
es cómoda porque evita quebraderos de cabeza posteriores a la publicación de una 
doctrina cuya elaboración los ha exigido en demasía. Por otra parte, entrar en dis-
cusión con pensadores que mantienen posturas ya consolidadas, o de escuela, 
raramente conduce a un diálogo fructífero”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental 
I, op. cit., 11. 
29 Cfr. Esclanda, R., - Sellés, J. F., Leonardo Polo: a Brief Introduction, op. cit. 
30 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonardo Polo 
31 Polo, L., Ethics: A Modern Version of its Classic Themes (Manila: Sinag-Tala, 
2008). 
32 Polo, L., Why a Transcendental Anthropology? (South Bend, Ind.: Leonardo Polo 






3. Background to the Study 
Synderesis seems to be a controversial topic. Simon’s opinion is 
that synderesis “should be allowed to join the number of forgotten con-
troversies” 36 or, as Aranguren says, it is a ‘useless’, ‘dead’ and 
‘embalmed’ word37, while others prove Simon right by not mentioning 
it at all, like MacIntyre in his well known A Short History of ethics38.  
The word synderesis was not used in classical philosophy, 
though one can argue that the reality behind was studied and men-
tioned under other names because it is deeply human.39 It was Jerome 
in his commentary to Ezequiel the first who uses it. “St. Jerome, in the 
opening chapter of his Commentary on Ezechiel 1, 4–14 (PL 25, 22 
B), is credited with introducing the Greek term ‘synteresis’ into Latin, 
referring to it as the spark of conscience (scintilla conscientiae) which 
even Cain’s sin could not eradicate from his nature. Derived from the 
Greek verb ‘syntereo’ (to watch closely, to preserve or keep safe) it 
seems to have been nothing more than a poetic way of describing con-
science”.40 According to De Blic (1949), it was a medieval scribe who 
                                                 
36 “It has been suggested that the term synderesis should be allowed to join the num-
ber of forgotten controversies”. Cf. Simon, Y., Critique De La Connaissance 
Morale (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1934), 56 quoted in O. Lottin, Principes de 
Morale, I, (Louvain: Editions du Mont César, 1947), 123, note I. Simon suggests 
that the term synderesis be replaced by sens moral. Cfr. also Crowe, M. B., “The 
Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 151, n. 1.  
37 “The Scholastic doctrine we have summarily explained and containing embalmed 
useless terminology (…) The first obstacle, terminology, is the easiest to over-
come: the words die, while philosophy is, it must be, living knowledge”. 
Aranguren, J. L., Obras Completas, Vol. 2: Ética (Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 1994), 
351. 
38 Macintyre, A. C., A Short History of Ethics, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
39 It is doubful though, that Aristotle, for example, defended that all men tended to 
the good and the first principle ‘do good’. Cfr. “Whether, then, it is not by nature 
that the end appears to each man such as it does appear, but something also depends 
on him, or the end is natural but because the good man does the rest voluntarily, 
excellence is voluntary, vice also will be none the less voluntary; for in the case of 
the bad man there is equally present that which depends on himself in his actions 
even if not in his end”. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1114 b 17, in The Complete 
Works of Aristotle, op. cit., 40. Though some authors may defend that Aristotle 
had a hint on it, which can be “a more or less steady natural inclination to direct 
one’s own conduct in accordance with reason. According to Aristotle, this inclina-
tion exists. It is an inclination that does not consist simply of acting in accordance 
with a morally neutral reason, as, for him, acting according to reason is the same 
as acting according to the virtues, to which we have a natural aptitude. However, 
speaking of an inclination within the reason (the reason being for Aristotle a po-
tency for opposites) presupposes the existence of something that robs reason of its 
original indeterminateness. Aristotle himself did not discuss this, but Aquinas al-
ludes to the problem when he mentions the existence of a natural habit of the reason 
known as synderesis, which he refers to elsewhere, significantly, as "the nursery 
of virtues”. González, Ana Marta, “Depositum Gladius Non Debet Restitui Furi-
oso: Precepts, Synderesis, And Virtues in Saint Thomas Aquinas”, The Thomist, 
63 (1999), 223.  
40 “That which is called Synteresis, and that which is called properly Syneidesis, or 
conscience. By the former of which, man having as it were a standard within him-
self of good and evil, he may guide himself in the choice of his actions; by the 
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made the error of writing "synteresis" (conservation) for "syneidesis" 
(conscience) when copying Jerome’s Commentary on Ezechiel. The 
error was incorporated into the popular Glossa ordinaria and, through 
Peter Lombard’s Sentences41, passed on to the scholastic theologians, 
who speculated as to its exact nature, usually giving it a special func-
tion distinct from conscience”42. 
Aquinas considered synderesis an intellectual habit responsible 
for the first principles of morality. For Bonaventura synderesis was the 
will’s inclination to do good. Ockham does not mention synderesis in 
his works. Luther in his early works mentions it but later he breaks 
with tradition and no longer accepts synderesis as he defended that 
nature was totally corrupt after the original sin, and synderesis was 
seen as an unpolluted remain of the original nature which kept men 
alert of their sins. From there on the topic, with rare exceptions, was 
only developed by those who followed medieval traditions.  
Leonardo Polo not only recovers the traditional view of syn-
deresis, but makes it a pivotal point of his anthropology. Synderesis 
becomes the innate habit through which the act of being, the person, 
activates all human faculties.  
This is in a nutshell the background to the topic which will be 
developed at length in the following chapters. Now it is time to express 
the problem definition in a more succinct form. 
 
4. Problem definition 
The problem that this research wants to clarify is: whether Polo’s 
proposal regarding synderesis is accurate and whether it can be a good 
approach for for a personalist view of ethics. 
                                                 
latter he is able to reflect upon himself, and... pass a judgment upon himself”. 
Goodman, J., The Penitent Pardon’d, 6th edition, corrected and enlarged, (London: 
J. Leake, John Meredit, 1707). 
41 This will be discussed in detail when discussing the historic development of syn-
deresis. For the full text of Jerome check p. 55. 
42 Wolter, A. B., Frank, W. A., Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality in Saint Thomas 
Aquinas (Washington D.C,: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 45. 
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5. Research questions, hypothesis or propositions 
The research has to elucidate: 
What is Polo’s conception of synderesis?  
How does synderesis act according to Polo? 
How do Polo’s proposals fit with the proposals of previous phi-
losophers? 
How do Polo’s proposals compare with contemporary philoso-
phers? 
Whether Polo’s proposals can explain in a better way, human 
actions with regard to ethics? 
 
6. Boundaries/Scope of the study 
Synderesis, as such, was not mentioned by classic philosophers 
(as seen above). It was mainly a medieval topic of discussion which 
was practically forgotten by the modern and contemporary philoso-
phers, except for those studying medieval philosophy. 
We consider it beyond the scope of our work to study in depth 
the precise use of the term, its history and the dispute regarding 
whether “synderesis” was a mistake of a copyist or a deliberate deci-
sion of St Jerome. The historical background, nevertheless, is 
particularly important because Leonardo Polo was a keen reader of 
philosophy and knew well its history as can be seen in the references 
he makes in his texts to their works and concepts43. 
Similarly, we should not deal with the associated concepts or 
terms linked to “synderesis”, like conscience, common sense, and nat-
ural moral law; nevertheless, we shall refer to them whenever 
necessary. 
7. Significance of the study 
Three issues make the study of synderesis relevant at this stage: 
a) it may help to understand the silence of modern and contemporary 
philosophers about synderesis, b) it may enhance the positive ap-
proach to ethics, and c) it may give a theoretical base for a personalist 
approach to Ethics. We discuss each in a general way here, but the full 
                                                 
43 Besides the works on specific philosophers e.g. Eckhart, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, 
Kierkegard, Nietzsche, Bergson, Polo is in continuous discussion with other phi-
losophers. The most cited are normally Aristotle among the classics, Aquinas 
among the medieval, Hegel, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz among the modern, 
and Heidegger among the contemporary. Cfr. R. Yepes, “Leonardo Polo y la His-
toria de la Filosofia”, Anuario Filosófico, vol. 25/1 (1992) 101-124; Franquet, M. 
J., “La Trayectoria Intelectual de Leonardo Polo”, op. cit. 
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extent of Polo’s contribution will only be understood at the very end 
of the dissertation. 
a) Oblivion of Synderesis in Modern and Contemporary Philos-
ophy 
The general view is that modern and contemporary leading phi-
losophers had hardly paid any attention to synderesis e.g. Descartes44, 
Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger.45 It seems as if it 
was considered as one of the subtleties of scholastic philosophy that 
had no foundation in reality and therefore it will not make any contri-
bution to human affairs. The protestant background, incompatible with 
the notion of synderesis which is not affected by the original sin, of 
many of the modern philosophers may also be a reason why they do 
not mention it. 
What Timothy C. Potts says of conscience can be applied with 
greater reason to synderesis: “Conscience has been much neglected by 
philosophers. It is not directly treated in ancient philosophy, while, 
apart from Bishop Butler, who was primarily interested in the aspect 
of self-deception, there is scarcely a philosopher from Descartes to the 
present day who has touched upon it more than tangentially”46. An 
example of this is the opinion of the British linguist Dr. Bill Long who 
said: “So, when the Oxford English Dictionary was first put together 
in the 19th century, the English language had various verbal excres-
cences from the past regarding conscience, filmy traces of concepts 
that pointed to something from earlier times. It had conscience, the 
"big" term that had come from syneidesis through conscientia. In fact, 
that is all we ever really needed. But then, we had the word syneidesis, 
transliterated from the Greek. And then, we had synteresis, that mis-
take that Jerome introduced into the language, which then sent 
Catholic theologians on a journey they probably have never recovered 
from. If only the human mind would just for once be content with sim-
plicity when simplicity actually does define what is before us. But that 
would be asking too much of people, I think. Instead of the prayer of 
St. Francis, ‘where there is darkness, (let me sow) light’, it must have 
been the prayer of these divines, “where there is light, (let me sow) 
darkness”. And, they spoke, and behold, there was darkness”47.  
Simon supports the view of the insignificance of synderesis in 
the modern and contemporary scene, and extends it to psychological 
                                                 
44 Descartes cites it as sinteresis at least once and gives it just the remorse function 
of conscience that influenced Bossuet. Cfr. García Junceda, J. A., “La Sindéresis 
en el Pensamiento de Santo Tomás”, op. cit., 435. 
45 In most of these author´s dictionaries the term synderesis does not appear. We 
enumerate the ones consulted in Chapter II below. 
46 Potts, T. C., Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002), 1. 




works: “First of all, notice that ‘conscience’ plays no role of signifi-
cance in either philosophical ethics or psychology in the twentieth 
century”48. Nevertheles, without such a name it is still an important 
concept in Freud’s psychoanalysis, but after that its significance dwin-
dles. M. Kroy rightly observes that in the Twentieth Century as a 
whole (or that part of it that lay behind him when he made his obser-
vation), “academic psychologists generally deny the term conscience 
(...) any legitimate place in their theories”49. Another confirmation of 
these assertions is that the on many counts impressive Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy in ten volumes by Donald M. Borchert does not include 
any of the voices: synderesis, synteresis or synedesis in their magnifi-
cent thematic index, and it is mentioned in passing only three times in 
the articles: Alexander of Hales, Gerson and Aquinas50. 
The opinion of synderesis’ lack of importance is somehow 
backed by no other than Cardinal Ratzinger, (later Pope Benedict 
XVI): “I would like, therefore, without entering into philosophical dis-
putes, to replace this problematic word (synderesis) with the much 
more clearly-defined Platonic concept of anamnesis. It is not only lin-
guistically clearer and philosophically deeper and purer, but 
anamnesis above all, also harmonizes with key motives of biblical 
thought and the anthropology derived from it”51. Even moral theolo-
gians, well-versed in medieval authors, support this argument as 
Crowe: “It has been suggested that the term synderesis should be al-
lowed to join the number of forgotten controversies”52. He also 
suggested the substitution of synderesis by moral sense. 
Synderesis cannot be seen, it cannot be measured, it cannot be 
perceived so it is difficult for positivist psychologists and philosophers 
to deal with it. Synderesis seems not to be a clear and distinct idea and 
because of this it is also a difficult topic for rationalist and idealist 
philosophers to pay any attention to it. Synderesis as such does not 
have direct external manifestations in real life so it is also a difficult 
                                                 
48 Cf. Simon, Y., Critique de la Connaissance Morale, Desclee de Brouwer, Paris, 
1934), 56 (cited by O. Lottin, Principes de morale, I, Editions du Mont César, Lou-
vain, 1947), 123, note I). 
49 Kroy, M., The Conscience, a Structural Theory (Herndon, VA, USA: Transaction 
Publishers, 1974), XII.  
The same opinion is share by Klein: “Curiously enough, despite their alert interest 
in motivation, psychologists seem to have overlooked [conscience] in their anal-
yses of mental phenomena. As a rule, the topic is not even mentioned in current 
texts”. Klein, D. B., “The Psychology of Conscience”, in International Journal of 
Ethics, 40/2 (1930) p. 247:  
50 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed, Borchert, D. M. ed., (USA, Detroit: Thomson 
Gale/Macmillan Reference 2006) s.v. Alexander of Hales: vol. I, 114; s.v. Gerson: 
vol. 4, 67; s.v. Aquinas: vol. 9, 434. 
51 Ratzinger, J., Benedict. On Conscience: Two Essays (Philadelphia: National Cath-
olic Bioethics Center, 2007), 31. 
52 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, Irish Theological 
Quarterly, 23 (1956) p. 151, n. 1. 
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topic for existentialist or voluntarist philosophers. So why does Leo-
nardo Polo give so much importance to it? For him, as we shall see, 
synderesis is a key piece of the ontological structure of human beings. 
It is the habit linking the personal level53 to all human activities. Syn-
deresis, according to Polo, manifests itself through two faculties; the 
intelligence and the will. Polo also speaks of synderesis as being the 
“self” or “I”, and the “soul”. Polo suggests that previous philosophers 
had a tenuous glimpse of this innate habit under those two concepts.  
b) Positive Approach to Ethics 
Ethics is normally seen in our days as a corrective measure to 
bad behaviour or bad tendencies. It tends to be normative and most 
people see it as a threat to a pleasant life. This is reflected in the pop-
ular saying that “anything good is either a sin or makes you fat”. 
Pinckaers has tracked back the negative approach to ethics to the 
duty-ethics of Kant and to the earlier notion of freedom as indifference 
of Ockham54. Ethics is viewed as the type of knowledge that prevents 
us from doing bad things. Ethics sets the limits that should not be 
crossed, and conducts that should be avoided. Virtues are presented as 
remedies to vices, in that they help to overcome our bad tendencies. A 
sample is this quotation: “The second reason I am glad you asked this 
question is because it shows that you have understood the key dynamic 
at work in a program of spiritual work, a ‘reform of life’ program, as 
it is sometimes called. The core of such a program is the patient, 
prayerful, and consistent effort to grow in virtues that correct our deep-
est sinful tendencies”55. The negative approach to ethics influenced 
also moral theology; in the words of Garrigou-Lagrange: “The two 
centuries from 1650 to 1850 were devoted to casuistry… Moral theol-
ogy is the science rather of avoiding sin than of cultivating virtue”56. 
Messner, more recently, attributes primarily a negative function to the 
                                                 
53 While Polo speaks of ‘nature, essence and person’ to speak of the different parts 
of the human ontological structure, I prefer to call them ‘natural, essential and per-
sonal levels’. This avoids the confusion between ‘person’ as unity and person as 
act of being; of ‘nature’ as principle of operations and nature as the physical and 
phychological elements of man, and of ‘essence’ as the form of man and the human 
essence in the way Polo understands it. Dilthey uses, for different purposes alto-
gether, the image of floors of a house: “Our thinking linked to special images 
separates somehow a superior floor of our psychic life with another lower floor, or 
inferior”. Dilthey, W., El Sistema de la Ética (Buenos Aires: Nova, 1973), 53. 
54 Cfr. Pinckaers, S., The Sources of Christian Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995). 
55 Bartunek, J., “Spiritualdirection.com”, Spiritual Direction, 2010. Accessed Octo-
ber 4, 2014. http://spiritualdirection.com/2010/05/03/what-virtues-can-i-practice-
to-overcome-the-root-sin-of-sensuality.  
56 “Regnum casuisticae fuit a medietate saeculi XVII ad medietatem saeculi XX (…) 
Sic est potus, ut apparet, ad peccatum vitandum quam at virtutem exercendam”. 
Garrigou-Lagrange, R., De Beatitudine (Rome: Marietti, 1951), 2.  
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moral conscience57. This attitude permeated also the modern approach 
to ethics according to Bauman58. 
Though the negative approach is accurate and effective, it could 
be perhaps more encouraging, more popular and powerful to have a 
positive approach to ethical matters, because it is more respectful to 
reality, where what is, is real, and trascendentally good, while evil is 
its absence, so it is unreal, like a hole in reality59. Saying it in a classic 
way, what is real is transcendentally good. Bad and evil are privations 
as Augustine defended: “evil has no positive nature; but the loss of 
good has received the name ‘evil’”60; so to be realistic in ethics it pays 
to be positive. This could rekindle the interest for moral issues, by 
providing an attractive direction and motivation for action. 
It has to be noted that there were voices that reacted against this 
view of ethics, like Romano Guardini61, Joseph Ratzinger62 and more 
recently MacIntyre’s celebrated proposal of taking up the Aristotelian 
tradition of virtue-ethics that has greatly helped to correct the negative 
view63. Consequently, the topics of happiness and virtues have raised 
                                                 
57 “Man experiences moral consciensce as a braking force”. “El hombre experimenta 
la conciencia moral como fuerza de freno”. Messner, J., Etica Fundamental (Ma-
drid: Rialp, 1969), 14. 
58 “The tacit assumption —virtually without exceptions— of the modern ethical 
thought and practice was recommending that in leaving the individuals to their 
freedom […] they should be prevented from using their freedom to do evil”. Bau-
man, Z., Ética Posmoderna (México: Siglo XXI, 2005), 13. 
59 The same approach is shared by Marina: “todavía me cuesta trabajo pensar que la 
ética no es el museo de las prohibiciones sino la máxima expansión de la creativi-
dad humana”. Marina, J. A., Etica Para Náufragos, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: Anagrama, 
1995), 11. 
60 Augustin, St., “City of God”, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fa-
thers of the Christian Church, 2. Accessed October 4, 2014. 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2053. 
61 “Therefore, it is ethically good what promotes good living, making it healthier, 
stronger, more fruitful and profound. The logical consequence is to assert that eth-
ical conduct is happiness, joy, joyful experience of a good expanding life”. 
Guardini, R., Etica. Lecciones en la Universidad de Munich, (Madrid: Biblioteca 
de Autores Cristianos, 1999), 274. 
62 “Morals are not man’s jail, but what is divine in him”. “La moral no es la cárcel 
del hombre, sino aquello divino que hay en él”. Ratzinger, J., Una Mirada A Eu-
ropa: Iglesia y Modernidad en la Europa de las Revoluciones (Madrid, Rialp, 
1993), 58. 
63 MacIntyre´s positive attitude can be seen in this short text: “Because my life is to 
be understood as a teleologically ordered unity, a whole the nature of which and 
the good of which I have to learn how to discover, my life has the continuity and 
unity of a quest, a quest whose object is to discover that truth about my life as a 
whole which is an indispensable part of the good of that life. So on this view my 
life has the unity of a story with a beginning, a middle, and an end, beginning with 
birth and ending, so far as concerns the final judgment to be passed on it – in re-
spect of the achievement of my good – with death”. Macintyre, A., Three Rival 
Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, And Tradition Being 
Gifford Lectures Delivered in The University Of Edinburgh in 1988 (Notre Dame, 
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 197. See also Macintyre, A. C., After 
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the interest of social scientists64 and have been at the center of a fruitful 
forty-year long debate, generating a vast literature65. Polo’s positive 
approach to ethics may make give ontological grounding to this ap-
pealing and motivating approach66. 
c) Personalistic foundation of ethics 
The third benefit of this study is that, in our opinion, Polo´s view 
of synderesis can be a good foundation for a personalist understanding 
of ethics. Teleological ethics tends to link moral actions to a final end 
based on human nature. This final end is common to all humans, which 
is lost in the generality. A “personal” task, is unique and tends to be 
more attractive. What is general is not as attractive as something that 
is exclusive and unique; a designed dress is rather more appealing than 
a ready-made one. Perhaps the reason for fashion and tatooing is that 
what is unique is appealing because it shows our individuality, fruit of 
our personality. Our personal freedom may foster the desire to be 
unique by being different. In the teleological views individuality is ex-
ercised in the election of the means towards the final end. The means 
and specific end are different for each people depending on their en-
dowment and their situation in life, but the generic end is common to 
all. Some ideologies understand that even the path and means are cho-
sen by God, as a kind of predestination, where freedom is reduced to 
accept or not to accept what is nevertheless going to happen67. 
                                                 
Virtue: a study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1981). 
64 For example: “Social scientists have caught the butterfly. After 40 years of re-
search, they attribute happiness to three major sources: genes, events and values”. 
Brooks, Arthur C. “A Formula for Happiness - The New York Times”. Accessed 
July 8, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/opinion/sunday/a-formula-for-
happiness.html?_r=0. 
65 Cfr. Sison, Alejo G., Happiness and Virtue Ethics in Business: The Ultimate Value 
Proposition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Giorgino, V., The 
Pursuit of Happiness and the Traditions of Wisdom (New York: Springer, Cham, 
2014); Abbà, G., Felicidad, Vida Buena y Virtud (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1992).  
66 Polo´s proposal is not the only way to defend a positive approach to ethics. It is 
possible to do it through different approaches. Aristotles and Aquinas were posi-
tive. In our days Millán Puelles, among many, also had a very positive approach: 
“All morally correct action is a free, extra free, affirmation of our being as human 
beings, a practical affirmation, factual”. “Toda conducta moralmente correcta es 
una libre, una libérima afirmación de nuestro ser de hombres, una afirmación prác-
tica, con hechos”. Millán-Puelles, A., Ética y Realismo (Madrid: Rialp, 1996), 19. 
67 Spinoza in modern philosophy has such a view: “Further conceive, I beg, that a 
stone, while continuing in motion, should be capable of thinking and knowing, that 
it is endeavouring, as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being con-
scious merely of its own endeavour and not at all indifferent, would believe itself 
to be completely free, and would think that it continued in motion solely because 
of its own wish. This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and 
which consists solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but 
are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined”. Spinoza, B., 




Against this background, Polo’s view of synderesis and of the 
“personal transcendentals” may shed new light on the fundamental 
topics for ethics; freedom and personal love. Synderesis will be the 
link between personal freedom and the lower levels of each personal-
ity. It can be the link that helps to explain the merits and demerits of 
actions, the final value of the person. Therefore, if Polo’s intuitions are 
right, synderesis could be useful to explain ethical decisions, which 
are always personal and specific.  
If we realize that each person is unique and unrepeatable, then 
his future perfection will also be unique and unrepeatable. Each person 
has specific characteristics, talents and opportunities which one has to 
respond to. The proper answer to these personal challenges is what 
will make the person grow as a person and become happier. Where 
does this individuality come from, and how does it connect with our 
common inheritance as human beings? Where can the link be found 
between what is good for all and what is good for me? The tug of war 
between relativism and objectivism could be better understood by 
finding out what is permanent and what can and should change in the 
human person, and how those changes affect personal growth. This 
will have a direct application in ethics. Ethics should help each indi-
vidual to discern what is good or bad for him. What makes him better 
as a person is good, what makes him lose personality is bad, it is evil. 
If we find the way to help each person to distinguish what is good for 
all, and what is only specifically good for him, and how to put this 
knowledge into practice, we will have discovered the foundation of 
personalistic ethics. An ethics that while judges what is good for all, 
applies this knowledge distinctively to each person. Ethics as a science 
has to consider the person, not only human nature and this both at the 
theoretical and practical level68. 
Personal perfection –which is the objective of positive ethics– is 
achieved by personal decisions that take into account the unrepeatable 
personality of each person. In this way it will be clearer that ethics 
helps to achieve one´s personal specific perfection, not just to submit 
to general rules. This will prevent the misconception that ethics is a 
set of rules that prevents personal creativity and therefore stunts free-
dom rather than potentiating it, when it is, in fact, the other way round. 
After having seen the benefits it is due time to see which areas 
of this problem have already been dealt with by other researchers.  
 
                                                 
68 The practical character of ethics is emphasized by Aristotle, Aquinas and those 
who defend the ethics of the ‘first person’ as Bertone does. cfr. Bertone, T., L’etica 
Del Bene Comune nella Dottrina Sociale della Chiesa, (Città del Vaticano: Libre-



































The topic of our research is Leonardo Polo’s view of synderesis, 
and we should limit this literature review to this precise topic. The 
topics of natural law1, conscience, self-identity, consciousness, pru-
dence, synderesis in medieval philosophy, etc. are not directly within 
the scope of this review. Though some books and articles are very use-
ful to understand synderesis, or Leonardo Polo’s philosophy, the main 
purpose of this section is to limit the search to those who have studied 
synderesis in Leonardo Polo. Nevertheless, we have expanded the 
search to other areas, e.g. synderesis in general, because the literature 
on Leonardo Polo is rather scanty. In Chapter IV we shall see the his-
torical development of synderesis up to the XX century, and will 
somehow complement this chapter. 
We first look into literature regarding the name, which com-
prises: a) the name itself and related terms, b) common language 
through dictionaries, c) the origin of both synderesis and synedesis, d) 
technical language through philosophical dictionaries and encyclope-
dias and then on, e) the topic itself by looking at the current studies on 
Leonardo Polo´s synderesis.  
 
1. On the names synderesis, synteresis and synedesis 
As González says, “philosophical ethics tends to develop a set 
of concepts through which the reality of action can be understood in a 
better way, in a way that the common moral experience can be defined 
                                                 
1 Many authors refer to Natural Law in a way that it looks as it it is something ob-
jectively known, rather than the habitual knowledge given by synderesis which is 
therefore not objective. Otherwise by making this distinction what they defend is 
absolutely valid, it is just not as subtle as it can be. Cfr. Bertone, T., L’etica del 
Bene Comune nella Dottrina Sociale della Chiesa, op. cit.; Jaroszynski and P., 
Anderson, M., Etica: El Drama de la Vida Moral (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2012); De-
wan, L. O., Fundamentos Metafísicos de la Ética, op. cit.; Millán-Puelles, A., Ética 
y Realismo, op. cit. 
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more precisely”2. Our first approach is, then, to clarify the usual mean-
ing of the term through common and specialized dictionaries. 
Synderesis is not a common-use word in most languages. It does 
not even appear in some standard dictionaries and it cannot even be 
found in a number of philosophical dictionaries or lexicons as shown 
below. It is different from synesis (conscience) which is considered 
the actual origin of both synteresis and synderesis. 
In English it can be spelt either as synteresis (closest to the orig-
inal Greek) or synderesis (which is the more common spelling which 
was taken from Medieval Latin). It is mainly used as a technical phil-
osophical or theological word, though it has also a medical meaning 
as a synonym to prophylaxis which is obsolete3. 
In most languages the transcription is practically identical: syn-
deresis in Greek, German, Chinese, Hindi, Arabic, Russian, Japanese, 
Korean, Vietnamese, Polish, Romanian, Afrikaans, Swedish, Norwe-
gian, and with little variations in Spanish, (sindéresis); French, 
(syndérèse); Italian, (sinderesi); and Portuguese, (sindérese). This is a 
clear indication that it is a technical, not intuitive term, incorporated 
from a foreign language4. 
We now look at the popular language dictionaries to see how the 
word is used in common language, and then more specifically within 
dictionaries of philosophy. 
 
2. Common Language dictionaries 
“Sinderésis” is a word hardly used in common and even edu-
cated parlance in Spanish. One has to explain its meaning even in 
academic circles despite of being included in the Diccionario de la 
Real Academia de la Lengua and some other good dictionaries. We 
could only trace its use in common language in Venezuela and Colom-
bia were it sometimes appears in newspaper headings5. 
                                                 
2 “La ética filosófica tiende a desarrollar un cuerpo de conceptos mediante el cual se 
pueda hacer cargo de la realidad de la acción, en unos terminos que permitan pre-
cisar mejor la experiencia moral ordinaria”. González, A. M., Tomás de Aquino. 
De veritate. Cuestiones 16 y 17, La Sindéresis y la Conciencia (Pamplona: Servicio 
de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1998), 5. Accessed November 13 
2014. http://dadun.unav.edu/handle/10171/5998. 
3 “Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language.” (London: W. 
& R. Chambers, 1903). 
4 Lexbook, http://lexbook.net/en/synderesis. Accessed December 11, 2014. In the 
same page it is said that “The term «synderesis» is normally little used and occu-
pies the 148.213 position in our list of most widely used terms in the dictionary”.  
5 Just some samples: Cfr. Mejía, E. C., “¡Sindéresis, Hombre!”, El Espectador, 
2008, Medellín. Accessed March 28, 2013, http://www.elespecta-
dor.com/columna-sinderesis-hombre 10 feb. 15. “Venezuela Pide ‘Sindéresis y 
Responsabilidad’” Alan García - Perú 21”. “La Sindéresis de las FARC.” Acces-
sed June 10, 2015. http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/la-sinderesis-
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The Real Academia de la Lengua. The official dictionary of the 
Royal Language Academy in Spain gives a meaning related to pru-
dence or natural common sense: “(From Greek συντήρησις) 
Discretion, natural capacity to judge rightly”6. 
Moliner. “from Greek synteresis; good judgement: aptitude to 
think with accuracy or prudence”.7 
Random House. This dictionary gives two meanings. The second 
one is based on the mystical knowledge recommended by Master Eck-
hart: “1. Innate knowledge of the basic principles of morality. 2. 
Christian Mysticism, the essence of the soul that unites with God. 
Also, synteresis”8. 
Merriam Webster. Similar to Random House but distinguishing 
the first meaning from syneidesis. “1. Inborn knowledge of the pri-
mary principles of moral action —distinguished from syneidesis 2. 
The essence, ground, or center of the soul that enters into communion 
with God: the spark or emanation of divinity in the soul”9. 
The Collins English Dictionary only lists synteresis and refers it 
exclusively to Theology: “(Theology) the function of consciousness 
that guides one’s conduct”10. 
The American Heritage includes neither synderesis nor syn-
teresis11. 
Wiktionary: “The supposed innate ability of the human mind to 
realise the basic principles of ethics and morals”12. 
The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia: “1. In med., preserva-
tive or preventive treatment; prophylaxis. Συντήρησις 2. Conscience 
regarded as the internal repository of the laws of right and wrong. 
“Synteresis, or the purer part of the conscience, is an innate habit, and 
                                                 
farc/341398-. Brigard, R. De, “Ausencia de Sindéresis”, El Tiempo, 2000, Co-
lombia. Accessed February 23, 2013. 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1223815 
6 “(Del gr. συντήρησις). Discreción, capacidad natural para juzgar rectamente”. 
Diccionario de la Lengua Española, 22, (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2001). 
7 “(Del gr. syntérēsis) buen juicio: aptitud para pensar con acierto o prudencia”. Mo-
liner, M., Diccionario De Uso del Español, 2. ed, (Madrid: Gredos, 1998). 
8 Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd ed. (New York: Random 
House Reference, 2001). 
9 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary. (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 2005). 
10 Collins English Dictionary, Anderson, S. Ed., 7th ed, (Glasgow: Harper Collins 
Publ, 2005). 
11 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 3rd ed. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1996). 




doth signify "a conversation of the know1edge of the law of God and 
Nature, to know good or evil”13. 
Free Dictionary Online: “1. (Med.) Prophylaxis. 2. (Metaph.) 
Conscience viewed as the internal repository of the laws of duty”14. 
 
3. Etymon of Synderesis 
Breve Diccionario Etimólogico: “Synderesis, med. S. XVII, 
Tom. Del gr syntérēsis, deriv. de syntēréō ‘yo observo, estoy atento’, 
y este de tēréō ‘yo velo, guardo’15. 
EnAcademic: “1350-1400; ME < ML synderesis, synteresis < 
Gk syntéresis a guarding, equiv. to syntere-, var. s. of syntereîn to 
guard closely (syn- SYN- + tereîn to guard) + -sis –SIS”16. 
The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia: “Synteresis (sin-te-
re´sis), n. [NL., Gr. συντήρησις, a watching closely, observation, 
συντήein, watch closely, observe together, sin abv, together, + tηrein, 
watch over, take care or heed, ηroς, a watch, guard.]”17. 
Merriam Webster: “Synteresis Medieval Latin, from Greek 
syntērēsis preservation, from syntērein to preserve (from syn- + tērein 
to guard, observe) + -sis; akin to Greek tinein to pay”18. 
 
4. Synedesis 
Some authors suggest that both terms, synteresis and synderesis, 
are a corruption of syneidesis. This is why it may be prudent to include 
a couple of references and etymons of this word for referential pur-
poses. 
Merriam-Webster: “the capacity to apply general principles of 
moral judgment to particular cases —distinguished from Syn-
deresis”19. 
                                                 
13 Burton, Anat. of Mel. p. 106” “The Century Dictionary Online in DjVu.” Acsessed 
October 2, 2014, http://www.global-language.com/CENTURY. 
14 Free Dictionary Online. Accessed October 2, 2014. http://www.thefreediction-
ary.com/synderesis. 
15 Coromines, J., Breve Diccionario Etimológico de la Lengua Castellana, 3rd ed. 
(Madrid: Gredos, 1973). 
16 EnAcademic. Accessed February 26, 2013. www.enacademic.com. 
17 The Century Dictionary Online in DjVu. Accessed October 2, 2014, www.global-
language.com/century. 




Collins: “(theology, obsolete) the function of consciousness con-
cerned with making judgement on performed acts”20. 
Merriam-Webster Etymon: “Syneidesis: Medieval Latin, from 
Greek syneidēsis, literally, consciousness, awareness, from synei-
denai, to have knowledge of something, be aware of something (from 
syn- + eidenai to know) + -sis”21.  
 
5. Philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias 
Lexique de Philosophie: “Syndérése. Dans la langue des scolas-
tiques, ce mot signifie la conscience ou plutôt la première étincelle de 
la conscience, ce principe inné d’action qui nous pousse au bien et 
nous détourne du mal. Par extension, la syndérèse sera aussi le re-
mords. Ce mot se trouve pour la première fois dans saint Jérôme, et 
Uberweg pense qu’il faut lire ‘ς’: il aurait done pour origine une erreur 
de copiste”22. 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy: “synderesis, in medi-
eval moral theology, conscience. St. Jerome used the term, and it 
became a fixture because of Peter Lombard’s inclusion of it in his Sen-
tences despite this origin. ‘Synderesis’ is distinguished from 
‘conscience’ by Aquinas, for whom synderesis is the quasi-habitual 
grasp of the most common principles of the moral order (i.e., natural 
law), whereas conscience is the application of such knowledge to fleet-
ing or unrepeatable circumstances23. 
A Dictionary of Philosophy: “Synderesis (or synteresis) in Aqui-
nas and other scholastic writers, the innate intellectual quality that 
enables every man to intuit the general and basic principles of practical 
moral reasoning. It is equated with St. Jerome´s scinctilla conscientia 
(spark of conscience) and derives from the late Greek word meaning 
‘careful guarding’ or ‘preservation”24. 
Oxford Dictionnary of Philosophy: “(or synteresis) the supposed 
natural or innate ability of the mind to know the first principles of eth-
ics and moral reasoning. Although traced to Aristotle, the phrase came 
to the modern era through St Jerome, whose scintilla conscientiae 
(gleam of conscience) was a popular concept in early scholasticism. 
                                                 




22 Bertrand, A., Lexique de Philosophie (Paris: Delaplane, 1892). 
23 Audi, R., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1995). 
24 Flew, A., - Priest, S., A Dictionary of Philosophy (London: Pan, 2002). Accessed 
October 3, 2014. http://www.credoreference.com/book/macdphil. 
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But it is mainly associated with Aquinas, as an infallible, natural, sim-
ple, and immediate grasp of first moral principles. Conscience, by 
contrast, is more concerned with particular instances of right and 
wrong, and can be in error”25. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition: “Synderesis, a term in 
scholastic philosophy applied to the inborn moral consciousness 
which distinguishes between good and evil. The word is really syn-
teresis (to look after, take care of), but synderesis is the commoner 
form. Diogenes Laertius in his account of the Stoics (VII.85) uses the 
phrase to describe the instinct for self-preservation, the inward har-
mony of Chrysippus, the recognition of which is. The term synderesis, 
however, is not found till Jerome, who in dealing with Ezek. I. 4 -15, 
says the fourth of the "living creatures" of the vision is what the Greeks 
call (i.e. scintilla coscientiae) the “spark of conscience”. Here appar-
ently synderesis and conscience are equivalent. By the schoolmen, 
however, the terms were differentiated, conscience being the practical 
envisaging of good and evil actions; synderesis being, so to speak, the 
tendency toward good in thought and action. The exact relation be-
tween the two was, however, a matter of controversy, Aquinas and 
Duns Scotus holding that both are practical reason, while Bonaventura 
narrows synderesis to the volitional tendency to good actions”26. 
Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names: “Philosophical 
terminology; immediate, intuitive apprehension of the fundamental 
principles of morality. For such medieval ethicists as Peter Lombard 
and Aquinas, synderesis, unlike mere conscience, is both infallible and 
general”27. 
The Philosophical Dictionary: “Immediate, intuitive apprehen-
sion of the fundamental principles of morality. For such medieval 
ethicists as Peter Lombard and Aquinas, synderesis, unlike mere con-
science, is both infallible and general”28. 
Catholic Encyclopaedia: “Synderesis, or more correctly syn-
teresis, is a term used by the Scholastic theologians to signify the 
habitual knowledge of the universal practical principles of moral ac-
tion. The reasoning process in the field of speculative science 
presupposes certain fundamental axioms on which all science rests. 
Such are the principle of contradiction, “a thing cannot be and not be 
at the same time” and self-evident truths like “the whole is greater than 
                                                 
25 Oxford Dictionnary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1994). 
26 Edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica 11th ed. “Synderesis - 1911 Encyclope-
dia Britannica - Bible Encyclopedia”, StudyLight.org. Accessed October 2, 2014. 
http://www.studylight.org/encyclopedia/bri/view.cgi?n=31810. 
27 A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names from FOLDO. Accessed Octo-
ber 2, 2014. 
http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/foldop/foldoc.cgi?A+Dictionary+of+Philosophi-
cal+Terms+and+Names. 




its part”. These are the first principles of the speculative intellect. In 
the field of moral conduct there are similar first principles of action, 
such as: “evil must be avoided, good done”; “Do not to others what 
you would not wish to be done to yourself”; “Parents should be hon-
oured”; “We should live temperately and act justly”. Such as these are 
self-evident truths in the field of moral conduct which any sane person 
will admit if he understands them. According to the Scholastics, the 
readiness with which such moral truths are apprehended by the practi-
cal intellect is due to the natural habit impressed on the cognitive 
faculty which they call synderesis. While conscience is a dictate of the 
practical reason deciding that any particular action is right or wrong, 
synderesis is a dictate of the same practical reason which has for its 
object the first general principles of moral action”29. 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Synderesis is a technical 
term from scholastic philosophy, signifying the innate principle in the 
moral consciousness of every person which directs the agent to good 
and restrains him from evil. It is first found in a single passage of St. 
Jerome (d. 420) in his explanation of the four living creatures in Eze-
kiel’s vision”30. 
Wikipedia English: “Synderesis, in scholastic moral philosophy, 
is the natural capacity or disposition (habitus) of the practical reason 
to apprehend intuitively the universal first principles of human ac-
tion”31. 
Modern Catholic Dictionary: “Synderesis or synteresis. The 
habit of knowing the basic principles of the moral law; the knowledge 
of the universal first principles of the practical order. Sometimes ap-
plied to conscience, which is, however, rather the mind’s concrete 
application of known principles, judging on the moral goodness or 
badness of a specific human action. (Etym. Greek synteresis, spark of 
conscience.)”32. 
Dictionario de Términos Éticos: “Procede del griego synthéresis 
(conservación) –que algunos santos padres (como san Jerónimo, por 
ejemplo) tradujeron como scintilla conscientia o chispa de la concien-
cia, no extinta tras el pecado original– o de syneidhesis (con-scientia, 
en latín), que puede traducirse como ‘evidencia moral’. Aranguren 
prefiere traducir como sentido moral, porque –según él– nos dicta lo 
que, en general debemos hacer y lo que en general debemos omitir 
(como que socorrer al necesitado es bueno y matar es malo). Los pen-
sadores cristianos la entendieron como una facultad innata de 
                                                 
29 The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912). Ac-
cessed February 26, 2014. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14384a.htm. 
30 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed December 24, 2013. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/synderes.  
31 Wikipedia. Accessed February 26, 2014. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syn-
deresis. 
32 Modern Catholic Dictionary, The Real Presence Association, 2014. Accessed 
February 26, 2014. http://www.therealpresence.org/dictionary/sdict.htm. 
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distinguir el bien del mal; por ella, por esta “chispa” de la conciencia 
–decían– discernimos que hemos pecado: “es una facultad innata que 
revela la ley moral de Dios inscrita en el alma de los hombres” (San 
Agustín). Santo Tomás –y con él todo el pensamiento tomista– enten-
dió que la sindéresis constituye la primera concrección de la regla 
suprema de la moralidad (hacer y perseguir el bien y evitar el mal), y 
la identifica con la recta ratio (orthos logos de los griegos) o recta ra-
zón. De ahí el significado que perdura hoy de la sindéresis es el de la 
“capacidad de pensar rectamente y con prudencia”33.  
Glosario de términos filosóficos: “From Greek “synteresis” (dis-
cretion) which also comes from “syntero” (to be attentive, to observe) 
this word synderesis refers to the souls’ capacity to distinguish the 
good from the evil and to discover and recognise the first moral prin-
ciples. It is not used today, but it was used by the scholastic 
philosophers to defend that human beings are capable of discover good 
(to which they gave absolute value) and distinguish it from evil, in an 
intuitive way (by nature) in the same way that they are capable of rec-
ognising the first principles of reasoning, such as the principle of no 
contradiction”34.  
Diccionario de Filosofía, Ferrater Mora: “El verbo griego (te-
reo) significa, en Homero, «vigilar atentamente». En la forma sintereo 
significa, en Aristóteles (De Plantis), «guardar», «conservar”. Se atri-
buye a San Jerónimo (Commentarium in Ezchielem, lib. I, cap. 1 
[Migne, P. L., XXV, col. 2]) la introducción de la forma sustantiva 
sinteresis significando la «chispa de la conciencia», scintilla conscien-
tiae, cuya misión es corregir los errores de la razón y dominar los 
apetitos sensibles. Según Joseph W. Yedlicka (art. cit. en bibliografía), 
la expresión scintilla conscientiae fue usada por autores escolásticos 
antes de aparecer la expresión synderesis, la cual parece haber sido 
usada ya como sinónima de ‘razón’ en las Quaestiones (ca. 1160-
1165) de un cierto Udo, en el primer comentario de las Sentencias de 
Pedro Lombardo. «Entre los Decretistas —escribe Yedlicka [...] 
etc”.35. 
Dictionario Akal de Filosofía: “Sindéresis, en la teología moral 
medieval, conciencia. San Jerónimo usó el término, que quedó conso-
lidado con su inclusión en las Sentencias de Pedro Lombardo. Pese a 
                                                 
33 Diccionario de Términos Éticos (Estella: Verbo Divino, 1999). 
34 “Del griego "syntéresis" (discreción) que deriva, a su vez, de "syntéreo" (estar 
atento, observar) el término sindéresis se refiere a la capacidad del alma para dis-
tinguir el bien del mal, para captar y reconocer los primeros principios morales. 
Hoy en desuso, el término fue utilizado por los filósofos escolásticos para defender 
que el ser humano, en general, está capacitado para reconocer el bien (al que daban 
un valor absoluto) y distinguirlo del mal, de un modo intuitivo (por naturaleza, 
pues), del mismo modo que está capacitado para reconocer los primeros principios 
del razonamiento, como el principio de no contradicción”. Sindéresis - Glosario 
de filosofía. Accessed October 2,2014. http://www.webdianoia.com/glosario/dis-
play.php?action=view&id=276&from=action=search%7Cby=S%7Cnr_page=2. 




su origen, Tomás de Aquino distingue “sindéresis” de “conciencia”, 
puesto que pare él la sindéresis es la captación cuasi habitual de los 
principios más comunes del orden moral (es decir, la ley natural), 
mientras que la conciencia es la aplicación de ese conocimiento a cir-
cunstancias fugaces e irrepetibles”36. 
Biblioteca Filosofía en español: [464] “Principio fundamental o 
sindéresis de la ética o moral según el materialismo filosófico. La ley 
fundamental o norma generalísima de toda conducta moral o ética, o, 
si se prefiere, el contenido mismo de la sindéresis, podría enunciarse 
de este modo: «debo obrar de tal modo (o bien: obro ética o moral-
mente en la medida en) que mis acciones puedan contribuir a la 
preservación en la existencia de los sujetos humanos, y yo entre ellos, 
en cuanto son sujetos actuantes, que no se oponen, con sus acciones u 
operaciones, a esa misma preservación de la comunidad de sujetos hu-
manos.» El principio fundamental de la sindéresis se desdobla en dos 
planos correspondientes a los dos contextos (el distributivo y el atri-
butivo) en los cuales se da la existencia de los sujetos corpóreos: el 
que contiene a la ética y el que contiene a la moral”37. 
Le Garzantine di Filosofia: “Sinderesi, termini (in gr. sintéresis, 
esame, conservazione) ricondato da san Gerolamo nel suo Commento 
a Ezechiele come sinonimo di quella parte delláima abidualmente de-
finita conscienza (I, c, 1); in san Tommaso esso mantiene el senso 
originario di tendenza verso il bene e di fuga dal male (Summa teho-
logiae, I, 1 q. 94, art. 1). Lo stesso significato di attitude dell´anima a 
riconoscere il primi principi morali e attestato in tutta la scolastica, che 
sulla scorta dei testi preccedentemente citati concepisce la sinderesi, o 
scintilla conscientiae, come la parte dell´anima non toccata del pecato 
originale. Nello stesso senso di funzione attiva della conscienza il ter-
mine si ritrova in J. B. Bossuet (Trattato sulla conoscenza di Dio e di 
sé stesso, cap. I, par.7), mentre in età contemporanea è caduto in 
disuso”38. 
 
6. Consulted dictionaries where synderesis and synteresis are 
not listed: 
Key Terms in Philosophy and Their Importance for Theology39. 
                                                 
36 Audi, R., Marraud, H., Alonso, E., Diccionario Akal de Filosofía, Akal Ediciones, 
Tres Cantos, Madrid, 2004. 
37 García Sierra, P., Biblioteca Filosofía en Español. Accessed October 14, 2014. 
http://filosofia.org/filomat. 
38 Enciclopedia Garzanti di Filosofia, Nuova ed. ampliata e aggiornata, (Milano: 
Garzanti, 1993). 
39 Clark, K. J., 101 key terms in philosophy and their importance for theology (Lou-
isville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004). 
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A Companion to African-American Philosophy40. 
A Companion to Hume41. 
A Descartes Dictionary42. 
A Hobbes Dictionary43. 
A Kant Dictionary44. 
A Rousseau Dictionary45. 
American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia46. 
Dictionnaire du corps47. 
Dictionnaire Sartre48. 
Encyclopedia of Empiricism49. 
Jacques Maritain. Dizionario delle Opere50. 
John Locke Bibliography51. 
Le vocabulaire des philosophes: Philosophie contemporaine52. 
Metzler Lexikon Philosophie53. 
                                                 
40 Lott, T. L., Pittman, J. P., eds., A Companion to African-American Philosophy 
(Malden, MA.: Blackwell, 2003). 
41 Radcliffe, E. S., ed., A Companion to Hume, (Blackwell Pub, Malden, MA, 2008). 
42 Cottingham, J., A Descartes Dictionary (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Reference, 
USA, 1993). 
43 Martinich, A., A Hobbes Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 
44 Caygill, H., A Kant Dictionary, (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Pub, 1995). 
45 Dent, N. J. H., A Rousseau Dictionary (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992). 
46 Lachs, J., Talisse, R. B., eds., American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia (New York: 
Routledge, 2008). 
47 Marzano, M., Dictionnaire du Corps (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
2007). 
48 Noudelmann, F., Philippe, G., Dictionnaire Sartre (Paris: H. Champion, 2004). 
49 Garrett, D., Barbanell, E., eds., Encyclopedia of Empiricism (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1997). 
50 Viotto, P., Jacques Maritain: Dizionario delle Opere (Roma: Città Nuova, 2003). 
51 Yolton, J. S., John Locke: A Descriptive Bibliography (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 
1996). 
52 Zarader, J.-P., ed., Le Vocabulaire des Philosophes (Paris: Ellipses, 2002). 
53 Burkard, F. P., Prechtl, P., Metzler Lexikon Philosophie: Begriffe Und Definitio-
nen (Stuttgart: Metzler, J B, 2008). 
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The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy54. 
The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy55. 
The Descartes dictionary56. 
The Freud Encyclopedia57. 
The Kant Dictionary58. 
The Oxford companion to philosophy59. 
The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy60. 
 
6. Conclusion on the search on dictionaries and lexicons 
 From the general dictionaries reviewed above we can conclude 
the following: 
 Synderesis and synteresis are two spellings of the same concept in 
English.  Spanish and other languages use almost exclusively, sindéresis.  In most languages synderesis is a technical word, except in Vene-
zuela and Colombia where it has permeated common language.  The term is considered more a theological than a philosophical 
term.  Most dictionaries expound that synderesis: 
Is a type of knowledge, knowledge of principles, that is inborn, 
that helps us to judge, what is morally good; 
There is no unanimity whether synderesis is the same as moral 
conscience; 
There are two interpretations regarding its original meaning: 
keeping vigilant, or preserving. 
                                                 
54 Bunnin, N., Tsui-James, E. P. Eds., The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, 2nd 
Ed. (Malden, Ma.: Blackwell Pub2003). 
55 Urmson, J. O., Rée, J. Eds., The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy 3rd 
Ed, (London: Routledge, 2005). 
56 Smith, K., The Descartes Dictionary (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). 
57 The Freud Encyclopedia: Theory, Therapy, and Culture, Erwin, E. (Ed.), (New 
York: Routledge, 2002). 
58 Thorpe, L., The Kant Dictionary (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014). 
59 Honderich, T. Ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 





 From the philosophical dictionaries reviewed we can conclude: 
There is unanimity on the identity between synderesis and syn-
teresis. 
That synteresis was not used until S. Jerome. 
That the common name used before was syneidesis, which 
means conscience. 
That it is not clear whether St. Jerome used it as differentiating 
it from syneidesis (conscience). 
That the distinction between synteresis as unchangeable prin-
ciples of morality and syneidesis as the judgement of the 
conscience (this is syneidesis) was a medieval theological-
philosophical distinction. 
That it is a Scholastic term. 
That the two main writers were Peter Lombard and Thomas 
Aquinas. 
That there was no agreement whether synderesis was located 
mainly in the intellect (Aquinas) or in the will (Bonaventure). 
7. Current studies on the topic 
The authors who have dealt with synderesis based on Leonardo 
Polo´s proposals are almost exclusively his disciples. Among them 
those who have deal more extensively on this topic are Juan Fernando 
Sellés, Francisco Molina and Josu Ahedo.  
Francisco Molina published a short book La sindéresis61 and a 
few other articles. In them he mainly deals with Aquinas’ proposals 
interpreted following Leonardo Polo’s interpretation. Molina’s were 
written mainly before the publication of the second volume of An-
tropología trascendental, where Polo explains synderesis at length. In 
the articles: “Sindéresis y Conciencia Moral”62, “Recta razón y sindé-
resis”63, “El yo y la sindéresis”64, “Sindéresis y voluntad”65, 
                                                 
61 Molina, F., La Sindéresis (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad 
de Navarra, 1999). 
62 Molina, F., “Sindéresis y Conciencia Moral”, Annuario Filosófico, vol. 29 (1996) 
773-786.  
63 Molina, F., “Recta Razón y Sindéresis”, in La Filosofía Práctica De Aristóteles, 
(1999). Accessed June 24, 2015. https://Sinderesis.Fi-
les.Wordpress.Com/2008/10/Recta-Razon-y-Sind.Pdf. 
64 Molina, F., “El Yo y la Sindéresis”, Studia Poliana, Vol. 3 (2001), 35-60. 
65 Molina, F., “Sindéresis y Voluntad”, in Futurizar El Presente: Estudios Sobre la 
Filosofía de Leonardo Polo, (Málaga, Universidad De Málaga, 2003), 193-212. 
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“Anámnesis del origen”66, “El principio de ley natural y sus princi-
pios”67, “Conciencia y destino”68. Molina develops in more detail 
some of the topics dealt in his book. Molina also started two blogs in 
which he popularises some of the topics dealt with in the academic 
publications69. Molina is very conversant both with Aquinas and Leo-
nardo Polo’s texts, which he understands in depth. Two small issues 
may need further discussion: the placement of synderesis at the per-
sonal level while Leonardo Polo texts seem to place it at the essential 
level, and the view that Polo diferenciates only two human levels ‘per-
sonal and psycosomatic’ while in our interpretation it is more 
understandable to speak of three level; personal, essential and natural, 
as we shall discuss later. 
Professor Juan Fernando Sellés is probably the person who has 
written more about synderesis as seen by Leonardo Polo. He has two 
articles devoted to this topic: “La Sindéresis o Razón Natural como la 
Apertura Cognoscitiva de la Persona Humana a su Propia Natura-
leza”70, and “The Anthropological Foundations of Ethics and its 
Dualities”71. Synderesis, nevertheless, is a recurrent topic in most of 
his books of anthropology and theory of knowledge. Antropología 
para Inconformes72 deserves special mention because it could proba-
bly be one of the best introductions to Polo´s Trascendental 
Anthropology. In it he tries to make Polo’s trascendental anthropology 
understandable to the general public. Other relevant books are: Cono-
cer y amar estudio de los objetos y operaciones del entendimiento y 
de la voluntad según Tomás de Aquino73, Curso breve de teoría del 
conocimiento74, Hábitos y Virtudes I to III75, Razón Teórica y Razón 
                                                 
66 Molina, F., “Anámnesis del Origen”, Miscelánea Poliana, 13 (2007): 1-5. 
67 Molina, F., “El Principio de la Ley Natural y sus Principios”, Miscelánea Poliana, 
vol. 9 (2006): 58-66. 
68 Molina, F., “Conciencia y Destino”, op. cit. 
69Molina, F., “A Modo de Prólogo,” (blog), http://habitosinderesis.blogspot.com.es/; 
and “Scintilla Animae” (blog) http://scintillaanimae.blogspot.com.es/ 
70 Sellés, J. F., “La Sindéresis o Razón Natural como la Apertura Cognoscitiva de 
la Persona Humana a su Propia Naturaleza”, Revista Española de Filosofía Me-
dieval, 10, (2003) pp.321-333. 
71 Sellés J. F., “The Anthropological Foundation of Ethics and its Dualities”, Journal 
of Polian Studies, 1 (2014) 47-77. 
72 Sellés, J. F., Antropología para Inconformes (Madrid: Rialp, 2006). This book has 
been translated in a reduced version as Anthropology For Rebels: A Different Way 
of Doing Philosophical Anthropology (Nairobi: Strathmore University Press, 
2011). 
73 Sellés, J. F., Conocer y Amar Estudio de los Objetos y Operaciones Del Entendi-
miento y de la Voluntad Según Tomás De Aquino (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1995). 
74 Sellés, J. F., Curso Breve de Teoría del Conocimiento (Bogotá: Universidad de la 
Sabana, 1997). 
75 Sellés, J. F., Hábitos y Virtud III (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Uni-
versidad de Navarra, 1988). 
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Práctica según Tomás de Aquino76, Los hábitos intelectuales según 
Tomás de Aquino77, Los hábitos adquiridos. Las virtudes de la inteli-
gencia y de la voluntad según Tomás de Aquino78. These books are a 
good introduction to Leonardo Polo´s works, since they give the back-
ground of Polo´s thought, and make them more relevant to the reader’s 
situation.  
 Sellés’ contribution regarding our topic can be summarized in 
his latest and dense article in English, “The Anthropological Founda-
tions of Ethics and its Dualities”, already mentioned above, in which 
he explains how synderesis is the habit that allows the knowledge of 
ethics as an intermediatery science between metaphysics and transcen-
dental anthropology; how synderesis is the link between the intellect 
and the practical reason, and how it is the support of all virtues and 
acts of the practical reason and of the will. To understand it in full one 
needs to understand some of Leonardo Polo’s basic concepts, such as 
what he means by dualities, and the difference between the personal 
and essential levels. This article will benefit from including some more 
daily life examples to make it easier to understand the process of mak-
ing decisions, as is done in his Antropologia para Inconformes. 
Josu Ahedo published in 2009 his doctoral thesis La Dualidad 
Tipológica Básica desde la Antropología Trascendental de Leonardo 
Polo79, which was the base for El conocimiento de la naturaleza hu-
mana desde la sindéresis: estudio de la propuesta de Leonardo Polo80, 
and “La necesidad de educar según el hábito de la sindéresis”81. 
Ahedo’s works are good for an internal hermeneutics of Polo’s text 
because he uses Polo’s own terminology and frequently cites Polo’s 
texts together with those of his disciples. This makes reading it a bit 
difficult for those not acquainted with Polo’s terminology, but rich for 
those knowing it. The dual consideration of act of being and essence 
which sometimes appears as triadic may be confusing as also does the 
remark in the same page that “only what is perfect can be distinguished 
from the act of being, and thus nature, which is not yet perfect, it is not 
                                                 
76 Sellés, J. F., Razón Teórica y Razón Práctica según Tomás De Aquino (Pamplona: 
Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2000). 
77 Sellés, J. F., Los Hábitos Intelectuales según Tomás De Aquino (Pamplona: Eunsa, 
2008). 
78 Sellés, J. F., Los Hábitos Adquiridos. Las Virtudes de la Inteligencia y de la Vo-
luntad Según Tomás de Aquino (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la 
Universidad de Navarra, 2000). 
79 Ahedo, J., La Dualidad Tipológica Básica desde la Antropología Trascendental 
de Leonardo Polo, Doctoral Thesis, (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2009).  
80 Ahedo, J., El Conocimiento de la Naturaleza Humana desde la Sindéresis: Estu-
dio de la Propuesta de Leonardo Polo (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de 
la Universidad de Navarra, 2010.  
81 Ahedo, J., “La Necesidad de Educar según El Hábito de la Sindéresis”, Metafísica 
y Persona, 10, (2013), 3-21.  
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the essence”82 can be missinterpreted as is the essence can be fused 
with what is natural, mainly corporeal, when the essence for Polo is 
strictly spiritual. The application of synderesis to education is a prac-
tical illustration of how theory could support or even modify practice. 
Other publications that are helpful to understand Polo’s concept 
of ethics are the following: La voluntad de poder y el poder de la vol-
untad. Una glosa a la propuesta antropológica de Leonardo Polo a la 
vista de la averiguación nietzscheana83 which has some indirect refe-
rences to the topic. Among the journal articles two are relevant to our 
topic: “Ideas centrales de la ética de Leonardo Polo”84, “Persona y na-
turaleza en la ética de Polo”85. This deep and well-documented study 
of Ana Marta González is centred on the consideration of the person 
as the act of being that makes it the root of free decisions, which is the 
first condition for any ethical decision.  
While there are very many reviews on Polo’s books on anthro-
pology and theory of knowledge we found only the three reviews on 
his book Ethics, two of La voluntad y sus actos and one of El yo. These 
books are the ones more related to the topic we are interested in. This 
indicates the little attention that the foundation of Ethics in Polo has 
so far received in comparison to his anthropology and epistemology, 
not to mention the little impact that his overall work has had in the 
English speaking world as commented above with regards to Ethics86. 
Not that he is well known in other languages because there is only one 
other work translated to any other language: Chi é l’uomo: uno spirito 
nel tempo87 in Italian. 
                                                 
82 “La esencia es la perfección, y como tal se distingue del actus essendi porque sólo 
lo perfecto se puede distinguir del actus essendi, por eso la naturaleza, que no es 
perfecta, no es todavía la esencia”. Ahedo, J., El Conocimiento de la Naturaleza 
Humana desde la Sindéresis: Estudio de la Propuesta de Leonardo Polo, ed. cit., 
54. 
83 Posada, J. M., Voluntad de Poder y Poder de la Voluntad. Una Glosa a la Pro-
puesta Antropológica de Leonardo Polo a la Vista de la Averiguación 
Nietzscheana (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2004).  
84 Gallardo et al., “Ideas Centrales de la Ética de Leonardo Polo”, in Futurizar el 
Presente: Estudios sobre La Filosofía de Leonardo Polo (Málaga, Universidad de 
Málaga, 2003). 
85 González, A. M., “Persona y Naturaleza en la Ética De Polo”, Anuario Filosófico, 
vol. 29 (1996), 665-679.  
86 Polo, L., Ethics: A Modern Version of its Classic Themes, op. cit. 
87 Polo, L., Chi É L’uomo: Uno Spirito nel Tempo, trans. Patrizia Bonagura, (Milán: 




Other Publications that use his anthropology and ethical views 
to comment on various issues: “La seriedad de la ética”88, “Eudaimo-
nía y destino”89, “La ética pública o la doble moral”90, 
“Caracterización de la voluntad nativa”91, “La voluntad y el volunta-
rismo en gnoseología según los escritos del profesor Polo”92, “La 
unidad de la vida humana (Aristóteles y Polo)”93 and “Vita viventis 
est essentia”94, “La experiencia de la libertad (Bergson-Polo)”95, “La 
experiencia del tiempo humano. De Bergson a Polo”96. There are also 
references to our topic on: “El tiempo humano y la virtud ética como 
modo de ganar tiempo”97, “La tarea del educador: la sindéresis”98.  
 
8. Concurrent views on Polo’s understanding of synderesis 
There is agreement between the quoted authors that Polo under-
stands synderesis as an innate habit which is responsible for the 
knowledge of the first principles of practical reason and that in this he 
follows the traditional view, originated by Jerome in his commentary 
to the book of Ezekiel 1:10, and that the study of synderesis was 
mainly developed in the middle ages and summarized by St. Thomas 
Aquinas.  
They also accept that in Polo’s philosophy synderesis is devel-
oped further and his role is amplified and explained, becoming the 
channel by which the personal level (act of being) “activates” the in-
telligence and will. Synderesis is also the connection between the 
                                                 
88 Barco del, J., “La Seriedad de la Ética”, Annuario Filosófico, 29/2 (1996) 387-
396. 
89 Corazón, R., “Eudaimonía y Destino”, Studia Poliana, 2 (2000) 165-189. 
90 Corazón, R., “La Ética Pública o la Doble Moral”, Miscelánea Poliana, vol. 18 
(2008) 1-6.  
91 Aranguren, J., “Caracterización de la Voluntad Nativa”, Anuario Filosófico, 29/2 
(1996), 347-358. 
92 García González, J. A., “La Voluntad y el Voluntarismo en Gnoseología según los 
Escritos del Profesor Polo”, Studium, vol. 25 (1985), 515-522. 
93 Castillo, G., “La Unidad de la Vida Humana (Aristóteles y Leonardo Polo)”, Anua-
rio Filosófico, vol. 29 (1996), 415-426.  
94 Castillo, G., “«Vita Viventis est Essentia”. La Actividad Vital Humana en el Plan-
teamiento de la «Antropología Trascendental»”, Studia Poliana, vol. 3, (2001), 61-
71.  
95 Umeres, L. G., “La Experiencia de la Libertad: Bergson-Polo”, in Futurizar El 
Presente: Estudios sobre la Filosofía de Leonardo Polo, Universidad de Málaga, 
Málaga, 2003), 145-151. 
96 Umeres, L. G., La Experiencia del Tiempo Humano. De Bergson a Polo (Pam-
plona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2001).  
97 Castillo, G., “El Tiempo Humano y la Virtud Ética como Modo de Ganar 
Tiempo”, Studia Poliana, 12 (2010), 117-127.  
98 Izaguirre, J.M., - Moros, E. R., “La Tarea del Educador: La Sindéresis”, Studia 
Poliana, 9 (2007), 103-127. 
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intelligence and the will and through them of soul and body. The links 
between synderesis and ethics are touched upon only by the three au-
thors mentioned: Ahedo, Molina and Sellés but not as the main topic 
of their studies.  
 
 
8. Synderesis in Polo’s works 
A quick analysis on the number of times the word synderesis 
appears in the books and articles of Polo’s already published works 
shows where he touches on this topic, and helps in the chronology of 
its development.  
According to the chart the second volume of Antropología tras-
cendental (Polo, 2003) is the one in which the word synderesis is most 
used, more than the rest of the books put together. Thematically the 
book deals with the essence of man, which, in Polo’s philosophy, stud-
ies synderesis and the human faculties; the mind and the will and their 
habits. The two volumes of Antropología trascendental are, according 
to Polo, his most important works, and the ones that explain the great-
est gains achieved by his philosophical method. 
The will is one of the faculties linked to the synderesis, so it is 
only natural that synderesis will be treated at length in La voluntad y 
sus actos I y II, which were published just before the first volume of 
Antropología trascendental. 
Epistemología, Creación y Elevación is the book where Polo ap-
plies the findings of his transcendental anthropology to Christology. 
Table 1: 'Synderesis' Frequency in L. Polo works. 
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Being the last book Polo wrote, it summarises regarding synderesis 
what he explained at length in Antropología transcendental, volume 
II. 
In his book Nietzsche, creador de dualidades contrasts Nie-
tzsche´s understanding of the will to his own anthropology.  
Polo only deals directly on Ethics in two books: Ética: hacia una 
versión nueva de los temas clásicos (1993) and Lecciones de Ética. 
The content of Lecciones de Ética (1981-1982) is older than Ethics. 
Ethics clearly is a more mature work. 
In El yo, Polo analyses the understanding of the self by different 
philosophers.  
In the remaining works synderesis is touched upon incidentally 
but not discussed at length. Nevertheless, synderesis, though coming 
late in his works, became crucial in Polo´s philosophy. Because of 
synderesis being a linchpin between the person and the essence of 
man, it cannot be understood without making reference to Polo´s other 
works on ontology and theory of knowledge which we shall quote in 
this dissertation. 
The earliest book in which synderesis appears cited is in 1993 in 
his book Ética. Nevertheless, the content of Lecciones de Ética was 
delivered in the academic year 1981-1982, even if it was published in 
2013 and in it synderesis is mentioned four times. Because Polo used 
to revise and modify all books for publishing we cannot be certain that 
the use of synderesis started in 1981 until the critical edition of his 
works is done99.  
 
10. Gaps in research 
There is little documentation that proves the existence of syn-
deresis. There are few works that contrast Polo´s proposal with 
alternative proposals.  
Polo’s synderesis can help explain some of the difficulties mod-
ern authors find when dealing with topics related to the synderesis 
such as moral law, ethics´ foundation, vocational ethics, etc. 
                                                 
99 “Es más, esta descripción de la sindéresis que Polo desarrolla en la Antropología 
Trascendental no la encontramos como tal en sus escritos anteriores. Hay que ha-
cer notar al respecto que en el Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento no aparece el 
hábito innato de sindéresis, por lo que allí se dice que los hábitos adquiridos de-
penden directamente del intelecto personal (cfr. Polo L., Curso de Teoría, IV/2, 
370). Sin embargo, Polo no entra en contradicción en la Antropología, I; más bien, 
con el estudio de la sindéresis esclarece y eleva´—tras una etapa de maduración— 
las indicaciones de sus escritos precedentes”. Piá Tarazona, S., “Sobre las Duali-
dades Intelectuales Superiores”, Studia Poliana, 3 (2001), 151. 
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Polo and his commentators are scant in showing how the 
knowledge of the synderesis can improve the life of humans in practi-
cal life, except for the two articles on education already cited above. 
The previous literature on this subject could be enhanced by in-
cluding all the texts in which Polo refers to synderesis and interlinking 
them in order to establish Polo’s doctrine on synderesis.  
How synderesis relates to common sense, natural moral law, and 
the self, can be dealt in more depth, rather than repeating Polo´s pro-
posals.  
It will be good to try to explain Polo’s thought using common 
words that will make his Anthropology more understandable for those 
with little background on his special terminology. 
 
11. Research objectives 
First and foremost the dissertation will try to see: 
Whether synderesis exists. How can it be proven? 
If it does exist, does it work according to Polo’s explanation? 
Is synderesis the door that allows communication between the 
different structural levels of the human being? 
Is synderesis the key to understanding the relationship between 
the person and his/her decisions? 
Is Polo’s ‘Transcendental anthropology’ a tool that helps to un-
derstand how moral decisions are taken? 
Secondly, the dissertation will compare Polo’s proposals with 
some philosophers who dealt with the foundation of ethics. We never-
theless, should focus on Leonardo Polo’s contribution, because the 
topic is too wide and we think that his contribution can have deeper 
insights than the other great authors. 
In this section we have seen what has been said, so far, regarding 
Polo´s view on synderesis. In the next chapter —Methodology— we 










This dissertation will probably be read by two types of people: 
those who know and have read Leonardo Polo in depth and those who 
hardly know his philosophy. The dissertation is done in a way that 
people with little background on Polo’s philosophy may understand 
his basic principles. We apologise to those who know Polo’s philoso-
phy because their knowledge of Polo’s philosophical works has 
probably more breadth and depth than the summary given in this work.  
Generally, it is better to move from the known, that which can 
be understood by any literate person, to establish a common ground, 
and from there move gradually to the less known. This is not easy be-
cause Polo liked to give new meaning to common expressions as it is 
frequent with creative philosophers. As we shall mention, he found it 
difficult to find terms for his ideas and had to struggle with language. 
His struggle is noticeable, giving at times several names to the same 
concept in order to give a more precise account of a particular reality. 
The meanings he gives are mainly taken from Madrid’s colloquial 
Spanish, and from his extensive philosophical readings, especially 
Heidegger among contemporary philosophers. The reader is supposed 
to have some knowledge of Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas philosophies to understand properly what Polo as-
serts. The terms Polo uses can be confusing —even to Spanish 
readers— so to minimise the unavoidable limitations of all transla-
tions, especially noticeable in the case of Polo’s works, we include 
Polo original texts in Spanish1. 
                                                 
1 Mimbi comments about Polo’s cryptic language: The honest seeker is only con-
fused by this endless labyrinth of words. One is then left wondering if scholarship 
would not be overplaying its hand with such reconstructions”… “In my view three 
things make Polo’s thought cryptic: a) his love for negative statements (“el in-
telecto agente no es…”); this has the effect of sending the mind off on a wild goose 
chase without ever settling on anything; b) the change he has wrought on the mean-
ing of some classic concepts, thus ‘transcendental’, ‘nature’, ‘essence’, ‘person’, 
‘agent intellect’, etc.; when one reads Polo he assumes these concepts keep the 
meaning given them by classical philosophy, yet…; c) his penchant for applying 
many terms to the same idea, e.g. to characterize what he calls mental presence 
(presencia mental), he uses no less than eighteen terms (cf. El Acceso Al Ser, 14): 
diferencia pura, lo vasto, mismidad, unicidad, ya, suposición, haber, etc.; now this 
is a sure recipe for perplexity!!! Multiplicantur entia (rationis) sine necessitate…”. 
Cfr. Mimbi, P., “The Discourse of the Method, Questions On Polo’s Method of the 
Abandonment of the Limit”, Miscelánea Poliana, 33 (2011), 31. 
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We have used two types of methodology in our research: per-
sonal research of his works and conversations with people who are 
conversant with his works and knew him personally. The personal re-
search consisted in the critical reading of Polo’s works that are related 
to the foundation of ethics in order to get a unified interpretation of his 
conception of synderesis and of the works of his disciples who have 
dealt on the topics researched. In the historical chapter we have read 
those authors who had dealt with synderesis in a relevant way. 
We have discussed Polo’s ideas with several of his disciples and 
also with students and faculty not conversant with his philosophy, to 
see whether the topics discussed are relevant to their lives. We also 
met other researchers specialised in Leonardo Polo’s philosophy to 
contrast the tentative interpretations of the texts and gather some more 
poins of view.  
 
1. Quotation style  
The thesis’ external director requested us to use the citation style 
of the Studia Poliana because most of Polo’s books and of those stud-
ying his works use it, and this makes cross references easier. 
Nevertheless, later it was agreed to use the Chicago-Turabian style, 
which is more frequent in academic literature written in English. 
We have used bold numbers in the superscripts of each note for 
easy reading. 
 
2. On citations 
Leonardo Polo’s quotations, as explained above, are given both 
in English and Spanish for easy cross-checking. The disadvantage is 
that quotes become lengthier.  
We may also indicate that Polo books, and in general philosoph-
ical books, are not easily accessible to African readers. Because of this, 
whenever possible, we have quoted the internet version, which makes 
the original texts more accessible.  
It might be relevant to clarify some points regarding the method 
at this stage.  
Regarding sources, we are open to any source that may shed 
light on the topic at hand. Any assertion that appeals to different cul-
tures, or different levels of knowledge may have some deep reality 
behind it. Quotations from the Bible, Quran, Vedas, religious authors, 
philosophers, poets or any other testimony are taken at their face value, 
i.e. as expresions of human experiences, not as “authorities”. Because 
of this we have not used nobility titles or other public recognition titles 
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such as count, saint, cardinal, and so on throughout the text unless they 
are used in the quoted texts.  
On the term “synderesis”, while we have limited to find its 
sources we are more interested about the reality it points at, than to its 
actual origin and the evolution of its meaning, be it ontological or 
merely functional.  
Whenever we have found it helpful to include some comment 
within a quote we have done it between square brackets [ ], which we 
use exclusively for this purpose. 
 
3. On Bibliography 
In order to facilitate cross-checking we have listed the books, 
articles, web-blogs in alphabetical order according to the author´s sur-
name. Some people prefer to distinguish primary and secondary 
sources but due to the number of quotations books and articles con-
sulted it will also be difficult to make a fool-proof classification 
understood equally by all readers. 
 
4. Organic method 
It is good, nevertheless, to take a leaf from Leonardo Polo’s 
method in that synderesis, like most topics related to the core of human 
structure, have to be treated organically, not analytically nor syntheti-
cally2. Synderesis is not part of a mechanism that can be isolated and 
studied apart from the rest. Synderesis cannot be considered as an el-
ement that mixes with other elements to form a compound. It is an all-
involving aspect of a spiritual and organic structure. This is why its 
partial study, focusing exclusively on it, is rather difficult because it 
has to do with many different interrelated topics. This also means that 
its study can be started from many different areas. We start by painting 
a general view of the different methods listed above, to be followed by 
a more detailed ontological analysis. This will make some repetitions 
                                                 
2 Polo utilises the comparison with the ecology to point out how the organic systems 
should be studied. “The ecological approach pays attention mainly to the side ef-
fects, i.e. the disturbances that the ecological system experiences when intervening 
in some of its parts, without taking into account the correlation among them. When 
those interfierences take place in an ecological system, the disturbances are less 
intense than those produced in an organism or in the human essence”. “El plantea-
miento ecológico fija su atención principalmente en los efectos secundarios, es 
decir, en las perturbaciones que el sistema ecológico experimenta cuando se inter-
viene en algunas de sus partes, sin tener en cuenta la correlación que existe entre 
todas ellas. Cuando esos inconvenientes tienen lugar en un sistema ecológico, las 
perturbaciones son menos intensas que lo que se produce en un organismo y en la 
esencia humana”. Polo, L., Ayudar a Crecer: Cuestiones de Filosofía de la Edu-
cación (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2006), 55. 
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and cross references unavoidable. We point out some of the different 
prespectives next. 
 
5. Different pespectives  
Synderesis is one reality but multi-faceted and therefore it can 
be accessed from many angles. This partially responds to the tradi-
tional distinction between the ‘material object’ (the reality) and the 
‘formal object’ (the angle or method used to study it). We can try to 
see the reality behind the term ‘synderesis’ from the linguistic, psy-
chological, anthropological, epistemological, sociological, moral, 
ontological and natural theology views. We look into some of these 
different approaches: 
a) Linguistical 
Leonardo Polo hardly deals on the issue of names; he does men-
tion frequently the etimology of words, or at times he uses the original 
words in Greek, Latin or German, but does not give the references or 
different possible meanings. He seems to be more interested in the re-
alities behind the words and only refers to their original meaning when 
they clarify the issue at hand. He also does not give many direct quo-
tations and hardly ever cites his sources. In the later books his 
assistants tried to find citacions for him, which he usually acknowl-
edged either in the introduction or at the end of the book3. There is 
therefore ample room for research in finding the actual texts Polo re-
fers to or to find the likely inspiring sources to his proposals4. One can 
try to go deeper and analyse the different levels of meaning as Putman 
suggests5, but that will be a really difficult task because of the width 
and length of Polo’s interests. Polo is mainly concerned with the de-
velopment of topics and therefore he either does not want to get 
distracted remembering the exact place where he found the infor-
mation or he does not want to distract the readers with it. More than 
on authorities he relies on the weight of the reality he is speaking 
about. This explanation is important especially on this topic because 
the only quotation we have found on the original meaning of syn-
deresis is as follows: “The etymology of the word synderesis refers to 
this [vigilance]: ‘sintereo’ I accompany with attentive invigilation. A 
                                                 
3 Cfr. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, 2 (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2010), 300. 
4 Some of his disciples did this in their own publications. Cfr. González Ginocchio, 
D., El Acto De Conocer: Antecedentes Aristotélicos De Leonardo Polo (Pamplona: 
Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2005); Yepes Stork, R., 
La Doctrina Del Acto En Aristóteles (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1993). Molina, F., La Sin-
déresis, ed. cit. Sellés, J. F., “La Sindéresis o Razón Natural como la Apertura 
Cognoscitiva de la Persona Humana a su Propia Naturaleza”, op. cit.; Corazón, R., 
El Objeto de la Metafísica en la Tradición Aristotélico-Tomista y en Polo, op. cit. 
5 “I shall be defending what one might call pragmatic pluralism, the recognition that 
it is no accident that in everyday language we employ many different kinds of 
discourses”. Putnam, H., Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 2005), 21. 
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superior light that iluminates the praxis of means that makes itself the 
admission criteria”6.  
We have already discussed the origin and current use of the word 
in Chapter I, and we may conclude that while there are good studies 
on the linguistic origin and use of the word, Polo does not refer directly 
to any of them. 
b) Psychologically  
The psychological approach is discussed in Section II, Chapter 
I, when discussing whether synderesis actually exists. Synderesis ap-
pears mainly as an internal experience, on which we have to reflect to 
be able to speak about it. People, without knowing it, use different 
names that hide its ontological reality: ‘I’, ‘self’, ‘myself’ and other 
words which are related mainly to conciousness. Synderesis is for 
Polo, the “I”, the “Me” depending on how we translate the Spanish 
“Yo” and also as “conscience” in its psychological acception, more 
than in its moral meaning7. A similar confusion, or at least not proper 
distinction, can be found in Rosmini8.We believe that what is psycho-
logical has an important value to know reality better as Levinas 
suggests: “I believe that psychological ‘accidents’ are the ways under 
which the ontological relationships are shown. The psychological is 
not a vicissitude”9. 
c) Anthropologically  
Some approaches to anthropology have no room for synderesis, 
others treat it in different ways depending on the focus they have. So-
ciological Anthropology looks at the way society gives or recognises 
the individuality of the different members of society; Archaeological 
Anthropology looks at the traces of self identity left in the human cul-
tural artifacts left by men; Paleontological Anthropology does it 
looking at the marks of self identity left by the human remains; Bio-
logical Anthropology to the biological signs of self identity in the 
DNA, and so on. Polo’s Trascendental Anthropology considers syn-
deresis as the link between the root of each person which is the act of 
being with the powers that constitute its manifestations at the essential 
and natural level. We are discussing Polo’s proposal and we use some 
of the established achievements of the other approaches when relevant, 
                                                 
6 “La etimología de la palabra sindéresis alude a esto: sintereo, vigilo con atención 
acompañando. Una luz superior ilumina la praxis medial erigiéndose en criterio de 
admisión”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 164. 
7 It is interesting to note the the ´I´ and ´conscience´ are related but not identical.  
8 “Este sentimiento con el cual somos conscientes de percibir la honestidad de nues-
tro juicio practico con la ley, acompañada de paz del corazón, o la deformidad del 
disenso acompañada de los remordimientos se llama conciencia”. Rosmini, A., De 
La Conciencia Ética (Barcelona: PPU, 1996), 163. 
9 “Yo creo que los «accidentes» psicológicos son las maneras bajo las que se mues-
tran las relaciones ontológicas. Lo psicológico no es una peripecia”. Levinas, E., 
Ética e Infinito (Madrid: Visor, 1995), 65. 
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but we do not enter into specific discussions at their level, since we are 
not specialists on any of them. 
d) Epistemologically 
There are several things we may consider regarding synderesis 
as knowledge: 1) it’s being an intellectual habit, 2) the specific type of 
habitual knowledge synderesis gives, 3) the hierarchical position of 
synderesis with regards to other types of knowledge, 4) the way syn-
deresis is known 5) the actual content synderesis gives as knowledge, 
6) synderesis capacity to grow as knowledge. 
We may advance that synderesis is a way to know but neither 
sensitive, nor objective but habitual knowledge. Habitual knowledge 
for Polo is higher than the “objectual” or “operational” knowledge. It 
is an “actual” knowledge which is always in act but as a habit. It is not 
an object, not an operation. It is not “presentative” but “habitual” or 
“monstrative”. Because of this in the moment one tries to make it “ob-
jective” it ceases to understand what it actually is. It is something 
similar as trying to consider the “esse” as an object because what one 
then gets is the “ens”10. When Polo tried to explain his anthropological 
approach he realised that he had to explain in more detail his theory of 
knowledge and after several years of research and lectures on the topic 
he published the 4 volumes of his Curso de teoría del conocimiento11. 
Only then did he feel comfortable and wrote the two volumes of An-
tropología transcendental. He sometimes calls habitual knowledge 
“mostrative” indicating that it just indicates something is, but that the 
habit cannot be reduced to what is ‘objective’ or ‘presential’ 
knowledge12. 
e) Sociologically 
Leonardo Polo links synderesis with culture, as the habit that 
controls the way the person relates with the external world and with 
other people13. This will not be possible without language which is the 
first cultural product and the only way to communicate among people 
to both work together producing new things and to share intimacies.  
                                                 
10 It is interesting how ‘natural law’ is seen as the way to have a remedy to the effects 
of globalization in economy. Tarcisio Bertone seems to understand ‘natural law’ 
objectively, more than as synderesis, which is habitual knowledge. Bertone, T., 
L’etica del Bene Comune nella Dottrina Sociale della Chiesa, op. cit. In this he is 
not alone, but we have the impression that the common tendency is to understand 
natural law in an objective way rather than as a habit.  
11 Cfr. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 16-18. 
12 “The expression or manifestation of the verb in the names is not a demonstration: 
to show is not to demonstrate”. “La manifestación o expresión del verbo en los 
nombres no es una demostración: mostrar no es demostrar”. Polo, L., Curso de 
Teoría del Conocimiento II (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2006), 329. 
13 Cfr. Murillo, J. I., “La Teoría de la Cultura de Leonardo Polo”, Anuario Filosófico, 
29 (1996), 851-868.  
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An important thing Polo states is that there is a kind of typology 
that can be established among people both because of their biological 
inheritance and their cultural environment, both modulated by the con-
sequences of personal decisions. The type of being either a woman or 
a man, for example, is one of the most easily recognised types. “The 
manifestation of the personal self is modulated, above all, by types. 
The correspondence between types and culture allows certain general-
izations, which are specific to the method of cultural sociology”14. 
Typification has to do with culture and therefore with society 
and with ethics. Aristotle already noticed the importance of culture 
that Leonardo Polo takes to a superior level, explaining how the per-
sonal level influences and improves the received culture. “All human 
societies have a number of common convictions; about this Aristotle 
wrote one of his most important works, ‘The Topics’, which is a logi-
cal theory of convictions and of discussions. We are able to share 
among ourselves much more than animals, precisely because we have 
personal identity, a display of our spirit that can be typically mani-
fested to others; man is a manifestative being, but can retract this 
manifestation, not wanting to appear; this has to do with truth and lies. 
What is typical of man is organised in habits. Habits are the essential-
ization of specific types. Moral habits are another dimension of 
ethics”15. 
This is not the place to point out the sociological importance of 
synderesis; that demonstration will come from proving how society is 
part of man’s inner core and how that core comes out through syn-
deresis. Here we just point out that there is a relationship between the 
ontological nature of man and his social behaviour and that sociology 
has to be aware that synderesis has a part to play in it. 
An interesting sociological topic is the study of human rights, 
which is a growing topic as societies of originally different cultures 
are increasingly more linked thanks to the new means of communica-
tion and transport. In our topic this is the connection between 
synderesis and natural moral law, which is also very interesting for 
                                                 
14 “Personal being manifestation is spread out, above all, by the types. The corre-
spondence between types and culture allows for some generalizations that are 
proper to cultural sociology’s methodology”. “La manifestación del ser personal 
es modulada, ante todo, por los tipos. La correspondencia entre los tipos y la cul-
tura permite ciertas generalizaciones, que son propias del método de la sociología 
cultural”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, 
(Madrid: Aedos, 1997), 78. 
15 “Todas las sociedades humanas tienen una serie de convicciones comunes (sobre 
esto Aristóteles escribió una de sus obras más importantes, los Tópicos, que es una 
teoría lógica de las convicciones y de la discusión). Somos capaces de poner en 
común mucho más que los animales, precisamente porque tenemos una identidad 
personal, un despliegue de nuestro espíritu; y eso se lo podemos manifestar típica-
mente a los demás; el hombre es un ser manifestativo, pero puede retraerse, no 
querer manifestarse (esto tiene que ver con la verdad y con la mentira). Lo típico 
en el hombre es coordinable en virtud de los hábitos. Los hábitos son la esenciali-




international law. Dupla points out that even if the agreement about 
the content of these rights is almost universal the agreement on their 
foundation is far from being agreed upon16. 
f) Ontologically  
Synderesis for Polo is the highest habit at the essential level of 
the human person17. It is an innate habit and depends on the act of 
being to be actualised, which is done through the bodily faculties, and 
more specifically through the brain, because, Polo believes that unless 
the senses are actualised, the act of being cannot configure the intelli-
gence and the will in their potentialies, as Aristotle, Aquinas and 
Bonaventure defended18. This does not mean that knowledge is a bod-
ily function, or that all knowledge is sensitive as Polo clarifies in detail 
in his four volumes of Curso de teoría del conocimiento. 
The personal transcendentals, which could be one of Polo’s most 
important contributions to anthropology, are constitutive or better 
said, are identical to, the act of being. As we shall explain, the agent 
intellect and personal love are personal radicals, and are the ultimate 
source of the operations of the intelligence and the will. In case of de-
fective body functions the radicals remain as acts, but will not be able 
to activate the intelligence and will, which are just instruments or po-
tentialities. Synderesis is innate but different from the other two innate 
habits –the habit of the first principles and the habit of wisdom– that 
                                                 
16 “The researcher whose attention is drawn towards human rights will soon notice 
a clear lack of proportion between the large degree of agreement reached on the 
content of those rights and the blatant discrepancy regarding their foundation. In-
deed, human rights stand at contemporary consciousness as moral reference in 
spite of the profuse cultural and ideological fragmentation our world. They practi-
cally enjoy universal acceptance; thought this unanimity changes to its opposite as 
soon as one asks to make explicit the reasons that guarantee the objectivity and 
universality of human rights”. “El estudioso cuya atención se vea solicitada por el 
tema de los derechos humanos no tardará en advertir una clara desproporción entre 
el amplio grado de alcanzado acerca del contenido de esos derechos y la clamorosa 
discrepancia en lo tocante a su fundamentación. En efecto, los derechos humanos 
se yerguen ante la conciencia contemporánea como referentes morales que, a pesar 
de la profusa fragmentación cultural e ideológica de nuestro mundo, gozan de 
aceptación prácticamente universal; mas esta unnimidad se muda en su contrario 
tan pronto reclamamos se hagan explícitas las razones que garantizan la objectivi-
dad y universalidad de esos derechos”. Rodríguez Dupla, L., Etica de la Vida 
Buena, (Bilbao, Desclee de Brouwer, 2006), 79. 
17 Polo uses the word apex, as the highest point. "Human powers are perfectible by 
habits, which themselves are not accidents, because even I must say that the apex 
of the human essence is an innate habit, synderesis named from the Middle Ages, 
which has already been discussed in the transcendental Anthropology II”. “La po-
tencia humana es perfeccionable por hábitos, los cuales propiamente no son 
accidentes, pues incluso hay que decir que el ápice de la esencia humana es un 
hábito innato, del que ya se ha tratado en la Antropología trascendental II, la sin-
déresis, así llamado desde el Medievo”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y 
Divinidad (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2014), 87. 
18 “Intelligence depends on what is given to abstract, because intelligence begins 
abstracting from images “La inteligencia depende de lo que se le dé para abstraer, 
porque la inteligencia empieza abstrayendo a partir de las imágenes”. Polo, L., 
Ayudar a Crecer: Cuestiones de Filosofía de la Educación, op. cit., 149. 
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Polo places at the personal level, and that are mainly related to the 
knowledge of beings. The innate habit of synderesis is, nevertheless, 
different on two accounts, one in that it belongs to the essential level 
and two, that it is dual in itself, having to do with knowledge (I-see) 
and with the will (I-want).  
Summing up, the ontological status of synderesis for Polo is that 
of a spiritual innate habit, directly linked to the act of being, and being 
the communication centre with the human material condition, the 
body. 
g) Theologically  
There are two ways or two knowledge levels dealing with theol-
ogy. They do not depend on the theme, which is always God and the 
relations to Him, but on the way of acquiring knowledge, that is, on 
the method. To the best of our understanding this can be easily con-
fused, when dealing with revealed texts. These texts can be used as 
examples, cultural or psychological manifestations of spirituality, 
which will indicate that one remains at the natural level of thinking 
proper of philosophy rather than the supernatural proper of the faith 
where they are considered as unfailing truths that are the basis of the-
ological knowledge and enquiry. The first approach is what I believe 
Polo does in most of his works. Nevertheless, he specifically says that 
his last work he uses his philosophical findings to penetrate deeper in 
the faith he professes. 
Leonardo Polo, who had a deep faith and lived by it, frequently 
uses texts from many different sources, frequently from the Bible or 
other religious works, mainly of the Roman Catholic Church. He does 
not use them as authorities, but sometimes as examples for his readers, 
who are mainly acquainted with the Roman-Catholic traditions, and at 
other times to show how his philosophical discoveries can help to un-
derstand better the truths of faith. It is not infrequent, though, 
especially in conferences or articles directed to mainly Roman Catho-
lic participants, that he bases some of his arguments on their shared 
faith. On our topic, even if he knew well the mystical interpretation of 
synderesis, especially through Eckhart and Bonaventure, he does not 
refer to synderesis under such aspect. For Polo, the direct way to con-
tact God is at the personal level, not above it —which is the mystical 
way defended by Eckhart and Bonaventure—, unless God elevates the 
soul above its natural capacities. For him synderesis is at the essential 
level even if it is at its apex, as we mentioned before. The intellectual 
habit that knows about personal relationships is “wisdom” and there it 
is where the relationship with God of every human person takes place. 
In this dissertation we shall keep to the philosophical method, 
the natural or metaphysical method. 
h) Ethically 
What we look in synderesis is whether it can be standard criteria 
of morality. As MacIntyre wisely says, “when we inquire about what 
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it is for something to be just or red or equal, the rational first move is 
to offer examples, to try and give a list of just actions or red objects or 
cases of equality. But such a list misses the point of the inquiry. What 
we want to know is not which actions are just, but what it is in virtue 
of which actions are just. What is it that enables us to mark off those 
cases which genuinely belong on our list from those that do not? We 
need a criterion. Wittgenstein will suggest that the criterion is embod-
ied in a rule, and the rule in a socially established practice. Augustine 
will suggest that the criterion is given by an interior illumination which 
is a gift of God. Plato finds his criterion in the knowledge of the 
Forms”19. We shall see whether Polo’s criteria can be synderesis. 
 
6. Summary of Methodology 
While many of the references we have made on ways to ap-
proach Polo’s proposal can be rather confusing for those who are not 
acquainted with Polo’s philosophy at this stage, (because we explain 
them later) our point here is to indicate that Polo’s discussion of syn-
deresis follows mainly an ontological and epistemological 
methodology, interspersed frequently with theological metaphors. 
We have listed the different ways synderesis can be approached. 
We shall use all of them within the historical framework in the next 
chapter. 
*** 
                                                 






HISTORICAL APPROACH I 
CLASSIC AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHERS 
 
1. Introduction  
The historical section should give a broad view of the origin, 
evolution, the related topics and the different and sometimes divergent 
views of synderesis. If synderesis is real, is there a chance of having 
only one view that can encompass all positions? To be able to do this 
one needs to be aware of all interpretations and show how they can be 
combined. Will this mean that we may fall into syncretistic or eclectic 
expositions? By syncretism we understand a position that accepts op-
posing and even contradictory views without being aware of it; this we 
should try to avoid because it will be accepting internal contradictions. 
What about eclecticism? Properly speaking eclecticism is a positive 
approach. An eclectic combines ideas coming from different sources 
leading to a deepening and clarification of the issue at hand. To be 
eclectic does not necessarily mean to join contrary or contradictory 
ideas, but to take ideas from different sources, that, at first view, may 
not go well together. Eclecticism is a mark of a great thinker. Aristotle 
and Aquinas could be described as great eclectics. Polo does not use 
this distinction. Polo employs the term eclectic mainly in its negative 
meaning1. He prefers to use synthesiser rather than eclectic e.g. saying 
that Aquinas is a great synthesiser2. This refers to our topic in the sense 
that Polo may also be a great synthesiser if he manages to combine the 
different, apparently contradictory, historical views of synderesis.  
While Polo brings many novel ideas and terms, and his approach 
to synderesis is new, he nevertheless tries to uplift and acknowledge 
                                                 
1 E.g. “In the present time there is an eclectic tendency, to mix models, wihout care 
for their consistency”. “En la época actual hay tendencia al eclecticismo, a la mez-
cla de modelos, sin preguntarse por la coherencia”. Polo, L., Lecciones de Ética 
(Pamplona: Eunsa, 2013), 31. 
2 “Because being able to blend Aristotle with Neoplatonism, Thomistic philosophy 
is a very powerful synthesis”. “Por conciliar a Aristóteles con el neoplatonismo, la 
filosofía tomista es una síntesis muy potente”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascenden-
tal II, op. cit., 210. This view is not unique to Polo but widespread: “La doctrina 
de Santo Tomás del fundamento de la moralidad es una síntesis maravillosa que 
integra elementos del pensamiento ético de Platón, Aristóteles y del estoicismo, 
trasponiéndolos y desarrollándolos en una misma visión que basa la moralidad en 
la naturaleza humana creada por Dios”. Elders, L., “El Fundamento de la Morali-
dad de Nuestros Actos”, in Actas De La XXVIII Semana Tomista (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial de la Universidad Católica Argentina, 2004), 36. 
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the previous contributions to the topic. Novelty, originality, does not 
mean to be totally different from tradition which could be a sign of 
lack of penetration and perhaps a bit of intellectual pride. Leonardo 
Polo, is extremely original in his approach to philosophy and in the 
use of novel terms to explain it; nevertheless, he never wanted to be 
original: “I insist on this point. To seek the truth means to try to ad-
vance in research. If one is a philosopher or a sciencist this is a must. 
To be or not to be original is secondary. Furthermore in philosophical 
disciplines it is not possible to propose something new without finding 
a pied-à-terre in previous thoughts that deserved to be commented and 
developed. This is why I have recommended my disciples not to just 
repeat me”3.  
One could say that reality is not dependent on our knowledge, 
but we do depend on our knowledge of reality, and this knowledge can 
grow. Because of this capacity to grow our understanding of the world 
is greatly based on what others have discovered. Not only we grow in 
the knowledge of reality, this knowledge also changes reality. Aristo-
tle could not speak about aeroplanes, rockets, electricity, etc., which 
now we can. Futhermore new knowledge and techniques allow us to 
have better instruments to know reality (telescopes, microscopes, par-
ticle accelerators and so on); the continuous progress in thinking 
allows us to see reality in a better, deeper way. The topic at hand is not 
indifferent to its historical development. Though we agree that “all this 
question of origins is secondary”4, it is good to know as much as we 
can about synderesis’ genealogy, to spot all nuances and see how the 
topic evolves and becomes clearer, or the consequences of having for-
gotten it. In this way “synderesis” can be better known; not because 
we are smarter than our predecessors, or that we have discovered their 
mistakes. It is a refinement of approach and an increased capacity for 
research. Nowadays the number of people devoted to research in any 
field are far more than in previous centuries, we have more means —
libraries, better editions of sources, facility to share resources, etc.—
and above all, we have more means to know and listen to previous 
scholars than ever before, so we can improve on what they worked on, 
so we can know reality perhaps with a bit more detail, or in a little 
more depth. 
The purpose of this section is twofold: firstly, to set the “status 
quaestionis”, which will help us set Polo’s proposal in perspective; and 
secondly will also allow us to understand Polo’s references to previous 
authors’ proposals. This historical section cannot be exhaustive; it is 
just indicative of the mosaic of opinions regarding synderesis. It does 
not intend either to touch on all associated topics such as conscience, 
                                                 
3 “Insistiré en este punto. Buscar la verdad comporta tratar de avanzar en la investi-
gación. En la medida en que uno puede, debe hacerlo si es filósofo o científico. Ser 
original o no es una cuestión secundaria. Por otra parte, en esas disciplinas no cabe 
proponer novedades sin encontrar un punto de apoyo en planteamientos anteriores, 
que merecen una glosa y una continuación. Por lo demás, siempre he recomendado 
a mis discípulos que no se reduzcan a repetirme”. Polo, L., Antropología Tras-
cendental I, op. cit., 12. 
4 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 155. 
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natural law, habitual knowledge, intellect and will, which will distract 
us from the main topic. 
Following the traditional historical division, we have structure 
the section into authors of classical, medieval, modern and contempo-
rary philosophies. We have divided the sections in two chapters due to 
their length. 
 
2. Synderesis in Classical Philosophers  
“Synteresis” or “synderesis” is not a topic discussed by any of 
the classical philosophers5. Even the word is hardly found on classic 
literature. Outside St. Jerome (c. 347–420) the word appeared only in 
4 occasions in the whole of the classic Greek preserved texts6. A re-
lated topic “synedesis” was used more frequently. “J. Dupon holds that 
syneidesis –found in the classical dramatists and in Plato and Aristotle 
but becoming rare after the period of Chrysippus– owed its prevalence 
at the beginning of the Christian era to the ‘enseignement populaire 
d’allure cynico-stoicienne’ whence St. Paul borrowed it”7.  
But even the “syneidesis” was not studied directly, nor in depth 
as Potts comments: “Conscience has been much neglected by philos-
ophers. It is not directly treated in ancient philosophy”8. So in spite of 
what medieval authors say seeking the authority of classic philoso-
phers to support their positions we can conclude that both the term and 
the reality behind synderesis is foreign to classical thinkers.  
Nevertheless, the need to understand oneself, others and society 
permeates mythical, religious and wisdom knowledge. The topics re-
lated to law were worked both by philosophers and jurists. The most 
quoted jurists of the Roman classic period are Cicero (106-43 B.C.)9, 
                                                 
5 “Classical Greek and Roman ethics, to my knowledge, do not contain anything like 
the principle, “Do good and avoid evil”. Of course it is impossible to establish a 
historical negative of this sort, but in several years of research for my History of 
Ethics, nothing really like the synderesis principle was found”. Bourke, V.J., “The 
Background of Aquinas’ Synderesis Principle”, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), Graceful 
Reason (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983), 352. 
6 Cfr. Stephanus, H., Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, vol. 7, 14.2. 1290-1 as quoted by 
Crowe, op.cit., 154.  
7 Ibid., 153 note 3. 
8 Potts, T. C., Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 1.  
9 “Natural law is that which has not had its origin in the opinions of men, but has 
been implanted by some innate instinct, such as religion, affection, gratitude, re-
venge, attention to one’s superiors, truth”. Cicero, M.T., De Inventione trans. 
Yonge, C.D. II, 161.Accessed Jan 12, 2014. http://www.classicpersua-
sion.org/pw/cicero/dnvindex.htm. “Naturae ius est, quod non opinio genuit, sed 
quaedam in natura vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, ob-
servantiam, veritatem”. De Inventione, Ibid., II, 161. 
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and Ulpian (170-228)10 as seen in the Justinian Digest11. Both authors 
were very influential on the medieval period.  
 
3. Medieval thinkers. Transition Period 
The classical treatise by O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux 
XII et XIII siècles speaks of three periods in the conceptual develop-
ment of synderesis: an elaboration period which goes up to the middle 
of the XIII Century, the consolidation of the treatise by Bonaventure 
and Thomas though in divergent ways, and a third period that is the 
consolidation of the two approaches12.  
While Origen, Jerome, Augustin and Boethius live within the 
classic period they tend to be studied among medieval authors because 
the content and method they use is clearly different from the non-
Christian philosophers of their time. We follow this tradition because 
of the influence that the Christian revelation had in their thought. 
While Origen (185-254) did not deal directly with the topic and 
did not use the term synderesis, his first homily on Ezequiel vision is, 
nevertheless, thought to have influenced Jerome’s commentary. Je-
rome was an admirer of Origen and he had translated his homilies on 
Ezekiel before writing his own commentary “with the difference that 
for Origen the eagle signifies ‘spiritus praesidens animae”13, not syn-
deresis14.  
                                                 
10 “Natural law is what nature teaches all animals”. “Ius naturale est, quod natura 
omnia animalia docuit”. Justinian Digest, Dig. 1.1.1.3. The Latin Library,  
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/justinian/digest1.shtml. Accessed Sept. 1, 2015. 
“As far as the ius civile is concerned, slaves are not regarded as persons. This, 
however, is not true under natural law, because, so far as natural law is concerned, 
all men are equal”. Ibid., Dig. 50.17.32.  
11 The Justinian Digest is a collection ordered by the Emperor Justinian in 530 a.d. 
that summarised 1.500 previous law books, and became the only non-statutary 
source for legal disputes. “Book, I Title I. Concerning Natural Law, The Law of 
Nations, And The Civil Law. Natural Law is that which nature has taught to all 
animals, for this law is not peculiar to the human race, but applies to all creatures 
which originate in the air, or the earth, and in the sea. Hence arises the union of the 
male and the female which we designate marriage; and hence are derived the pro-
creation and the education of children; for we see that other animals also act as 
though endowed with knowledge of this law”. Accessed Sept. 1, 2015. 
http://www.constitution.org/sps/sps02_j1-1.htm “Dig. 1.1.1.3. Ulpianus 1 inst. Ius 
naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam ius istud non humani generis 
proprium, sed omnium animalium, quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur, avium 
quoque commune est. hinc descendit maris atque feminae coniunctio, quam nos 
matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio: videmus et-
enim cetera quoque animalia, feras etiam istius iuris peritia censeri”. Accessed 
Sept. 1, 2015. http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/justinian/digest1.shtml 
12 Lottin, O. D., Psychologie et Morale aux XII et XIII siecles, vol. II, 1, (Louvain: 
Gembloux & J. Duculot, 1948), 105. 
13 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 15.  
14 “Wherever the spirit went, the living creatures also went’. These living creatures 
have this ‘likeness over themselves of a man’, though they are ‘of four faces’. Ezek 
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a) Jerome (c. 347–420). Jerome was never aware, nor anyone 
else until eight hundred years later, that a single word would cause 
such rivers of ink. Jerome´s use of “synteresis” instead of “synedesis” 
in his commentary to Ezekiel I, 10, generated, and is still generating, 
lots of texts as this dissertation is proof. Peter Lombard is, in part, the 
main cause because, some eight hundred years later, he included Je-
rome´s commentary in his book Sentences, which became the basic 
textbook for medieval universities and a required text to comment for 
those who wanted to become Lecturers of Theology. This meant that 
Jerome´s synderesis was commented in no less than 200 medieval 
summas15. This was because any lecturer had to present a commentary 
to the Summa as a requisite to become a master and use his text to 
lecture.  
It is important to read the full text of Jerome’s commentary to be 
able to understand these commentaries: “Most people interpret the 
man, the lion and the ox as the rational, emotional and appetitive parts 
of the soul, following the division by Plato, who calls them the logikon 
and thymikon and epithymetikon, locating reason in the brain, emotion 
in the gall-bladder and appetite in the liver. And they posit a fourth 
part which is above and beyond these three, and which the Greeks call 
synteresin: that spark of conscience which was not even extinguished 
in the breast of Cain after he was turned out of Paradise, and by which 
we discern that we sin, when we are overcome by pleasures or frenzy 
and meanwhile are misled by an imitation of reason. They reckon that 
this is, strictly speaking, the eagle, which is not mixed up with the 
other three, but corrects them when they go wrong, and of which we 
read in Scripture as the spirit ‘which intercedes for us with ineffable 
groaning’ (Romans, VIII, 26). ‘For no one knows what a man is really 
like, except the spirit which is in him’ (I Corinthians, 2:11). And, writ-
ing to the Thessalonians, Paul also entreats for it to be kept sound 
together with soul and body (1 Thessalonians, 5:23). However, we 
also see that this conscience is cast down in some people, who have 
neither shame nor insight regarding their offences, and loses its place, 
as is written in the book of Proverbs: ‘When the wicked man reaches 
the depths of sin, he doesn’t care at all’. (Proverbs, XVIII, 3.) So they 
                                                 
I, 5. It is not said at the beginning that they are of four faces, but since among the 
four faces a human face rises above and holds precedence, it is described. It is also 
called ‘a human face and the face of a lion on the right of the four parts, and a face 
of a calf to the left of the four, and a face of an eagle to the four parts’ (Ezek I: 5, 
10). Let us see, then, whether it signifies the tripartite soul concerning which it has 
also been discussed in the doctrines of others. Let us see whether in the tripartite 
soul another part, the fourth, that is, force, presides. What is the tripartition of the 
soul? By ‘man’ the rational part is being indicated; by ‘lion’ it’s irascible part; by 
‘calf’ its desirous part. But the ‘spirit’ who presides to help is not ‘to the right’, as 
the man and lion, he is not ‘at the left’, as the calf, but he is over all three faces. 
For in another passage the eagle is declared (Ezek., I: 4, 10), so that through the 
eagle he signifies the presiding spirit of the soul. But I am speaking of the “spirit 
of man who is in him” (cf. I Cor 2:10). And thus all things are led by the will of 
God”. PG, 13, 681B; cf., PL 25, 706-7. 
15 Cfr., Potts, T. C., Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, op. cit., 2002, 90.  
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deserve to be told: ‘You have acquired the face of a prostitute, you 
refuse to blush’ (Jeremiah, III, 3)”16. 
Though the text has already been over-commented we would 
like to distinguish here between the linguistic to the theological, an-
thropological, psychological, epistemological and ontological 
approaches which are usually intertwined in most commentators. 
Linguistically there are a number of researchers that defend that 
Jerome never used the word “synteresis”, that he used “syneidesis”. 
Later either he or more likely a Latin copyist got confused and wrote 
synteresis instead of syneidesis17. What is factual is that “synteresis” 
was the term used by Habranus Mauring in his own text on Ezech. I 
(PL, 110, 508) probably written about 842 A.D. He does not actually 
comment on the text; he only transcribes it. Another factual thing is 
that the commentators use “synderesis” rather than “synteresis” and 
that both terms are acceptable in English while only “synderesis” and 
its equivalents are used in most other modern languages. It is also im-
portant to note that the “the term that came into the Schools was 
synderesis and not syneidesis (which the scholastics never use)”18. 
Whatever the case, the term caught fire on moral medieval philosophy. 
In the XIII Century synderesis was said to be different things, perhaps 
never thought by St. Jerome himself. In modern philosophy and per-
haps due to the influence of Luther the term was hardly used both in 
theology and in philosophy19.  
Theologically we can say that Jerome’s work and that of his 
commentators have a clearly theological grounding and a theological 
                                                 
16 “Alii vero qui philosophorum stultam sequuntur sapientiam, duo hemisphaeria in 
duobus templi Cherubim, nos et Antipodas, quasi supinos et cadentes homines su-
picantur. Plerique, juxta Platonem, rationale animae, et irascitivum, et 
concupiscitivum, quod ille vocat ad hominem, et leonem ac vitulum referunt: ra-
tionem et cognitionem, et mentem, et consilium, eamdemque virtutem atque 
sapientiam in cerebri arce ponentes: feritatem vero et iracundiam atque violentiam 
in leone, quae consistat in felle. Porro libidinem, luxuriam, et omnium voluptalum 
cupidinetn in jecore, id est, in vítulo qui terrae operibus haereat. Quartamque 
ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria est, quam Graeci vocant quae scintilla 
conscientiae in Cain quoque pectore, postquam ejectus est de paradiso, non extin-
guitur, et qua victi voluptatibus, vel furore, ipsaque interdum rationis decepti 
similitudine, nos peccare sentimus. Quam proprie Aquilae deputant, non se mis-
centem tribus, sed tria errantia corrigentem, quam in Scripturis interdum vocari 
legimus spiritum, qui irterpellat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus (Rom. 
VIII:26). Nemo enim scit ea quae homímis sunt, nisi spiritus qui in eo est (I Cor. 
II:11). Quem et Paulus ad Thessalonicenses scribens, cum anima et corpore servari 
integrum deprecatur (I Thess.V). Et tamen hanc quoque ipsam conscientiam, juxta 
illud quod in Proverbiis scriptum est Impius cum venerit in profun- dum peecato-
rum, contemnit (Prov. XVIII: 13): cernímus pracipitari apud quosdam et suum 
locumamittere, qui ne pudorem quidem el verecundiam habent in delictis, et me-
rentur audire: Facies meretricis facta est tibi, noliusti (Al. Nescis) erubescere 
(Jerem. III: 3)”. Minge Patrologia Latina, 25, (Paris: Garnier fratres et J.-P. Migne 
successores, 1884), Lib I Cap I, 21 Translation taken from Ibid., 79.  
17 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 153, note 4. 
18 Ibid., 155. 
19 Cfr. Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit. 
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intent. It is based on God’s word through one of his great prophets, 
Ezekiel. It is furthermore supported by three canonical texts of St. 
Paul’s letters and a text of the Proverbs20. This is why some authors 
dismiss the study of synderesis as a Christian theological issue, with 
no relevance to philosophy. For the commentators it had also the au-
thority of St. Jerome who was the great scholar saint who translated 
the entire Bible into Latin and that was, and still is, the recognised 
authorised translation for the Roman Catholic Church. Nevertheless 
he also quotes Plato and refers to other Greeks who he does not specify 
and being an issue relating to man it does have interest in anthropol-
ogy.  
Anthropologically we can see Jerome knows Plato’s tripartite 
division of the soul -the rational, irascible and concupiscible, that he 
quotes in Greek. The interesting thing is that he adds a fourth one (the 
eagle), which he places above all the other three. In Plato’s approach 
the reason is the charioteer that controls the two horses: the irascible 
and the concupiscible. Jerome´s fourth element is above reason and 
does not mix with any of the other three. This means that it is a differ-
ent type and furthermore that it is infallible, which none of the other 
three are. This affects all humans, not only Christians. So it is not dif-
ficult to understand why there was a lot of interest on this topic to the 
point of being set for special “disputations” in the XII and XIII Cen-
turies. 
Psychologically it presents numerous questions, for example, 
whether it is related to the appetitive or to the cognitive powers, or 
whether synderesis is a new type of faculty. What type of supremacy 
will it have to the rational and to the appetitive powers? Will it be 
identical in all men? Will it be the same in men and women?  
Epistemologically there are two basic questions: how do we 
know synderesis, and, if it is a type of knowledge, what type of 
knowledge is it? If it is different from the intelligence, how does it 
control the rational part of the soul? The quote of Romans VIII, 26 
points out to something different from ratio, for two reasons: one, be-
cause it is above “ratio”; and secondly, because “it produces ineffable 
groanings”. Ineffable means that reason does not understand, cannot 
represent it, and therefore cannot speak about it. 
Ontologically are perhaps the more radical questions: what type 
of being has synderesis? Is it ‘potency’, a ‘habit’ or an ‘act’? How does 
it relate to the other powers, potencies, habits and acts? What moves it 
to act? What type of activity does it have? Even more radical modern 
scholars ask: does it exist at all? Or is just a construct of Jerome to 
explain a mystical vision?  
Morally: Morality seems to be synderesis’ main purpose; to re-
mind what is good and what is evil even to the dammed; “by which 
we discern that we sin”. Furthermore, it keeps the moral commands, 
                                                 
20 Rom. VIII: 26; I Cor. II: 11; I Thess.V; Prov. XVIII: 13.  
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notwithstanding the behaviour of the person, such as the unrepented 
Cain, to whom the synderesis reminds continuously of his sin. Jerome 
is nevertheless, aware that one can become insensible to synderesis’ 
promptings as the Jeremiah’s quote included in his text, indicates. 
b) Augustine (354–430). The Bishop of Hippo, who was con-
temporary to Jerome, did not use the term synderesis or synteresis in 
any of his works. He nevertheless will be influential in the discussion 
that started in the XII Century because of his theory of the two reasons: 
the “ratio inferior” and the “ratio sublimior”21. “Yet action, by which 
we use temporal things well, differs from contemplation of eternal 
things; and the latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to knowledge. 
For although that which is wisdom can also be called knowledge, as 
the apostle too speaks, where he says: ‘Now I know in part, but then 
shall I know even as also I am known’; when doubtless he meant his 
words to be understood of the knowledge of the contemplation of God, 
which will be the highest reward of the saints; yet where he says: ‘For 
to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word 
of knowledge by the same Spirit’, certainly he distinguishes without 
doubt these two things, although he does not explain the difference, 
nor in what way one may be discerned from the other. But having ex-
amined a great number of passages from the Holy Scriptures, I find it 
written in the Book of Job, that holy man being the speaker: ‘Behold, 
piety, that is wisdom; but to depart from evil is knowledge’. In thus 
distinguishing, it must be understood that wisdom belongs to contem-
plation, knowledge to action”22. 
Augustine may have got this distinction through Plotinus, or 
from the Stoic Posidonious “hegenomikon”. This topic somehow re-
appears in later authors as the distinction between the “intelligentia” 
as contrasted with “ratio”23.  
c) Isidore of Sevilla (560–636). The Etymologies of Isidore of 
Sevilla was one of the most important reference books for the early 
medieval times. He modified the definition of Natural Law of the Jus-
tinian Digest. Some authors claim that his alterations created more 
                                                 
21 Cf. Augustin, De Trinitate, vol. 3, trans Philip Schaff, (Grand Rapids Michigan: 
WM B Eerdmans, 1887), 240. Accessed September 12, 2014. 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf103.html.  
22 “Distat tamen ab aeternorum contemplatione actio qua bene utimur temporalibus 
rebus, et illa sapientiae, haec scientiae deputatur. Quanvis enim et illa qua sapientia 
est, possit scientia nuncupari, sicut el Apostolus loquitur, ubi dicit, Nunc scio eae 
parte, tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum (I Cor. XIII, 12); quam scien-
tiam profecto contemplationis Dei vult intelligi, quod sanctorum erit premium 
summum: tamen ubi dicit, Alii quidem datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii 
sermo scientiae secundum eumdem Spiritum (Id., XII, 8); haec utique duo sine 
dubitatione distinguit, licet not ibi explicet quid intersit, et unde possit utrumque 
dignosci. Verum Scripturarum sanctarum multiciplem copiam scrutatus, invenio 
scriptum esse in libro Job, eodem santo viro loquente: Ecce pietas est sapientis; 
abstinere autem a mails est scientia (Job XXVIII, 28). In ha differentia intelligen-
dum est ad comtemplationem sapientiam, ad actionem scientiam pertinere”. 
Augustine, St., De Trinitate, XII, 14: 22.  
23 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 156-157. 
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confusion than clarity24. The link of his definition with synderesis is 
that he used the expression “the instinct of nature”, which will influ-
ence, through Gratian, most Canon lawyers in medieval times. 
d) Other early medieval authors. Other influential authors, for 
example Boethius or the very influential book Pseudo-Denis, do not 
mention synderesis. At the beginning of the XII Century Gundislinus 
brought up the two divisions of the soul between the upper and lower 
one in his translation of Avicenna’s De Anima and his De immortali-
tate Animae, which was commented by William of Auvergne’s De 
immortalitate, which will be linked to synderesis by the XII century 
commentators since it could be easily linked to the superior and infe-
rior reason of Augustine25.  
It is also interesting to note that important authors among the 
early medieval theologians do not use the term synderesis in their 
works, for example, William of Campeaux (c.1070-1122), Peter Abe-
lard (c.1079-142), Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153) and that Crowe 
concludes that in the time from St. Jerome to the end of the XII Cen-
tury both in theology and canon law, “the term occurs sporadically. 
The canonists, in fact, never adopted it; and its popularity with the 
theologians was only assured after the year 1200”26. 
 
4. XII Century 
According to Cunningham, the early commentators were mainly 
considering two topics regarding synderesis: “These earlier thinkers, 
however, were mainly preoccupied with two problems: the indestructi-
bility of synderesis, and its infallibility as guardian of the moral order 
directing man to moral goodness”27.  
a) Gratian c. 1150. We know very little about Gratian because, 
like many medieval artists, architects, sculptors and builders of the 
                                                 
24 “IV. QVID SIT IVS NATVRALE. [1] Ius autem naturale [est], aut civile, aut gen-
tium. Ius naturale [est] commune omnium nationum, et quod ubique instinctu 
naturae, non constitutione aliqua habetur; ut viri et feminae coniunctio, liberorum 
successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio, et omnium una libertas, 
adquisitio eorum quae caelo, terra marique capiuntur. [2] Item depositae rei vel 
commendatae pecuniae restitutio, violentiae per vim repulsio. Nam hoc, aut si quid 
huic simile est, numquam iniustum [est], sed naturale aequumque habetur”. “What 
natural law is (Quid sit ius naturale) 1. Law is either natural, or civil, or of nations. 
Natural law (ius naturale) is common to all nations, and, because it exists every-
where by the instinct of nature, it is not kept by any regulation. Such is the union 
of a man and woman, the children’s inheritance and education, the common pos-
session of everything, a single freedom for all, and the right to acquire whatever is 
taken from the sky, the earth, and the sea”. The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 117.  
25 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 157. 
26 Ibid., 153. 
27 Cunningham, S. B., Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert 
the Great (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 220. 
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great cathedrals, he gave more importance to his work than to his 
name. Gratian is the author of the greatest compilation of law after the 
Justinian Digest. His work, which tried to revise all Canon Law up to 
his time and resolve the conflicting canons, was the textbook used in 
all universities to teach canon law until it was superseded with the 
publication of the official Code of Canon Law in 1917. This fact alone 
explains the influence of his definition of natural law which was taken 
from Isidore28. 
b) Other earlier jurists. As Ojakangas points out29, other XII-
XIII Century jurists –most of them in Bologna– continue using the 
term “naturalis ius” though without precision. The texts of the main 
jurists of that time, Azo of Bologna, (1150–1230), Accursius (1182–
1263) and Henry of Bracton (1210–1268) lack the precision that the 
theologians will demand30. Some of their texts can be interpreted as if 
“natural law” meant that all nature was God31 –which probably was 
                                                 
28 “Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali videlicet iure et moribus. Ius nature est, 
quod in lege et evangelio continetur, quo quisque iubetur alii facere, quod sibi vult 
fieri, et prohibetur alii inferre, quod sibi nolit fieri. Unde Christus in evangelio: 
‘Omnia quecunque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos eadem facite illis. Hec 
est enim lex et prophete’. Hinc Ysidorus in V libro Ethimologiarum ait: Divine 
leges natura, humane moribus constant. Omnes leges aut divine sunt, aut humane. 
Divine natura, humane moribus constant, ideoque he discrepant, quoniam alie aliis 
gentibus placent. (§ 1) Fas lex divina est: ius lex humana. Transire per agrum al-
ienum, fas est, ius non est. Ex verbis huius auctoritatis evidenter datur intelligi, in 
quo differant inter se lex divina et humana, cum omne quod fas est, nomine divine 
uel naturalis legis accipiatur, nomine uero legis humane mores iure conscripti et 
traditi intelligantur. (§ 1) Est autem ius generale nomen, multas sub se continens 
species. Unde in eodem libro Ysidorus ait: (D. 1 c. 2) Ius genus, lex species eius 
est”. Gratian, Decretum D.1 d.a.c.l, ed. Emil Friedberg (Leipzig, 1879, repr- Graz, 
1959). 
29 Ojakangas, M., The Voice of Conscience: A Political Genealogy of Western Ethi-
cal Experience (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 52. 
30 For example, Accursius defines it as follows: “Natural law is a type of law, that 
all animals are knowledgeable and experts from birth, i.e. from God. [...] I correctly 
say all animals: because it applies not only to humans, but to all animals, even to 
the heavens”. Accursius Institutionum Vol. 4 (Paris: Claude Chevallon, 1529) col. 
13 on Inst. 1.2 “Ius naturale est quoddam ius, quo iure omnia animalia sunt in-
structa et perita a natura id est a Deo. [...]. Bene dico omnia animalia: quia non 
solum habet locum in hominibus, sed in omnibus animalibus: Sive in coelo”, as 
cited by Steven A. Epstein, in The Medieval Discovery of Nature (Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
31 “In fact, the passing references to the natural law give the impression that the 
eclecticism has been self-defeating –for it can hardly be said that a clear image of 
the natural law emerges. And to add to the uncertainty, Accursius, like some of his 
predecessors, notably Placentinus and Azo, uses the phrase idest Deus as an ex-
pansion of natura. On the face of it this was pantheistic and was to be formally 
asserted in this sense much later. Accursius makes it clear that he understands God 
as creator of the world and in that sense the source of the natural law. And in two 
other contexts Accursius, instead of God, uses the philosophical term natura natur-
ans. With Azo and Accursius one sees the explicit influence of the canon lawyers’ 
definition –natural law, according to Gratian, being what is found in the Law and 
the Gospel. But, not surprisingly, the real meaning of natural law for the civilians 
is that found in the Roman law, namely Ulpian’s definition: quod natura omnia 
animalia docuit. This the civilians retained, despite the dificulties in understanding 
it; and from them it was to find its way into the canonists and, more importantly, 
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very far from their thinking–. Some texts say that it applied to all that 
was created by God, and in others that “natural law” only affected hu-
man beings32. They probably just wanted to indicate that the base of 
all law was the will of God inscribed in nature and that His authority 
was the ultimate reason to obey them.  
In fact the disconnection between the canonists and theologians 
was noticeable, as Ullman points out using Aquinas as point of refer-
ence: “on the whole, the mutual relations between St. Thomas Aquinas 
and the canonists were somewhat strained, and the mutual influence 
negligible”33. This does not mean that Aquinas did not deal on Law, 
but that he treated it in philosophical way from his first works, as other 
theologians did. One has also to be aware of the great influence his 
treatise on Law in the Summa had later34. It does not mean either that 
                                                 
into the theologians”. Crowe, M.B., The Changing Profile of the Natural Law, 
(Rotterdam: Springer Science & Business Media, 1978), 91. 
32 “The great work in civil jurisprudence was done at Bologna, starting with Irnerius 
(c.1055–1130/38) and reaching its height with Accursius (c.1184–1263). Ac-
cursius gave various descriptions of natural law, including references to natural 
instinct, ius gentium, simple justice or equity as perceived by reason, and a canonic 
definition that incorporated an element of revelation. Azo, Accursius’ predecessor 
in Bologna, who died around 1230, had made a similar multiple analysis of natural 
law. Their eclecticism is characteristic of the civilians generally. They were atten-
tive to the problem(s) of natural law. But if they were puzzled by the different 
directions it had taken in the past, they were evidently not much concerned whether 
their reconciliation was more than superficial. It is difficult to conclude that much 
progress was made, except perhaps to expose the difficulties more plainly”. 
Weinreb, L., Natural Law and Justice (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1990), 50. Accessed November 21, 2014, http://www.hup.harvard.edu/cat-
alog.php?isbn=9780674604261. 
33 “The Roman idea that the pope as a prince was not bound by the laws, was made 
to apply not only to human, but also to divine laws. And this particular instance of 
natural (divine) law provides a fitting occasion to observe, firstly, how little can-
onistic scholarship was influenced by contemporary scholastic theology and 
philosophy, and, secondly, that the Thomistic system of law in particular made no 
impression upon contemporary or later canonists. On the other hand, the Stagirite’s 
Christian interpreter was frequently at loggerheads with his brethren in the canon-
istic camp. In one place he charged them with following the human rather than the 
divine law, whilst in another he complained of the professors of sacred theology 
who referred to the "glossulas juristarum" as an authority. On the whole, the mutual 
relations between St. Thomas Aquinas and the canonists were somewhat strained, 
and the mutual influence negligible”. Ullmann, W., Medieval Papalism, (London: 
Routledge, 2012), 47. 
34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, qq. 90 to 97. “The great thirteenth-
century philosopher and theologian, Thomas Aquinas, played a pivotal role in the 
history and development of Western jurisprudence. During his productive but short 
life, Aquinas wrote extensively on moral matters, and as a corollary, on topics in 
political and legal philosophy. His exposition in Summa Theologiae on matters of 
law is often referred to as the classical canon of natural law theory”. Liskka, A., in 
Pattaro, E. (ed.), A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, (New 
York: Springer, Dordrecht, 2005), 284. Cfr. also Finnis, J., Aquinas. Moral, Polit-
ical and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 1998). 
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he does not use some of the terms which the jurists, for example, “in-
stinct”35, which his master Albert also used36. As anecdotal proof of 
this continued schism between theologians, philosophers and jurist is 
that the author quoted above, Weinreb, in his book Natural Law and 
Justice, written for jurists, does not even mentions “synderesis”37. This 
will excuse us from continuing to look into juridical sources which 
will divert us from our main topic.  
c) Peter Lombard (c. 1100–1160). The first actual commentary 
to Jerome´s text was by Peter Lombard, about eight centuries after Je-
rome wrote it, in the Liber Sententiarum, where he discusses the nature 
of the will with regards to sin. He asks whether the will is always de-
termined to the good, even in sinners. In the discussion he refers to 
Jerome’s text but he does not use the word “synderesis” using instead 
Jerome’s “scintilla conscientia” changing it to “scintilla rationis”38. 
We give the full text to show how shy he was of using an uncommon 
word. “Man is therefore rightly said to naturally want what is good, 
because he was constructed with a good and righteous will. For the 
higher spark of reason which, as Jerome says, could not even be extin-
guished in Cain, always wants what is good and hates what is bad 
(Commentary on Ezekiel, I, 7). Others, however, say that there is a 
mental motivation by which the mind, having abandoned the law of 
higher things, subjects itself to sins and is attracted by them. Before 
grace is present to someone, this motivation, according to them, tyran-
nises and rules over man and suppresses the other motivation. 
                                                 
35“Now, laws that are established should stem from the instinct of nature [ex naturali 
instinctu], if they are human: just as in the demonstrative sciences, also, every hu-
man discovery takes its origin from naturally known principles. But, if they are 
divine laws, they not only express the instinct of nature but also supplement the 
deficiency of natural instinct, as things that are divinely revealed surpass the ca-
pacity of human reason. Leges autem positae oportet quod ex naturali instinctu 
procedant, si humanae sunt: sicut etiam in scientiis demonstrativis omnis humana 
inventio ex principiis naturaliter cognitis initium sumit. Si autem divinae sunt, non 
solum instinctum naturae explicant, sed etiam defectum naturalis instinctus sup-
plent: sicut ea quae divinitus revelantur, superant naturalis rationis capacitatem”. 
Aquinas, Th., Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 123 n. 7. Accessed February 13, 2015 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/scg3111.html#26768 . 
36 It is the instinct, the ‘instinct of conscience (instinctus conscientiae), as Albert the 
Great put it in Summa De Bono. Cfr. Lottin, O., Psychologie et Morale aux XII et 
XIII siecles, vol. II, 1, (Louvain: Gembloux & J. Duculot, 1948), 218. 
37 Weinreb, L., Natural Law and Justice, op. cit., 50. 
38 “Recte ergo dicitur homo naturaliter velle bonum, quia in recta et bona voluntate 
conditus est. Superior enim scintilla rationis, quae etiam, ut ait Hieron. (18), in 
Cain non potuit extingui, bonum semper vult, et malum semper odit. Alium auten 
dicunt motum esse quo mens relicta superiorum lege subjicit se peccatis, eisque 
oblectatur. Iste motus, ut aiunt, antequam adsit alicui grata, dominatur et regnat in 
homine, alterumque deprimit motum; uterque tamen ex libero arbitrio est. 
Veniente autem gratia ille malus motus eliditur, et alter naturaliter bonus liberatur, 
et adjuvatur ut efficaciter bonum velit bonum, no tamen absolute concedi oportet 
bonam habere voluntatem set potius malam. Alii autem dicunt unam esse volun-
tatem, it est, unum motum, quo naturaliter vult homo bonum, et ex vitio vult homo 
malum, eoque delectatur: et in quantum vult bonum, naturaliter bonus est; in quan-




However, this is by free choice. When grace comes, the bad motivation 
is crushed and the other, naturally good one is freed and helped so that 
it is effective in wanting what is good. But before grace, although a 
man naturally wants what is good, yet it must not be allowed without 
qualification that he has a good will, but rather an evil one”39.  
It is worth noticing that Peter Lombard’s Sentences “down to the 
sixteenth century it was the textbook in the university courses, upon 
which each future doctor had to lecture during two years”40. It can be 
guessed that further speculation on the topic was mainly based on 
Lombard’s text. Also that he does not really mention, nor discusses 
synderesis directly, and furthermore that he does not accept or reject 
Jerome´s position with regards to the problem he is discussing. It is 
left open for the future commentators to read Jerome´s original text 
and make their enlightened choice. 
It is only after the death of Peter Lombard that the word “syn-
deresis” appears for the first time after Jerome’s in the Commentary in 
the Sentences41 of Master Udo, written about 1165 and in the five 
books on the commentary to the Sentences of Peter Poitiers (c.1130 
c.1215). Simon of Bisiniano (1173-1176), a canonist, in his Summa 
super Decretum seems to be the first who suggested a link between 
synderesis and natural law: “Nearly seventy years before Albert had 
ever tackled these questions, that is, around 1175, one of the decretists, 
Simon de Bisiniano, had already anticipated the Albertinian position 
by equating natural right with synderesis”42. But it was Stephen Lang-
ton (c.1150 c.1228) who was the first one to discuss synderesis as a 
topic on its own, placing it squarely as part of our rational 
knowledge43. Godfrey of Poitiers (c. 1231) adds to the discussion the 
relationship between synderesis and sin, merit and demerit44. For Al-
exander Neckam (1157-1217) synderesis is closer to the will than to 
the intelligence; neverthless he also says that it belongs to the Augus-
tinian “ratio superior”45. William of Gascoigne, asserts in his treatise 
                                                 
39 Translated by Potts, T. C., Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, op. cit., 93. 
40 Ghellinck, J., “Peter Lombard”, in The Catholic Encyclopedia, (New York: Robert 
Appleton Company, 1912). 
41 “Aquila uero significat sinderesim (Vienne 1050: sinendesim) id est superiorem 
rationem que etiam “in Cain extincta non est, nunquam se miscentem tribus, sed 
ipsa semper errantia corrigentem’”. Text from Lottin, O., op. cit., 107. 
42 Cunningham, S. B., Reclaiming Moral Agency, op. cit., 220. & Crowe, M. B., 
“The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 156.  
43 “Est quaeda vis qua homo naturaliter detestatur malum, et est pars vis rationis!”. 
p.114 (another version) has “Synderesis est pars accidentalis vis rationalis”. Lottin, 
O., Psychologie et Morale, II, op. cit., 112. 
44 “Such questions were provoked by Jerome’s phrase, Comm. in Ezech. I:1 (PL, 25, 
22) “Et tam hanc ipsan quoque conscientiam cernimus praecipitare apud quosdam 
et suum locum ammittere”. Lottin, O., Psychologie et Morale, II, op. cit., 115-119. 
45 “Ratione ergo usus talis sinderesis comparatur scintillae, ratione simpticitatis 
puero, ratione contemplationis rerum supracelestium aquila... secundum dicentes 
sinderesim esse desiderium, deberet sinderesis potius figurari per vitulum quam 
per aquilam”. Lottin, O., Psychologie et Morale, II, op. cit., 122. 
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(1203-8) that natural law is an “instinct of human nature”, adding that 
its discovery arises from a “contemplation of a unique sort”46.  
The XII Century progress can then be summarised as follows: 
synderesis becomes part of the mandatory discussions in all universi-
ties thanks to Peter Lombard’s inclusion of Jerome’s commentary in 
his Sentences. The jurists on their own develop the topic of natural law 
mainly based on Cicero as transmitted and changed slightly by Isi-
dore’s Ethymologies47. Both topics are linked by Simon de Bisiano. 
Thanks to Stephen Langton the name and topic of synderesis becomes 
a topic on its own. From then on there is an open discussion whether 
synderesis belongs to the intellect or the will, and its relationship with 
conscience and natural law and that at these early stages there is no 
clear agreement between the different proposals. 
 
5. XIII Century: first half 
Taking into account that there is a chronological continuity be-
cause the division on centuries is arbitrary, the XIII Century is where 
the topic of synderesis is dealt with in depth and somehow crystallises 
to our days. The topics dealt with in the previous Century continue 
during the first half of the XIII century. The second half is where the 
three great minds of medieval philosophy, Albert the Great, Thomas 
of Aquinas and Bonaventure give the two classical and somehow di-
vergent approaches to synderesis. After then the commentators will 
repeat either Thomas or Bonaventure positions, while others will fol-
low the “via nova” and not even mention the topic, for example, 
William of Ockham. 
a) William of Auxerre (1231), who lived across the two centu-
ries, dealt with synderesis in his Summa Aurea. He was asked by Pope 
Gregory IX to revise the available books of Aristotle in Latin in spite 
of his Augustinian background. He defended that synderesis was 
within Augustines’ ratio superior but that nevertheless, it could be 
corrupted48. Also “in his Summa he connects the precepts of natural 
law to those of synderesis”49, and in this he influenced Phillip the 
Chancellor.  
                                                 
46 Greene, R.A., op. cit., 180.  
47 “In a recurrent way, Cicero underlines his purpose of attaining a plane of philo-
sophically organic justification of the moral order”. Cfr. Corso de Estrada, L., 
“Marcus Tullius Cicero and the Role of Nature in the Knowledge of Moral Good”, 
Natural Law: Historical, Systematic and Juridical Approaches (Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2008), 9. 
48 “Quaeritur utrum ratio peccet et praecipue utrum ratio superior sive sinderesis 
peccet. Nobis videtur sine praejudicio quod sinderesis est superior pars rationis et 
Ipsa aliquando peccat”. Lottin, O., Psychologie et Morale, II, op. cit., 123 and p. 
125 note 1. 
49 Celano, A., “The Foundation of Moral Reasoning”, Diametros, 38 (2013) p. 9. 
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b) Hugh of Saint-Cher, O.P., (c. 1200–1263) and his disciples 
followed William of Auxerre’s proposals. Roland of Cremona (1178–
1259), clarified that the conscience´s errors do not come from syn-
deresis, but from the “ratio inferior”50. William of Auvergne (1180-
1249) disagrees with his predecessors saying that synderesis51 is not a 
different faculty, but one of the functions52 of the “ratio superior inas-
much as it makes the natural law known”53.  
c) Phillip Chancellor (c. 1160-1236). The importance of Phillip 
is highlighted by Cuningham when he compares his work with what 
his predecessors had achieved: “From the middle of the twelfth cen-
tury, the recurrence of the concept of synderesis sparked a number of 
questions, but almost invariably these questions dealt only with its 
properties... What is synderesis? Remained largely unanswered. The 
merit from this impressive undertaking falls to Phillip the Chancel-
lor”54. In his Summa de bono he was the one who “virtually created 
the formal treatise on the subject”55. But not only his contemporaries 
speak well of his work; the fact that most of his successors followed 
his scheme of topics and most of his solutions, also conveys his origi-
nality. “Later writers... and even St. Thomas Aquinas, did little more 
than discuss, and in the same order, the questions raised by Phillip. In 
the successors of Phillip the Chancellor little that is novel appears, be-
yond a certain ringing of the changes on the concepts of synderesis, 
conscience, natural law and habitus”56. Phillip puts it in this way: “re-
garding synderesis which is called the spark of conscience we should 
ask... whether it is a power of the soul... or a connatural habit of the 
soul? And if it is a power whether it belongs to the superior or inferior 
part of the soul, as Augustine classifies them in The Trinity book, and 
the Master of the Sentences repeats... To which it should be said that 
                                                 
50 “Synderesis est summus rex in regno animae et imperat non fieri malum, et non 
obeditur sibi sicut facit bonus abbas et mali monachi non obediunt ...non sic se 
habet superior ratio ad inferiorem sicut inferior ratio ad inferiores vires et vide 
quare; aliquando non potest prohibere inferiorem rationem, quia inferior ratio ab-
strahitur et allicitur, id est inficitur dulcedine peccatti”. Lottin, O., Psychologie et 
Morale, II, op. cit., 133.  
51 “Hoc autem sufficienter fit per donumscientiae antedictae, sive per scientiam legis 
Dei: supervacuae igiturt ponunt synderesim istam”. William of Auvergne De An-
ima, t. 2, c. 7, 13, 219. Ed. William, and Roland J. Teske (Milwaukee, WI: 
Marquette UP, 2000). 
52 “Ex his igitur omnibus manifestum est tibi quod synderesis nunquam errans et 
nunquam cessans a contradictione et rebellione malorum non potest esse vel dici 
in anima humana nisi splendor iste legis, naturalis aut vis intellectiva inquantum 
splendet lumine huius legis scilicet naturalis”. Lottin, O., Psychologie et Morale, 
II, op. cit., 125, note 2.  
53 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 159.  
54 Cunningham, S. B., Reclaiming Moral Agency, op. cit., 220. 




synderesis, even if according to the form receives the name of a habit-
ual power, I say that it is an innate habit not an acquired one”57. In an 
interesting remain of his Augustine tradition Phillip situates synderesis 
above freedom58. Synderesis belongs to the superior part of the soul, 
while freedom belongs to the inferior part. In this way he guarantees 
the infallibility and universality of morals as Plato did. There is some 
identification of synderesis with the innate will disposition to the good 
that “will lead to Bonaventura’s concept of the synderesis as the will’s 
natural inclination”59.  
d) Alexander of Hales (c. 1185–1245). Alexander’s Gloss on the 
Four Books of the Sentences of Peter Lombard “was particularly im-
portant because it was the first time that a book other than the Bible 
was used at the ordinary hours reserved for the study of the Bible”60. 
So his influence was great. On our topic he explained the relationship 
between natural law, conscience and synderesis. Conscience and syn-
deresis are both involved in the cognitive and affective parts of the 
soul61. In the hierarchy of knowledge conscience is above reason and 
synderesis above conscience62. For him “natural law is the primary 
rule, regulating reason through conscience and will through syn-
deresis. However, the distinction between conscience and synderesis 
                                                 
57 “Quaerendum est de synderesi, quae dicitur scintilla conscientiae... utrum sit po-
tentia animae es an habitus aliquis connaturalis a principio ens in anima? Et si est 
potentia utrum sit illa quae est ratio secundum superiorem vel inferiorem partem 
ejus, prout dividit Augustinus in libro de Trinitate, et Magister in Sententiis ejus 
recitat divisionem... Ad quod dicendum est quod synderesis, licet secundum for-
mam nominis habitualis potentia, non dico de habitu acquisito sed innato”. Lottin, 
O., Op. cit., II, op. cit., 1948), 140–2, 145–8.  
58 “Intellectus duobus modis accipitur. Quandoque dicitur intellectus cognitio prin-
cipiorum in unaquaque facultate, secundum quod dicit Aristóteles quod intellectus 
est acceptio immediate propositionis, et secundum hoc intellectus semper est verus 
in speculativis; eodem modo sinderesis semper est vera quantum ad primam viam 
in faciendis; quia sicut in speculatiuis sunt quaedam quae per se sunt nota, que sunt 
pura natura speculationis, ita in agendis sunt quedam principia agendi per se nota, 
in quibus ius nature consistit. Quandoque dicitur intellectus potentia intelligendi 
usualiter, et huius est conferre intelligibilia, et quandoque utitur apparentibus ra-
tionibus, quandoque existentibus, et sic intellectus quandoque est verus, 
quandoque est falsus, sicut dicit Aristóteles quod intellectus potens est fingere mul-
tas compositiones que non ueniunt in rerum natura”. Phillip the Chancellor, 
Summa Aurea, (Paris-Rome: J. Ribaillier, 1982), II, X, c. 6, q. 1, ad. 1), 302.  
59 Celano, A., “The Foundation of Moral Reasoning”, op. cit., 13. 
60 Brown, S. F., - Flores, J. C., The A to Z of Medieval Philosophy And Theology 
(Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow, 2010). 
61 Alexander of Hales, Summa II.73.1.2 (Florence: Quaracchi, 1949), II.418.  
62 “Lex naturalis non est conscientia nec synderesis licet extendendo conveniant in 
hoc quod est regulare. Differunt tamen quoniam lex proprie est regula facultatis, 
et primo et per se; mediante autem conscientia est regula facultatis et primo et per 
se; mendiante aut est regula rationis, quonian conscientia ex lege formatur; medi-
ante vero synderesi, quae est scintilla conscientiae, est regula ipsius voluntatis”. 




is a bit blurring when he affirms that in conscience there are two levels 
and that the superior one is the same as synderesis”63.  
e) John of La Rochelle (c. 1200–1245). This author clarifies 
three senses of conscience: a) one as synderesis; b) the second as the 
habitus naturalis dictandi bonum et malum and; c) the third as “opinio 
habita de agendis vel non agendis”64. This already shows a desire of 
combining the nature of synderesis with its function and relating it 
with conscience which will be done later by Albert the Great and his 
disciple Aquinas.  
f) Other authors. One of them was Gautier de Chateau Thierry 
(Gualterus de Casto Theodorici,1249). He continues the discussion 
trying to distinguish and relate the terms. Gautier distinguishes four 
meanings of conscience: natural law, synderesis, judgment of inferior 
reason and the habitus naturalis or superior part of reason. He con-
cludes that the four are the same faculty “conscience” endowed with a 
habitus and with different operations. Another was Odo Rigaldus 
(1275). According to Davies, Odo “seems to have had direct influ-
ence on Bonaventure’s understanding of synderesis”65, in that he 
stresses that synderesis belongs to the affective part of the soul and 
conscience exclusively to the knowledge. He considers that synderesis 
illuminates conscience, to which Bonaventure disagrees66.  
The stage is ready now for the classic treatment of synderesis 
which will remain fixed up to our days thanks to the work of Albert, 
Aquinas and Bonaventure in the second half of the Century.  
 
6. XIII Century: second half 
The second half of the XIII Century sees the change of influence 
from the Platonic interpretation of synderesis as “ratio superior” to the 
Aristotelian view of synderesis being the major premise of the moral 
syllogism, change that culminates in the works of Albert the Great and 
his disciple Aquinas. As Crowe insinuates, this is the time in which 
the classic theories on synderesis, conscience, practical intellect are 
casted: “it was not until the thirteenth Century that the uncertainties of 
terminology involved between conscience, synderesis, ratio superior 
and scintilla were resolved”67.  
                                                 
63 Summa II.73.2.6, (Florence: Quaracchi, 1949), 426. Cf. Davies, R. G., “The Force 
of Union: Affect and Ascent in the Theology of Bonaventure”, (Cambridge: Digi-
tal Access to Scholarship at Harvard, Harvard, 2012), 41. Accessed February, 26 
2015, http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9385627.  
64 Cfr. Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 160-161.  
65 Davies, R. G., “The Force of Union: Affect and Ascent in the Theology of Bona-
venture” (Cambridge: Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard, Harvard, 2012), 
42. 
66 Lottin, O., Op. cit., II.1.  
67 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 158.  
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a) Bonaventure (1221–1274)68. Bonaventure’s interpretation of 
synderesis is highly influenced by Thomas Gallus (ca. 1200-1246) in 
his Mystical Explanatio in libris Dionysii, probably received through 
Odo of Rigaud. According to Gallus, synderesis is the “vis anima” 
(motor of the soul) and the spark of the soul, which is the one able to 
unite the soul to the divine spirit whenever God touches the soul and 
ignites it in pure ecstasy of love69. Both Gallus and Odo consider syn-
deresis to be a light that illuminates conscience. Bonaventure differs 
with them on this point; for him synderesis is not light, it is heat. Light 
is knowledge and as such it belongs to conscience. In the same way 
that the intellect judges with the help of some innate natural light, the 
will has its own natural weight which guides it to what is good. It is 
worth to note that Bonaventure does not use light –lumen– but weight 
–pondus–, to stress that synderesis belong to the affective domain not 
to the cognitive70. To make this distinction clearer, Bonaventure com-
pares conscience and synderesis with the supernatural virtues; while 
faith is knowledge, charity is affection: “synderesis is to conscience as 
charity is to faith, or as the habit of affect itself is to the habit of the 
practical intellect”71. This in Bonaventure does not mean a decrease of 
the importance of the intelligence as Davies points out: “In doing so, 
the intellect is not so much abandoned as drawn up into and concen-
trated in the faculty of love, since for Bonaventure the faculties are 
ultimately identical to the soul itself in substance. Thus the mens is 
exceeded in a way that includes the intellect within the faculty of af-
fect”72. For St. Bonaventure “There is symmetry of activities, and 
natural dotation. In the same way that the intelligence is endowed with 
principles to judge and lead to the truth, so in the appetite there should 
be a natural inclination to the good, and this is synderesis”73. 
That the intelligence is natural does not mean that it comes with 
preconceived knowledge as Plato defended. Bonaventure quotes Aris-
totle saying that the intelligence is like a “tabula rasa”. Bonaventure 
agrees with Aristotle: “As the philosopher says ‘there is nothing in the 
intelligence that was not first in the senses’ and ‘all our knowledge 
starts in the senses’ which should be understood that all that is in the 
                                                 
68 This section owes many of the insights to the umpublished doctoral dissertation 
of Robert G. Davies: “The Force of Union: Affect and Ascent in the Theology of 
Bonaventure” (Cambridge: Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard, 2012). Ac-
cessed December 14, 2014. 
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9385627/Davis_gsas.har-
vard_0084L_10307.pdf?sequence=1.  
69 Lawell, D., “Affective Excess: Ontology and Knowledge in the Thought of 
Thomas Gallus”, Dionysius, 26, (2008), 147. 
70 “Intellectus; aut necesse erit praeter conscientiam et synderesim ponere in nobis 
aliquod directivum, aut necesse est ponere, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte af-
fectus”. In II Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, concl. ed. (Florence: Quaracchi, 1949), II. 910. 
71 Bonaventure, St., In II Sent d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4, Opera Omnia, (Florence: Collegii 
S. Bonaventurae, 1837), 911.  
72 Davies, R. G., “The Force of Union: Affect and Ascent in the Theology of Bona-
venture”, op. cit., 21. 
73 Bonaventure, St., In II Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, fund. 4, Opera Omnia, op. cit., 908. 
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intelligence is an abstract simile”74. The power it has is just potential 
until it is successively activated by the senses: “no one would ever 
know ‘whole’ or ‘part’ or ‘father’ or ‘mother’ without some exterior 
sense receiving its species”75. Similarly, synderesis needs to be acti-
vated. Bonaventure argued that conscience is an acquired habit in two 
senses: insofar as it depends on the acquisition of species derived from 
sense to judge universals and particulars, and insofar as it needs sup-
plemental education to judge particulars. Because of this, conscience 
has two levels, which Langston calls “potential” and “applied con-
science”76. Potential conscience is the power the soul has to know the 
general principles of action, like “obey God”, “respect your parents”. 
This conscience is innate, as a power, not in its contents, but cannot be 
wrong. “As the gloss and saints say, synderesis per se always encour-
ages to the good and rebukes evil, while we are in this life”77. The 
applied conscience is the application of the general rules to the specific 
situations of life.  
Bonaventure’s conception of synderesis, therefore, contrasts 
with his predecessors in that he considers conscience as an exclusive 
habit of knowledge and attributes to synderesis exclusively an affec-
tive or motivational purpose. Simplifying his proposal, we can say that 
synderesis is the flame that kindles conscience, or saying it with an-
other example, it is the starter, the mover that coaxes conscience to 
work; conscience becomes the repository of the general rules of be-
haviour in a first instance and then in a second level, applies those 
rules to the particular circumstances of each decision. Both synderesis 
and conscience at the general level are innate and therefore cannot be 
suppressed, though both can be obscured by lack of exercise or by us-
ing them incorrectly78.  
But there is a second sense in which Bonaventure speaks of syn-
deresis, which is linked with Augustin’s and Gallus’ mysticism. 
Synderesis is the highest degree of union with God. It is not an intel-
lectual union as in Aristotle or Aquinas but a loving union, and this is 
                                                 
74 “Unde si aliquando dicat Philosophus (Aristotle, De anima, III, 4), quod «nihil est 
in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu» et quod «omnis cognitio habet ortum 
a sensu»; intelligendum est de illis quae quidem habent esse in anima per similitu-
dinem abstractam; et illa dicuntur esse in anima ad modum scripturae”. 
Bonaventure, St., In II Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, concl. Ibid., 904. 
75 “Nemo enim imquam cognosceret totum, aut partem, aut patrem, aut matreni, nisi 
sensu aliquo exteriori speciem eius acciperet; et hinc est, quod «amittentes unum 
sensum necesse habemus unam scientiam amittere"». Illud aulem lumen sive nat-
urale iudicatorium dirigit ipsam animam in iudicando tamde cognoscibilibus quam 
de operabilibus”. Bonaventure, St., In II Sent. d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, concl. Ibid., 903. 
76 Langston, D., “The spark of conscience: Bonaventure’s view of conscience and 
synderesis”, op. cit., 80. 
77 “Sicut dicunt Sancti et Glossae manifeste, synderesis, quantum est de se, semper 
habet ad bonum stimulare et peccato remurmurare, quandiu sumus in statu viae”. 
Bonaventure, St., In II Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, Opera Omnia, op. cit., 914. 
78 For a more detailed discusión of the relationship between synderesis and con-
sciensce, cfr. Lázaro, M., “Vivencia Interior de la Ley Natural en San 
Buenaventura: Sindéresis”, Anuario Filosófico, 41/1 (2008) p. 87.  
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why he speaks of an excess of affection79; a coming out of oneself, or 
better, rapture, a taking up by God himself. Actually this is the main 
topic of Bonaventure’s book The Itinerary of the soul towards God. 
The purpose of life is this itinerary, and the purpose is to identitfy with 
Christ, perfectly reflected in the life of his founder, Francis of Assisi. 
Limiting ourselves to the epistemological way it consists of six steps: 
the first two are based on the world (outside the soul, where it discov-
ers the traces of God) and are sense and imagination; the following 
two are based on the person (within the soul where the soul discovers 
the image of God) and are reason and the intellect; and the last two are 
beyond reason (beyond the soul, where it unites with God) and are 
intelligence and the spark of synderesis, which is the summit of the 
soul: “We have six steps in our ascend towards God, ‘Therefore, ac-
cording to the six stages of ascension unto God, there are six stages of 
the soul’s powers by which we mount from the depths to the heights, 
from the external to the internal, from the temporal to the eternal - to 
wit, sense, imagination, reason, intellect, intelligence, and the apex of 
the mind, the illumination of synderesis. These stages are implanted in 
us by nature, deformed by sin, reformed by grace, to be purged by 
justice, exercised by knowledge, perfected by wisdom”80. This pas-
sage suggests that the transformation that occurs in the soul’s 
exceeding of itself is fundamentally one of the soul’s motions. To 
know God ecstatically means to be drawn out of oneself and into God. 
Another name for the soul’s motion toward its object is amor. Thus 
one could say that to love God is to know God in an ecstatic way, or 
conversely, that to know God ecstatically is love, “because this is a 
difficult type of knowledge that can only be acquired by the experts 
and only if the experts are rooted and grounded in love”81. 
Bonaventure’s conception of conscience and synderesis is con-
sidered opposite to that of Albert the Great, his disciple Aquinas and 
                                                 
79 “Excessivum autem modum cognoscendi dico, non quo cognoscens excedat cog-
nitum, sed quo cognoscens fertur in obiectum excedens excessivo quodam modo, 
erigendo se supra se ipsum”. Bonaventure, St., Quaestiones Disputatae De Scien-
tia Christi, q. 7, concl. op.cit, VII, 40. 
80 “Iuxta igitur sex gradus ascensionis in Deum sex sunt gradus potentiarum animae, 
per quos ascendimus ab imis ad summa, ab exterioribus ad intima, a temporalibus 
conscendimus ad aeterna, scilicet sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia 
et apex mentis seu synderesis scintilla. Hos gradus in nobis habemus plantatos per 
naturam, deformatos per culpa, reformatos per gratiam; purgandos per institiam 
exercendos per scientiam, perficiendos per sapientiam”. Bonaventure, St., Opera 
Omnia, op. cit., V. 5, 297. op.cit.  
81 “De quo etiam mystice quasi est tota Scriptura divina, et de quo Apocalypsis 
secundo: “Dabo ei calculum, et in calculo nomen novum scriptum, quod nemo scit, 
nisi qui accipit”; quia istum cognoscendi modum vix aut nunquam intelligit nisi 
expertus, nec expertus, nisi qui est “in caritate radicatus et fundatus, ut possit com-
prehendere cum omnibus Sanctis, quae sit longitudo, latitudo etc”; in quo etiam 
experimentalis et vera consistit sapientia, quae inchoatur in via et consummatur in 
patria; ad cuius circumlocutionem magis sunt idoneae negationes quam affirma-
tiones, et superpositiones quam positivae praedicationes; ad cuius experientiam 
plus valet internum silentium quam exterius verbum. Et ideo hic finis verbi 
habendus est, et orandus Dominus, ut experiri donet quod loquimur”. Bonaventure, 
St., Scientia Christi, d. 7, 19, Ibid., vol 5, 43.  
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their commentators. Bonaventure’s is the archetype of the affective 
(Augustinian, Platonic) view while Aquinas will be the prototype of 
the intellectual view (Dominican, Aristotelian)82. We shall see how all 
this is significant to Polo’s proposal in the next chapters. 
b) Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280). Albertus Magnus, as his 
name indicates, is one of the great thinkers of medieval times. His im-
portance is shaded by his outstanding disciple Aquinas, who built upon 
and improved some of his master’s findings. Regarding the topic at 
hand, Albert uses the word synderesis at least 145 times in his works, 
most of them in his Summa Theologiae83. Even if statistics are not as 
important as the content it does give an indication of the consideration 
given by an author to the topic, for example, as we already commented 
in the introduction, Aquinas uses the word almost as twice as his mas-
ter: 255 times. 
Albertus Magnus’ understanding of synderesis evolved as he 
managed to gain access to Aristotle’s successive translations of the 
Ethic to Nichomacus. His complete second commentary to it, Super 
Ethica, was finished shortly before 1250, and “It was the most influ-
ential work on Ethics in the Middle Ages”84. Of the works in which he 
mentions synderesis we shall concentrate on what is referred to as De 
Synderesi, though it is not an independent treatise, but question 71 of 
his Summa de Creaturis, in De Homine”85. We shall add some com-
ments from his later work the Summa Theologiae, which was left 
unfinished upon his death in 1280.  
With his habitual clarity Albert starts by defining what he under-
stands by synderesis attributing it to Basil, though Basil did not use 
the term. He defines it as “the power of the mind which has within it 
the seeds of judgment by which we separate the evil from the good”86. 
In a similar way, he links natural law with synderesis, this time under 
                                                 
82 Cfr. The section on “Theological Concept of Consciensce in: Zagar, J., Acting on 
Principles: A Thomistic Perspective in Making Moral Decisions. (Orlando: Wipf 
and Stock Publishers, 2010). Also the article Billy D.J., “The Autority of Con-
science in Bonaventure and Aquinas”, Moralia, 31 (1993), 237-263. 
83 The search was done in the Waterloo University Alberti Magni E-corpus using 
“sinderes” as the searching word with the following results: 113 (145) matches 
(instances) in all selected texts: 1 (1) match (instances) in De XV Problematibus 
(ed. Mandonnet, 1908); 4 (6) matches (instances) in De IV Coaequaevis (ed. 
Borgnet, 1895); 14 (20) matches (instances) in Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 
1893-4); 94 (118) matches (instances) in Summa Theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-
5) Accessed Nov 10, 2014. http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/cgi-bin/cgiwrap/alber-
tus/searchAlbertus.cgi.  
84 Celano, A., “The Foundation of Moral Reasoning”, op. cit., 20. 
85 While Albert scarcely mentions the concept of synderesis in his other works on 
moral philosophy, he devotes an entire section to its importance for moral action 
in the De homine” Celano, Ibid., 25”. 
86 “Diffinitio synderesis, scilicet quod ipsa est virtus animi habens in se naturaliter 
sibi insita et inserta semina judicandi, per quam mala segregamus a bonis”. Alber-




the authority of St. Augustine, who did not use the term either: “uni-
versal law is written by nature in the natural judgement: and he calls 
the natural judgement synderesis”87. The third authority he uses is St. 
Jerome’s passage on Ezekiel, which he quotes extensively. It is inter-
esting that it concludes that synderesis is the only of the four faculties 
Ezekiel mentions, which is spiritual, the other three being linked to the 
body (irascible is linked to the gall, the concupiscible with the liver, 
and the reason to the brain, but synderesis is above them)88. Following 
Jerome’s version, he also quotes St. Paul reference to the “spirit” 
which he links to synderesis as both being above reason: “synderesis 
is the spirit that intercedes for us with indescribable cries”89.  
Of great interest is that Albert links synderesis with the “agent 
intellect” which is also the light of science and prudence. The agent 
intellect is the light that illuminates both the theoretical and practical 
intelligences from the first principles of knowledge and action; first 
principles which as such cannot be demonstrated (to avoid regress to 
the infinite) and therefore are self-evident90. Synderesis is then the 
place of the first principles of practical action. Albert affirms never-
theless, as Bonaventure also saw, that the general principles, in spite 
of being innate, are empty until they are put into practice91. This is 
probably why he likes to quote Basil’s reference to synderesis as hav-
ing “the seeds of judgment”. “Albert does not claim that the principles 
of synderesis are learned, but rather that reason comes to recognize 
them through teaching and practice”92.  
Regarding whether synderesis is a power or a habit, Albert con-
cludes that it is a power with a habit “potentia cum habitu”93 because 
it is able to judge and simultaneously incline towards the good. He also 
                                                 
87 “Quod ipsa sit virtus animae habetur a beato Augustino (S. Augustinus, Lib. II De 
libero arbitrio, cap. 10) qui dicit quod universalia juris scripta sunt naturaliter in 
naturali judicatorio: appellans naturale judicatorium synderesim”. Ibid. 
88 “Tertium est, quod ipsa sola inter quatuor est sine organo per omnem modum, ex 
eo quod ratio ponitur in arce cerebri, irascibilis vero in felle, concupiscibilis autem 
in jecore, ista vero extra, hoc est, supra haec”. Albertus Magnus, De Creaturis, q. 
71, a. 1, 3, in Opera Omnia, op. cit., vol. V, 35, 591. 
89 “Synderesis is spiritus qui interpelat pro nobis gemitus inenarrabilitibus”. Albertus 
Magnus, De Creaturis, q. 71, a. 1, 4 op.cit. Ibid., vol V, 35, 591. 
90 “Si autem quaeritur, quae sit illa vis naturae, dico, quod absque dubio illa naturae 
vis est lumen intellectus agentis, cuius lumen est species specierum intelligibi-
lium… Illud enim lumen distinctum ad species terminorum, quae sunt in principiis 
primi intellectus agentis et practici, facit per se, hoc est sine probatione et demon-
stratione, asssentire principiis primis scientiarum et operationum”. Albertus 
Magnus, De bono, tr. V, q. 1, a. 1, in Opera omnia, 28, (Münster: H. Kühle et al., 
Aschendorff, 1951), 265, ll. 58–67.  
91 Albertus Magnus, De bono, tr. I, q. 4, a. 2, in Opera omnia, 28, op.cit., 49, ll. 70–
78.  
92 Ibid. p. 527, ll. 21–26. 
93 “Licet enim potentia de se non juvet potentiam vel inclinet ad bonum, tamen 
potentia cum habitu juvat et inclinat”. Albertus Magnus, De Creaturis, q. 72, a. 1 
sol, in Opera Omnia, op. cit., vol 35, 599. 
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says that it is not part of reason, but of the intellect, and more specifi-
cally of the practical intellect. He connects it with the upper intellect 
following Augustine’s classification. He also subscribes that syn-
deresis never errs, “numquam habet errorem”, because it deals with 
universal reasons, and errors are due to the particular application of 
the principles. He explains this in the article on conscience. “The ma-
jor of this syllogism is synderesis of which is proper to incline to the 
good due to the universal reasons of goodness”94. Regarding whether 
synderesis was not affected by original sin (fomes peccati) he indicates 
that synderesis is what is furthest from corruption and indicates that 
some authors say that synderesis was never corrupted because it did 
not suffer the consequences of the fall, but he leaves it just as a com-
ment. One very interesting last question he answers is: why did classic 
philosophers not speak about synderesis? In his answer he compares 
“philosophi” with “sancti”, and says that philosophers decided morals 
on pure human understanding, while the saints placed moral law above 
human, in divine justice, and therefore they looked for eternal rea-
sons95. 
In the next question, following the order of Lombards’ Sen-
tences, he discusses conscience which he defines as the conclusion of 
a practical syllogism: “We affirm that conscience is the conclusion of 
the practical reasoning of two premises being the major synderesis and 
the second reason”96. From this definition it is easy for him to explain 
how conscience does err and therefore how it can be distorted in the 
following two short articles. As Celano points out, Aristotle’s psychol-
ogy is the key to interpret Albert’s understanding of synderesis and 
conscience: “The Aristotelian doctrines of the practical syllogism and 
the relation between the speculative and the practical intellect were the 
framework that he used to explain the relationship between synderesis 
                                                 
94 “Et istae quaestiones ponunt talem syllogismum: Omne bonum faciendum: hoc 
est bonum: ergo hoc est faciendum. Major autem istius syllogismi est synderesis, 
cujus est inclinare in bonum per universales rationes boni. Minor vero est rationis, 
cujus est conferre particulare ad universale. Conclusio autem est conscientiae. 
Quod sic probatur: Ab omnibus communiter supponitur, quod conscientia aggravat 
vel excusat in toto vel in parte. Inter tres autem actus praehabitos primus non at-
tingit actum particularem, sive opus meritorium vel demeritorium hoc vel illud. 
Secundus autem qui rationis est, non est de faciendo, sed de ratione faciendi: cum 
enim dicit, quod hoc est bonum, rationem dicit faciendi, sed nec adhuc imperat 
faciendum vel non faciendum: sed quando infert per modum sententiae hoc esse 
faciendum vel non faciendum, tunc excusat si sequitur in illo opere, vel excusat si 
non sequitur. Dicendum ergo ad primum, quod actus conscientiae est actus ra-
tionis, sed consequens ex alio actu praecedente”. Albertus Magnus, De Creaturis 
q. 72, a. 1 sol. Op.cit. 
95 “Dicendum, quod Philosophi distinguunt potentias secundum objecta generalia: et 
si considerant operabilia, faciunt hoc secundum rationem juris humani. Sancti 
autem specialius distinguunt secundum jus divinum et humanum, et secundum 
principia juris, et parlicularia inventa: et ideo Sancti ponunt synderesim ad prin-
cipia et portionem superiorem rationis, quae inhaerescit justitiae divinae 
contemplandae secundum rationes aeternas, quarum neutrum ponunt Philosophi”. 
Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae, II, q. 71, a. 1, ad 10.  Ibid., vol 35, 594. 
96 “Dicimus, quod conscientia conclusio est rationis practicae ex duobus praemissis, 
quarum major est synderesis, et minor rationis”. Albertus Magnus, De Creaturis 
q. 72, a. 1 sol. Ibid., vol 35, 599. 
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and conscience. Synderesis provides the general principles of action 
to the practical intellect which brings the situation to be judged and the 
judgment becomes the conscience. From the general rules of what is 
good, we come to the application of the judgement to the particular 
situation”97.  
Albert attributes synderesis also to angels. This is pure theology 
or reasoning based on the strength of the truth of revelation. We bring 
it here to stress how Albert believes that synderesis is purely spiritual 
as we have seen in the quotation from De Homine above. He quotes 
Isaiah to show that the demons have remorse, which means that there 
is something within them that prompts them on the good and the bad. 
From this he claims that the good angels should have the same but 
making them happy rather than unhappy, by knowing they have taken 
the right decision98: “Then it should be confirmed that both good and 
bad angels have synderesis, in the good for rejoicing of their con-
science, in the bad for their affliction and the sadness of their 
conscience”99.  
Albert deals more directly on synderesis in question 99 of the 
second part where, in three articles, he successively considers the will, 
synderesis and conscience. It is interesting to note that he does not 
repeat the arguments of De Homine. The quote is brief, and the expla-
nation shorter. He now quotes Gregory on his commentary to Ezechiel, 
I, 10 instead of quoting Jerome´s classic text. He does quote Jerome 
but this time on the commentary to Malach., II, 15: “By the wife of 
your adolescence he understands natural law inscribed in the heart and 
in the spirit. By the spirit is not understood the animal part that does 
not perceive what is from God, but the rational spirit that claims for us 
with unspeakable groans”100. He also links the spirit with synderesis 
and with natural law. Albert introduces a new quote from Augustin 
from the first book On Children´s Baptism, and relates the innate light 
which is later developed unto maturity with synderesis: “Such light 
                                                 
97 Celano, A., “The Foundation of Moral Reasoning”, op. cit., 24. 
98 “Solutio. Dicendum, sicut dicitur, Isaias, LXVI, 24: Vermis eorum non morietur. 
Sicut daemones habent afflictionem ignis: ita etiam habent afflictionem ex remorsu 
conscientiae, sive synderesis murmurantis contra malum, et remordentis pec-
cantem. Unde concedendum est, quod synderesis est in bonis et in malis Angelis, 
sed in bonis ad jucunditatem conscientiae, in malis autem ad afflictionem et tristi-
tiam ejusdem conscientiae”. Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae, II, tract 5 q. 25 
m. 2 a. 3, in Opera Omnia, op. cit., vol. 32, 284. 
99 “Unde concedendum est, quod synderesis est in bonis et in malis Angelis, sed in 
bonis ad jucunditatem conscientiae, in malis autem ad afflictionem et tristitiam 
ejusdem conscientiae”. Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae, II, tract 5, q. 24 m. 
2 a. 3 sol, op.cit.  
100 “Per uxorem adolescentiae intelligit legem naturalem scriptam in corde et in spir-
itu. Spiritus vero dicitur non animalis pars quae non percipit quae Dei sunt, sed 
rationalis spiritus, qui postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus”. Albertus 
Magnus, Summa Theologiae, II tract 16, q. 99, ob., vol 33, 235, op.cit. 
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that always shines the good cannot be other than synderesis”101. He 
quotes also Aristotle using the parallel between the speculative reason 
and the agent intellect “that is like a light in the soul that rejects what 
is false and lights what is true where there is a light always inclining 
to the good, that cannot but be synderesis”102. Albert keeps to his pre-
vious conclusion that synderesis is a power completed with a habit 
“synderesis is a power with a habit within”; “synderesis dicit po-
tentiam cum habitu completam”103. His main argument is an argument 
of authority104: “one only thing can be replied, that the power of the 
reason, is enumerated among the powers by the saints and the philos-
ophers, principally the Platonic”. Regarding where this power inheres 
Albert seems to be happy both with Aristotle and Plato saying that it 
inheres in the ‘deliberative reason’ according to Plato and more pre-
cisely Aristotle in the ‘practical intellect’. Similarly Albert does not 
mind to say that is “part of the natural will”105, but he does not specify 
reasons as he did in the De Homine.  
In the article’s two solutions there is an interesting distinction 
that we may use later when discussing Polo’s views on synderesis. Al-
bert distinguishes the relationship between synderesis and the powers 
above and below it, while defending that synderesis as such cannot err 
regarding what is superior to it (he does not specify here what he 
means by superior) in the same way that a horseman can fall because 
his horse fails him, not because the horseman’s fault. The powers he 
places under synderesis are the “liberum arbitrium” (free choice), the 
will and reason106.  
                                                 
101 “Illud lumen quod cum semper illuminet ad bonum, non videtur aliud esse quan 
synderesis”. Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae, II, tract 16, q. 99, a. 1. Ibid., 
vol. 35, 235. 
102 “Philosophi posuerunt lumen semper incendens ad verum, quod est intellectus 
agens: qui (sicut dicit Aristóteles in III De anima) est in anima sicut lux quae re-
pugnat falso et illuminat ad verum. Cum ergo hoc magis necessarium sit in 
practicis quam in speculativis, ad perfectionem rationalis animae pertinet, quod in 
operabilibus sive practicis sit lumen inclinans semper in bonum, et remurmurans 
malo hoc autem lumen non potest esse nisi synderesis, quia directe habet actum 
synderesis, et lumen est habitus et non potentia: ergo synderesis est habitus et non 
potential”. Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae, Pars II, tract. 16, q. 99, m. 2, art. 
1, 235 b.  
103 Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae, II, tract. 16, q. 99, memb. 2, a. l.  
104 “Et ad omnia quae inducta sunt, una sola responsione respondent, quod ratione 
potentiae quam dicit, numeratur cum potentiis a Sanctis, et a Philosophis, maxime 
Platonicis”. Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae, Pars II, tract.16, q. 99, m.2, art. 
1 solutio, 235 b. 
105 “Si sit aliquid voluntatis? Distinguendum, quod duplexest voluntas, naturalis scil-
ícet, et deliberativa: et concedendum est, quod non est sine voluntate naturali, sed 
nihil est voluntatis deliberative”. Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae, Pars II, 
tract. 16, q. 99, m. 2, art. 1, solution, 236 b. 
106 “Quod synderesis proprium est non peccare secundum se: tamen habet duas com-
parationes: unam scilicet ad superius, et secundum hanc numquam peccat: alteram 
quae est ad inferius quod regit, hoc est, ad liberum arbitrium, et ad rationem, et ad 
voluntatem extra quas et supra quas est, ut dicit Gregorius et secundum hunc 
modum praecipitatur per accidens, sicut miles cadente equo qui casus non est vit-
ium militis, sed equi et non refertur ad militem, nisi quia non tenuit per fraenum 
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He explains this relationship better in the 2nd article of the 2nd 
section of this question when distinguishing conscience from syn-
deresis. Albert clarifies that what is above synderesis is the habit of 
natural law “habitum legis naturalis”, and that because of this, syn-
deresis is a kind of “content” that has a relationship with conscience. 
What is very interesting is that Albert clarifies that this is what makes 
synderesis a “potentia habitualis” rather than an empty power “po-
tentia nuda”. Conscience nevertheless is related also to the “liberum 
arbitrium”, will and reason. Both are under synderesis and can be 
wrong. So, the facth that conscience can be wrong or right, clean or 
stained, is not a direct consequence of its relationship with synderesis.  
Article three is also interesting in that Albert admits that part of 
synderesis stops working in those condemned, the part inclining them 
to the good. The other part, the one remonstrating for doing evil, re-
mains, but not in that they regret the evil done, but in that they do not 
like the pain that accompanies it, which is a similar solution he applied 
to the devils in a question discussed previously (question 25). 
Albert’s contribution to the consideration of synderesis may be 
considered eclectic in that it brings in all previous interpretations and 
links them together within the intellectual Aristotelian psychology 
without doing away the Platonic contributions. In this way Albert 
places synderesis as “ratio superior” somehow directly linked with 
God through the content of the natural law, and with the three Platonic 
soul powers: reason, concupiscence and irascible passions which are 
under it. It is ecclectic in defending that synderesis is simultaneously 
potency with a habit. Similarly, there is some eclecticism in consider-
ing it an intellectual power but that moves, and it is linked somehow 
to the will though the will is under it. These ambivalences are com-
bined with a surprising lack of consideration between synderesis and 
prudence that will be one of the points that his disciple Aquinas will 
explain. 
A summary of the medieval philosophy achievements on the un-
derstanding of synderesis will be incomplete without Aquinas’ 
contributions who completed some of the points his master was left 
unattended. 
c) Aquinas (1225-1274). “For St. Thomas the scintilla conscien-
tiae is synderesis, not alone because it is the purest part of conscience 
but because it flies above the conscience as the spark does over the fire 
(and as, one recalls, the eagle does over the symbols of the faculties in 
the vision of Ezechiel)”107.  
Crowe thinks that Aquinas does not add much to what his master 
Albert had discovered regarding synderesis. Aquinas’ thought evolved 
                                                 
ne cespitaret. Ita aliquando imputatur synderesi peccatum rationis, voluntatis, et 
liberi arbitrii: quia non tenuit ne caderet”. Albertus Magnus, Summa Theologiae, 
Pars II, tract.16, q. 99, m. 2, art.2, 237. 
107 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 158. 
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from an eclectic position to a detailed one and later he just gave cur-
sory attention to the topic, or at least to the term. Potts shares the 
opinion that Aquinas added little to what already was proposed by 
Phillip the Chancellor and Bonaventure. “Aquinas’ treatment of syn-
deresis, viewed as a whole, mainly consisted in a tidying-up operation. 
He grafted onto Phillip’s account some of Bonaventure’s develop-
ments under the heading of conscientia, and clarified some ambiguities 
and distinctions”108.  
Interesting also is the view that for Aquinas synderesis became 
a no-go topic at the end of his intellectual development. Crowe says: 
“In any event, as will be seen, St. Thomas, even before the writing of 
the Prima Pars, had practically abandoned synderesis as a term of ma-
jor importance. In the Secunda Pars we should, perhaps, have 
expected synderesis and conscience to be considered at length. On the 
contrary neither gets more than a passing mention. In the question on 
the natural law we find the admission, in the answer to an objection, 
that synderesis is the habitus containing the precepts of the natural law, 
which are the first principles of human action. And in the Secunda-
Secundae, in one of the articles on the virtue of prudence, St. Thomas 
makes use of the familiar parallel between the speculative and the 
practical intellect, remarking that both make use of first ‘naturally 
known’ principles. But it is not until he has to reply to the objections 
that he actually uses the term synderesis. The contrast with the ex-
tended discussions in the Commentary on the Sentences and the De 
veritate is striking. Unfortunately, one can only surmise the develop-
ment that led St. Thomas to give such little prominence to the term 
synderesis in his latest period. The Commentary to the Nicomachaean 
Ehics and the Summa contra Gentiles, where one would have expected 
some mention of synderesis and which would have provided a chron-
ological link between the early and the late stages in St. Thomas’ 
thought on the question, are not helpful since neither deals with the 
question”109. 
While Crowe thinks that the treatment of synderesis in the 
Summa shows a decreasing interest of Aquinas in this topic, others 
like González, think that the few references to synderesis in the 
Summa are due to a process of maturity and synthesis on the part of 
Aquinas. “If we compare the parallel narrations in the Summa we will 
discover to what point De Veritate considerations have been incorpo-
rated in the Summa structure after a praiseworthy work of 
synthesis”110. Both comments point to the fact that the treatment of 
synderesis is greater in Aquinas´ youth works Supra Sententiam and 
De Veritate than in his great maturity works, the two Summas.  
                                                 
108 Potts, T. C., Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, op. cit., 50. 
109 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 143. 
110 “Si las comparamos con sus lugares paralelos en la Summa avertiremos hasta qué 
punto el tratamiento de estos temas en el De Veritate ha sido incorporado mediante 
una encomiable labor de sintesis a la estructura de la Summa”. González, A. M., 




While it is true that philosophy is not done by numbers, numbers 
may indicate the attention given to a particular topic. A quick check 
on the number of times the word is used by Aquinas in all his works 
can help us to understand what Crowe says. Using the excellent search 
engine of the Corpus Thomisticum 111 that lists all the times the word 
is used and gives the associated sentence, we have recorded the fol-
lowing table: 
One can argue that instead of using the word synderesis Aquinas 
in his late works used the more general word “ratio naturalis” as Sellés 
points out112, but this may be an object of discussion for two reasons: 
a) Aquinas only equates both in a single text113, and b) a number of 
times Aquinas uses ratio naturalis in a more general way than syn-
deresis. Aquinas uses the term naturalis ratio in 60 other occasions 
with wider meanings, sometimes linking it to prudence, at other times 
to practical reason. The actual meaning given to it should be discussed 
in each case, which will divert us from the main purpose of this dis-
sertation114. Hoffman also points out that in the Summa Aquinas 
“occasionally replaces the word synderesis by the term understanding 
(intellectus), the intellectual virtue of grasping the first principles of 
reason”115. Anyway, Aquinas himself seems to consider more im-
portant to know that there is a habit of the intellect which is permanent, 
innate, natural, and that is the foundation of assessing moral behavior 
rather than to use the name “synderesis” as shown in the quote from 
De Veritate: “It remains, therefore, that the name synderesis desig-
nates a natural habit simply, one similar to the habit of principles, or it 
means some power of reason with such a habit. And whatever it is 
makes little difference, for it raises a doubt only about the meaning of 
the name. However, if the power of reason itself, insofar as it knows 
naturally, is called synderesis, it cannot be so considered apart from 
                                                 
111 Cfr. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/index.html 
112 Cfr. Sellés, J. F., “La Sindéresis o Razón Natural como la Apertura Cognoscitiva 
de la Persona Humana a su Propia Naturaleza”, Revista Española de Filosofía Me-
dieval, 10 (2003) 321-334.  
113 Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 47, a. 6, ad 1. 
114 The Index Thomisticus lists only 63 times the concordance for “ratio naturalis”, 
two of which are attributed to Thomas de Sutton and Guillelmus Wheatley. The 
word “ratio” in all its declensions is listed 40,792 times. 
115 Davies, B., Stump, E., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 256. 
Table 2: 'Synderesis' Frequency in Aquinas works. 
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every habit, for natural knowledge belongs to reason by reason of a 
natural habit, as is clear of the understanding of principles”116.  
Rather than checking whether Crowe’s or González’ interpreta-
tions are correct, it is worth studying in detail what Aquinas’ 
conception of synderesis is, because it is what would link to Leonardo 
Polo´s Aquinas quotes. We now summarise what Aquinas’ position on 
synderesis in the three main works in which he uses it: Supra Sen-
tentiam, De Veritate and the Summa Theologiae. We shall analyse his 
proposal in De Veritate which is the more systematic and detailed of 
the three. 
c.1) Commentary on the Sentences (1254-1256). In Supra Sen-
tentian Aquinas uses two main arguments to explain synderesis: one 
following the practical syllogism taken from Albert, and the second 
using the graduation of perfection following the Pseudo-Dionysius. 
“Every movement must proceed from an immovable mover; every-
thing that undergoes change must proceed from something that 
remains one and the same. The principle is clear from an inspection of 
natural bodies; and it applies to the process of reasoning, for reasoning 
is change or movement; a movement from principle to conclusion. 
Such movement requires, as it’s point-de-depart, a stable and un-
changing knowledge, not obtained by the normal discourses but 
immediately given to the intellect. In speculative matters this immedi-
ate and unchanging knowledge is found in the habitus of first self-
evident principles, known as intellectus principiorum. In practical 
matters a like habitus of self-evident principles is required; and that 
habitus is synderesis”117.  
                                                 
116 Thomas aquinas, De veritate, q. 16 a. 1 co. For Aquinas quotations we use the 
system of the Corpus Thomisticum which gives the paragraph in square brackets 
first and then the traditional way. This make it easier to cross-check quotations. 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html 
117 “Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut est de motu rerum naturalium, quod omnis 
motus ab immobili movente procedit, ut dicit Augustinus VIII Super Genes. et 
philosophus probat in VII Phys., et 8, et omne dissimiliter se habens ab uno eo-
demque modo se habente; ita etiam oportet quod sit in processu rationis; cum enim 
ratio varietatem quamdam habeat, et quodammodo mobilis sit, secundum quod 
principia in conclusiones deducit, et in conferendo frequenter decipiatur; oportet 
quod omnis ratio ab aliqua cognitione procedat, quae uniformitatem et quietem 
quamdam habeat; quod non fit per discursum investigationis, sed subito intellectui 
offertur: sicut enim ratio in speculativis deducitur ab aliquibus principiis per se 
notis, quorum habitus intellectus dicitur; ita etiam oportet quod ratio practica ab 
aliquibus principiis per se notis deducatur, ut quod est malum non esse faciendum, 
praeceptis Dei obediendum fore, et sic de aliis: et horum quidem habitus est syn-
deresis. Unde dico, quod synderesis a ratione practica distinguitur non quidem per 
substantiam potentiae, sed per habitum, qui est quodammodo innatus menti nostrae 
ex ipso lumine intellectus agentis, sicut et habitus principiorum speculativorum, 
ut, omne totum est majus sua parte, et hujusmodi; licet ad determinationem cogni-
tionis eorum sensu et memoria indigeamus, ut in 2 Post. dicitur. Et ideo statim 
cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur, ut in 1 Post. dicitur. Et ideo dico, quod synderesis 
vel habitum tantum nominat, vel potentiam saltem subjectam habitui sic nobis in-
nato”. Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent., lib. 2, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, co. Translation in 
Crowe, M. B., op.cit. 230. 
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 “St. Thomas’ second argument for the existence of synderesis 
is an interesting one, built upon a principle he borrows from the neo-
Platonic Liber de Causis or from the book of Divine Names of the 
pseudo-Denis. The principle is that Divine Wisdom must arrange cre-
ated beings in an orderly series without any gaps in a hierarchy”118. 
Synderesis is a natural habit of the intellect in its practical activity 
which can neither err nor be destroyed or corrupted, which is in be-
tween the intelligence as a power and the conscience which is its act, 
as a consequence of a practical syllogism. The content of this natural 
habit are the most general precepts of eternal law as they apply to the 
human person, as Aquinas understands it, and natural moral law. As 
Crowe says, “St. Thomas summarises the position: certain universal 
principles —ipsa universalia principia juris— constitute the natural 
law; synderesis is the habitual knowledge of those principles (or per-
haps the faculty of reason as informed by such knowledge); and 
conscience is the application of the principles to conduct by way of 
conclusion”119. “To the fifth it should be said that a natural habit is 
never lost as is obvious in the habit of the first speculative principles, 
                                                 
118 “Respondeo dicendum, quod, secundum Dionysium, divina sapientia conjungit 
prima secundorum ultimis primorum, quia, ut in Lib. de causis ostenditur, in ordine 
creatorum oportet quod consequens praecedenti similetur, nec hoc potest esse nisi 
secundum quod aliquid participat de perfectione ejus; quod quidem inferiori modo 
est in secundo ordine creaturarum quam in primo; unde hoc quod inferior creatura 
de similitudine superioris participat, est supremum in inferiori et ultimum in supe-
riori, quia est deficientius receptum quam in superiori sit. Inter creaturas autem 
talis est ordo ut primo sit Angelus, et secundo sit rationalis anima. Et quia rationalis 
anima corpori conjuncta est; ideo cognitio debita sibi secundum suum proprium 
ordinem, est cognitio quae a sensibilibus in intelligibilia procedit, et non pervenit 
in cognitionem veritatis nisi inquisitione praecedente, et ideo cognitio sua ration-
alis dicitur. Quia vero Angelus simpliciter incorporeus est, nec corpori unitur; 
cognitio naturae suae debita est ut simpliciter sine inquisitione veritatem appre-
hendat: propter quod intellectualis natura nominatur. Oportet ergo quod in anima 
rationali, quae Angelo in ordine creaturarum configuratur, sit aliqua participatio 
intellectualis virtutis, secundum quam aliquam veritatem sine inquisitione appre-
hendat, sicut apprehenduntur prima principia naturaliter cognita tam in speculativis 
quam etiam in operativis; unde et talis virtus intellectus vocatur, secundum quod 
est in speculativis, quae etiam secundum quod in operativis est, synderesis dicitur: 
et haec virtus scintilla convenienter dicitur, quod sicut scintilla est modicum ex 
igne evolans; ita haec virtus est quaedam modica participatio intellectualitatis, re-
spectu ejus quod de intellectualitate in Angelo est: et propter hoc etiam superior 
pars rationis scintilla dicitur quia in natura rationali supremum est; unde et Hier-
onymus dicit quod per aquilam significatur quae cetera animalia in volando 
transcendit; ita et haec virtus transcendit rationabilem, quae per hominem signifi-
catur, et concupiscibilem quae per vitulum, et irascibilem quae per leonem. Sicut 
autem non contingit in speculativis intellectum errare circa cognitionem primorum 
principiorum, quin semper repugnet omni ei quod contra principia dicitur; ita etiam 
non contingit errare in practicis in principiis primis; et propter hoc dicitur, quod 
haec superior rationis scintilla quae synderesis est, extingui non potest, sed semper 
repugnat omni ei quod contra principia naturaliter sibi indita est”. Thomas Aqui-
nas, Super Sent. lib. 2, d. 39, q. 3, a. 1 co. Translation in Crowe, M. B., “The Term 
Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 231. 
119 CROWE, M.B., Ibid., 233. 
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which are always present in man, and the same applies to syn-
deresis”120.  
As we can see, in this first juvenile work of Aquinas there is no 
substantial difference to what Albert the Great explained in his works.  
c.2) Quaestio Disputata de Veritate (1256-1259). In De Veritate 
the treatment of synderesis is more extensive and systematic than in 
Supra Sententiam, but it is substantially the same. Aquinas devotes a 
whole question to it, q.16. This question is nevertheless related to the 
previous question where the topic of the superior and inferior reason 
is discussed and to question 17 which deals with conscience. In this he 
follows the scheme of Peter the Chancellor: “On neither question, 
then, of synderesis or of conscience, does the De Veritate present any 
startling development of St. Thomas’ thought beyond that found in the 
Commentary on the Sentences. Rather is it the same thought presented 
in greater detail; with, in the De Veritate, a greater emphasis upon the 
dependence of all subsequent practical knowledge on the habit of syn-
deresis”121.  
We shall now try to summarize Aquinas’ vision of synderesis: 
its ontological nature as an innate habit of the intelligence in depend-
ence of the active intelligence as its power. The intelligence through 
the conscience is the act that gives the information that prudence re-
quires to know whether a particular action is prudent to do or not at a 
particular moment. It can also be considered the link of synderesis with 
the natural moral law. 
c.2.1) Synderesis is an innate habit. In De Veritate Aquinas ex-
plains in a clearer way why synderesis is both a habit and a power but 
that they are two different things with the same name122. Nevertheless, 
the habit takes preeminence as González points out: “while the powers 
are naturally inclined to their object, habits preserve their freedom... 
In this way the fact of being a habit preserves an essential characteris-
tic of our moral experience: we can follow or not follow it, in either 
case it does not disappear”123. 
                                                 
120 “Ad quintum dicendum, quod habitus naturalis nunquam amittitur, sicut patet de 
habitu principiorum speculativorum, quem semper homo retinet; et simile est 
etiam de synderesi”. Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. lib. 2, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5. 
121 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 241. 
122 “We do not say that synderesis means a power and a habit, as though the power 
and the habit were one thing, but because the power together with the habit which 
it underlies is designated by one name”. R.W. Mulligan translation. “Ad quartum 
dicendum, quod synderesis non dicitur significare potentiam et habitum quasi 
eadem res sit potentia et habitus; sed quia uno nomine significatur ipsa potentia 
cum habitu cui substernitur”. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad 4. 
123 “Mientras que las potencias tienden naturalmente a su objeto, los hábitos... se 
usan con libertad. En este sentido, la condición de hábito preserva una nota esen-
cial de nuestra experiencia de la norma moral: podemos cumplirla o no cumplirla, 
y no por ello desaparece”. González, A. M., De Veritate. Cuestiones 16 y 17, La 
Sindéresis y la Conciencia, op. cit., 12. 
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Aquinas also clarifies that it is not only a natural habit, but also 
inborn, as González also points out: “What is natural is not necessarily 
inborn. What is inborn excludes any external intervention. What is nat-
ural, on the other hand, can be both partly inborn and in part from an 
external agent. According to St. Thomas this is what happens to natu-
ral habits that perfect human reason, both in its speculative as in its 
practical use”124.  
To be natural does not mean that it is always manifested: “In an 
analogic way, without sensitive knowledge our intelligence will not be 
able to form the habit of synderesis”125. “This explains what (Aquinas) 
says also in De Ver. q. 16 a. 3 when he points out that harm in some 
corporeal organ can impede the habit of synderesis”126.  
c.2.2) Synderesis is Knowledge. Aquinas affirms that synderesis 
is knowledge. He repeatedly uses the words ‘lumen’, ‘scintilla’127. As 
he categorically states, “This habit exists in no other power than rea-
son, unless, perhaps, we make understanding a power distinct from 
reason. But we have shown the opposite above”128. 
This type of knowledge, nevertheless, is different from specula-
tive knowledge. Synderesis works as the major premise of a kind of 
practical syllogism. But because it has to be the immovable base to all 
moral judgements it has to be immutable and therefore it cannot be 
known as the conclusion of a discursive reasoning. What type of 
knowledge can it be? By comparing it to angelic knowledge it seems 
to be an intuitive type of knowledge: “Hence it is that human nature, 
insofar as it resembles the angelic nature, must both in speculative and 
practical matters know truth without investigation. And this 
knowledge must be the principle of all the knowledge which follows, 
                                                 
124 “Lo natural no es siempre innato. Lo innato excluye la intervención de un princi-
pio exterior; lo natural, en cambio, puede proceder en parte de la naturaleza, y en 
parte de un principio exterior. Según Santo Tomás, esto es lo que ocurre con los 
hábitos naturales que perfeccionan a la razón humana, tanto en su uso especulativo 
como en su uso práctico”. González, A.M., op. cit., 1998), 12. 
125 “Anolagemente, sin conocimiento sensible nuestro entendimiento no podría tam-
poco formar el hábito de la sindéresis”. González, A.M., op. cit., 13. 
126 “Esto explica lo que afirma tambien en De Veritate. q. 16, a. 3 cuando anota que 
una lesion in los órganos corporales puede impedir el habito de la sinderesis” Gon-
zález, A.M., op. cit., 13, note 18. “Uno modo ut dicatur actus synderesis extingui, 
in quantum actus synderesis omnino intercipitur. Et sic contingit actum synderesis 
extingui in non habentibus usum liberi arbitrii, neque aliquem usum rationis: et 
hoc propter impedimentum proveniens ex laesione organorum corporalium, a qui-
bus ratio nostra accipere indiget. Alio modo per hoc quod actus synderesis ad 
contrarium deflectatur”. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 3, co. 
127 “Responsio. Dicendum quod synderesim extingui, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno 
modo quantum ad ipsum lumen habituale”. De veritate, q. 16, a. 3, co; “Sicut scin-
tilla est illud quod est purius in igne, ita synderesis est id quod supremum in 
conscientiae judicio reperitur; et secundum hanc metaphoram synderesis scintilla 
conscientiae dicitur”. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q 17, a. 2, ad 3. 
128 “Hic autem habitus non in alia potentia existit, quam ratio; nisi forte ponamus 
intellectum esse potentiam a ratione distinctam, cuius contrarium supra, dictum 
est”. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1, co. 
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whether speculative or practical, since principles must be more stable 
and certain”129. 
There are two interesting affirmations regarding the type of 
knowledge that synderesis is. Synderesis is intuitive rather than dis-
cursive knowledge. Aquinas also seems to say that this type of 
knowledge is more perfect than the discursive, since there will not be 
discursive knowledge without it. The second point is that synderesis is 
a type of knowledge that somehow replicates the task of the estimative 
in animals: “Animals are said to possess a measure of prudence, but it 
does not follow from this that they are rational. Their prudence is a 
kind of participation in reason and is present in them ‘secundum 
quamdam aestimationem naturalem’. In a similar way man’s intuitive 
apprehension of first principles is ‘per quamdam tenuem participa-
tionem’ and does not demand a special faculty. Such apprehension is 
rather the perfection of the act of reason. The imperfect act of reason 
is discursive; its function is double: to work forward from intuitive 
apprehension, and to work back to it. There can be no discursus of the 
human mind unless it begins in the simple acceptance of truth in first 
principles; and the result of the discursus is only guaranteed by a return 
to first principles for comparison. Discursus may be compared with 
the rational act of intellectus as generation with being or motion with 
rest. Just as in bodies capable of both, motion and rest may be traced 
back to the same principle (the nature of the body) so the intuition of 
first principles and ordinary discursus are reducible to the same prin-
ciple (the faculty of reason)”130.  
c.2.3) Totally certain and immutable. In the second article Aqui-
nas gives the same argument as in his Super Sentences regarding the 
infallibility of synderesis. To guarantee moral certitude synderesis has 
to be stable; it cannot err. No truth can be achieved in a syllogism if 
the first premise is not certain. As Crowe puts it, “unless the principles 
are firmly established there cannot be stability or certitude in what fol-
lows. Now, since all changeable things depend upon a primum 
immobile, so all specific knowledge must derive from knowledge that 
is quite certain. This certissima cognitio, beyond the reach of error, is 
the knowledge of first universal principles; specific knowledge is re-
ferred to these principles and its truth accepted or its falsity rejected 
by reference to them. If error were possible in the knowledge of first 
principles, no certainty could be found in the knowledge which fol-
lowed. In the same way in human actions there must be some 
permanent and unchangeable criterion of rectitude by which all actions 
must be judged; and this is provided by synderesis, which inclines to-
wards good and away from evil. The universal judgement of 
                                                 
129 “Unde et in natura humana, in quantum attingit angelicam, oportet esse cognitio-
nem veritatis sine inquisitione et in speculativis et in practicis; et hanc quidem 
cognitionem oportet esse principium totius cognitionis sequentis, sive practicae 
sive speculativae, cum principia oporteat esse certiora et stabiliora.”. Thomas 
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 1, co. 
130 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics” Irish Theological 
Quarterly, 23/3 (1956), 238. 
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synderesis cannot err. Error —as was seen in the Commentary on the 
Sentences— occurs in the application of universal judgments to par-
ticular cases and may be caused by a false reasoning or by a false 
assumption”131.  
The explanation of the errors in conduct are due, not to syn-
deresis, but to the application of its principles during the deliberation 
process. Either because either by malice or weakness the mind and the 
will are moved by the passions and by the fomes peccati as this text 
explains: “On the contrary. Good can be purer than evil, for it is that 
some good may have no admixture of evil, but there is nothing so bad 
that it does not have some of the good mixed. But in us, there is some-
thing that always inclines us to evil, namely, the tinder (fomes peccati). 
Therefore, there will be something which always inclines towards the 
good. This seems to be only synderesis. Therefore, synderesis never 
sins”132. 
c.2.4) Imperishable. Aquinas devotes article 3 of q 16 to explain 
why synderesis by its own nature cannot disappear. This is because it 
belongs to the essence of man, being an intrinsic part of his intelli-
gence, and not to the passive, but to the active, to the agent intellect. 
This fact will be important for Leonardo Polo who will expand on the 
relations between synderesis and intelligence: “regarding it being ha-
bitual light; it is impossible that synderesis may be quenched: in the 
same way that the soul of man cannot be deprived of the light of the 
agent intellect through which we come to know the first principles of 
both what is to be understood and what is to be done; this light belongs 
to the nature of the soul itself, since through it this is an intellectual 
soul”133.  
c.2.5) Relation between synderesis and conscience. González 
says that “occasionally, conscience and synderesis were indistinctibly 
called ‘naturale iudicatorium’ the law of our intellect”134. Perhaps one 
should be more cautious cautious because Albert, was practically the 
first who clarified the difference between conscience and synderesis: 
“Conscience is called the law of understanding by reason of that which 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 239 
132 “Sed contra. Bonum potest esse magis purum quam malum: quia aliquod bonum 
est cui non admiscetur aliquid de malo; nihil autem est adeo malum, quod non 
habeat aliquid de bono permixtum. Sed in nobis est aliquid quod semper inclinat 
ad malum, scilicet fomes. Ergo et aliquid erit quod semper inclinat ad bonum. Hoc 
nihil videtur esse nisi synderesis. Et sic synderesis numquam peccat”. Thomas 
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 2, s.c. 1. 
133 “Quantum ad ipsum lumen habituale; et sic impossibile est quod synderesis ex-
tinguatur: sicut impossibile est quod anima hominis privetur lumine intellectus 
agentis, per quod principia prima et in speculativis et in operativis nobis 
innotescunt; hoc enim lumen est de natura ipsius animae, cum per hoc sit intellec-
tualis”. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 3 co. 
134 “En ocasiones, la tradición recogida por Santo Tomás había llamado indistinta-
mente a la conciencia y a la sindéresis naturale iudicatorium o ‘ley de nuestro 
intelecto’”. González, A. M., Tomás de Aquino, De veritate. Cuestiones 16 y 17, 
La sindéresis y la Conciencia, op. cit., 15. 
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it has from synderesis. It is never this, but something else which is the 
source of error”135. While Aquinas’ treatment of conscience in this 
work is not as extensive as the one devoted to synderesis, Potts gives 
him some merit to it because of the novelties included: “It was only 
when he turned to conscientia that Aquinas introduced some really 
new ideas”136. Potts, compares Aquinas to Bonaventure but it appears 
that what he considers a novelty of Aquinas can be attributed to his 
master Albert; the consideration of conscience as being an act of the 
practical reason.  
Aquinas explains, as he did in Supra Sententiam, that in a similar 
way there is an intellectual or speculative judgement based on first 
principles, there is a practical syllogism. In this syllogims the major 
premise is given by synderesis, a habit of the intelligence being con-
science a conclusion, an act of the intelligence done through this 
intelligence habit. So there should not be confusion between syn-
deresis, and conscience. This helps to explain why conscience can err, 
while synderesis cannot137. “Aquinas holds that conscience is not a 
power or a habitus (a stable disposition to act in a certain way), but an 
act”138.  
c.2.6) Inclination. The most debated question among those who 
follow Aquinas and those following Bonaventure is whether syn-
deresis belongs to the appetitive or to the intellectual powers. For 
Bonaventure, as we have seen, it belongs to the appetitive. It is a kind 
of weight, ‘pondus’. Thomas is clear as well but in contrast for him 
synderesis is purely intellectual, as González remarks: “Synderesis is 
a habit, and an intellectual habit (practical). It is not a tendency, nor a 
moral habit... Even if this contrasts with some of St. Thomas´ expres-
sions as in De Veritate, q. 16 a. 1, sc. 4, but in the same place he says 
that it is not an appetitive power that in his view are already completely 
well explained with the rational, irascible and concupiscible appe-
tites”139.  
                                                 
135 Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 2, ad 4. 
136 Potts, T. C., Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, op. cit., 20. 
137 “Nomen enim conscientiae significat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid; unde 
conscire dicitur quasi simul scire. Quaelibet autem scientia ad aliquid applicari 
potest; unde conscientia non potest nominare aliquem habitum specialem, vel ali-
quam potentiam, sed nominat ipsum actum, qui est applicatio cuiuscumque habitus 
vel cuiuscumque notitiae ad aliquem actum particularem”. Thomas Aquinas, De 
Veritate, q. 17, a. 1 co. 
138 “Respondeo dicendum quod conscientia, proprie loquendo, non est potentia, sed 
actus”. Iª q. 79 a. 13 co. Lamont, J., “Conscience, Freedom, Rights: Idols of the 
Enlightenment Religion”, in The Thomist, 73 (2009), 169-239. 
139 “La sindéresis es un hábito, y un hábito intelecutal (práctico). No es una tenden-
cia, ni un hábito moral. Tiene un objeto, indudablemente, merced al cual libra de 
la completa indeterminación a la potencia racional, pero su modo de “tener” el 
objeto no es inclinando hacia él; la sindéresis no es una potencia que tienda natu-
ralmente a su objeto ni tampoco un hábito moral, que inclina a una determinada 
acción. La sindéresis como tal no inclina a nada. Sólo conoce y prescribe: es un 
hábito intelectual”. In the footnote to this text: “Esto contrasta con modos de decir 
del propio Santo Tomás por ejemplo en De Veritate, q. 16 a. 1 sed contra, 4; en 
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c.2.7) Natural Law. Without going deep into the topic of natural 
law in Aquinas we have to mention that for him it is directly integrated 
in synderesis, at least the principles of natural law, and this is in par-
allel with the first principles of all speculative sciences: “So in the 
same way as in the human soul there is certain natural habit which 
knows the principles of the theoretical sciences, which we call the un-
derstanding fo the principles, there is also in the soul a natural habit of 
the first practical principles which are the universal principles of the 
natural law”140.  
c.3) Summa Theologiae. As mentioned at the beginning, the 
treatment of synderesis in the Summa is surprisingly less detailed than 
in any previous work. Nevertheless, the Summa does not contradict 
what Aquinas discussed extensively in his previous works. What is 
interesting is the novelty that was not treated in detail by Albert which 
is the connection between synderesis and prudence, which Aquinas 
does in the reply to an objection “The moral virtues require to know 
the end by the natural reason which is called synderesis... synderesis 
moves prudence in the same way as the habit of the first speculative 
principles”141.  
It will be inaccurate to say that previous thinkers did not link 
synderesis with the virtue of prudence, but it is Aquinas who, without 
doubt, has the best treatise on virtues since Aristotle. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between reason, practical reason, synderesis, conscience 
and prudence are not easy to place together as this text of Lamont 
shows, where prudence seems to take synderesis role: “prudence –as 
Aquinas understands it– is a virtue that is exercised in acts. Prudence 
is what supplies the intellectual component of good actions (cf. S.Th., 
II-II, q. 47, a. 8). It is prudence, not conscience, that is, ‘the capacity 
for judging the rightness of actions’, but this capacity is exercised in 
the applying of right reason to action. The assent to a true judgement 
of conscience will form a component of an exercise of prudence, but 
it cannot itself be an exercise of prudence, because an exercise of that 
                                                 
esta ocasión, en efecto, afirma que el acto propio de la sindéresis es inclinar al bien 
y advertir del mal. Sin embargo, en ese mismo lugar descarta que sea una potencia 
motora, que a su juicio quedan suficientemente descritas en los apetitos irascible, 
concupiscible y racional (voluntad)”. González, A.M., Op. cit., 1998, 16. 
“Ad quartum dicendum, quod synderesis non dicitur significare potentiam et habi-
tum quasi eadem res sit potentia et habitus; sed quia uno nomine significatur ipsa 
potentia cum habitu cui substernitur”. De veritate, q. 16 a. 1 ad 4 
140 “Sicut igitur humanae animae est quidam habitus naturalis quo principia specu-
lativarum scientiarum cognoscit, quem vocamus intellectum principiorum; ita 
etiam in ea est quidam habitus naturalis primorum principiorum operabilium, quae 
sunt universalia principia iuris naturalis”. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 16, a. 
1, co. 
141 “Ad tertium dicendum quod finis non pertinet ad virtutes morales tanquam ipsae 
praestituant finem, sed quia tendunt in finem a ratione naturali praestitutum. Ad 
quod iuvantur per prudentiam, quae eis viam parat, disponendo ea quae sunt ad 
finem. Unde relinquitur quod prudentia sit nobilior virtutibus moralibus, et moveat 
eas. Sed synderesis movet prudentiam, sicut intellectus principiorum scientiam”. 




virtue goes all the way through to the act. One can make a true judge-
ment of conscience without acting upon it”142.  
We conclude the section on the Summa where we find the nov-
elty of the relationship between prudence and synderesis better 
established than in the previous works, by citing Crowe again on the 
substantial conformity of his doctrine to the previous works in spite of 
Aquinas´ apparent reluctance to use the term: “But if synderesis were 
better abandoned as a term, the underlying reality need not necessarily 
be renounced. On the contrary, when he wrote the law-questions in the 
Prima-Secundae, and probably long before, St. Thomas must have re-
alised that the term synderesis was not indispensable. The natural law, 
conceived as a series of fundamental propositions of the practical rea-
son, the first principles of morality, together with the activity of the 
reason in knowing and applying them, allowed him to retain the reality 
of synderesis (and on this his thought does not seem ever to have var-
ied significantly) without having to use the term”143.  
Aquinas’ synthesis has tried to match the contributions of Aris-
totles, Augustin, Pseudo Dyonisius and the view of the lawyers as well 
studied by Abertuni144 which Polo will somehow fault as we shall see 
later. 
*** 
                                                 
142 Lamont, J., “Conscience, Freedom, Rights: Idols of the Enlightenment Religion”, 
op. cit., 175. 
143 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 245. 
144 “Tomás de Aquino fez confluir no conceito de sindérese o “nous” de Aristóteles 
com o princípio da continuidade de Dionísio. Da mesma forma, a questão da sin-
dérese oportuniza a Tomás de Aquino incorporar, nessa confluência de tradições, 
a autoridade de Agostinho, a saber, “algumas regras e virtudes verdadeiras e imu-
táveis”, permitindo ainda vincular a sindérese com a lei natural, o “hábito que 
contém os preceitos da lei natural”, conceito proveniente da tradição dos decretis-
tas”. Abertuni, C. A., “Sindérese, o Intellectus Principiorum da Razão Prática”, 






HISTORICAL APPROACH II 
MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY 
PHILOSOPHERS 
 
1. Synderesis after Aquinas 
It is well known that Aquinas’ doctrine was not immediately ac-
cepted in Paris, where his doctrine was actually condemned for one 
hundred and fifteen years1. Nevertheless, it later became a standard 
text, to the point that the Summa Theologiae replaced the Sentences in 
most Catholic universities. As Crowe points out, synderesis continued 
to be discussed but only as part of the mandatory comments to the 
Sentences: “It is not intended to suggest that St. Thomas’ successors 
did not discuss synderesis or that they showed distaste for the term. It 
would be tempting to think that St. Thomas had contributed to a de-
cline in its importance, but it would be difficult to demonstrate. Dom 
Lottin finds much material on synderesis in the Oxford and Paris mas-
ters –the latter mostly disciples of St. Thomas or of St. Bonaventure– 
of the second half of the XIII Century. But he remarks that the ques-
tions on synderesis and conscience were not among those hotly 
discussed by the Schoolmen; there is scarcely a Quodlibet on either in 
the whole century. They usually cropped up –in fact were inevitable– 
in the Commentaries on the Sentences which alone would have en-
sured the survival of synderesis at least to the XVI Century when Peter 
Lombard’s Sentences ceased to be the standard text-book of theol-
ogy”2.  
The Commentary to the Sentences continue the discussion of 
synderesis and conscience until the XVI Century. The disciples of the 
two camps during the XIII Century are well studied by Lottin3. Among 
the Franciscans who followed mainly Bonaventura position with slight 
modifications like Gauthier the Bruges (1225-307), Guillaume de la 
Mare (1285), Richard the Mediavilla (1249-1302), Pierre Jean 
Loive, Piere de Trabibus (c.1300), and Richard Rufus (1260). 
Among the Dominicans who followed Aquinas like Hannibald, Ro-
main the Rome, Jean Quidort (1255-306), Richard Fishacre (1200-
1248), Godefroid de Fontaines (1250-1306), Pierre d’Auvergne (c. 
                                                 
1 The bishop of Paris, Étienne Tempier, condemmed Aquinas theories in 1210 and 
reafirmed his condemmation in 1277. Aquinas was included in the canon of the 
saints in 1323. Two years later, in 1325, the Paris decree was repealed. Later Pope 
Pius V in 1567 proclaimed Aquinas a Doctor of the Church.  
2 Crowe, M. B., “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics”, op. cit., 245.  
3 Cfr. Lottin, O. D., Psychologie et Morale aux XII et XIII siécles, op. cit., vol. II. 
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1240-1304), and Bernard d’Auvergne (1307). Nevertheless, there 
was no established policy so one finds Franciscans who are much 
closer to Aquinas than to Bonaventure, like Simon de Lens (1273-
1295) and Dominicans who follow Bonaventure like Robert Kiwardby 
(1215-1279) or others who try to combine both in an eclectic way like 
Richard de Mediavilla (c.1249-c.1308). Nevertheless, those who are 
going to change the way and direct philosophy eventually in a different 
direction are John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) and William of Ockham 
(1280-1349) who start the new Century. 
a) John Duns Scotus (1265–1308). The opening paragraph of 
Langston´s chapter on Scotus and Ockham states the surprising fact 
that such well-informed and powerful thinkers had little to say about 
synderesis: “It is consequently surprising that these topics receive little 
direct attention from either Duns Scotus or William of Ockham... 
These two great thinkers’ failure to treat conscience and synderesis, 
however, is an indication that the focus of the discussion of these is-
sues has changed to issues about the virtues”4. More surprising is that 
Scotus, being Franciscan, sides with Aquinas and places both syn-
deresis and conscience squarely as part of the practical reason, and 
following Aquinas, he says that conscience is the conclusion of a prac-
tical syllogism that has synderesis as the major premise. Scotus 
devotes the traditional chapters to synderesis and conscience in Ordi-
natio II, dist. 39, qq. 1-2, where he addresses Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences (II, dist. 39): “I reply to these questions: If synderesis is as-
sumed to be something having an elicited act that necessarily and at 
all times inclines one to act justly and resist sin, then since nothing of 
this sort is in the will, we cannot assume it to be there. Consequently, 
it is in the intellect, and it cannot be assumed to be anything other than 
that habitual knowledge of principles which is always right”5. Lang-
ston suggests that the interest of Scotus in placing synderesis squarely 
in the side of the intellect is to let the will free to decide without being 
constrained by any external or internal law: “To suggest that the will 
is compelled to do good would mean that there could be no sin. If syn-
deresis always proposes what is right, and always opposes what is 
wrong, then it is not something that pertains to the free will, and so 
must be something that relates to the practical intellect”6.  
b) William of Ockham (1280–1349). Ockham is more radical 
than Scotus in breaking with tradition and does not mention synderesis 
at all in his works nor he treats conscience directly. Nor does he deal 
with natural law in his academic works. Only after he is called to the 
papal court of Avignon and starts questioning the authority of the 
Pope, does he deal with the topic of natural law, clearly for personal 
and practical reasons.  
                                                 
4 Langston, Douglas C. Conscience and other Virtues: From Bonaventure to Macintyre 
(Place of Publication Not Identified: Pennsylvania State Univer, 2001), 54. 
5 Ordinatio, Book 2, distinction 39 in Langston, D. C., Conscience and other Virtues 
from Bonaventure to Macintyre op. cit.,54.  




2. XIV and XV Centuries 
High peaks are followed by deep valleys both in geography and 
in philosophy. Franciscans and Dominicans continued the tradition of 
their masters, mainly the doctrines of Bonaventure and Aquinas, with-
out original developments, and in many cases without grasping the 
depth of the masters’ vision. Synderesis, though discussed, was mainly 
a repetition without deep understanding of its possibilities. 
Among the Dominicans in Germany there was a streak of mys-
ticism which somehow links with the understanding of synderesis as 
the means of a direct communication with God, or rather to identify 
oneself with God. The great masters of this mystical line were Meister 
Eckhart (1260–1329), and Jean Gerson (1363–1429). 
a) Meister Eckhart (1260–1329). The XIV century most influ-
ential author regarding synderesis was the Dominican Eckhart. He 
gives a mystical function to synderesis following Bonaventure’s high-
est level of knowledge. Synderesis is a supra rational7 way of knowing 
God, which, as we mentioned before, connects also with the platonic 
‘Superior Ratio’ of Augustine: “What the eye sees or the ear hears is 
straightaway seized by desire, provided it pleases, and conveyed to the 
critical faculty which considers it well and, if lawful, passes it on to 
the superior powers, which take it and carry it up to the chief power, 
without likeness, for this power admits neither image nor likeness. It 
is called synderesis, and is all one with the soul’s nature, a spark of the 
divine nature. It cannot abide what is not good. It is without stain; per-
fectly pure and wholly superior to temporal things, it dwells in 
unchanging stability, like eternity. Anything that enters here must first 
be freed from multiplicity and sensible affections. The powers of the 
soul, outer and inner, are all summed up in this, and whatever gets into 
this highest power it passes on to all the rest, an act eternal in its nature; 
it is so quick, it is practically timeless”8.  
Eckhart main followers, Johannes Tauler (1300–1361), Heinrich 
Suso (1295–1366), Jan van Ruysbroeck (1293–1381) and Jean Gerson 
(1363–1429) consolidated the German mysticism which also influ-
enced one of the intellectuals of the followed century, Nicholas the 
Cusa (1401–1464), who was an avid reader of Eckhart. His “docta ig-
norance” speaks of his debt to Meister Eckhart mysticism.  
                                                 
7 “Neither in Cain nor in any other sinner is synderesis silent, but it always calls out 
in opposition to evil and in inclination to good with an appropriate voice that nei-
ther time nor place ever interrupts or diminishes. ‘This is so even though its 
external voice is not audible in time and place, because it is neither temporal nor 
material”. Eckhart, Meister Eckhart Sermons (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1981, # 




b) Jean Gerson (1363–1429). Gerson places synderesis in the 
affective side of the soul together with the will and the sensitive appe-
tite: “There are then three affective powers, proportional to the forms 
of cognition: synderesis, will, and the sensitive appetite”9. His ap-
proach is interesting for two reasons: one because he uses the word 
‘instinct’ translated as a ‘natural inclination’, as the jurists did in me-
dieval times: “Synderesis is an appetitive power of the soul that comes 
immediately from God. It takes on a certain natural inclination to the 
good. Through this proclivity it is drawn to follow the movement of 
the good on the basis of the understanding presented to it in the simple 
intelligence”10. It is interesting secondly because his book on mysti-
cism –On Mystical Theology– gave credit to the mystical way11. 
For Gerson, “synderesis is an appetitive power of the soul that 
comes immediately from God. It takes on a certain natural inclination 
to the good. Through this proclivity it is drawn to follow the moment 
of the good on the basis of the understanding presented to it in the 
simple intelligence”12. In De mystica theologia speculativa Gerson 
presents the soul as having three cognitive and three affective powers 
in a paralleled, hierarchical arrangement. Under Cognitive (Vires Cog-
nitivae) there are intelligentia simplex, ratio, and sensualitas in 
descending order. Under Affective (Vires Affectivae) there are syn-
deresis, appetitus rationalis and appetitus sensualis in likewise 
descending order. Gerson defines the three powers of the Vires Cog-
nitivae as follows. Intelligentia simplex (pure intelligence) is “the 
cognitive power of the soul which receives a certain natural light im-
mediately from God, in and through which first principles, with the 
apprehension of the terms, are known to be true and unquestionably 
certain”13. Gerson points out that this reality has been described by a 
variety of names including mind, the highest heaven, spirit, the light 
of intelligence, the shadow of angelic understanding, divine light in 
which truth immutably shines, and the spark or peak of reason.  
The mysticism of Gerson is different from Eckhart’s because he 
tries to unite with God as a creature, through the highest capacities 
                                                 
9 Gerson, J., Jean Gerson: early works (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 280. 
10 Ibid. 
11 “Jean Gerson was not only the last of the great Scholastics but also one of the most 
significant medieval mystics. It was he who defined the mystical union (unio mys-
tica) as the perfection of a contemplative life”. Ojakangas, M., The Voice Of 
Conscience: A Political Genealogy Of Western Ethical Experience (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 6. “A common pattern in mystical theology and the key to the 
via mystica for Gerson is synderesis which has been naturally implanted in the 
soul. As the innate point of contact between God and man, the synderesis becomes 
the home of the Holy Spirit where Christ is spiritually born into the soul”. Ozment, 
S., “The University and the Church: Patterns of Reform in Jean Gerson”, Medie-
valia et Humanistica, 1 (1970), 118. 
12 Gerson, J., Jean Gerson: Early Works (New York, Paulist Press, 1998), 279. 
13 Quodlibet Online Journal: “On the Life and Mystical Theology of Jean Gerson 
(1363-1429)”. Accessed December 11, 2014. http://www.quodlibet.net/ger-
son.shtml. De myst. 10, 26. 4 ff. 
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man is endowed –knowledge and love– not a near pantheist identifi-
cation as some texts of Eckhart may suggest. We shall touch again on 
Gerson´s double line of triple ascent when discussing synderesis in 
Leonardo Polo. 
c) In the nascent Renaissance independent voices which wanted 
to break with the scholastic and go back to the classics we find Mar-
celo Ficino (1433-1499) in Italy, who translated Plato to Latin and re-
created the Platonic Academy in Florence, does not make any direct 
reference to synderesis in his works.  
In Holland Erasmus (1466-1536) also avoided the name of syn-
deresis.  
In Spain Juan Luis Vives (1493-1540) considers synderesis14 a 
theological technical term. Though he uses the term twice in his works, 
he nevertheless gives it a clear importance to the point that by neglect-
ing synderesis one degrades himself to the level of the animals15.  
                                                 
14 “Sed restant nihilominus in nobis reliquiae illius tanti boni, quae satis testantur 
quantum id fuerit quot amisimus; haec a vulgo theologorum synteresis nominatur, 
quasi conservatio, Hieronymo est conscientia, Basilio naturale judicatorium, Dam-
ascenus lucem mentis nostrae vocat; philosophi quidam tale sunt procul intuiti, qui 
anticipaniones tradunt, et naturales informationes, quas nos dicimus a magistris, 
vel usu, sed hausimus, et accepimus a natura, tametsi alii alliis pro magnitudine 
ingenii plures certioresque sunt has regulas sortiti, tum excoluntur, elimanturque, 
usu, experimentis, disciplina, meditatione”. Vives, J. L., De Anima, Opera Omnia 
(Valencia: Archiepiscopi Typographi, 1782), Vol 3, 356. 
“Haec mentis nostrae sive lux, sive censura, qua recte, qua oblique, semper tamen 
ad bonum et verum devergit, et fertur prona, unde existit approbatio virtutum, et 
improbatio virtiorum, atque hinc leges et precepta morum, et intus in unoque cons-
cientia, qua delicta ipsa sua arguat, reprehendar, damner, nisi penitus sensu 
humano careat, et degeneret in brutum”. Ibid.  
“But sin has clouded our mind with great and heavy darkness, and therefore the right 
norms have been corrupted. Many errors are due to ignorance when we deduct 
them form those universal norms to the individuals and species. Nevertheless, 
there is in us some remains of that great good that tell us how great the good we 
lost was. This is what a majority of theologians call “sinteresis” this is “preserva-
tion”. For St. Jerome it is conscience, for St. Basil it is the natural judgment, for 
St. John Damascenus it is the light of our mind. Some philosophers had some kind 
of confused intuition of it when they spoke from anticipations, or natural 
knowledge we have not received from our teachers or from experience; though 
some because of the quality of their intelligence, have understood these norms with 
greater certainty and depth than others, later they cultivate and perfect with prac-
tice, experience, instruction and meditation. This light or understanding of our 
mind etiher directly or indirectly always leads us to the good and the true and to 
them it goes with strength. From here comes the approval of virtues and the rejec-
tion of vices, from it the moral precepts and norms in the interior of each 
conscience that chastises our crimes and reprehends and condemns them unless 
one has totally lost human sensibility and has degraded to the condition of an ani-
mal”. Vives, J. L., De Anima, op. cit., 356.  
15 “Sunt in nobis igniculi quidam, seu semina virtutum a natura indita, ut Sotici 
Philosophi observarunt; nostri Synteresin Graeco verbo nominant, quasi conserva-
tionem et scintillam justitiae illius, qua primo auctor generis humani donatus erat 
a Deo; ille igniculus, adolescere modo liceret, ut illi sentiunt ad magnam nos vir-
tutem perduceret, sed obruitur depravatis judiciis atque opinionibus et dum lucere 
incipit, ac in flamman se attolere, non modo nullo adjutus alimento, sed adversis 
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In England the Renaissance author Thomas More (1478-1535), 
the great defender of the intimacy and inviolability of personal con-
science16 who died rather than go against it, surprisingly did not use 
the term synderesis17.  
 
3. Modern Thinkers. The XVI Century 
The XVI Century marks the division between the Medieval and 
Modern thought in Philosophy and Theology. The seeds of Ockham, 
Scotus, Eckhart and the Renaissance thinkers helped by the develop-
ment of the printing press changed the ideological and political 
landscape of Europe. The great upheaval was started by Martin Luther. 
Nevertheless in order to show the diversity of the interplaying currents 
we list thinkers following a chronological rather than a doctrinal order, 
i.e. irrespective whether their doctrines are closer to the medieval or 
departing from them. 
a) Denis the Carthusian (1402–1471). This author, known also 
by the names of Denys van Leeuwen, Denis Ryckel, and Dionysius 
                                                 
quoque flatibus et imbre opressus, extinguitur; parentes, nutrices, nutricii, magistri 
eruditionis, consanguinei, necesarii, familiares, magnus erroris magister populos, 
hi omnes semina illa virtutum radicitus conatur extirpare, et emicantem igniculum 
stultitia suarum opinionum tanquam ruina opprimere”. Vives, J. L., De institutione 
Feminae, Opera Omnia (Valencia: Archiepiscopi Typographi, 1782), Vol 4, 260. 
“As Stoic philosophers said, there is in us a kind of sparks of light or seeds of virtue 
placed by nature. Christians call it synderesis using a Greek term that is like a 
reproduction of that spark of justice that God donated to the first man. This small 
flame can grow even to the greatest virtue, according to them, but is overpowered 
by perverted opinions and judgments, so that when it starts flaring as a big light, it 
is not only deprived from food, but it is little by little extinguished by rain and 
wind. Parents, nurses, caretakers, learned teachers, relatives, common people who 
are masters of error, all struggle to uproot these seeds of virtue and extinguish with 
the stupidity of their opinions, as if it were a digrace, the light of that little flame”. 
Ibid. 
16 “But surely among those that long to be rulers, God and my own conscience clearly 
know, that no man may truly number and reckon me. And I suppose each other 
man’s conscience can tell himself the same”. Dialogue of Conscience, in: 
http://www.thomasmorestudies.org/docs/Dialogue%20on%20Con-
science%20Modernized.pdf. Accessed November 27, 2014 
17 More used the word of conscience abundantly, but as Brian Cummings says: “It 
is possible also that here More, like Luther, begins the slow historical process of 
abandoning the distinction between synderesis and conscientia”. Cummings, B., 
“Conscience and the law in Thomas More”, Renaissance Studies, 23/4 (2009), 482. 
In a search done by the search engine of http://www.thomasmores-
tudies.org/search.html the word appears only once in a footnote on the article by 
Fr. Jospeh Koterski, S.J. “The technical name for the faculty by which a person 
has this infallible knowledge of the first practical principle is synderesis. The term 
conscience is then reserved for the disposition that is built up in an individual 
(however well-formed or ill-formed this disposition may be) to make judgments 
of moral evaluation in practical cases”. “Failed Politician? Saintly Statesman? 
Faithful Conscience!”  
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van Rijke, left a vast work in 43 volumes18. In his Commentary to the 
Sentences he basically follows Aquinas. What is interesting is that in 
his Commentary to the Proverbs he uses the term ‘lucerna Domini’, 
lamp of God, which he identifies with the synderesis. The idea is not 
new, but the expression is: “The spirit or the soul of man is the candle 
of the Lord, this is, the thing lit up by the light of God with the intel-
lectual light, contains in itself the light of his intelligence and of 
synderesis. Of whom it is said that in the Psalm, is signed upon us the 
light of thy countenance, O Lord, for this natural light is some kind of 
sign or impression of the uncreated light in the soul. And the breath of 
the soul is called, according to that word of Genesis says: He breathed 
into his face the breath of life”19.  
b) Thomas de Vio, Cajetan (1469-1534). Cardinal Thomas de 
Vio is the official commentator of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. His 
comments are included in the Leonine edition which is the standard 
version of Aquinas’ complete works. His comments do not change 
what Thomas said on synderesis. For him it is the natural habit of the 
first principles and it is sometimes referred to as conscience, taken 
broadly20; “commonly it firstly denotes the habit of first conscious-
ness, namely, ‘synderesis’, which is the root and the rule of 
conscience... And the cause is given, because commonly we name the 
cause by the effect and the habit by act”21.  
c) Martin Luther (1483–1546). Luther could be considered as 
the hinge between the medieval and modern times. In order to obtain 
a teaching post, he commented Peter Lombard Sentences between 
1501 and 1511, where he describes synderesis in the classical way fol-
lowing Aquinas. He continues doing so in subsequent years22, but as 
his doctrine departs from orthodoxy his view of the total corruption of 
                                                 
18 Several volumes are available online at http://stevenedwardhar-
ris.com/2012/10/12/denys-the-carthusian-opera-omnia. 
19 “Lucerna Domini spiraculum hominis, id est, spiritus seu anima hominis est lu-
cerna Domini, id est res illuminata a Deo lumine intellectuali, continens in se 
lumen ingenii atque synderesis. De quo lumine fertur in Psalmo, Signatum est su-
per nos lumen vultus tui, Domine: quia hoc lumen naturale, est quoddam 
signaculum atque impressio increatae lucis in anima”. Denis the Carthusian, Enar-
rationes, XX, art 20, Doctoris ecstatici D. Dionysii Cartusiani Opera Omnia 
(Montreuil/Tournai: Monstrolii, typis Cartusiæ S.M. de Pratis, 1896–1935), vol. 
VII, 136. 
20 “Quoad secundum, conscientia communiter sumitur pro habitu primo, scilicet syn-
deresi, qui est conscientiae principalis radix et regula. Declaratur auctoritatibus 
Hieronvmi, Damasceni et Basilii. Et redditur causa: quia consuetum est ut causas 
effectuum nominibus appellemus, et habitus ab actibus nuncupemus”. Caieant 
Commentary to, I, q. 79, a. 13, in Summa Theologiae vol. 5, (Vatican City: Le-
onina, Typographia Polyglota Vaticana, 1945), 281 Commentary. 
21 Already quoted in the previous note. 
22 “The synteresis of the reason pleads inextinguishably for the best, the true, the 
right, and the just. For this synteresis is a preservation (conservation), a remainder 
(reliquiae), a residue (residuum) and a survivor (superites) of our nature... in the 
corruption and faultiness of perdition”. Luther, M. M., Sermone aus den Jahren, 
1514-1517, in Martin Luthers Werke, (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1908), vol. I. p. 32. 1-
6. Cfr. as quoted in Ojakangas, M., The Voice of Conscience, op. cit., 65. 
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nature does not leave room for synderesis: “After 1519 the term dis-
appears altogether, best explainable by Luther’s increasingly 
pessimistic anthropology”23. There is no remaining goodness, no 
source of goodness in humans, whose nature is totally corrupted. 
In spite of rejecting synderesis, Luther believes that there are 
morals and fixed standards. Nevertheless, by not having a stable, uni-
versal foundation he will have flexible moral standards and his 
successors will devise as many moral systems as different theological 
systems which come out of the principle of free interpretation of the 
Bible. The ‘sola Scriptura’ will give as many different churches as dif-
ferent interpretations of the Bible24. Luther’s approach to natural law 
is more bewildering since he appeals to it severally when political mat-
ters of obedience and disobedience to different authorities came up. 
Strange that natural law works in society, but not on personal matters, 
due to the rotten nature of man, as McNeill explains in the second and 
third part of his article25. A conscience without synderesis will stop 
being a judge of actions and become just a simple witness to the ac-
tions done and the evilness of all of them which is the way to help the 
corrupt nature to ask for commiseration from God. So the more wicked 
our conscience shows us the better for our spiritual development: “For 
Luther, in other words, conscience is no longer a guide of life but an 
instance which reproduces the divine judgement of absolute condem-
nation, revealing to the believer his absolute sinfulness, ‘blindness, 
misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate, and contempt of God’”26.  
d) Christopher of Saint German (1460–1540), was a civil lawyer 
in the city of London who wrote an influential book of a Dialogues 
between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student in the Laws of England, 
which reflects the use of ‘synderesis’27 among lawyers in the city of 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Luther employed in his early writings, especially his Psalms and Romans, the 
scholastic term synteresis, which is a moral sense (called by Aquinas a habit) com-
mon to all men, a residuum or remnant of unfallen nature, which becomes the 
entering point of God’s work in the soul. It is admitted that Luther abandoned this 
term as he sharpened the distinction between nature and grace; but he did not there-
with cast away the notion of a natural morality”. Mcneill, J. T., “Natural Law in 
the Thought of Luther”, Church History, 10/3 (1941) p. 219. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ojakangas, M., The Voice of Conscience, op. cit., 66. 
27 “Sinderesis is a natural power of the soul, set in the highest part thereof, moving 
and stirring it to good, and abhorring evil. And therefore sinderesis never sinneth 
nor erreth. And this sinderesis our Lord put in man, to the intent that the order of 
things should be obrserved. For, after St. Dionyse, the wisdom of God joined the 
beginning of the second things to the last of the first things: for angel is of a nature 
to understand without searching of reason, and to that nature man is joined by sin-
deresis, the which sinderesis may not wholly be extinted neither in man, ne yet in 
damned souls. But nevertheless, as to the use and exercise thereof, it may be let for 
a time, either through the darkness of ignorance, or for undiscreet delectation, or 
the hardness obstinacy. First by the darkness of ignorance, sinderesis may be let 
that it shall not murmur against evil, he believeth evil to be good, as it is in heretics, 
the which, when they die for the wickedness of their error, believe they die for the 
very truth of their faith. And by undiscreet delectation sinderesis is sometime so 
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London. The book was so popular that the term, misspelled, was used 
in some popular plays28. Christopher uses synderesis as the justifica-
tion for the universal application of natural law. He wrote in English 
and his work was very influential even outside England.  
e) Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). The great theologian of the 
second scholasticism has a brief passage which summarises well the 
Thomistic view on synderesis29. Suárez nevertheless hardly uses syn-
deresis in the rest of his works. We could find another citation in the 
second book of De Legis where he defends that natural law is not 
proper of an individual but of all men as synderesis is30. He gives a 
                                                 
overlaid, that remorse or grudge of conscience for that time can have no place. For 
the hardness of obstinacy sinderesis also let, that it may not stir to goodness, as it 
is in damned souls, that be so obstinate in evil, that they never be inclined to good. 
And though sinderesis may be said to that point extinct in damned souls, yet it may 
not be said that it is fully extinct to all intents”. Christopher Saint German, The 
Doctor and Student, Or, Dialogues Between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student in 
the Laws of England, (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2014), 39. 
28 “Shakespeare’s fellow dramatists Ben Jonson and John Marston read Doctor and 
Student as they take a word from the treatise and use it respectively in Every Man 
Out of His Humour (III.iv), dedicated to the Inns of Court, and Satires (III.viii), 
written in Marston’s rooms in Middle Temple. The word picked up, misspelling 
and all, is ‘synderesis’. Marston writes ‘returne sacred Synteresis, lnspire our 
trunches’, and Jonson mocks it in a list of inkhorn terms as ‘the soules Synderisis’. 
Syntheresis is Greek for the mystical bond between the body and the Soul, the flesh 
and the spirit. In Doctor and Student it signifies the spark of life which Equitie (the 
bond) gives to the Law (the flesh) and Justice (the spirit of the law), making a 
living legal system out of the bare bones of the letter of the law”. Knight, W. N., 
Autobiography in Shakespeare’s Plays: Lands So by his Father Lost (New York: 
Lang, 2002), 26. 
29 “Duo tamen non praetermittam, synderesim et conscientiam: synderesis nomen 
est non intellectus, sed habitus in eo existentis, facilemque reddit ad assentiendum 
principiis practicis, unde Latine sonat conservationem, fortasse quia judicio talis 
habitus plura sunt conservanda, vel certe, quia illius munus est conservare in nobis 
officium rationalis naturae. De hoc habitu, atque altero, qui circa speculativa ver-
satur, intellectusque principiorum dicitur, videantur dicta apud Aristotelem in 
posterioribus. Jam conscientia signifícat habitum quemdam dimanantem a synde-
resi immediate, vel mediate judicio alicujus conclusionis practices, est enim 
conscientia quoddam actúale examen nostrarum operationum, quo judicamus illas 
malas esse, aut bonas: si forte judicamus malas, e vestigio sequiturin volúntate 
remorsus, et tristitia quaedam, quae vermis appellatur. Si autem nihil appre-
neusibile in illis invenimus, subsequitnr quies quaedam et gaudium. Unde 2, 
Corinth. 1, dicitur: Gloria nostra est testimonium conscientice nostrae. Qua de 
causa Durandus, in 2, dist. 9, quaest. 2, putavit conscientiam esse habitum volun-
tatis, sed minus vere, nam, ut ex ipso nomine constat, conscientia cognitionem 
significat, id autem, quod in volúntate sequitur, affectus est bonae, vel malae con-
scientiae. Solet etiam aliquando sumi conscientia pro ipso habitu svnderesis, quo 
sensu Damascenus vocat nostri intellectos lucem: Basilius vero esse naturale judi-
catorium, Hieronymus super Ezechielem appellat synderesim, prout haec omnia 
refert S. Thomas, prima parte, quaest. 79, art. 13, et optime exponit”. Suárez, F., 
Commentaria ac Disputationes in Primam Partem D. Thomae De Deo Effectore 
Creaturarum Omnium (Venice: Typographia Balleoniana, 1740) Cap. X, 9, 435. 
30 “Ratio est, quia haec lex est veluti proprietas consequens, non rationem propriam 
alicuius individui, sed specificam naturam, quae eadem est in omnibus. Item syn-
deresis eadem est in omnibus hominibus, et per se loquendo esse posset eadem 
cognitio conclusionum; ergo et eadem lex naturae”. Suárez, F., De Legibus II, VIII 
(Paris: Vives, 1856), vol. 5, 117. 
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number of authorities, mainly on natural law rather than of synderesis, 
like Aristotle, Cicero, Lactactius and Aquinas in his q. 94, a. 2. In the 
Disputationes Metaphysicas he just uses the word synderesis to ex-
plain the distinction between synderesis and intelligence, memory etc., 
in a passage where he discusses the distinction between ‘rationis rati-
ocinata’ and the real distinction31.  
f) Other authors 
While a number of Spanish theologians were involved in the dis-
cussions and development of natural and international law during the 
XVI and XVII Centuries which is clearly linked to synderesis, the dis-
cussion was mainly centred on natural justice. For those who would 
like to go deeper into this topic a good starting point could be the book 
Contemporary Perspectives on Natural Law prepared by Ana Marta 
González32. 
The topic, was though, known in by the counter-reform theolo-
gians to the point of influencing popular mistics as María de Agreda 
who, without having formal education, gives a beautiful description of 
synderesis, synteresis in 
the English transla-
tion: “The two kinds of 
virtues, the infused 
and the acquired, are 
founded upon a third 
kind, called natural 
virtue; this is born 
within us as part of our 
rational nature and is called synteresis. It is a certain knowledge of the 
first foundations and principles of virtue, perceived by the light of rea-
son, and a certain inclination in the will, corresponding to this light. 
Such, for instance, is the sentiment, that we must love those who do us 
good, or that we should not do unto others, what we do not wish to be 
done to ourselves, etc”.33 
 Synderesis continued being used in traditional philosophical 
manuals throughout Europe. As an example we can see how in the 
textbook of Pierre Godart in France, Totius Philosophiae Summa. Syn-
deresis is explained within the treatise of human actions under ‘The 
                                                 
31 “Et fere certum argumentum esse, illa non distingui actu in re, sed ratione ratioci-
nata. Probatur ex dictis, & primo inductione nam Petrus, homo, animal, caetera 
praedicata prout in re sunt in Petro, non distinguntur ex natura rei. Similiter in 
intellectu ratio superior & inferior, synderesis, memoria, & simila attributa eius, 
non significanda aliqua in re distincta, set ratione tantum racionata: quia illa po-
tentia talis est, ut haec omnia in sua adaequata ratione comprehendat, nec sint in 
illa separabilia ullo modo etiam de potentia Dei absoluta, quoad ipsam facultatem, 
seu actum primu, lice quad usum possint separari”. Suárez, F., Disput. Met. VII, 3 
op.cit, vol 25, 271.  
32 González, A.M., Contemporary Perspectives On Natural Law: Natural Law as a 
Limiting Concept (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2012).  
33 Agreda, M. de J. de, City of God (Hammond, Indiana: Conkey, 1914), 373. 
Figure 1: Godart's diagram. 
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principiis congenitum actionum humanarum’ as “Intellectus Moralis, 
est lux vitae, lex morum, dux rationis” which comprises “In eo sunt 
syntheresis, lex naturalis, conscientia, Moralis, Prudentia Iurispru-
dentia”, and gives the definition of synderesis as: “Syntheresis, est 
anima custos, rectrix conservatrix, quasi ‘fotagogos kai paidagogos’, 
which “Definitur, habitus primarum bene vivendi regularum, p. 
neminem ladere suum cuique tribuere”. He also includes a pedagogi-
cal chart to express the work of the synderesis before and after the 
action34 (Figure 1). 
In England the term synderesis was still alive at the beginning 
of the Century. An interesting fact is that the discussion was not cen-
tred on Jerome’s Comment on Ezechiel but on Proverbs, XX, 27, both 
in Cambridge and London. The discussion was whether the interpre-
tation of the text gave priority to God as light of understanding or to 
human natural light. The first interpretation is closer to the Calvinist 
marginal note to the influential Geneva Bible: “Theof God giveth life 
unto man and causeth us to see and trie the secrets of our dark 
hearts”35. The second is closer to the Deists in the sense that man by 
himself can understand God and the moral law. The two interpreta-
tions seem to have been recorded in an eclectic way in the commentary 
ordered by the Synod of Dort: “The soul of man (meaning the rational 
or reasonable soul, which is endowed with the natural light of under-
standing, and distinction between good and evil, or also with the 
supernatural light of regeneration, whereby a man has the capacity to 
apprehend and understand, what he ought to believe, and how he ought 
to live) is the lamp of the Lord”36. The main defender of the Calvinist 
position was Anthony Tuckne. The Deist position defender was Ben-
jamin Whichcote, which he may have taken from Ephraim Huit’s 
Anatomy of Conscience37. 
Nevertheless, it was also in England where the most radical crit-
ics will come, not only of synderesis but also of the judgment of moral 
                                                 
34 “Lex naturalis, est actuale mentis dictament quo naturae, luce, & duce novimus 
officia vitae), doctis, & probis non esse invidendum. Conscientia, est cordis scien-
tia, quasi conscriptus cordis codex, in quo quidquid later, patebit. Dicitur actuale 
mentis dictamen quo concludimus ex universali praecepto aliquot particulare, vt. 
Puta hic, & nuc, hui viro probe, & docto non est invidendum. Excusat, ablsovit, 
delectat, insontes licet accusentur, imo, & damnetur: est enim fax veritatis & 
sincera pax cordis”. Godart P., Totius Philosophiae Summa (Ludovicum Billaini, 
Paris, 1666), 166.  
35 Cfr. Greene, R. A., “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderesis”, Journal 
of the History of Ideas, 52/4 (1991), 621. 
36 Cfr. Ibid. 
37 “There is in Conscience a speculative part, called synderesis, comprising the prin-
ciples of right reason, the lawes of good and evill; which in this Discourse affords 
the first proposition being indeed one of its principles. There is also a practicall 
part, called syneidesis (which by some is strictly taken for Conscience it selfe,) the 
which supplies the Assumption... from both which issues the Conclusion, compos-
ing a compleate Syllogisme”. Huit, E., The Anatomy of Conscience, London, 1626, 
134-35; quoted by Greene, R. A. “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Syn-
deresis”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 52/4 (1991), 625. 
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conscience. Hobbes and Locke could not understand how something 
that cannot be seen would be the guarantee of universal morals that 
were so different among so many people not just from different cul-
tures but within the same country, which at the time was in constant 
turmoil. Both of them span the century and will be very influential in 
the following centuries in France and through France in the rest of the 
world. 
f) John of Saint Thomas (1589–1644). A Dominican monk con-
sidered one of the more accurate commentators of Aquinas, and one 
of the clearer in exposing his doctrine, commented on the synderesis 
in his Cursus Philosophicus stating that both conscience and syn-
deresis are part of the intellect38. Nevertheless, it cannot be confused 
with the intellect because it is different from it. Regarding its origin he 
clarifies that synderesis is natural as the root of moral behaviour, but 
as the other natural habits, does not work until it is activated by other 
intellectual acts39.  
As a sample of the discussion going on in Spanish universities, 
the comparison of his interpretation with other contemporary theolo-
gians is interesting; he cites Gregorio Martínez and M. Báñez as 
understanding synderesis and the other practical intellectual habits in-
correctly40. 
g) Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Anders Schinkel explains that 
“Hobbes was annoyed, to say the least, by the liberty with which men 
from different religious persuasions used the term (conscience) for 
their own purposes”41. This made him reject the appeals to conscience, 
and much more to synderesis which he does not use in his works. 
                                                 
38 “Synderesis nominat habitum principiorum regulantium practice actiones, consci-
entia vero applicationem eorum ad operandum, neutrum autem distinctam 
potentiam exigit ab intellectu”. John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicum Tho-
misticus (Olms: Arnaud, 1678), 874.  
39 “Dicit habitum principiorum esse partim acquisitum, partim naturalem. Est ac-
quisitus, quatenus dependet a speciebus, ut ex ipsorum terminorum cognitione 
innotescat, et ita de se intellectus, antequam species aliquas acquirat, sine ullo 
habitu est. Cum enim habitus iste sit lumen determinatum et circa determinata obi-
ecta, ad quae inclinat, non potest esse idem cum potentia et ex sola eius 
indifferentia et potentialitate resultare, sed ex aliqua determinata repraesentatione 
obiectorum, quae speciale lumen determinent et circa specialia obiecta inclina-
tionem ponant. Est autem naturalis ille habitus, non formaliter in se, sed radicaliter, 
quatenus positis speciebus et explicatis terminis ex ipsa natura intellectus provenit 
tanta adhaesio et inclinatio ad illam veritatem, quod nullo modo potest ei dissentiri, 
sed naturali vi adhaeret illi evidentiae”. John of St. Thomas, Ibid. 
40 “‘Alia synderésis, seu principiorum practicorum, sed unus, & idem habitus sit pro 
utrisque’. Gregorius Martinez, Quast. 57 art. 2, Dub. 1 circa secundum argumen-
tum. Et idem sensit Bañez M., a. tom. 1 part. Quast. 79 art. 12 dub.1 & 2. 
Conimbrincenses autem in Lib. Et hic disp.7 Quaest. 6. art. 1 ponunt synderesim, 
quae esst habitus circa principia, practica quas virturem condistintam ab intellectu 
principiorum, sapientia, & scientia”. Ibid., 192.  
41 Schinkel, A., Conscience and Conscientious Objections (Amsterdam: Pallas Pub-
lications, 2007), 203. 
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Schinkel proceeds: “By speaking of conscience instead of their opin-
ions, they transfer the aura of objectivity of conscience, ‘properly 
understood’, to this new private conscience, behind or within which 
their private opinions hide”42. The solution is the unanimity or agree-
ment, which is “the social contract”. The rule of conscience and morals 
then becomes society and society expresses it by the laws.  
Hobbes places law, this is society, above conscience, since con-
science is unreliable. This does not mean that those without society do 
not have morals, or that those morals are not related to conscience be-
cause they follow the law of nature43, and this is clearer in “common 
wealths relationships”, where the kings have to follow their con-
sciences since there is no law of nations44. “Good and Evil are names 
that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, 
customes, and doctrines of men, are different… For moral philosophy 
is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil in the conver-
sation and society of mankind.”45. This means that where there is law 
the law is the ultimate rule; where there is no law (as is the case of the 
relations among states) then the will of the ruler prevails, and the ruler 
will work according to his appetites and aversions, which directly fol-
low their nature. 
h) John Locke (1632-1704). “Locke …argues that there is no 
such thing as synderesis, for there are no such things, Locke says, as 
‘innate principles’, whether practical or theoretical”46. Yolton in his 
Locke Dictionary says that, ‘conscience’ “is not a term used very often 
by Locke”, and “after 1690, it fades out of his use”47. While Hobbes 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 207. 
43 “From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, three things can 
be inferred. First, that where law ceases, sin ceases. But the law of nature cannot 
cease, because it is eternal; so violation of covenants, ingratitude, arrogance, and 
all acts contrary to any moral virtue can never cease to be sin”. Hobbes, Th., Levi-
athan, John Bennett Edition, Part II, Chapter 27, 131. Accessed December 22, 
2014. http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/hobbes1651part2.pdf. 
44 “Concerning the duties of one sovereign to another, which are covered by the so 
called ‘law of nations’, I needn’t say anything here, because the law of nations and 
the law of nature are the same thing. Every sovereign has the same right in procur-
ing the safety of his people as any individual man can have in procuring the safety 
of his own body. And the same law that dictates to men who have no civil govern-
ment what they ought to do and what to avoid in regard of one another dictates the 
same to commonwealths. That is, dictates it to the consciences of sovereign princes 
and sovereign assemblies; for there is no court of natural justice except the con-
science, where not man but God reigns”. Hobbes, Th., Leviathan, John Bennett 
Edition, Part II, Chapter 30, 159, op.cit.  
45 Hobbes, Th., Leviathan, 1660, ch. 15. Accessed Nov 29. 14 http://www.ttu.ee/pub 
lic/m/mart-murdvee/EconPsy/6/Hobbes_Thomas_1660_The_Leviathan.pdf. 
46 Byham, J., Ordinary Citizens: Locke’s Politics of “Native Rustic Reason”, (PhD 
diss., Michigan State University, 2014), Accessed Oct 31, 2015, 60. 
etd.lib.msu.edu/islandora/object/etd%3A2764/view_premis. 
47Yolton, J. W. A Locke Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), ‘con-
science’ in Schinkel, A., Conscience and Conscientious Objections (Amsterdam: 
Pallas Publications, 2007), p.211.  
102 
 
still believes in some reference to a law of nature when the laws are 
not agreed upon by the commonwealth of society, Locke does not, as 
the following quote from his essay shows. There are no “rules being 
written on their hearts. To which I answer that many men can come to 
assent to various moral rules in the same way that they come to the 
knowledge of other things –without the rules being written on their 
hearts. And others may be led the same way by their education, the 
company they keep, and the customs of their country. Such an assent 
to the rules, however it is come by, will activate the conscience– which 
is nothing but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rightness or 
wrongness of our own actions. And if conscience is a proof of innate-
ness, contraries can be innate principles; because sometimes men will 
conscientiously promote what others conscientiously avoid”48. 
For Locke there are no innate ideas, not a single one, and to be-
lieve in innate knowledge is proper to lazy people who prefer to 
believe in others rather than to devote themselves to prove what they 
can believe or not: “Some of the first sort, because of their general and 
easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: but the truth is, ideas 
and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences; though 
some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily 
than others; and therefore are more generally received: though that, 
too, be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds 
happen to be employed; God having fitted men with faculties and 
means to discover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are em-
ployed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of 
mankind, is from the different use they put their faculties to. Whilst 
some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their 
power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and 
dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to ex-
amine, and not blindly to swallow others, with an implicit faith, 
employing their thoughts only about a few things, grow acquainted 
sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and 
remain ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose in 
search of other inquiries”49. To believe in others, not using our own 
intelligence leads to “a worship of idols. It is easy to imagine how, by 
these means, it comes to pass that men worship the idols that have been 
set up in their minds; grow fond of the notions they have been long 
acquainted with; and stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities 
and errors; become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys, and contend 
too, to fight, and die in defence of their opinions”50. Leonardo Polo 
will point out that Locke and modern philosophers in general have not 
discovered the power of habitual knowledge.  
                                                 
48 Locke, J., Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Thomas Tegg, 
1825), Book I, ch. III, § 8, 25.  
49 Ibid., 82, Book I, ch. III, § 23. 
50 Ibid., 83-84, Book I, ch. III, § 26. 
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Locke directs most of his criticism to the common sense theo-
ries, mainly Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid, and the Cambridge 
Platonist theologians. 
i) Joseph Butler (1692-1752). He was a protestant pastor, and 
later Bishop, who in his sermons confronted the psychological egoism 
of Hobbes and Locke’s rational approach to morals and religion. To-
gether with the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and Francis 
Hutcheson (1694 -1746) he rejects Hobbes and Locke’s approach and 
rather than speaking about ‘conscience’ he speaks of a general ‘moral 
sense’51, which at the beginning of the following century will become 
‘Common Sense’ in the Scottish of Thomas Reid. None of them make 
reference to synderesis but to nature and to behaving according to na-
ture which “is the voice of God speaking in us”52. Butler explains the 
situation of multiple moralities in the world because there is need to 
develop that initial nature we receive53.  
 
4. Modern Thinkers. XVIII Century 
The XVIII Century continues the diverse versions of morality; 
the traditional as shown by Peter Lemonnier (1757) in his Cursus 
Philosophicus ad Scholarum usum Accommodatus: “Synderesis ac-
cipitur, modo pro habitu, modo pro actu”54, and the more debated 
‘moral sense’ by the Scotish philosophers of the Common Sense. 
                                                 
51 “Some British authors gave conscience a new name — impressed, perhaps, by the 
Hobbesian and Lockeian critique of conscience, but in line with their empiricism. 
For them, conscience became the «moral sense»”. Schinkel, A., Conscience and 
Conscientious Objections (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2007), 228. 
52 “Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all 
imperfection in him. And this will forever be a practical proof of his moral char-
acter, to such as will consider what a practical proof is; because it is the voice of 
God speaking in us”. Butler, J., Butler’s Works, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897, 
vol. I, Introduction), 13. Cf. also: “so they often contribute also, not to the inversion 
of this, which is impossible: but to the rendering persons prosperous, though 
wicked; afflicted, though righteous; and, which is worse, to the rewarding of some 
actions, though vicious, and punishing other actions, though virtuous. But all this 
cannot drown the voice of nature in the conduct of Providence, plainly declaring 
itself for virtue, by way of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For our being 
so constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favoured and discounte-
nanced”. Butler’s Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), vol. I, Chapter III, 79.  
53 “What passes before their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them experience, 
caution against treachery and deceit, together with numberless little rules of action 
and conduct, which we could not live without; and which are learnt so insensibly 
and so perfectly, as to be mistaken perhaps for instinct: though they are the effect 
of long experience and exercise as much so as language, or knowledge in particular 
business, or the qualifications and behaviour belonging to the several ranks and 
professions”. Ibid. p. 116.  
54 “Intellectus, est facultas cognoscendi ea omnia, quibus mediantibus, vita humana 
regitur, moresque diriguntur ad honestatem. Ad facultatem hanc pertinent Syn-
deresis, prudentia & conscientia. Synderesis accipitur, modo pro habitu, modo pro 
actu. Si sumatur pro habítu, est facilitas cognoscendi prima principia moralia, hoc, 
verbi gratia, alteri ne feceris, quod tibi fieri non vis. Si vero sumatur pro actu, est 
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a) Thomas Reid (1710–1796). He was a contemporary and main 
adversary of Hume and founder of the Scottish Common Sense Phi-
losophy. While defending a realistic philosophy55, he nevertheless 
does not mention synderesis in his works. In making reference to 
Malebranche56, he refers to the innate abilities that allow to develop 
further experiences and sciences, and that are later improved further 
by philosophers, “Common Sense is like Common Law”57 in that all 
people have its basis but only lawyers and philosophers are able to 
develop their principles further. 
b) David Hume (1711-1776). Hume is no different from Hobbes 
in placing the universality of morals in social agreement but he is more 
precise in saying that this agreement is based on a moral feeling. Being 
sceptical about causation and about the substance, it would be difficult 
for him to appeal to a common nature, though he uses the name in his 
main work: “A Treatise of Human Nature which is an attempt to in-
troduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects”58. 
                                                 
primorum illorum principiorum cognitio. Prudencia sumitur pariter, vel pro habitu, 
vel pro actu. Si sumatur pro habitu, est facilitas eruendi conclusiones, ex primis 
principiis moralibus; si vero, pro actu, est illatio conclusionum, ex primis principiis 
moralibus. Conscientia, est sensus quídam intimus, consequens notitiam agen-
dorum, aut fugiendorum: modo dicitur quies interna, modo vermis internus, prout 
nempe, vel secundum, vel contra sensum ilium intimum agimus”. Lemonnier, P., 
Cursus Philosophicus ad Scholarum Usum Accommodatus, VI tomus, Moralis, 
(Paris: Genneau L., et J. Rollin, 1750), 52-53. 
55 “No philosopher has ever formally denied the truth or disclaimed the authority of 
consciousness; but few or none have been content implicitly to accept and consist-
ently to follow out its dictates. Instead of humbly resorting to consciousness, to 
draw from thence his doctrines and their proof, each dogmatic speculator looked 
only into consciousness, there to discover his preadopted opinions. In philosophy, 
men have abused the code of natural, as in theology, the code of positive, revelation 
and the epigraph of a great protestant divine, on the book of scripture, is certainly 
not less applicable to the book of consciousness: “Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua 
dogmata quisque; Invenit, et pariter dogmata quisque sua”. Reid, T., On the Pro-
gress of Philosophy (London: Trubner & Co, 1858), 147. 
56 “We admit, nay we maintain, as D’Alembert well expresses it, that the truth in 
metaphysics, like the truth in matters of taste, is a truth of which all minds have 
the germ within themselves to which indeed the greater number pay no attention, 
but which they recognise the moment it is pointed out to them. But if, in this sort, 
all are able to understand, all are not able to instruct. The merit of conveying easily 
to others true and simple notions is much greater than is commonly supposed; for 
experience proves how rarely this is to be met with. Sound metaphysical ideas are 
common truths, which every one apprehends, but which few have the talent to 
develope. So difficult it is on any subject to make our own what belongs to every 
one”. Reid, T. On Common Sense, III #10, in Philosophical Works, Volume 1, 
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1967), 751. 
57 “Common Sense is like Common Law. Each may be laid down as the general rule 
of decision but in the one case it must be left to the jurist, in the other to the phi-
losopher, to ascertain what are the contents of the rule and though in both instances 
the common man may be cited as a witness, for the custom or the fact, in neither 
can he be allowed to officiate as advocate or as judge”. Ibid. p. 752. 
58 “We may only affirm on this head, that if ever there was any thing, which cou’d 
be call’d natural in this sense, the sentiments of morality certainly may; since there 
never was any nation of the world, nor any single person in any nation, who was 
utterly depriv’d of them, and who never, in any instance, show’d the least appro-
bation or dislike of manners. These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution 
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The main purpose is ethical. Hume intends precisely that, to find a 
“scientific” method to defend the universality of ethics, nevertheless 
as Schindels says “Hume replaces both ‘synderesis’ and conscience 
with moral sentiments, with feelings of approbation and disapproba-
tion. Hume bases morality on ‘nature’ in a new way, anticipated by 
Hobbes and Locke”59, nevertheless by placing the base of morals in 
feelings he makes it rather subjective. 
In the discussion on “Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Na-
ture”, Hume notes that in order to acquire knowledge of human nature, 
man is often compared to animals, or one man to another. Human na-
ture is not defined by anything ‘metaphysical’, a divine spark, a 
mysterious moral faculty, but by man’s motives for action”60. Yet, and 
this is an important difference with Locke, “Hatred, resentment, es-
teem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions I feel 
more from communication than from my own natural temper and dis-
position. So remarkable a phaenomenon merits our attention, and must 
be traced up to its first principles”61. Locke’s rejection of any innate 
ideas went too far for Hume.  
c) Adam Smith (1723–1790). It is interesting to include Adam 
Smith to indicate a fact not always mentioned, that Smith´s interest in 
morals was great and that it is reflected in the title of one of his books: 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which already indicates his connec-
tion to Hume, Locke and Hobbes. Smith’s definition of conscience and 
his appeal to a faculty that tells us whether our action is agreeable or 
contrary to its directions seems to be a call for the forgotten ‘syn-
deresis’ which Smith has never heard of: “The word conscience does 
not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or 
disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such 
faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted 
agreeably or contrary to its directions… When love, hatred, joy, sor-
row, gratitude, resentment, with so many other passions which are all 
supposed to be the subjects of this principle, have made themselves 
considerable enough to get titles to know them by, is it not surprising 
that the sovereign of them all should hitherto have been so little 
heeded, that, a few philosophers excepted, nobody has yet thought it 
                                                 
and temper, that without entirely confounding the human mind by disease or mad-
ness, ‘tis impossible to extirpate and destroy them”. Hume, D., A Treatise of 
Human Nature, (Auckland, The Floating Press, 2009), 722. “Willey (Willey, B., 
The Eighteenth Century Background (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 122, notes that 
Hume ‘is aware (...) that different ages and races have approved different things, 
but for his purpose it is sufficient to make a catalogue of the qualities approved 
and condemned by his own age and social group. The moral judgments of this 
group, he evidently feels, are sufficiently representative to be taken as those of 
average humanity’. In Hume, then, we find that same remarkable feature of paro-
chialism parading as universalism that appears to have been so widespread in his 
time”. Schinkel, A., op.cit., 288.  
59 Schinkel, A., Ibid. 
60 Hume takes issue with Hobbes and his followers here, and refutes the idea that all 
man’s actions are purely the result of self-love. 
61 Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, op.cit., 491. 
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worthwhile to bestow a name upon it?”62. He indicates that it is sur-
prising that no philosopher has given it a particular name and that he 
will accept it to be called a kind of ‘moral sense’ though “the word 
moral sense is of very late formation, and cannot yet be considered as 
making part of the English tongue”63. He also gives the impresion that 
it is a kind of sentiment but different from common sentiments. 
d) Rousseau (1712–1778). Rousseau had great influence in the 
following century, and he became the unavoidable reference to all Ro-
mantics. He praised and defended conscience against Montaigne’s 
scepticism and that of rationalists and empiricists64. His clear and sim-
ple style won many hearts, because he was appealing mainly to the 
heart. “Conscience. Conscience! Divine instinct, immortal voice from 
heaven; sure guide for a creature ignorant and finite indeed, yet intel-
ligent and free; infallible judge of good and evil, making man like to 
God. In thee consists the excellence of man’s nature and the morality 
of his actions; apart from thee, I find nothing in myself to raise me 
above the beasts”65. Rousseau understands conscience mainly as a 
feeling, a natural feeling, above intelligence, the most important direc-
tor of life: “The decrees of conscience are not judgments but feelings. 
Although all our ideas come from without, the feelings by which they 
are weighed are within us”66. And life is a struggle where the feelings 
of conscience are battling the feelings of the body, rather than the in-
telligence: “Conscience is the voice of the soul, the passions are the 
voice of the body. Is it strange that these voices often contradict each 
other? And then to which should we give heed? Too often does reason 
deceive us; we have only too good a right to doubt her; but conscience 
never deceives us; she is the true guide of man; it is to the soul what 
instinct is to the body”67. Such statement really looks like a description 
of synderesis, where it not for the subjectivism that this conscience 
has, which depends on each subject in Rosseau’s doctrine, as his idea 
of God also depends on feelings. 
The praise of conscience as director and its consideration as in-
stinctive will be accepted by Kant with his Practical Reason, and by 
Darwin and Freud in the following Century. While none of them used 
                                                 
62 Smith, A., The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (London: Steward, Henry G Bohn, 
1853), 479.  
63 Ibid. 
64 “But at this word I hear the murmurs of all the wise men so-called, Childish errors, 
prejudices of our upbringing, they exclaim in concert! There is nothing in the hu-
man mind but what it has gained by experience; and we judge everything solely 
by means of the ideas we have acquired. They go further; they even venture to 
reject the clear and universal agreement of all peoples, and to set against this strik-
ing unanimity in the judgment of mankind, they seek out some obscure exception 
known to themselves alone”. Rousseau, J. J., Emile (New York, Dent & Sons Ltd., 
1911), 252.  
65 Rousseau, J. J., Ibid., 252. 
66 Rousseau, J. J., Ibid., 252. 
67 Rousseau, J. J., Ibid., 249. 
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the term synderesis they are referring to that innate source of goodness 
common to all men. 
e) Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The often-quoted saying of 
Kant, found in the first lines of his conclusion to the Critic of the Prac-
tical Reason: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing 
admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on 
them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within”68, may ex-
press the importance that Kant gives to morals, and on the other hand 
it also manifests the dichotomy between nature and morals in his crit-
ical system. In this sense he has not overcome Hume. His foundation 
of ethics will be paradigmatic in that he grounds morals in a pure for-
mal precept which is simple to understand. Nevertheless, the precept 
does not overcome the “social agreement” of the English empiricist, 
nor its subjacent subjectivism. As Schinkel summarises, “In a sense, 
Kant epitomizes the Enlightenment problem of grounding the author-
ity of conscience, while he, in fact, made the most impressive effort to 
find a basis for it. A failure is simply most noticeable when a serious 
attempt was made. The problem is old, but for those in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries who attempted to redefine conscience and to 
provide it with a new anchorage, be it in Nature or Reason, it went 
back most directly to Hobbes and Locke, for the latter”69. As a deep 
philosopher, nevertheless, Kant had a hint of synderesis as Bouyer 
points out: “Above all however, as we have said earlier, Kant’s analy-
sis of conscience, despite being encased in formalism, does include a 
real awareness of the inner capably religious element within it, and 
comes very close to the Thomist analysis of synderesis”70. In his work 
Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant states: “But now 
this is possible only because the free power of choice incorporates 
moral feeling into its maxim: so a power of choice so constituted is a 
good character, and this character, as in general every character of the 
free power of choice, is something that can only be acquired; yet, for 
its possibility there must be present in our nature a predisposition onto 
which nothing evil can be grafted”71 which sounds very close to the 
traditional synderesis, and to an habitual knowledge which Kant calls 
a feeling, following the empiricist approach. 
f) Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). Jeremy Bentham is the most 
radical proposer of utilitarism, where subjectivity reigns. His distinc-
tion between the real (read sensible) and the fictitious leaves no room 
                                                 
68 Kant, I., Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics 
(London: Longmans & Co, 1889), 173.  
69 Schinkel, A., Conscience and Conscientious Objections, op. cit., 271. 
70 Bouyer, Ch., BOUYER, L., The Invisible Father: Approaches to the Mystery of the 
Divinity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 290.  
71 Kant, I., Religion within the boundaries of mere reason and other writings (Cam-
bridge Cambridge University Press, 1998), 51. Cfr. for a more detailed account of 
the good and evil foundation in Kant: Rodríguez Duplá, L. R. D., “¿Por qué sos-
tiene Kant que el hombre es malo?, in Ética Sin Religión? VI Simposio 
Internacional Fe Cristiana y Cultura Contemporánea, Instituto de Antropología y 
Ética, (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2007). 
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for faculties so synderesis has no room in his system: “Faculties, pow-
ers of the mind, dispositions: all these are unreal; all these are but so 
many fictitious entities. When a view of them comes to be given, it 
will be seen how perfectly distinguishable, among psychical entities, 
are those which are recognised in the character of real, from those 
which are here referred to as the class of fictitious entities”72. Bentham 
can be even more specific with regards to natural rights: “That which 
has no existence cannot be destroyed –that which cannot be destroyed 
cannot require anything to preserve it from destruction. Natural right 
is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical non-
sense– nonsense upon stilts”73.  
 
5. Contemporary Thinkers. XIX and XX Century 
The beginning of the XIX Century sees the explosion of the Ro-
mantic Movement. Romanticism is the rebellion against the extreme 
rationalism of the two previous centuries. From reason to senses, from 
the will to the instinct, from sculpture to music, from proportion to 
spontaneity, from urban to rural, from imperial to national, from inter-
national to local, from artificial to natural. As mysticism was a reaction 
to scholasticism, then, Romanticism was a reaction to the cult of rea-
son74. Romanticism affected philosophy as well, and there was a 
coming back to the Medieval, to the mysteries, to the oriental. The 
opening of Asia and Africa and the travel facilities together with the 
large number of publication of literary, historical and philosophical 
sources made it easier to stress the subjectivist view of ethics, already 
started in the previous three centuries.  
a) Charles Darwin (1809-1882). Darwin will not deny morals or 
their importance: “I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers 
who maintain that, of all the differences between man and the lower 
animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important”75. 
Nevertheless, morals for him is a social feeling, that animals can even-
tually achieve: “The following proposition seems to me in a high 
degree probable, namely, that any animal whatsoever, endowed with 
well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense 
or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well 
developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man”76. And this will 
depend on contrasting feelings: “Nevertheless the bee, or any other 
social animal, would in our supposed case gain, as it appears to me, 
some feeling of right and wrong, or a conscience. For each individual 
                                                 
72 Bentham, J., The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh: Bowring, William Tait, 
1838, vol. 8), 196. Accessed December 12, 2014. http://oll.libertyfund.org/ti-
tles/bentham-the-works-of-jeremy-bentham-vol-11-memoirs-of-bentham-part-ii-
and-analytical-index. 
73 Ibid., vol. 2), 501. 
74 Cfr. Schinkel, A., Conscience and Conscientious Objections, op. cit., 277.  
75 Darwin, C., The Descent of Man (New York: Appleton, 1871), vol. I, 67. 
76 Ibid., 68  
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would have an inward sense of possessing certain stronger or more 
enduring instincts, and others less strong or enduring; so that there 
would often be a struggle as to which impulse should be followed; and 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction would be felt, as past impressions were 
compared during their incessant passage through the mind”77. “Ulti-
mately a highly-complex sentiment, having its first origin in the social 
instincts, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled 
by reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, 
confirmed by instruction and habit, all combined, constitute our moral 
sense or conscience”78.  
Rousseau’s natural feeling has now a scientific base and an evo-
lutionary explanation. It is an instinct directed to the physical survival. 
The apex mentis, which use to link men to God, is now the survival 
instinct of social animals with high intellectual capacity which even-
tually creates the moral norms and religion and God, as a means of 
survival. As such this instinct is totally undetermined, and will become 
the libido in Freud, the will to life of Schopenhauer, the will to power 
of Nietzsche. The concept of a human moral instinct is not new. What 
is new in Darwin is to reduce morals to animal instincts and link them 
to an evolutionary process.  
b) Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860). Schopenhauer uses the 
word synderesis in Spanish in one of his works. Nevertheless he seems 
to understand it according to his impulse to life rather than in the clas-
sical way that was used by the author he admires and quotes: “It may 
be that this impulse or instinct is the unconscious effect of a kind of 
prophetic dream which is forgotten when we awake lending our life a 
uniformity of tone, a dramatic unity, such as could never result from 
the unstable moments of consciousness, when we are so easily led into 
error, so liable to strike a false note. It is in virtue of some such pro-
phetic dream that a man feels himself called to great achievements in 
a special sphere, and works in that direction from his youth up out of 
an inner and secret feeling that that is his true path, just as by a similar 
instinct the bee is led to build up its cells in the comb. This is the im-
pulse which Balthazar Gracián79 calls ‘la gran sindéresis’, the great 
power of moral discernment: it is something that a man instinctively 
feels to be his salvation, without which he would be lost”80. Schopen-
hauer had great regard for Gracián whom he calls “My excellent 
Baltasar Gracián”. Schopenhauer used different words rather than 
‘sindéresis’ in other passages of his translation of Gracián’s book The 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 70. 
78 Ibid., 159. 
79 The 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica wrote of Gracián that “He has been exces-
sively praised by Schopenhauer, whose appreciation of the author induced him to 
translate the Oráculo manual, and he has been unduly depreciated by Ticknor and 
others. He is an acute thinker and observer, misled by his systematic misanthropy 
and by his fantastic literary theories”. Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th ed. (New 
York: The Times, 1911), vol. 12, 311. 




Art of Worldly Wisdom depending on the context, and did not seem to 
have used “synderesis” in his own works, except for the one quoted 
above81. 
c) Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Nietzsche follows Scho-
penhauer in conceiving the root of human behaviour as an instinctive 
force, which for him is the will to dominate; the will to power. He 
despises all Christian concepts, so it is no surprise that he does not 
mention synderesis in his works, even having read Gracián and admir-
ing him82. What he says about conscience already gives a hint on why 
he does not even consider the traditional view on synderesis: “con-
science: this is not, as you may believe, ‘the voice of God in man’; it 
is the instinct of cruelty, which turns inwards once it is unable to dis-
charge itself outwardly. Cruelty is here exposed, for the first time, as 
one of the oldest and most indispensable elements in the foundation of 
culture”83. For Nietzsche morality is just a psychological phenome-
non, which somehow resembles what Freud will later say as Janaway 
points out: “Moralization is the elevation of feeling guilty into a vir-
tue”84. Something that is therefore artificial, not natural, not innate, 
what is innate is the will to power, not morals. Nevertheless this source 
of action in man which pushes him to power has some of the charac-
teristics of synderesis, but instead of moving towards good it moves 
towards power. It is a different foundation for an evolutionary ethics 
that favours the reign of the fittest, without a purpose other that power 
that coincides with Schinkel’s comment: “There is thus a structural 
resemblance between Nietzsche’s view of conscience and the Chris-
tian idea of synderesis. Both are signs of an original state from which 
we have fallen; a better, natural state, which we long to return to”85.  
The XX Century inherits all the past achievements in a way that 
was never possible before, in the sense that the incredible technical 
advances initiated in the XIX Century come to make knowledge of the 
past available to practically anyone interested. So what already started 
in the XIX Century with historical research and publication of afford-
able classic books of all cultures; the improvement of means of 
                                                 
81 Cfr. Palacios, L.-E., “Cuatro Aspectos de la Sindéresis”, Estudios en Honor del 
Dr. Luis Recasens Siches (México: Universidad Nacional Autonoma México, 
1980), 690. 
82 Nietzsche wrote in BVN 1884. 536 –Letter to Peter Gast on: 09/20/1884. NF-
1873.30 (34) –Posthumous Fragments Fall 1873– winter 1873-74. 30 (34). 
“Gracián shows wisdom and prudence in the life experience, making it possible to 
compare anything now. We are probably the Mikroscopiker of reality, to see to 
understand our novels (Balzac, Dickens), only to call and explain what no one 
understands”. Accessed March 18, 2015. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Se-
lected_Letters_of_Friedrich_Nietzsche#Nietzsche_To_Peter_Gast_-
_January.2C_1887 
83 Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo (Portland, Me: Smith & Sale, 1911), 36. 
84 Janaway, C., “Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-punishment in Nietzsche’s Geneal-
ogy” in Leiter, B., Sinhababu, N. eds., Nietzsche and morality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 153. 
85 Schinkel, A., Conscience and Conscientious Objections, op. cit., 308, note. 
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transport especially after the second World War; the unforseen number 
of universities and congresses; the number of scholarly periodicals; 
and the facility of sharing resources on the internet, makes it now pos-
sible to know, assimilate and defend any type of philosophy. 
Synderesis has been studied, mainly in history of philosophy as a col-
lateral term to conscience, and conscience inasmuch as it is either 
related to morals or its neurological base. On the other hand, the term 
is still being taught in secondary education, at least in Spain, and in 
centers of theology based on scholastic philosophy or in universities 
where natural law is being taught. Nevertheless, it is not a topic dealt 
with by most professional philosophers as can be easily seen by doing 
few searches in the internet.  
d) Sigmund Freud (1856–1939). In the same way that Darwin 
gave scientific credibility to the feelings as motor of the moral life, 
Freud gave credibility to the unconscious as the motor of human deci-
sions, the irrationality and struggle between the desire for pleasure and 
the desire of chastisement, the apollonian and the dionysiac of Nie-
tzsche. Though Freud denied Nietzsche influence, it seems that it was 
that Freud knew Nietzsche’s works as Leher points out86. The well-
known fact that for Freud the dynamic of the human psyche comes 
from the unconscious id, which is governed by the principle of pleas-
ure and the ego and superego, which try to direct and repress id’s 
impulses. The superego has some resemblance to synderesis as 
Lansgton indicates87, “And perhaps most surprising, the relationship 
between the superego and the conscience parallels the traditional rela-
tionship between the synderesis and conscience. Just as the synderesis 
stands as the repository of the universal moral rules one should obey, 
so the superego is the repository of the beliefs and dictates that guide 
behaviour in the medieval view”88.  
e) Max Scheler (1874-1928). Scheler was one of the most influ-
ential authors on Ethics in the XX Century. With his work Formalism 
in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, he first dismantled the 
formalistic Kantian ethics and secondly he proposed an intuitive ac-
cess to ‘objective formal values’ with his theory on moral values and 
their hierarchy. His intuitive vision of values, which is universal, was 
                                                 
86 Lehrer, R., Nietzsche’s Presence in Freud’s Life and Thought: on the Origins of a 
Psychology of Dynamic Unconscious Mental Functioning (Albany: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 1995), 1-10. 
87 “The power of the id expresses the true purpose of the individual organism’s life. 
This consists in the satisfaction of its innate needs. No such purpose as that of 
keeping itself alive or of protecting itself from dangers by means of anxiety can be 
attributed to the id. That is the business of the ego, which is also concerned with 
discovering the most favourable and least perilous method of obtaining satisfac-
tion, taking the external world into account. The superego may bring fresh needs 
to the fore, but its chief function remains the limitation of satisfactions. The forces 
which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id are 
called instincts...After long doubts and vacillations we have decided to assume the 
existence of two basic instincts, Eros and the destructive instinct”. Freud, S., An 
Outline of Physchoanalysis (New York, Random House, 1955), 5.  
88 Langston, D. C., 2001, op. cit., 91.  
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largely based on a similar formulation of Franz Clemens Brentano 
(1838–1917)89 through his contact with Husserl90. None of them made 
reference to synderesis, but their quest is a different way of trying to 
find a guarantor of the universality and permanence of ethical princi-
ples. G.E. Moore (1873-1958), himself also very influential, shared 
the intuitionist Brentano’s views as shown in his famous review to 
Brentano’s work91.  
e) Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). The existentialists do not be-
lieve in a fixed human nature, but that there is a force within men that 
makes them become “authentic”, “self-realising” and other ways of 
becoming or making themselves. That force has different directions, 
and normally starts with a discovery and a rejection of being “one 
more”, “a thing”, “a nature”. That internal guiding force would have 
resemblance with synderesis as the impulse to become, but it is miss-
ing a normative. We only deal sketchily with Heidegger as 
representative of existentialism. It is not easy to understand what 
Heidegger calls ‘conscience’, but it appears more as an indeterminate 
force that brings one out of the unauthentic living to the authentic. No 
norms are given, only the push to be authentic92. If this is so, which is 
the interpretation given by Sepulveda, Heidegger’s concept of con-
science seems closer to the classic synderesis93 than to the classic 
interpretation of conscience. What is clear is that the classic medieval 
philosophy had little influence in Heidegger’s thought, which basi-
cally is a reaction to Hegel’s rationalism: “In its symbolic aspect, it 
expresses what we might call a ‘romantic’ experience of conscience, 
reminiscent of Rousseau... Conscience makes itself felt (or heard), so 
to speak, by making something else felt: it opens up the possibility of 
authentic existence, in contrast with the present inauthenticity. But, 
                                                 
89 Cfr. Brentano, F., The Foundation and Construction of Ethics (London: 
Routledge, 2009).  
90 In spite of basing himself in Brentano and believing in the objectivity of the values 
Husserl seems to have found some limitations to Brentano’s system. Cfr. Crespo, 
M., El Valor Ético de aa Afectividad: Estudios de Ética Fenomenológica (Santiago 
de Chile: Universidad Católica de Chile, 2012), 50. For a more detailed explana-
tion of Husserl´s Ethics cfr. Ferrer, U. and Sánchez-Migallón, S., La Ética de 
Edmund Husserl (Sevilla: Plaza y Valdés, 2011).  
91 Cfr. Moore, G. E., “Review of F. Brentano’s The Origins of Knowledge of Right 
and Wrong”, International Journal of Ethics, vol. 14 (1903), 115-123.  
92 “In Da-sein’s assumption of the choice to live authentically, where it finds itself 
primordially, conscience is revealed as existing ‘in the kind of being of Da-sein’. 
Heidegger, M., Being and Time, # 269. The word ‘in’ does not depict conscience 
as an inner voice (or set of voices) apart from Da-sein as represented in some car-
icatures, where the devil and the angel each on a human shoulder and whisper 
advice to the unwitting subject. Instead, ‘in’ differentiates the phenomenon of the 
conscience from ‘out’, and indicates that conscience does not occur as an outside 
voice which calls Da-sein. Conscience, revealed as a call (Being and Time # 269), 
calls from within”. Sepulveda, K., “The Call: Heidegger and the Ethical Con-
science”, Res Cogitans, vol. 2/1 (2011), 76. 
93 “Instead, we silently listen in order to understand the call, and in this hearkening, 
partake in the call and become aware of it. We become aware of a call that comes 
‘from me, and yet over me’”. Ibid., 77. 
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although it figures in experience –although it is experience– it belongs 
(in the terms I have used previously) to insistent, rather than existent 
reality”94.  
f) The Neo-thomists. The Encyclical Aeterni Patris of Pope Leo 
XIII at the end of the previous century, 1879, spurred a renaissance of 
the study of Thomas Aquinas’ works which flourished at the beginning 
of the XX Century. The publication of Aquinas’ complete works, the 
Leonine Edition, which included the commentaries of Cardinal 
Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) gave an instrument for scholars to study 
more in detail Aquinas’ thoughts directly. Jacques Maritain95, Etienne 
Gilson96 in France, Joseph Pieper97 in Germany, Cornelio Fabro98 in 
Italy, Jesús García López99, and Antonio Millán Puelles100 in Spain 
were academics who studied and applied Aquinas’ doctrines to mod-
ern problems in philosophy while many others did it in the theological 
fields such as Garrigou-Lagrange101, Henry de Lubac102, Royo 
Marin103, Joseph Mausbach,104 and Octavio Derisi105, among many 
                                                 
94 Schinkel, A., Conscience and Conscientious Objections, op. cit., 304. 
95 “Moreover, Maritain emphasizes –and this is his distinctive contribution to natural 
law theory– that the first principles of natural law (particularly, ‘We must do good 
and avoid evil’) are indemonstrable and are known connaturally or preconsciously 
‘through that which is consonant with the essential inclinations of human nature, 
an activity that Maritain, following Aquinas, called ‘synderesis’ (Critics have ar-
gued, however, that this kind of knowledge is obscure and problematic and is, 
therefore, inadequate as a basis for law)”. Berry Gray, C. “Jacques Maritain”, The 
Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia (London: Routledge, 1999), 534. 
96 Cfr. Gilson, E., The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1991). 
97 “The living unity, incidentally, of synderesis and prudence is nothing less than the 
thing we commonly call ‘conscience’. Prudence, or rather perfected practical rea-
son that has developed into prudence, is distinct from ‘synderesis’ in that it applies 
to specific situations. We may, if we will, call it the ‘situation conscience’. Just as 
the understanding of principles is necessary to specific knowledge, so natural con-
science is the prerequisite and the soil for the concrete decisions of the «situation 
conscience»”. Pieper, J., The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, 
Temperance (Notre Dame Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 11. 
98 Cfr. Fabro, C., La nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione (Torino: Societá Editrice 
Internationale, 1950). 
99 Cfr. García López, J., Escritos de Antropología Filosófica (Pamplona: Eunsa, 
2006). 
100 Millán-Puelles, A., Léxico Filosófico (Madrid: Rialp, 2002), 204 y 389. 
101 Cfr. Garrigou-Lagrange, R., Reality: a Synthesis of Thomistic Thought (Seattle: 
CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2012).  
102 Lubac, H. de, Theology in History (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996). 
103 Cfr. Royo Marín, A., Teología de la Perfección Cristiana (Madrid: Editorial Ca-
tólica, 1988). 
104 Some like Joseph Mausbach explain synderesis following Aquinas and without 
confronting it with other authors. Cfr. Mausbach, J. and Ermecke, G., Teología 
Moral Católica, I (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1971), 231. 
105 “Así como tenemos el intellectus principiorum, el hábito natural de la inteligencia 
para aprehender el ser y sus nociones primeras, del mismo modo la sindéresis es 
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others. Both the theologians and philosophers did not dwelt on syn-
deresis in depth because most of their work was based on Aquinas’ 
maturity works, the two Summas106.  
g) Romano Guardini (1885-1968). He wrote an influential book 
on ethics in which he approaches ethics with a phenomenological 
method based on Max Scheler axiology. While his approach is very 
attractive, and has several points of contact with classic ethics and 
Polo’s view, it needs a deeper ontological foundation. This is shown 
in that he does not have a clear approach to the habits and does not 
mention synderesis as such, though he somehow refers to its reality as 
shown in this quote: “Thanks to this process a progressive purification 
and formation of conscience is achieved. One listens better, reaches a 
clearer acceptance and firmer judgments about the good (which, in 
turn, it perfects the executive conscience). What we have described in 
a round about way is the actual fact that conscience has something 
beforehand with its own force, which is precisely, is its foundation. 
This, nevertheless, requires to gradually be implanted, step by step, in 
the concrete existence of man. What is in it is a starting point that has 
to grow, to improve, constantly returning to the original call to free-
dom made by the good. Although conceptually we cannot break it 
down, we know what we mean and that it is right. And we know some-
thing else: that we are obliged to know it, and that if one does not know 
it is not an objection against it, but against our own weakness and in-
terior dispositions. Because knowledge of the core of existence is, in 
itself, part of ethics’ task”107. 
                                                 
el hábito de la inteligencia práctica, que capta el bien o fin último y los primeros 
principios normativos de la voluntad (ya que ésta es facultad ciega y dirigida en 
sus pasos por la inteligencia), y el appetitus naturalis, el hábito de la voluntad que 
la inclina al bien”. Derisi, O. N., Los Fundamentos Metafísicos del Orden Moral 
(Buenos Aires: Universitas, 1980), 49. 
106 As an example we can quote a text from the most modern of them, Cornelio 
Fabro. It is almost a literal translation of Aquinas’ text. In II Sent., d. 39, q. III, a. 
1. “First principles are like ‘seminal reasons’ of all knowledge and virtue and their 
understanding is likened to a ‘divine seal’ and a ‘spark of the soul’. This virtue is 
fittingly called ‘spark’, for just as a spark is a small flying particle of fire, so this 
virtue is a small participation of intelligence with respect to the intelligence that 
exists in an angel. Hence also the superior part of reason is called ‘spark’, because 
it is the highest thing in a rational nature”. Fabro, C., “The intensive hermeneutics 
of Thomistic philosophy: the notion of participation”, The Review of Metaphysics, 
vol. 27/3 (1974) p. 488. 
107 “Gracias a todo este proceso se logra una progresiva purificación y formación de 
la conciencia moral: se avanza para poder escuchar mejor, llegar a una más clara 
aceptación y a unos juicios más firmes respecto del bien (lo que, a su vez, hace que 
se perfeccione la conciencia moral ejecutora). Lo que hemos descrito con rodeos 
es la realidad de que la conciencia moral tiene de antemano algo con vigencia pro-
pia, y que este algo es su fundamento; pero esto con vigencia propia tiene que 
imponerse poco a poco en la existencia concreta del hombre. Lo que en él hay es 
un inicio, y tiene que crecer, mejorar, volviendo permanentemente a la originaria 
interpelación de la libertad por parte del bien. Aunque conceptualmente no pode-
mos desmenuzarlo, sabemos a qué nos referimos y qué es lo correcto. Y sabemos 
algo más: que el bien tenemos la obligación de conocerlo, y que el no conocerlo 
no es una objeción contra él sino contra nuestra propia debilidad y disposición 
interior. Porque el conocimiento del núcleo de la existencia es, en si mismo, parte 
de la tarea ética”. Guardini, R., Etica, Op.cit., 104. 
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h) Jacques Maritain (1882–1973). He is in agreement with 
Aquinas and his interpreter Cajetan as the quote in his book The De-
grees of Knowledge indicates: “It must be said that moral philosophy 
itself proceeds according to a practical and compositive mode (since 
modus et finis scientia esse concomitantur, as Cajetan says, In Iam., 
XIV, 16; for, if ethics is distinguished from speculative philosophy by 
its ratio formalis sub qua, why should it not also be distinguished from 
it by its mode of knowing?). As we have already said, the mode of 
knowing is to be understood as practical and compositive in respect to 
the conditions of the object known (human acts), which object is con-
sidered in relation to its ends and in its practical values, and referred 
to the first principles of synderesis. For this reason, moral philosophy 
is oriented from the beginning toward the operable taken as such, and 
towards the positing of acts in existence”108.  
i) Etienne Gilson (1884–1978). This author hardly uses syn-
deresis in his works, though he had a very clear idea of its meaning 
and history. In fact, he classified the different medieval positions in a 
footnote in his magnificent The spirit of medieval philosophy. He clas-
sifies them into four classes, three of which are voluntarisms: a) total 
voluntarism like the one of Henry the Ghent, b) semi voluntarism of 
Bonaventure, c) the transactional voluntarism of Richard of Middleton 
and d) one intellectualist which is the one defended by Aquinas109. 
                                                 
108 Maritain, J., The Degrees of Knowledge (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1998), 481. 
109 Gilson clasified then as:  
“A) Thoroughgoing voluntarism (Henry of Ghent). Conscience belongs to the affec-
tive, not the cognitive, part of the soul. There are men who know quite well what 
ought to be done and lack the conscience to do it. Synderesis is then defined as 
being “quidam universalis motor, stimulans ad opus secundum regulas universales 
legis naturae”, while conscience is “quidam particularis motor, stimulans ad opus 
secundum dictamen rectae rationis”. H. of Ghent, Quodlibet, I, qu.18. 
 B) Semi-voluntarism (St. Bonaventure). Conscience is an innate habitus of the cog-
nitive faculty, in its practical not its speculative function. The word designates 
either the intellectual faculty itself, or the habitus of practical principles, or the 
principles themselves contained in the habitus. (St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., 39, 1, 
1, Resp.). In this, then, is included what St. Thomas calls synderesis, as St. Thomas 
himself admits it may be in all vigour; but St. Bonaventure’s synderesis itself is 
quite different. It stands to the affectivity as good sense does to the reason: “affec-
tus habet naturale quoddam pondus, dirigens ipsum in appetendis" (In II Sent., 39, 
2, 1). We recognize the Augustinian pondus; thus St. Bonaventure puts synderesis 
in the affective part: "Dico enim quod synderesis dicit illud quod stimulat ad bo-
num et ideo ex parte affectionis se tenet”. In II Sent., 39, 2, 1. 
C) Transactional voluntarism (Richard of Middleton): synderesis may mean our nat-
ural and necessary inclination to the good in general, and then it is affective; or the 
persuasion of reason inclining, but not necessitating us to good, and then it is in-
tellectual. Conscience is the prescription of the practical reason.  
D) Intellectualism (Thomas Aquinas); synderesis and conscience both belong to the 
cognitive order on its practical side. Scotus, D., In II Sent., 39, 1 (synderesis is in 
the higher reason where St. Jerome and Peter Lombard would put it); In II Sent., 
39, 2: synderesis is the ‘habitus principiorum’ belonging of right to the natural 
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Gilson, at least in the works consulted, does not discuss synderesis at 
length. According to Bradley, Gilson “always read the medievals with 
an eye on his contemporaries as well as the moderns, some have said 
with an eye too fixed on Heidegger’s dubious history of the forgetful-
ness of being”110. Which means that Gilson “narrated the history of 
philosophy as one long praeparatio for and one long declinatio from 
Aquinas: in particular, from Aquinas’s “existentialism” –linguistically 
marked by the Latin infinitive of the verb “to be” the metaphysics of 
esse”111.  
j) On authors not mentioned. We are aware that there are many 
authors not mentioned, though we think the most relevant ones for the 
topic at hand have been quoted. As mentioned before the purpose is 
more to give some temporal coordinates to the topic rather than an 
exhaustive account of authors and their doctrines. 
We could not find any reference to studies on Pascal and Berg-
son reading synderesis, in spite of both of them highlighting the power 
of the “heart” above the intelligence (Pascal) and the inner power to 
act and direct life (Bergson’s elan vital)112.  
We do not consider in this section the works of Peter Kreef, Wil-
liam May, Grisez, MacIntyre, and other current authors who speak of 
synderesis in their works, because they do not alter the doctrine of the 
classics, mainly that of Aquinas, and because they did not influence 
Leonardo Polo regarding synderesis. 
Synderesis is still being used in Secondary education manuals in 
some countries, e.g. Spain. It is being discussed through the treatises 
and manual of natural law, and mainly by philosophers reading Medi-
eval Philosophy. As we shall see there is a revival on the topic thanks 
to the new approach given by the proposals of Leonardo Polo, which 
will generate more studies on the classic views on the topic which will 
also help to get a deeper understanding of the human intimacy.  
                                                 
practical reason; conscience is the ‘habitus proprius conclusionis practicae’, de-
duced from these principles. Cfr. Gilson, E., The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 477. 
110 Bradley, D., “A Thomistic Tapestry: Essays in Memory of Etienne Gilson”, Notre 




112 Polo comments that Bergson is closer to his proposal but that he did not manage 
to leave the essential level. “The habits may help to explain Bergson’s approach, 
that is, the distinction between intuitive -instinctive- and intellectual knowledge. 
Bergson correctly indicates the identity of the limit, but does not overcome it, in-
stead he defends a definite contrast between intuition and rational knowledge”. 
“Con los hábitos es posible dar cuenta del planteamiento de Bergson, es decir, de 
la distinción entre el conocimiento intuitivo, instintivo, y el intelectual. Bergson 
llega a indicar correctamente la mismidad del límite, pero no lo abandona, sino que 
sienta un contraste definitivo entre la intuición y el conocimiento racional”. Polo, 






6. Historical Summary 
In this section we have seen how synderesis, as a term, was de-
veloped, probably from a confusion of copyists unlearned in Greek, to 
deepen studies on the different ways conscience relates to nature and 
morals. The main positions have been:  
1. To dismiss the topic as something religious.  
2. To dismiss it as a figment of our imagination that gives reality 
to feelings. 
3. To say that it is part of the practical intelligence.  
4. To explain that is a function of the will. 
5. To sustain that it is a habit of the intelligence. 
6. To manifest that it is a habit of the will. 
7. To considerer that it is in both the intelligence and will. 
8. To say that it is a natural instinct.  
9. Different relationships between synderesis, intelligence, rea-
son, will, prudence, and God. 
The main points of contact are that synderesis is related to the 
moral life of persons, that it is universal, either as a knowledge or a 
feeling, and that it influences one’s behaviour. 
Leonardo Polo was a deep and extensive reader and would try to 
give an answer to all unanswered questions and have a consolidated 
proposal, which may include all valid intuitions. Of his proposal and 
its evaluation is to what the next sections are devoted. We have delib-
erately refrained from evaluating each of the historical proposals to 
allow Polo’s position deal with them. 
In the next chapter we give an overiew of Polo’s anthropology 









INTRODUCTION TO TRANSCENDENTAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
The philosophy of Leonardo Polo is innovative, dense, difficult 
to read but rich, and therefore worth the effort it takes. This section 
tries to give a bird’s eye view of his philosophy and some keys to his 
nuclear concepts1. This will give a framework to position synderesis 
within Leonardo Polo´s philosophy. We can state in advance that syn-
deresis is particularly important in his transcendental anthropology 
which, for him, is the highest way of doing philosophy.  
 
1. Leonardo Polo’s philosophical interest is mainly anthropo-
logical 
There are several books and articles that explain Leonardo 
Polo´s thought and his contributions to philosophy2. His own intellec-
tual biography can be found in the Prologue to Antropología 
trascendental I,3 where he explains his intellectual biography. There 
he states that Antropología trascendental is the culmination of his phi-
losophy: “Certainly this book is the apex of my philosophical research. 
With this I mean that the method I have followed cannot go further. 
But as this method allows discovering abundant thematic areas, this 
book is an addition to the topics discussed but not exhausted in my 
previous works. Thanks to its dual value –methodical and thematic– 
the apex opens again the multiple thematic fields: re-considers them”4.  
                                                 
1 Cfr. for an English reader the recently published introduction could be of assis-
tance: Esclanda, R., Sellés, J. F., Leonardo Polo: A Brief Introduction (South 
Bend, Ind.: Leonardo Polo Institute of Philosophy, 2014). Though not dealing di-
rectly about Leonardo Polo it nevertheless is a very good entry point for 
understanding Transcendental Anthropology: Sellés, J. F., Anthropology for Re-
bels: A Different Way of Doing Philosophical Anthropology (Nairobi: Strathmore 
University, 2011). 
2 Cfr. for an abundant bibliography: García González, J. A., Obra de y sobre Leo-
nardo Polo, (Madrid: Bubok, 2012), Available at http://www.leonardopolo.net/polo.htm  
3 It is available in English and Spanish at http://www.leonardopolo.net/re-
vista/mp43.htm#Polo  
4 “Seguramente este libro es el vértice de mi investigación filosófica. Quiero decir 
con esto que el método que la ha conducido no da más de sí. Pero como ese método 
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Professor Juan A. García González confirms Leonardo Polo’s 
assertion: “We want to emphasize his anthropology, because all the 
philosophy of Leonardo Polo is essentially anthropology”5. Professor 
Murillo shares the same opinion: “From the beginning of his dedica-
tion to philosophy his objective was to develop an anthropology, 
meaning that all his other philosophical endeavours have been in a way 
directed to this project”6.  
In the same prologue, worth reading in full, he also gives two 
characteristics of his work he neither intended to be ‘systemic’. “Tra-
ditional philosophy allows further development. This means that it is 
an open philosophy in the sense that it is aware that it has not thought 
of everything. Modern philosophy, on the contrary, does not allow to 
be continued, precisely because it is systemic and therefore ‘closed’. 
The great modern philosophers confuse philosophy with absolute 
knowledge. Curiously some people think that classic philosophy is 
also complete. If St. Thomas Aquinas had thought out all that can be 
thought, then the other philosophers could only repeat what he said. 
But this is the same mistake that systematic philosophers fall into, 
though for different reasons, which could be the principle of authority 
or some mental laziness”7. 
Nor did he think that some of his proposals would have the last 
word, because things can always improve: “The search for truth re-
quires continuous researching. If one is a philosopher or scientist, he 
ought to continue. To be original or not is not relevant. On the other 
hand, in these subjects one cannot propose new things without having 
                                                 
permite acceder a frutos temáticos abundantes, este libro se añade a la cosecha 
contenida y no agotada en otros escritos. Por su doble valor –metódico y temático– 
la cima vuelve a abrir los diversos campos temáticos: los re-itera”. Polo, L., An-
tropología Trascendental, I, (Pamplona, Eunsa, 1999), 13. 
5 Garcia, J. A., “The transcendental anthropology of Leonardo Polo”, Instituto de 
Estudios Filósoficos Leonardo Polo, (2008). Accessed February 16, 2013, 
http://www.leonardopolo.net/textos/miating.htm.  
6 “Desde el principio de su dedicación a la filosofía, su objetivo era desarrollar una 
antropología, dando a entender que todas sus demás ocupaciones filosóficas han 
estado de un modo u otro orientadas a ese proyecto”. Murillo, J. I., “Conocimiento 
Personal y Conocimiento Racional en la Antropología Trascendental De L. Polo”, 
Studia Poliana, 13 (2011), 70. 
7 “La filosofía tradicional se presta a ser continuada. Esto quiere decir que es una 
filosofía abierta o que sabe que no lo ha pensado todo. En cambio, la filosofía 
moderna se resiste a ser continuada, precisamente porque es sistemática y, por 
tanto, cerrada. Los grandes filósofos modernos confunden la filosofía con el saber 
absoluto. Curiosamente, sin embargo, para algunos la filosofía clásica es una filo-
sofía terminada. Si Tomás de Aquino ha pensado todo lo que se puede pensar, los 
filósofos posteriores sólo pueden repetirlo. Pero eso es caer en el mismo error al 
que invitan los filósofos sistemáticos, aunque quizá por otros motivos, como puede 
ser el criterio de autoridad o cierta pereza mental”. Polo, L., Antropología Tras-
cendental, I, op. cit., 13. 
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a foundation based on previous achievements that deserve to be com-
mented and developed further. Actually, I have always recommended 
my disciples not to limit themselves to repeat just what I said”8.  
 
2. The language barrier 
Philosophers have trouble using common language, firstly due 
to the topics they deal with, as Leonardo Polo says regarding 
knowledge: “Human language is not made to deal with knowledge: 
linguistics and cognitive structures are different; there are knowledge 
levels infra-linguistics and others above linguistics”9. A new philo-
sophical method finds difficulties when using classical expressions. 
Levinas even says that this is a characteristic of any new philosophy: 
“The great recent innovations consist at least in making thematic what 
previously was not. Making them thematic requires genius and brings 
in a new language”10.  
McIntyre explains how not taking into account these changes in-
dicates lack of understanding of ethical concepts11. The expresion of 
new ideas can be done giving new meaning to classic terms. This can 
be rather confusing to readers who are not acquainted with his philos-
ophy but the change of meaning of terms is a common feature in 
history of philosophy. In other instances Leonardo Polo gives new spe-
cific meaning to common language Spanish expressions. Polo is aware 
of these difficulties: “I acknowledge that these expressions are meta-
phors which are only adequate for a description, without adopting 
special terminology, and only as a first approach. It is clear that this 
needs to be thought out slowly and insisting on it for a long time, to 
develop the themes that are accessible with this method”12. 
                                                 
8 “Buscar la verdad comporta tratar de avanzar en la investigación. En la medida en 
que uno puede, debe hacerlo si es filósofo o científico. Ser original o no es una 
cuestión secundaria. Por otra parte, en esas disciplinas no cabe proponer novedades 
sin encontrar un punto de apoyo en planteamientos anteriores, que merecen una 
glosa y una continuación. Por lo demás, siempre he recomendado a mis discípulos 
que no se reduzcan a repetirme”. Ibid. 
9 “El lenguaje humano no está hecho para hablar del conocimiento: la formalidad 
lingüística no es la cognoscitiva; hay niveles cognoscitivos infra lingüísticos y su-
pra lingüísticos”. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, I (Pamplona: Eunsa, 
2006), 14. 
10 “Las grandes innovaciones de hoy; pero estas consisten, por lo menos, en tematizar 
algo que no lo estaba antes. Tematización que exige genio y ofrece un nuevo len-
guaje”. Levinas, E., Ética e Infinito, op. cit., 37. 
11 “There are continuities as well as breaks in the history of moral concepts. Just here 
lies the complexity of the history”. and “To alter concepts … is to alter behavior”. 
"So concepts like "pleasure" and "happiness" are stretched and extended in all di-
rections until they are used simply to name whatever men aim at”. MacIntyre, A. 
C., A Short History of Ethics, op. cit., 1, 3 and 236.  
12 “Reconozco que estas expresiones son metafóricas, adecuadas a una exposición 
descriptiva, sin adoptar una terminología especial, y sólo preliminar. Es claro que 
esto se necesita ponderarlo lentamente, largamente, muy insistentemente, mucho 
tiempo, para desarrollar la temática accesible con este método”. L. Polo, in Cruz, 
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Leonardo Polo uses both methods; frequently he gives new 
meaning to classic expressions (e.g. nature, essence) and when he can-
not he frequently common Spanish words giving them a technical 
meaning in his philosophy13. We may need to comment on two of them 
to continue with the introduction to his thought: ‘límite’ (limit) and 
‘abandono’ (abandonment). 
By ‘límite’ Leonardo Polo tries to convey the idea of border, 
boundary, something that encircles and limits the activities, constrain-
ing or confining at the same time to ensure that the activities within 
the boundaries are done in a particular way. Limit therefore signals the 
end of something, which is therefore constrained within the limit. We 
consider that both English terms ‘boundary’ and ‘limit’ adequately 
convey what Polo intends to say14.  
More difficult to convey is the term ‘abandono’. Leonardo Polo 
uses the word to mean ‘leave behind’ but at the same time overcome 
or surpass15. Perhaps ‘surpassing’ conveys the meaning more accu-
rately because it reflects better the idea of going beyond the limit, and 
continue progressing, without leaving behind what was achieved be-
fore. Polo himself states that he prefered to use the word ‘abandon’ 
over ‘surpassing’ to avoid that his idea be interpreted in the way Nie-
tzsche uses it and also to avoid its physical connotations. We shall use 
indistintively the words ‘surpassing’, ‘overcoming’ and ‘going be-
yond’, which we think are closer to Polo’s intended meaning16 in spite 
of him saying: “I do not like the word ‘surpassing’ because the one 
who has used it most is Nietzsche and it does not have an intellectual 
meaning. More than overcoming, I use ‘abandon’, to mean ‘going be-
yond the limit’”17. To confirm Leonardo Polo’s assertions we include 
two quotations from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, chapter 34: ‘Self-Sur-
passing’ where the word ‘surpassing’ is used 25 times, and 
‘overcome’, 6 times. “I teach you the Superman. Man is something 
that is to be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass man?”; “Ten 
                                                 
J., “Filosofar Hoy. Entrevista con Leonardo Polo”, 1992, 40. Accessed 16 
February 2013, en: http://dspace.unav.es/dspace/handle/10171/687. 
13 “En consecuencia, el estudio de lo físico es muy conveniente porque nos obliga a 
lo siguiente: si queremos entender lo otro tendremos que emplear desde luego otras 
operaciones mentales, pero tendremos que utilizar también otros términos”. Polo, 
L., El Conocimiento del Universo Físico (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2008), 74. 
14 “The definition of limit”, Dictionary.com. Accessed 27 February 2013 http://dic-
tionary.reference.com/browse/limit?s=t. 
15 “The definition of abandon”, Dictionary.com. Accessed 27 February 2013, in 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/abandon?s=ts. 
16 The words ‘overcoming’ and ‘surpassing’ can also be correct translations. In mat-
ter of translations the traditional Italian saying “tradutore, traditore” (translator, 
traitor) applies in full strength in the case of philosophical translations and more 
so in the case of Leonardo Polo, who is especially difficult not only for the topics 
he deals with but because of the special way he uses Castilian traditional idioms. 
17 “La palabra superación no me gusta porque quien más la ha empleado es Nietzs-
che y no tiene sentido intelectual. Más que superar digo abandonar, ir más allá del 




times a day must thou overcome thyself: that causeth wholesome wea-
riness, and is poppy to the soul”18.  
 
3. The key to Leonardo Polo’s philosophy  
Leonardo Polo considers his philosophy as a continuation or, 
better said, a “furthering” of classic philosophy. Polo’s new discovery 
starts from the highest achievement of all previous philosophies: “The 
meaning of my proposal is clear: it is to get the best from the nuclear 
thesis of Thomism”19. According to him, Aquinas’ philosophy has 
been the highest philosophical achievement: “Specifically, my outline 
starts from the distinction between being and essence presented by 
Thomas Aquinas, which is the last important discovery of traditional 
philosophy”20. 
This distinction allowed Aquinas to distinguish the different 
types of being in their radical differences and Polo’s philosophy is 
based on this distinction between the essence and the act of being in 
all creatures: “In order to complete the exposition of the multiple di-
mensions of the proposed method it is good to refer again to the real 
distinction that is the discovery that culminates Thomas Aquinas’ phi-
losophy. This discovery allows distinguishing the creatures from God. 
In the creatures the act of being and the essence are really different; 
not in God”21. 
Nevertheless, Aquinas’ discovery needs to be rectified and, once 
rectified, applied to anthropology in a new way. Firstly it has to be 
applied to anthropology which Aquinas did not. He did it mainly to 
distinguish God from his creatures and the angels from human beings: 
“I will try to study how the real distinction between the being and the 
essence works in anthropology, which Thomas Aquinas does not 
do”22. This implies a subtler distinction of the anthropological struc-
ture of human beings, where the act of being is properly distinguished 
from the human essence. In order to distinguish the specific human act 
of being from the act of being of the non-spiritual creatures, he calls it 
in a different way: being-with or co-being. We shall see later why he 
                                                 
18 Nietzsche, F., Thus Spake Zarathustra (philosophy.eserver.org, 2013). Accessed 
27 February 2013. http://philosophy.eserver.org/nietzsche-zarathustra.txt.  
19 “El sentido de mi propuesta es claro: se trata de sacar partido a la tesis nuclear del 
tomismo”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental, I, op. cit., 20. 
20 “En concreto, mi planteamiento arranca de la distinción real de ser y esencia for-
mulada por Tomás de Aquino, que es la última averiguación importante de la 
filosofía tradicional”. Ibid. 
21 “Para completar la exposición de la pluralidad de dimensiones del método pro-
puesto, conviene volver a aludir a la distinción real, que es la averiguación en que 
culmina la filosofía de Tomás de Aquino. Esta averiguación permite distinguir la 
criatura de Dios. En la criatura el acto de ser y la esencia son distintos realmente; 
en Dios no”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 117. 
22 “Procuraré estudiar cómo juega en antropología la distinción real del ser con la 
esencia, lo que Tomás de Aquino no hace”. Ibid., 19. 
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calls it that way: “In man one can speak both of the act of being and 
also of the human essence. Man is not his essence; on the contrary the 
essence is his. Regarding the act of being we cannot say that it belongs 
to man, but that man is that act of being”23. The act of being of crea-
tures, is a different being for each type of creature, nevertheless we 
cannot explain fully the differences between them, so there is need for 
a distinction between the essence and the act of being. This is a radical 
duality -between the act of being and the essence- present in all crea-
tures. “A created reality which is different from another cannot be 
explained by the first one because no creature can be the sufficient 
reason of another. Because of this the real distinction between the act 
of being and the created human essence requires the divine action. 
Therefore, the act of being is not a sufficient reason of the essence”24. 
This duality is especially important in human beings where the act of 
being will have control of the essence in a way that non-free creatures 
do not have. This duality is also the key to the foundation of morals.  
In order to be able to apply the real distinction to anthropology 
and furthering Aquinas’ proposals Polo explains that two tasks are 
needed: some of the basic points of Aquinas’ philosophy need to be 
corrected because they are not compatible with the distinction between 
the act of being and the essence, and Aquinas was not aware of this: 
“Firstly, the real distinction between being and essence is not entirely 
compatible with other notions that Thomas Aquinas, as synthesizing 
philosopher, takes from previous philosophers”25. According to Polo 
Aquinas was too attached to Aristotle and his commentator Averroes 
and this led him to some inconsistences. “Thomistic philosophy does 
not reach the theme. I want to say that it falls short or better, that it is 
constrained by his Aristotelian background and by the influence of 
Averroes”26. 
Secondly, Thomas Aquinas did not apply his discovery to the 
realities where it bears more fruit, which is the study of the human 
person: “Secondly, that the already mentioned Thomist discovery can 
be extended, or better used, if it is applied directly to the human being, 
this is, if one actually distinguishes man’s act of being, which is the 
                                                 
23 “En el hombre por una parte se podrá hablar de acto de ser humano, y también se 
podrá hablar de esencia del hombre. El hombre no es su esencia sino que la esencia 
es suya; en cambio el ser humano no es del hombre, sino que el hombre es ese ser”. 
Polo, L., “La esencia del hombre”, Miscelánea Poliana, 4 (2005), 26. 
24 “Una realidad creada distinta de otra no puede ser enteramente explicada por la 
primera, puesto que ninguna criatura es razón suficiente de otra. Por eso también 
la distinción real entre acto de ser y esencia humana, creados, exige el concurso 
divino. Por tanto, el acto de ser no es razón suficiente de la esencia”. Polo, L., 
Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad (Pamplona, EUNSA, 2014), 236. 
25 “En primer lugar, que la distinción real de ser y esencia no es enteramente com-
patible con otras nociones que Tomás de Aquino, como filósofo sintetizador, 
recoge de la filosofía anterior a él”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. 
cit., 13. 
26 “La filosofía tomista no llega al tema; quiero decir que se queda corto, o mejor, 
que está frenado por la herencia aristotélica y el influjo de Averroes”. Ibid., 14. 
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person, and man’s essence”27. This makes Polo consider himself a spe-
cial Thomist: “I consider myself somehow a rebel Thomist and in 
another sense a developer of his philosophy. In reality this is to be a 
realist by distinguishing being from the essence and having in mind 
the intentional character of the object thought. I saw all these in an 
instant, but to ponder over it required many years, and to extract its 
consequences and adjust them, it is a lifelong task”28.  
Polo further explains that the modern and contemporary philos-
ophies are not in line with traditional philosophy29. This means that 
modern philosophy cannot strictly be part of the philosophia perennis, 
though some of the points highlighted by modern philosophers can be 
incorporated due to the openness of traditional philosophy: “Strictly 
speaking, traditional philosophy is a stretch of the perennial philoso-
phy and, therefore, open to new discoveries”30.  
According to Polo, modern philosophy while giving great im-
portance to the self is a closed philosophy that does not allow 
development31. He really makes a hard assessment of modern philos-
ophy, which has to be understood within a precise context of doing 
philosophy without casting away previous achievements. Modern phi-
losophy condemned itself by wanting a radical new start, as if what 
was done before was of no value. It is like the man who is cutting off 
the branch where he is standing and trying to build on the vacuum left 
as he falls together with the branch he was standing on. “Spinoza’s 
central notion is causa sui i.e. foundation. The key to Leibniz’s 
thought is the ‘principle of sufficient reason’, which he confuses with 
the principle of identity. In the Critique of the Practical Reason the 
transcendental subject becomes the real foundation for Kant. The He-
gelian system is based on merging identity and causality. 
Transcendental anthropology is unreachable following these ways. As 
I say in El Acceso modern philosophy is a waste of time. After six 
centuries, we are in a position to say that they have been employed in 
                                                 
27 “En segundo lugar, la aludida averiguación tomista puede ampliarse, o aprove-
charse mejor, si se estudia in recto en el hombre, esto es, si se distingue realmente 
el acto de ser humano, que es persona, de la esencia del hombre”. Ibid., 13. Cfr. 
for a detailed Study of Thomas Aquinas’ approach to the human act of being: 
Lombo, J. A., “La Persona y su Naturaleza: Tomás De Aquino y Leonardo Polo”, 
Anuario Filosófico, 29/2 (1996), 721-739.  
28 “Me considero un tomista en cierto modo rebelde y en cierto modo continuador. 
En definitiva, es esto: ser realista distinguiendo el ser de la esencia y teniendo en 
cuenta el carácter intencional del objeto pensado. Todo esto lo ví de golpe, aunque 
darle vueltas requiere muchos años, y sacarle fruto y ajustarlo es tarea de toda la 
vida”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental, I, op. cit., 13. 
29 Cf. Note 7 above. 
30 “En rigor, la filosofía tradicional es un tramo de la filosofía perenne y, por tanto, 
abierta a nuevos hallazgos”. Ibid., 32. 
31 This was also commented by the Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri as pointed in 
this article Castilla y Cortazar, B., “En Torno A La Díada Transcendental”, 
Anuario Filosófico, 29/2 (1996), 400. 
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a badly conducted philosophical research. This modern project re-
quires to be thought again”32. 
A new way has to be found to continue philosophy retaining the 
achievements of classic and medieval philosophies, rectifying what is 
needed, and this can be done through a more careful analysis of the act 
of being. Polo’s proposal to further develop traditional philosophy is 
radical and it comes from the main novelty found by Thomas Aquinas. 
Polo proposes a new understanding of the act of being, which, as act, 
will be different according to the different types of being, one act of 
being for all the material universe, one for each of the created persons, 
and one for God. In this dissertation we restrict our endeavour to the 
study of synderesis which is related to the discovery of the unique type 
of act of being each person has. This will require a deeper study of the 
triadic structure of the man and of the personal transcendentals: “The 
extra-mental being, including the act of being of the universe, is, no 
doubt, transcendental. But as the human act of being is different from 
the act of being of the universe, we should accept transcendentals that 
are not metaphysical transcendentals, but anthropological”33. This tri-
adic structure is the key to understand Polo’s works, which requires a 
new method, the overcoming of the mental limit, so that the personal 
act of being can be reached and, as much as possible, known. 
Before discussing the personal transcendentals, we should sum-
marise Polo’s three levels of the structure of the person first so that 
synderesis can be seen in its structural context. 
 
                                                 
32 “En Espinosa la noción central es la de causa sui, fundamento. La clave del pen-
samiento de Leibniz es el principio de razón suficiente confundido con el de 
identidad. El sujeto trascendental kantiano cumple la noción de fundamento real 
en la Crítica de la razón práctica, y de condición última de posibilidad en la Crítica 
de la razón pura. El sistema de Hegel se estructura fundiendo la identidad con la 
causalidad. Pero por estos caminos no se alcanza la antropología trascendental. 
Como digo en El Acceso, la filosofía moderna es una gran pérdida de tiempo. Al 
final de seis siglos, estamos en condiciones de sostener que han sido ocupados por 
una tarea filosófica mal conducida. Ello obliga a reformular el planteamiento mo-
derno”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2010), 87.  
33 “El ser extramental, incluido el acto de ser del universo, es sin duda trascendental. 
Pero como el acto de ser humano se distingue del acto de ser del universo, es me-
nester admitir trascendentales que no sean metafísicos, sino precisamente 
antropológicos”. Polo, L., Antropología Transcendental I, op. cit., 23. 
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4. The triadic structure of the person 
Polo’s proposal is an expanded structure of man, from the dual-
istic hylomorphic structure of matter and form, body and soul, to a 
triadic one. In the dualistic classic interpretation, the soul is the form 
of the body. The triadic has three levels: nature, essence and person34, 
the person and essence constituting what in classic philosophy is called 
the human soul. This structure is only possible in human beings in 
whom the essence can receive the act of being and exist without mat-
ter, i.e. as an actualized pure form: “Man is a micro-cosmos in whom 
the intellectual, i.e. the non-physical, is united to a body. Nevertheless 
man is more than corporeal and, soul-corporeal, because he is also a 
personal being”35. 
The distinction between the fact that something exists (being) 
and ‘what it is’ (essence) seems traditionally well established. We can 
actually think many things that do not exist, and may never exist; and 
those essences or ‘what’s’ have no existence or being. According to 
this, personal existence and human essence are not equivalent. Note 
that we do not say ‘personal essence’. A person is different from the 
human being. This is because each person is different from any other 
person, but all humans coincide in being humans. The essence of man 
is humanity, not the whole man which is the humanity as actualised by 
his personal act of being. This does not happen in rocks, trees and an-
imals. Each palm tree has the same essence and each is a different 
entity but it is not a different person. They all act alike, because their 
principle of operations (nature) is their essence which is common to 
                                                 
34 While some authors had intuitions of the three levels, none actually proposed the 
structure as Polo does. For example, Scheler distinguishes between the ‘I’ and the 
person: “‘Of course, if personality´s essence was founded on the I as Edward von 
Hartmann supposes in his sharp but purely dialectic studies about this question, 
the idea of a divine person would also be absurd. Because to every ‘I’ belongs 
essentially and necessarily an ‘outside world’ as well as a different ‘you’ and a 
‘body’, all of which would be a priori absurd to preach God. And, conversely, the 
reasonable idea of a divine person already shows that the idea of person is not 
founded on the ‘I’”. “Claro que si la esencia de la personalidad estuviera fundada 
en el ‘yo’ —como supone Eduardo von Hartmann en sus estudios agudosos, pero 
puramente dialécticos, sobre esta cuestión—, sería también absurda la idea de una 
persona divina. Pues a todo ‘yo’ le pertenece esencial y necesariamente un ‘mundo 
exterior’ lo mismo que un ‘tú’ y un ‘organismo’, cosas todas ellas, que sería ab-
surdo —a priori— predicar de Dios. E, inversamente, la idea razonable de una 
persona divina muestra ya que la idea de la persona no está fundada el ‘yo’”. Sche-
ler, M., Etica: nuevo ensayo de fundamentación de un personalismo ético (Madrid: 
Caparrós Editores, 2001), 529. And “For the same reasons, "disease" and "health" 
cannot be predicates of the person, but they can be of the soul, of man, etc. There 
are "soul´s diseases", but no "person´s diseases”. “Por iguales razones, no pueden 
ser predicados de la persona "enfermedad" y "salud" más sí del alma, del hombre, 
etc. Existen "enfermedades del alma", pero no hay "enfermedades de la persona”. 
Ibid., 634.  
35 “El hombre es un microcosmos en el que está reunido lo intelectual, es decir, lo 
no físico, con un cuerpo. Ahora bien, el hombre no sólo es naturaleza corpórea y 
anímica, o anímico-corpórea, sino que también es un ser personal”. Polo, L., Ética: 
Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos (Madrid: Aedos, 1997), 200. 
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all palm trees. In human beings we do not act alike because our prin-
ciple of operations is not in our essence-nature but it is in our person, 
our personal act of being. What we have in common with other persons 
is the essence (humanity; we are all human beings) but our person –
act of being–is different. We are not something (essence) but someone 
(person). Our “who” is what properly identifies us, not our “what”, 
though naturally our ‘what’ makes us human with specific character-
istics. 
According to Leonardo Polo the first level of each human being 
is ‘human nature’ which comprises what one has received and can 
hardly be changed. The second level is the ‘human essence’ where the 
human faculties –the intelligence and the will– have their proper place 
where the growth of the human person can take place. And the third 
and highest level is the ‘person’ –or ‘personal level’– which corre-
sponds to the act of being of each person36. There is no need to get 
fidgety about the inadequacy of these words to refer to the spiritual 
realities because we have no sensorial experience of them, and because 
most of our words are taken from our sensorial experience.  
To stress the unity of the human being and avoid giving the im-
pression that they are three different things we translate Polo’s 
reference to the three constituent parts of human beings as “levels”: 
the natural, essential and personal levels. A quick and fast method to 
distinguish what belongs to each level is to compare any particular 
activity with activities of other beings; i.e. to find whether any other 
being can do the same thing that a human being does at that particular 
level. Whatever can be done by animals belongs to the natural level; 
whatever can be done by other human being corresponds to the essen-
tial level –humanity–; and what can only be done by each person, as 
unique, belongs to the personal level. For example, eating is common 
to animals, cooking is common to men, but my mother is my mother; 
                                                 
36 It is good to note that the term person has already been used with two different 
meanings; one to refer to the human being (as a unity or suppositum) and another 
to refer to the top level of the human being structure (which is the personal level).  
Figure 2: Triadic Structure of the Person. 
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she is unique to me and I am unique to her. What is proper to the per-
sonal level cannot be done by other professional, or animal; it is a 
personal relationship.  
We include a simple chart that may assist those who are not ac-
quainted with Leonardo Polo’s triadic structure. For simplicity we call 
it ‘triadic structure’ because triadic means having “three” and it ex-
presses well this structure. We shall now describe succinctly the main 
characteristics of each of the three levels. (Cf. Figure 2) 
a) The natural level 
‘Nature’ is one of the terms which causes more confusion when 
reading Leonardo Polo. He uses the classic philosophical terms nature 
and natural with different meanings; sometimes in the Aristotelian 
meaning as principle of operations; at other times, as opposite to arti-
ficial; others to mean the first level of the triadic structure of the man. 
For example he uses it in the classical way in the following texts: “Man 
is a being that possesses what is normally called a nature”37; “In this 
nature are united, a spiritual dimension called the soul –an immortal 
soul– and a very peculiar body”38. Other texts seem to contradict what 
we have just quoted, especially when he distinguishes the human being 
from the non-spiritual realities: “Aristotle, who is the one who thinks 
over concepts deeply, accepts that the act is previous and superior to 
potency and that the potency should be finite because the act follows 
it as substance. This is nature; nature means finite potency. Neverthe-
less man has no nature because he does not have a finite potency; it is 
not finite because man makes it infinite”39. No doubt Leonardo Polo 
is aware of this as the following text suggests: “The human personal 
being has some characteristics that can be seen from Aristotle’s under-
standing of human nature. But also, what is peculiar to human nature 
can be understood as coming from the personal character of the human 
being. To accept that man is person adds to his nature his proper un-
derstanding as essence. In this way anthropology is completed”40.  
                                                 
37 “El hombre es un ser que posee lo que suele llamarse una naturaleza”. Polo, L., 
Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 67. 
38 “En esa naturaleza están unidas una dimensión espiritual que se llama alma –un 
alma inmortal– y un cuerpo muy peculiar”. Ibid. 
39 “Aristóteles que es el que madura más las nociones, admite que, siendo el acto 
anterior a la potencia y superior a ella, la potencia tiene que ser finita porque el 
acto le sucede como sustancia. Eso es la naturaleza; naturaleza significa potencia 
finita. Pues bien, el hombre no tiene naturaleza porque no tiene potencia finita y 
no la tiene porque infinitiza su potencia”. Polo, L., El ser I. La existencia extra 
mental, Pamplona: Eunsa, 1997), 8 note. This treatment of ‘nature’ constrast with 
the classical one, which traditionally has been used to support the objectivity of 
morals as for example this text: “And because man has a nature, it is possible to 
say that his behaviour is either human or inhuman”. “Y porque el hombre tiene una 
naturaleza, es posible decir de él que se comporta humana on inhumanamente”., 
Millán-Puelles, A., Ética y realismo, op. cit., 15. 
40 “El ser personal humano tiene unas características que se pueden ver a partir de la 
naturaleza humana tal como la entiende Aristóteles. A su vez, lo peculiar de su 
naturaleza se puede entender como derivado del carácter personal del hombre. Ad-
mitir que el hombre es persona añade a la naturaleza del hombre su cabal 
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Nature, or better the natural level, for Leonardo Polo does not 
coincide with the essence as it did for Aristotle. A new way other than 
the hylomorphic explanations to express the relationship between liv-
ing beings’ nature and their essence should be found: “For living 
beings the hylomorphic model is so special that it suggests we look for 
a different explanation. The living being is a body, form and matter, 
but not in a way a stone has it. The stone has a form and matter also, 
but the material and formal principles of the living are not the ones of 
the stone because the stone is not its movement”41.  
The model which is insufficient for living creatures is even more 
inadequate for human beings: “It is better not to apply to man the no-
tions of substance and accidents”42. To understand human beings as 
hylomorphic compositions between bodies and souls, –i.e. as matter 
and form– is totally inadequate, even if we state that the soul –the 
form– is spiritual. The act of being is the key to understand human 
beings, not just as living, but as persons. And this element, the personal 
act of being, somehow changes the nature of human beings and this is 
why human bodies are different from those of the animals. Humans 
have many common functions with other living creatures but even 
these common features are radically different; different because their 
root, their ‘radix’ is the personal act of being: “An anthropology that 
considers man as a soul-body cannot be the same as an anthropology 
that highlights the radical primacy of the person. This is because the 
person adds to nature its effusive, contributing dimension. Because 
man is a person, he is not subjected to the laws of nature but overshoots 
them and has radical freedom. Because of this and through its nature 
man’s presence in the world is inventive. Men oozes out from himself, 
contributes; we have named this capacity ‘manifestation’. Man is a 
being that manifests himself but that can also decline to manifest”43. 
b) The essential level 
Above the natural level comes the essential level, which is the 
one classic philosophers developed most frequently. What constitutes 
                                                 
comprensión como esencia. De este modo se completa la antropología”. Polo, L., 
Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 92. 
41 “El modelo hilemórfico en el viviente es tan especial que invita a buscar otro mo-
delo. El viviente es un cuerpo, forma y materia, pero no como la piedra. También 
la piedra es un compuesto de forma y materia, pero los principios material y formal 
del viviente no son los de la piedra porque la piedra no es en el movimiento”. Polo, 
L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, I, op. cit., 169. 
42 “Conviene no aplicar al hombre las nociones de sustancia y accidente”. Polo, L., 
Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2015), 86.  
43 “No es lo mismo una antropología que considere el hombre como ser anímico-
corpóreo, que una antropología que resalte la primordialidad radical de la persona. 
Porque la persona añade a la naturaleza la dimensión efusiva, aportante. Por ser el 
hombre una persona, no está sujeto a las leyes de la naturaleza, sino que sobresale 
por encima de ellas y goza de una libertad radical. Por eso, su presencia en el 
mundo a través de su naturaleza es inventiva. El hombre saca de sí, da de sí, aporta; 
a esto lo hemos llamado manifestación. El hombre es un ser que se manifiesta y 
que puede también negarse a la manifestación”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión 
Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 92. 
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this level are the intelligence and will, which are the powers that make 
humans radically different from animals. The identity of the person 
(the “self” or “I”) as it appears to oneself and to others, also belongs 
to this level. This is where our development, as humans, takes place. 
This development consists on the growth in knowledge and virtues, 
which perfect the intelligence and will respectively. Here is where our 
ideas, character and freedom are manifested. But the self is not the 
most important level, what is shown and seen are the manifestations 
of the personal level. The essential level is a co-principle, without 
which the human person would not exist, but it is not the radical one: 
“In man as created being the distinction between person and self is 
established as follows: the person is equivalent to the human act of 
being and the self is an element of the manifestation of the person. In 
this way it is clear that being is really different, the self and the person 
are not isolated, and the self is not independent from the person”44. 
The essence of man changes. This was one of the characteristics 
highlighted by Kierkegaard and the existentialists. Polo explains that 
this change takes place at the essential level: “Man is essence because 
the first beneficiary or the main victim of his performance is he him-
self”45. But the changes in the essence are due to what makes a person 
radically different from all other persons. The personal level is the 
cause of the creativity of human beings and of their inner growth: 
“Man does not exhaust his species [essential level] but typifies it, and 
above the types he can grow in his essence; therefore, men should, 
properly speaking, not be counted. When we ask ‘how many chickens 
do you have?’ or ‘how big is Mexico’s population?’ the number is not 
used in the same way (to confuse both uses leads to serious ethical 
errors). A dog can be exchanged with another dog, not a person. Nu-
meration is justified when one asks ‘how many lambs do you have?’ 
If you give me a lamb, I give you five chickens. In history one finds 
many accounts of massification but they are inhuman, precisely be-
cause each person, and only he, is the person who is; this is what we 
call ‘irreducibility’ in philosophy. No human interchanges should be 
done: if one negotiates with humans as it is done with chickens, one is 
denying their character as persons: persons are not interchangeable; 
they are irreducible. Also as each of them has a type, it is not good 
business to ignore their differences when choosing, for example team 
members for specific tasks”46. 
                                                 
44 “En el hombre creado la distinción entre persona y yo se establece de esta manera: 
la persona equivale al acto de ser del hombre y el yo es un ingrediente de la mani-
festación de la persona. De esta manera se sienta que, aunque sean realmente 
distintos, el yo y la persona no están aislados, y el yo no es independiente de la 
persona”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 258. 
45 “Con otras palabras, el hombre es esencia porque el primer beneficiario o la prin-
cipal víctima de su actuación es él mismo”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión 
Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 84. 
46 “El hombre no agota su especie, sino que la tipifica, y por encima de los tipos 
puede crecer su esencia; por tanto, tampoco los hombres son estrictamente nume-
rables. Cuando preguntamos: ¿cuántas gallinas tiene usted? o bien ¿cuántos 
habitantes tiene México?, el número no se emplea de la misma manera (empeñarse 
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Polo summarises the three characteristics of the essential level 
in his last book: a) it is the manifestation of the personal level, b) it is 
a contribution, and c) it is free.  
These characteristics are modulated differently through the in-
telligence and the will (I-see and I-want at a higher level) as we shall 
see when discussing synderesis: “In the first place the essence is the 
manifestation of the human person. This manifestation is done accord-
ing to what I call the I-see and willing-I. Secondly I described the 
essence as contribution, based on the will that through its acts the hu-
man essence becomes ‘giving’; and as lighting lights, based on the 
intelligence. Thirdly the human essence is free, and according to the 
sum of it all is living reality”47.  
The knowledge of the differences among persons and how each 
carves his character leads to a superior instance: “The consideration of 
the essence gets us closer to the consideration of the irreducibility of 
the person”48, which is the highest level. 
c) The personal level  
For Polo the personal level, the person, is the act of being, the 
human esse, the actus essendi49. The act of being cannot be an acci-
dent, it is the highest level of the human being, to which both the 
natural level and the essential level are pliable, and therefore are like 
potencies to the act, but a special type of potency: “This has obliged 
us to accept a radical act, which would allow us to exclude the priority 
                                                 
en confundirlos conduce a cometer errores éticos graves). ¡Un perro se puede cam-
biar por otro perro, una persona, no! La numeración está justificada cuando se 
pregunta ¿cuántos corderos tiene usted? Si me da un cordero estoy dispuesto a 
darle cinco gallinas. En la historia se registran muchas veces fenómenos de masi-
ficación, pero son inhumanos, justamente porque cada persona, y sólo ella, es la 
persona que es; esto es lo que filosóficamente se llama irreductibilidad”. Ibid., 79. 
 “No se deben hacer intercambios con seres humanos; si se negocia con ellos como 
con las gallinas, se está negando su carácter de personas: las personas no son in-
tercambiables sino irreductibles. Como además cada una de ellas posee un tipo, no 
es buen negocio ignorar sus diferencias a la hora, por ejemplo, de seleccionar a los 
colaboradores para tareas concretas”. Ibid., 80. 
47 “En primer lugar, la esencia es la manifestación de la persona humana. Esa mani-
festación tiene lugar de acuerdo con lo que llamo ver-yo y querer-yo. En segundo 
lugar, describí la esencia como aportación, en atención a la voluntad, a través de 
cuyos actos la esencia humana alcanza carácter donal; y como luz iluminante, en 
atención a la inteligencia. En tercer lugar, la esencia de la persona humana es libre, 
y, de acuerdo con todo ello, es una realidad viviente”. Polo, L., Epistemología, 
Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 257. 
48 “La consideración de la esencia nos acerca a la irreductibilidad de la persona”. 
Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 84. 
49 “The esse hominis has two distinct functions: on the one hand, give being to the 
finite entity of man and, moreover, make the intellect infinite as an extension. Thus 
the intellect is not, properly speaking, a faculty of a substance”. “El esse hominis 
cumple dos funciones distintas: por una parte, principiar la entidad finita del hom-
bre y, por otra parte, dotar de infinitud al intelecto como continuación suya. Así 
pues, el intelecto no es propiamente una facultad de una sustancia”. Polo, L., An-
tropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 130. 
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of the potency to avoid confusing it with the notion of spontaneity. 
This meaning of the act is the actus essendi, which corresponds with 
a new meaning of the potency, which is the essence”50; “To accept that 
man is a person adds to human nature its proper understanding as es-
sence”51.  
It is difficult to speak of the act of being because it is spiritual, 
purely formal, unique, undivided and is above the intelligence. In the 
same way that we have transcendentals that apply to all beings maybe 
we can have some transcendentals at the level of the act of being. In 
the same way that the “ens”, can be seen differently with relation to 
the other metaphysical transcendentals perhaps the personal act of be-
ing can be seen also from different angles. This is what Polo calls 
personal transcendentals or personal radicals. 
c.1) The personal transcendentals 
Leonardo Polo’s first volume of his Antropología transcenden-
tal explains in detail the similitudes and differences between the 
ontological transcendentals and the personal transcendentals. The 
study of the personal transcendentals is one of the most original of 
Polo’s contributions to Anthropology. Here we can only refer to them 
inasmuch as they are related to synderesis. 
Polo uses the word ‘transcendental’ in different ways depending 
on the context. He can refer either to the classical, epistemological, 
metaphysical, logical or even the Kantian transcendentals. When Polo 
uses the term transcendental in its ontological meaning he distin-
guishes the properly metaphysical ‘transcendentals’ –which he 
reduces from five to three– from the ‘personal transcendentals’. The 
proper understanding of the difference allows him to rank transcen-
dental anthropology above metaphysics. The personal transcendentals 
are coextensive to personal beings but not to non-personal beings. 
They apply to any spiritual creature but not to non-spiritual creatures. 
They are exclusive to persons, being persons not only the human per-
son but also the pure spirits and God. 
 In logic, transcendental refers to what is beyond the categories 
and can be predicated of anything, which has a parallel meaning in 
metaphysics, which refers to any quality that is coextensive with be-
ing, i.e. that is present in all beings.  
In epistemology Polo uses it to refer to realities beyond the ‘ob-
ject’, beyond the content of our ‘objective thinking’. What we know 
                                                 
50 “Ello nos ha obligado a admitir un acto radical, que permita excluir la prioridad 
de la potencia o evitar su confusión con la noción de espontaneidad. Ese sentido 
del acto es el actus essendi, con el que se corresponde un nuevo sentido de la po-
tencia que es la esencia”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I (Pamplona: Servicio 
de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1998), 49. 
51 “Admitir que el hombre es persona añade a la naturaleza del hombre su cabal 
comprensión como esencia”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los 
Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 92. 
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habitually, as a habit, is beyond objective thinking. The act of thinking 
does not appear as the object. The act does not appear in the object 
being thought. This is a transcendental consideration of knowing. Polo 
often expresses it as follows: “what is thought does not think” (“lo 
pensado no piensa”)52 or “the ‘I’ thought does not think” (“el yo pen-
sado no piensa”)53. 
The personal transcendentals are the ways the act of being (the 
person) can be detected. Because the transcendentals are above the in-
telligence and will, they are above all determination from the inferior 
levels. Another implication is that they accompany any personal man-
ifestation in the same way as the ontological transcendentals 
accompany any natural being. This means that any human action can 
be referred always to any of the personal transcendentals indistinc-
tively. 
c.2) Insufficiency of the classic transcencendentals 
We have to go beyond metaphysics in order to understand 
properly the ontological status of the habits and the existential 
knowledge. The reason being that the traditional transcendentals do 
not make room for freedom: “A method to study the great topics of 
metaphysics, and together with this, I defend the thesis that with this 
method it is also possible to distinguish metaphysics from transcen-
dental anthropology. This distinction requires what I call an expansion 
of the transcendentals”54. 
To manifest the difference and need for the new transcendentals 
Polo gives the example of the transcendental good as an ontological 
transcendental as understood by Aristotle and the personal transcen-
dental that supports it: “Metaphysics needs to be done: to recover and 
advance in the lines of classic metaphysics. But one has to avoid trying 
to apply the classic categories to the personal being, because the per-
sonal transcendentals are different. For example, for Aristotle the first 
principle is lovable, but it does not love; love is not a transcendental. 
                                                 
52 “El sentido del hecho como improsecución se puede entender en función de la 
proposición: lo pensado no piensa. El hecho como correlato real del objeto se debe 
al límite mental como no aparición de carácter de pensante en lo pensado”. Polo, 
L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, III (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2006), 297. 
53 “Suelo emplear para el caso la fórmula el yo pensado no piensa, que vale según la 
constancia del estatuto de los objetos pensados (presencia mental). Ningún objeto 
piensa: puedo pensar que pienso, pero no puedo de ninguna manera comunicar mi 
carácter pensante a lo que pienso. La realidad del sujeto no está en lo pensado, y 
el sujeto no es una operación”. Ibid., 235. 
54 “Un método para afrontar los grandes temas de la metafísica, y, junto con eso, 
sostengo la tesis de que con ese método también es posible distinguir la metafísica 
de la antropología en el plano trascendental. Esta distinción comporta lo que suelo 
llamar ampliación de los trascendentales”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, 
op. cit., 21. 
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Good is a transcendental in metaphysics, but not love; in anthropology 
love is a transcendental, a personal transcendental”55. 
c.3) Co-existence-with as the first of the personal transcenden-
tals 
What is the clearest distinction between the being of the non-
spiritual creatures with the being of spiritual ones? For Leonardo Polo 
the non-spiritual beings are ‘persistent’. Persistence does not mean that 
they do not change but that the changes are not theirs; they do not have 
command over them. Polo states further that the non-spiritual universe 
has only one act of being and one unique essence, which is common 
to all non-spiritual beings. By contraposition each spiritual being has 
an essence, and a different act of being, and therefore co-exists with a 
multiplicity of co-beings and with the being of the universe. What is 
proper of the spirit is its inherent unavoidable expansiveness, the lack 
of limit, which is a consequence of freedom and in the final instance, 
of his spirituality: “The differences between the act of being of the 
universe –I call it persistence–, and the human one –I call it the char-
acter of ‘more’– ; and of God –I call it ‘originating identity’–, have to 
be highlighted”56. 
The act of being of the person is entitatively extrovert. It needs 
to relate to the exterior both to the persistence or the world, and to 
other personal beings57. This is the radical difference between the per-
sonal act of being and the non-spiritual existence. And this distinction 
explains further the difference between Transcendental Anthropology 
and Metaphysics: “As a starting point, admitting that being and exist-
ing are equivalent expressions in metaphysics, transcendental 
anthropology is the doctrine that deals with the human co-being or hu-
man co-existing. Man is not limited to being, but co-being. Co-being 
means being-with. The being studied by metaphysics is equivalent to 
existing (simply as persistence). Anthropology cannot be reduced to 
                                                 
55 “Hay que hacer metafísica: recuperar y avanzar por la línea de la metafísica clá-
sica. Pero también hay que evitar endosar al ser personal las categorías de la 
metafísica clásica, porque los trascendentales antropológicos son diferentes. Por 
ejemplo, en Aristóteles, el primer principio es amable, pero no ama; el amor no es 
un trascendental. En metafísica es trascendental el bien, pero no el amor; en antro-
pología es trascendental el amor: el amor es un trascendental personal”. Polo, L., 
in Cruz-Cruz, J., “Filosofar Hoy. Entrevista con Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 40. 
56 “Hay que destacar la diferencia entre el acto de ser del universo –al que llamo 
persistencia–, el del hombre –al que llamo carácter de además– y el de Dios –al 
que llamo Identidad originaria–. De acuerdo con estas distinciones se evitan algu-
nas confusiones, como son el panteísmo y la interpretación del hombre como un 
mero ente intracósmico”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 
87. 
57 Guardini understands the innate social character of man, (even if his is mainly a 
fenomenological approach), who rejects the existencialists who tend to concentrate 
so much in the personal existence that they may lead to an ethics of personal per-
fection, of a false auto-realization. “Inasmuch as man revolves around himself, he 
loses sight of his true being”. “En la medida en que el hombre se centra en si 
mismo, pierde de vista su verdadero ser”. Guardini, R., Etica. Lecciones en la Uni-
versidad de Munich, op. cit., 51. 
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metaphysics because a human being is more than being or mere exist-
ence as he is co-being or co-existent which is ‘being with’ (naturally 
also with the being of metaphysics)”58. The co-being of the personal 
level is shared at the essential level through its social manifestations: 
ethics, language, politics, and all the personal manifestations that 
spread our thoughts and good will naturally among our different soci-
eties. We can also say that this personal transcendental is so far the 
best explanation of the natural social character of human beings and 
of the natural origin of society59. It can also make one have a glimpse, 
though never explain or fully understand, the multiplicity of persons 
in God.  
c.4) Personal freedom 
The second of the personal transcendentals is personal freedom. 
Leonardo Polo describes it as ‘radical novelty’. Radical because it is 
at the root of all decisions and changes we make, and novelty, because 
it cannot be ‘deduced’. It is always fresh. This freedom is entitative, 
which means that there is no person without personal freedom. If you 
remove the radical freedom from a person he or she stops being a per-
son, one becomes a stone, tree or animal, a non-free being. The 
interesting corollary of being at the personal level, as the co-existence-
with and the other radicals, is that it cannot be understood by the in-
telligence which is at the essential level. A second implicit corollary 
is that it permeates down to essential level as the free will (liberum 
arbitrium), and at the corporeal level, where we have the corporeal 
freedom.  
Personal freedom is exactly the opposite of the fear to the clas-
sical fatum, the old stoic kosmos, and the fatum of the intransigence 
that the world understood in a mechanicistic way portaits that Levinas 
also conveys but without ontological support60. 
Traditional philosophy considered freedom as a property of the 
will, not as something which could be identified with the person as 
such, because the traditional philosophy was limited to the essential 
                                                 
58 “De entrada, admitiendo que ser y existir son expresiones equivalentes en metafí-
sica, la antropología trascendental es la doctrina acerca del co-ser humano o bien 
de la co-existencia. El hombre no se limita a ser, sino que co-es. Co-ser designa la 
persona, es decir, la realidad abierta en intimidad y también hacia fuera; por tanto, 
co-ser alude a ser-con. El ser que estudia la metafísica equivale a existir (por lo 
pronto, a persistir). La antropología no se reduce a la metafísica porque el ser hu-
mano es más que existir o ser, en tanto que co-ser o co-existir; y, por tanto, ser-con 
(desde luego, con el ser de la metafísica)”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental 
I, op. cit., 29. 
59 Cfr. Altarejos, F., “La Co-Existencia, Fundamento Antropològico de la Solidari-
dad”, Studia Poliana, vol. 8 (2006), 119-150.  
60 “The fear of being in a world without any possibility of something new, without a 
future without hope, a world where everything is regulated in advance; the old 
horror at the destiny”. “Al espanto de encontrarnos en un mundo sin novedades 
posibles, sin porvenir de la esperanza, un mundo donde todo es regulado de ante-
mano; al antiguo espanto ante el destino”. Levinas, E., Ética e Infinito, op. cit., 30. 
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level and that was the highest level reached in traditional anthropol-
ogy61.  
c.5) Personal knowledge 
The personal knowledge is not the intellectual knowledge of the 
person or human being but the act of knowing oneself, some inner 
transparency which accompanies the personal act of being. Leonardo 
Polo uses the image of the light which is not seen unless it illuminates 
something. We know it at the essential level when we know the per-
sonal manifestations of something, but it hides the transparent light as 
it makes other things shine. Polo identifies this light with Aristotle’s 
active intelligence; the agent intellect. The agent intellect is the one 
that activates with more or less intensity the passive intellect, that be-
longs to the essential level, and that from there activates or controls 
the sensitive knowledge62.  
Polo develops the personal knowledge, the intellect ‘ut actus’, 
or agent intellect, following Aristotle and Aquinas. Nevertheless his 
development goes far beyond what Aristotle and Aquinas discovered. 
We shall touch upon this topic when explaining synderesis in detail63. 
c.6) Personal love 
The last of the personal transcendentals Leonardo Polo speaks 
about –he recognises that more maybe found in future – is personal 
love. Personal love is the highest manifestation of the expansiveness 
of the person. It activates the will which then becomes love at the es-
sential level, and controls desires at the natural level. Polo speaks of a 
dimension of the act of being as personal love which starts with ‘ac-
ceptance’64 co-implicated with a second dimension of ‘giving’ and a 
                                                 
61 The classical manual of Moral is but just one testimony: “Como Ia libertad reside 
en Ia voluntad, solamente los actos e intenciones de Ia voluntad interna constituyen 
actos morales”. Mausbach, J. and Ermecke, G., Teología Moral Católica I, op. cit., 
93. 
62 From Aristotles it is known that the capacity to think is distinctive of what is hu-
man. To link it to a personal level was also seen by Guardini, not as a 
transcendental, but as something specifically spiritual; "Only in the realization of 
truth the person reaches its meaning because the person is naturally referred to the 
truth. It exists for the truth, as a permanent possibility of realizing it. The person 
exists only if there is truth; why; because an autonomous being can only exist if it 
is concious of himself”. Guardini, R., Etica. Lecciones en la Universidad de Mu-
nich, op. cit., 160. 
63 Cfr. for a more detailed explanation: Sellés, J. F., “El intelecto agente como acto 
de ser personal”, Logos, 45 (2012) 35-63; El Conocer Personal. Estudio Del En-
tendimiento Agente según Leonardo Polo (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones 
de la Universidad de Navarra, 2003. 
64 Guardini sensed the characteristic of the transcendental love as acceptance, i.e. as 
esential to the spiritual being of man, in a fenomenological way and in a direct 
relationship with God and places it as the foundation of ethics. “The demands of 
accepting are not only of accepting the condition of being created, but also of its 
content. One has to accept not only that one is, but also how he is”. “Pero la exi-
gencia de la aceptación se dirige no solo a la aceptación de la condicion de realidad 
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third one which is the ‘gift’. The gift in humans has to be done at the 
essential or corporeal level, since the act of being cannot be donated 
because that is what one is and has received, one does not have control 
over it; we have received it as a gift, and we have no control at the ‘act 
of being’ level; we are not creators65.  
This has been a very brief description of the personal transcen-
dentals the development of which is rich in possibilities. We have 
constrained ourselves to what is strictly necessary to understand the 
texts we shall quote when discussing synderesis. This explanation can 
be valuable to understand the levels of knowledge, levels of love, the 
levels of happiness and levels of law66. 
But how can these personal transcendentals be reached if they 
are above the intelligence and will? This is what Leonardo Polo con-
siders the key to overcome the limitations of the classical and modern 
philosophy an open way to continue doing philosophy without having 
to reject all previous achievements. He calls it the “abandonment of 
the mental boundary”67.  
 
5. The new method 
To reach philosophically the personal act of being one needs a 
new method that should be able to reach the act of being of man. This 
method has to fit the topic at hand what Polo calls the “theme”. A 
higher reality cannot be understood with methods fit for a lower real-
ity68. Even Aquinas, who discovered the act of being, did not have a 
method to reach it in a philosophical way: “Human co-existence, as a 
theme than can be reached, cannot be found in Thomas Aquinas’ phi-
losophy. This is not an oversight of this great metaphysician and 
Christian theologian; neither it is an omission that can be overcome by 
adding a chapter to his works, because the reason for this omission is 
                                                 
creada, sino también a su contenido”. Guardini, R., Ética. Lecciones en la Univer-
sidad de Munich, op. cit., 863. El ser humano no sólo debe aceptar que es, sino 
también que es el que es”. The clarity and courage of this acceptance is the ethical 
basis of existence”. Ibid., 398 
65 The coimplication between acceptance and freedom is also clearly seen by Millán 
Puelles, “Free acceptance is a truism, because acceptance is only real if it is free”. 
“Libre aceptación es una redundancia, porque la aceptación sólo tiene sentido si es 
libre”. Millán-Puelles, A., Ética y Realismo, op. cit., 14. 
66 Regarding the three levels of law see Sellés, J. F., “Natural Law, Essential Law 
and Personal Law”, in Torralba, J.M., (ed.), Natural law: Historical, Systematic 
and Juridical Approaches, (Newscastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Pub, 
2008). 
67 Cfr. for more details: Sellés, J. F., “Trascendentalidad del Amor Personal Hu-
mano”, Tópicos, 45 (2013), 33-68.  
68 The fact that a richer theory cannot be understood, integrated or explained by a 
less developed one is explained well by MacIntyre with regards to the Aristotelian 
and Augustian theories in the medieval times. What he said can be applied to 
Polo´s theory with regards to the previous ones. Cf. MacIntyre, A., Three Rival 
Versions of Moral Enquiry, op. cit., 119. 
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much deeper: it is that the impulse that motivates his philosophy can-
not reach the theme; I want to say that it falls short, or better, that it is 
constrained by his Aristotelian background and by the influence of 
Averroes. Because of this we can say that the human co-existence is 
only virtually contained in Thomistic philosophy and that in order to 
develop it, one should reorganise it. It is not possible to research co-
existence by just adding it to the topics Thomas Aquinas deals with, 
because it is not in line with them”69.  
Both traditional and modern philosophies did not have a method 
to treat properly personal topics. Polo proposed a method that retains 
the metaphysical achievements of classic philosophy and also ac-
counts for the latent achievements of modern philosophers with the 
adequate corrections needed: “Method is equivalent to intellectual act. 
The act through which metaphysics topics are achieved should be dif-
ferent enough from the act by which the topics proper to 
transcendental anthropology are reached”70.  
How does one reach there? Through a new method that is based 
on an intuition Polo had in 1950, when he was twenty-four years old. 
He called it the discovery of the mental boundary: “It came to me sud-
denly. I was just thinking about being and thinking, and the 
relationship between each other; then I realized that we cannot reach 
the being while we do not overcome the supposition of objective 
knowledge, because supposition limits intellectual objects, and a lim-
ited knowledge cannot be knowledge of being in a transcendental 
sense”71. 
                                                 
69 “La co-existencia humana como tema susceptible de ser alcanzado, no aparece en 
la filosofía de Tomás de Aquino. Ello no obedece a una distracción de este gran 
metafísico y teólogo cristiano; no es tampoco una mera omisión que pueda subsa-
narse con sólo añadir un capítulo nuevo a su obra, porque la razón de esa omisión 
es más profunda: se trata de que el impulso que alimenta la filosofía tomista no 
llega al tema; quiero decir que se queda corto, o mejor, que está frenado por la 
herencia aristotélica y el influjo de Averroes. Por eso se ha de decir que la co-
existencia humana sólo virtualmente está contenida en el tomismo, que por ello se 
ha de continuar de acuerdo con cierta reorganización. Para investigar la co-exis-
tencia, no basta con superponerla a los temas de que se ocupa Tomás de Aquino, 
porque no es alineable con ellos”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 
20. 
70 “Método equivale a acto intelectual. El acto según el cual se conoce la temática 
metafísica tiene que ser suficientemente distinto del acto según el cual se alcanzan 
los temas de la antropología trascendental”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental 
I, op. cit., 99. 
71 “En la primavera de 1950, Leonardo Polo cae en la cuenta del límite mental. La 
detectación del límite fue una intuición expresa. Según cuenta: "eso se me ocurrió 
de repente, y punto. Estaba pensando acerca del pensar y el ser, y cómo tenía que 
ver el ser con el pensar; entonces me di cuenta de que al ser no podíamos llegar 
mientras no se abandonara la suposición del objeto, porque la suposición hace que 
el objeto sea limitado y un conocimiento limitado no puede ser un conocimiento 
del ser si éste se toma en sentido trascendental”. Franquet, M. J., “La trayectoria 
intellectual de Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 305. Polo understands “supposition” as the 
objectivity of the concepts, “La presencia es la suposición del objeto”. Polo, L., 
Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento II, op.cit., 106. 
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It is a kind of discovery that was preceded by a special interest 
in philosophy and lots of personal reading that started when he was 
fourteen years old and that matured ten years later. We are more inter-
ested in the development of that intuition, which marked all his 
philosophical development, than in the analysis of this moment, of 
which Leonardo Polo did not write much about. “The method I pro-
pose is what I call ‘abandonment of the mental limit’, and this, so to 
speak, is exclusive to me72. Not to have found a thinker that had dis-
covered this before me does not ask for a special acknowledgement 
because, more than vanity, it gives me a lot of insecurity. ‘To abandon 
the mental limit’: this is the method the fecundity of which I have tried 
to explore for the last 40 years”73. We shall try to explain this method 
and its implications to our subject step by step. 
a) The act of being cannot be known ‘objectively’ 
For Leonardo Polo the boundary of knowledge is the barrier 
which prevents us from knowing the actual being. The boundary, what 
limits our intelligence to reach the being is objective knowledge: “The 
object, and nothing else, is the mental boundary”74. The object is so 
powerful that it hides behind it other types of knowledge. This has 
blocked the development of philosophy since Parmenides. Objective 
knowledge, ‘the object-thought’ is like a photograph, devoid of life, 
devoid of acting, of thinking. Objective knowledge is unable to unhide 
the ‘thinker’ who is behind the object; the-one-who-thinks the object. 
Continuing witht the photograph simile, we can say that the photo-
graph does not show the photographer. The person who thinks cannot 
be reduced to the product of his thinking. The same idea can be said 
in many ways: you are not what you are thinking; what is thought is 
not the thinker; we are the thinker, not the thought we think.  
In a vivid text Polo expresses the limitations of ‘objective’ 
knowledge which prevents the knowledge of ‘being’: “I had formu-
lated the inadequacy of the knowledge about the human person in an 
expression that few have understood... which reads as follows: ‘the 
thought ‘I’ does not think’. The self cannot be known as an object-
thought because no object thinks (but is being thought). I can think ‘I 
am I’ but I cannot give reality to the ‘I’, I objectivize because objects 
qua-objects are not real. Now, in the case of the human person know-
ing as being-not-real is not knowing the person properly. The human 
                                                 
72 “The abandonment of the mental boundary is the guiding thread of Polo’s philos-
ophy”. “El hilo conductor de la filosofía de Polo es el abandono del límite mental”. 
Murillo, J. I., “Conocimiento personal y Conocimiento Racional en la Antropolo-
gía Trascendental de L. Polo”, op. cit., 71. 
73 “El método que propongo es lo que llamo «abandono del límite mental», y esto, 
por así decirlo, es de mi exclusiva competencia. No se aduce con ello ningún mé-
rito, pues más que de vanidad me llena de inseguridad el no haber encontrado algún 
pensador anterior que lo haya visto. «Abandonar el límite mental»: ése es el mé-
todo cuyo alcance he tratado de explorar desde hace cuarenta años”. Polo, L., in 
Cruz-Cruz, J., “Filosofar Hoy. Entrevista con Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 40. 
74 “El objeto es simplemente, y nada más, el límite mental”. Polo, L., Antropología 
Trascendental I, op. cit., 21. 
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person is not knowable as an object because what strictly is proper to 
it; what cannot be left behind, is that the person is real. If the character 
of being-thinking-now does appear as object-thought, then, properly 
speaking, the person does not appear as thinking”75. 
The ‘mental object’ is what we have possession of, a special type 
of possession, which is intimate and nevertheless constitutes the 
boundary to know the “being”: “As I have said, to have is equivalent 
to the intellectual operation by which it commeasurates exactly to its 
object: the object is what we have. To ‘have’ is the mental bound-
ary”76. The objective knowledge has two facets (it is dual), one is the 
subject that knows, and in front of it is the object. We shall see that, 
for most philosophers, the subject does not mean the person but an-
other object thought77. “The dual character of the operational 
knowledge has to be recognised. On the one hand is the operation of 
knowing and on the other what the operation has which, precisely, is 
its object”78. Leonardo Polo uses different terms to express the idea 
that the object-thought hides the life that created it, or rather, is creat-
ing the object. The other terms used for this type of knowledge are: 
‘objective’; ‘supposition’; ‘intentional’; ‘operational’ and ‘present’. 
                                                 
75 “Yo formulé la inadecuación del conocimiento de la persona humana en una ex-
presión que pocos han entendido (los que lo han entendido son discípulos míos, lo 
que significa simplemente que han abandonado el límite por su cuenta), que dice 
así: el yo pensado no piensa. El yo no puede ser conocido como un objeto pensado 
porque ningún objeto piensa (sino que es pensado). Yo puedo pensar "yo soy yo", 
pero no puedo dotar de carácter real a ese "yo" que objetivo porque los objetos qua 
objetos no son reales. Ahora bien, en el caso de la persona humana el no ser real 
es conocerla impropiamente. La persona humana en términos de objeto es un tema 
inaccesible porque lo estrictamente propio, aquello de lo que no se puede prescin-
dir es que es real. Si el carácter de pensante no puede comparecer según el objeto 
pensado, propiamente hablando como pensante no comparece”. Polo, L., in Cruz, 
J., “Filosofar Hoy. Entrevista con Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 46. 
76 “Según he dicho el haber equivale a la operación intelectual conmensurada con el 
objeto: el objeto es lo que hay. El haber es el límite mental”. Polo, L., Antropología 
Trascendental I, op. cit., 21 note 2. 
77 Some personalistic philosophers sensed and spoke about the difference between 
the knowledge of the person as an object and the real person, but were not able to 
find the method to apply their intuition into a transcendental anthropology. Among 
these Sellés in a private conversation mentioned: Frankl, V., Guardini, R., Nédon-
celle, M., Ratzinger J. and Scheler, M. Regarding this topic we can bring a 
quotation from Scheler: “But an act is never an object. To the essence of the acts 
belongs only be experienced while performing them, and by ‘being given’ through 
reflection. Indeed, an act can never be, at the same time, in an object by a second 
act that considers it retrospectively. Neither is ‘object’ in the reflection in what it 
becomes conscious to the act overcoming its naïve implementation: the reflective 
knowledge ‘accompanies’ the act, but does not make it objective”. “Pero un acto 
no es nunca un objeto. Pues a la esencia de los actos pertenece el ser vividos úni-
camente en la realización y el ser dados en la reflexión. Efectivamente, nunca 
puede convertirse un acto, a su vez, en objeto merced a un segundo acto que lo 
considere retrospectivamente. Tampoco es ‘objeto’ en la reflexión que hace cons-
ciente al acto superando su realización ingenua: el saber reflejo ‘acompaña’ al acto, 
pero no lo objetiva”. Scheler, M., Etica, op. cit., 503. 
78 “Hay que admitir el carácter dual del conocimiento operativo, pues por una parte 
está la operación de conocer y, por otra, aquello que la operación posee, que es 
justamente su objeto”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 34. 
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“The intellectual operation is described as supposition, presence, ac-
tual act and unicity. All these descriptions are equivalent”79.  
Present in the sense that the object is ‘present to the mind’ and 
the act is an intellectual ‘operation’ which is ‘intentional’ and ‘pre-
sents’ the object: “Where can we see that the act of being cannot be 
the intentional act? This is because the intentional knowledge is al-
ready there, and because of this it is knowledge as present (because of 
this I call the intellectual operation, ‘presence’). To know intellectu-
ally is to present; and what is intentionally known is what is present, 
one knows in present when one knows objectively”80.  
The presence of the present is a rendering of Parmenides’ say-
ing: “The same think for thinking and that is thought”81. This is to be 
within the boundary of the objective knowledge. Leonardo Polo says 
that this is to relinquish the act of thinking, which remains occult –in 
the object– in the thought. By paying attention to the activity, more 
than to the result one can notice, discover –but not objectively– the 
boundary, and by discovering it one automatically ‘detects’ the bound-
ary and therefore one is open to explore what is not ‘present’, what is 
not object-like. “What we can learn from Parmenides is the-presence-
of-the-present, i.e. that what is thought, is what is intentional. But then 
the presence, the boundary, remains occult, because what appears is 
what is present (the operation does not know itself, because what is 
known is intentional); therefore, to detect the mental boundary is to 
detect the presence and to detect the presence is to abandon what is 
present and notice the topic of being”82.  
According to Polo, Aristotle did not clarify this matter suffi-
ciently: “And again I have to point out a discrepancy with classic 
philosophy, where the contrary thesis frequently appears, this is, that 
being means actual-being, or, at least, that actuality belongs to being. 
In many passages of Aristotle they are also confused (being and es-
sence). On the contrary I defend that actuality is equivalent to mental 
                                                 
79 “La operación intelectual se describe como suposición, presencia, acto actual y 
unicidad. Estas descripciones son equivalentes”. Ibid., 42 note. 
80 “Dónde se ve que el acto de ser no puede ser intencional? Justamente en que el 
conocimiento intencional es ya tenido, por lo que es un conocimiento según pre-
sencia (por eso a la operación intelectual la llamo presencia). Conocer 
intelectualmente es presentar; y lo conocido intencionalmente es lo presente; se 
conoce en presente cuando se conoce objetivamente”. Polo, L., in Cruz-Cruz, J., 
“Filosofar Hoy. Entrevista con Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 46. 
81 “Parmenides”, en Gallop, D., Parmenides of Elea: Fragments: A Text and Trans-
lation with an Introduction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). 
82 “Lo que hay que salvar de Parménides es que lo mismo es lo pensado, lo intencio-
nal, lo presente de la presencia. Pero entonces la presencia, el límite, queda oculto, 
puesto que lo que comparece es lo presente (la operación no se conoce a sí misma 
porque lo conocido es intencional); por tanto, detectar el límite mental es detectar 
la presencia; y detectar la presencia es abandonar lo presente y advertir el tema del 




presence, which is different from being”83. These terminological pre-
cisions are important in order to understand Polo’s texts regarding 
synderesis. 
We have seen that the object, the objective knowledge, which is 
an operation of the intelligence, is the boundary which prevents access 
to the being as being. How can we overcome the boundary without 
using the intelligence? What type of knowledge can it be, if it is not 
operational? 
Polo studies human knowledge in great detail in his Curso de 
teoría del conocimiento. The development of this Course was a con-
sequence of the need to clarify the superior anthropological types of 
knowledge: “After some tentative expositions, it was seen that the 
knowledge of con-causality belongs mainly to judgement. This re-
quired the study of human knowledge, because judgement is preceded 
by abstraction. It was then necessary, therefore, to study the first intel-
lectual operation and the habits and operations that follow it so as to 
discover the way to overcome the mental boundary and allow the in-
telligence to proceed; what meant that a course of theory of human 
knowledge had to be written”84. 
Polo distinguishes four basic levels of human knowledge: sensi-
tive, operational, habitual and personal, as expresed in the following 
quote: “There are other levels or ways to know: other types of cogni-
tive acts, of which we can highlight two: habitual knowledge –which 
I consider that is knowledge in act, even if not actual, superior to op-
erational knowledge– and knowledge as act of being: as esse 
hominis”85.  
Sensitive knowledge is well studied in classic philosophy and is 
linked to each specific organ and the efficient working of the nervous 
system. Intellectual knowledge is entirely different and much more 
                                                 
83 “Pero de nuevo tengo que señalar una discrepancia con la filosofía clásica, en la 
que aparece con frecuencia la tesis contraria, a saber, que ser significa ser-actual, 
o, al menos, que la actualidad es propia del ser. También ser y actualidad se con-
funden en bastantes pasajes de Aristóteles. En cambio, aquí se sostiene que la 
actualidad equivale a la presencia mental, la cual se distingue del ser”. Polo, L., 
Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento III, op. cit., 17. 
84 “Después de algunos ensayos expositivos, se vio que el conocimiento de la con 
causalidad corresponde sobre todo al juicio. Ello obligaba a estudiar el conoci-
miento humano, pues el juicio es precedido por la abstracción. Era preciso, por 
tanto, proceder al estudio de la primera operación intelectual y de los hábitos y 
operaciones que la siguen, para averiguar el modo de abandonar el límite mental 
al proseguir la actividad de la inteligencia; lo que equivalía a escribir un Curso de 
Teoría del Conocimiento humano”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. 
cit., 17. 
85 “Existen otros niveles o modos de conocer: otros tipos de actos cognoscitivos, de 
los cuales podemos destacar dos: el conocimiento habitual –considero que es un 
conocimiento en acto, aunque no actual, superior al conocimiento operativo–, y el 
conocimiento como acto de ser: como esse hominis”. Polo, L., Antropología Tras-
cendental I, op. cit., 29. 
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complex than traditionally thought. Polo reserves the name “opera-
tion” to the intelligence’s activity as a faculty. An “operation” then 
means the activity of a faculty. There are two types of knowledge 
higher than the operations of the intelligence: ‘habitual’ and ‘personal’ 
knowledge. Habitual knowledge is proper of the intellectual habits; 
personal knowledge is the direct knowledge that the ‘act of being’ 
(personal level) has of himself. These distinctions are very relevant for 
our topic because according to Polo synderesis is a type of habitual 
knowledge, and therefore, it is above the knowledge intelligence gives 
as faculty, but below personal knowledge. 
b) Incapacity of operational knowledge to notice the being 
The first characteristic of Polo’s new method is that it cannot be 
“objective”. Objective here is understood as conceptual, as the ‘object’ 
is what the intellect presents. When the intelligence abstracts it “makes 
objects” because that is how it operates. The natural tendency of the 
intelligence is to ‘objectivize’, to ‘entify’ or ‘reify’, this is, to under-
stand everything as ‘a thing’, as an ‘ens’86. The new method has to 
overcome this problem; it has to go beyond this mental boundary, it 
has to go beyond the distinction between subject and its object. The 
subject is the opposite side of the object, but it is already ‘objecti-
vized’, an object looking to the object, so to speak. This mental 
boundary has to be surpassed and this is done by noticing it from 
above. We can say that if we understand the text quoted below then 
we are in a very good position to understand Polo’s philosophy and 
therefore the topic at hand; the originality of his proposal regarding 
synderesis: “The being cannot be separated from being, I repeat, the 
being cannot be possessed objectively because in that way one makes 
it non-real, but if being is non-real, then it is nothing; the intentional 
consideration of being is a ‘quid pro quo’; being is its being but if one 
knows it ‘intentionaliter’ in Scholastic terminology, it becomes an ex-
trinsic denomination. When I know an idea the idea does not affect the 
reality I know, because the idea is in my mind as an intelligible in act, 
and in the reality as intelligible in potency. The real distinction be-
tween the essense and being points out in an extreme way the 
importance of this issue, because if being and essence were the same, 
knowing something about the essence would know something about 
the being”87. 
                                                 
86 Some authors discovered the limitation of the objective knowledge in different 
ways, but they did not discover that there was a superior level, i.e. the way of 
overcoming it. We can cite as example this short text of Dilthey: “Todo nuestro 
pensar solo puede conocer, combinar, separar y relacionar la coexistencia, la suce-
sion, la identidad, la uniformidad. Pero esto significa directamente mecanizar”. 
Dilthey, W., El Sistema de la Ética, op. cit., 58. 
87 “No se puede separar, repito, el ser del ser, no cabe apoderarse objetivamente de 
él porque en esa medida se ‘desrealiza’, pero si el ser no es real, no es nada; la 
consideración intencional del ser es un quid pro quo; el ser coincide consigo, pero 
ser conocido intentionaliter, como decían los escolásticos, es una denominación 
extrínseca. Cuando conozco la idea no afecta para nada a lo que conozco, porque 
la idea de lo que conozco está en mi mente como inteligible en acto y en la realidad 
como inteligible en potencia. La distinción real entre esencia y ser extrema lo 
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Operational or objective knowledge is devoid of being, and 
therefore one cannot add knowledge of reality by relating objects to 
objects. Reality, i.e. being, cannot be reached by operating with ob-
jects: “I formulate this as follows: ‘in the proposition A is A, or A is 
B, A is already supposed’; I know something more than A but I do not 
know A better, which is exactly the same as what is already known; I 
cannot increase its knowledge just by thinking the object again, be-
cause objective knowledge is suppositive –knowledge can be 
increased going from object to object, but one cannot go beyond the 
object–. To suppose is equivalent to exclude. Knowing objectively is 
to exclude ‘being’ from the object. When executing knowing opera-
tions, the intentional object is possessed by the operation exclusive of 
being. The operation does not produce the object –this is Kant’s error– 
but the object is purely intentional and this means that it is disposed of 
real being. What is deprived of real being can be an illumination of 
reality, but it cannot be knowledge of the radicality of being, that if it 
is not –or if it is excluded– is nothing”88.  
This objective knowledge is the operational knowledge which 
makes present whatever it considers in the act of thinking, and this is 
the cause of the confusion between ens and esse that makes real met-
aphysic impossible: “From operations we know the present. The 
mental operation is described as mental presence. But one cannot say 
that the act of being is actual or present. Remember how we differen-
tiate the Thomist’s distinction between the ‘be’ as a verbal union and 
the ‘be’ as act of being. The first is actual, objective and therefore the 
second meaning of ‘be’ should not be like that. Therefore if the object, 
as mental boundary, is not overcome, it does not seem possible to 
reach the act of being”89. 
 
                                                 
agudo de la cuestión, porque si el ser y la esencia fuesen lo mismo, al conocer algo 
de la esencia conocería algo del ser”. Polo, L., in Cruz, J., “Filosofar Hoy. Entre-
vista con Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 40.  
88 “Esto lo formulé así: «en la proposición "A es A", o "A es B", A ya está supuesta»; 
conozco algo más que A, pero no conozco mejor a A, que es la misma en tanto que 
ya ha sido conocida; sobre el haberla pensado no puedo volver incrementándolo 
porque el conocimiento objetivo es supositivo (pasando de objeto a objeto se puede 
incrementar el conocimiento, pero no traspasar el objeto). Suponer equivale a exi-
mir: al conocer objetivamente se exime de ser al objeto. Eximir de ser es el límite 
mental. Al ejercer operaciones cognoscitivas, el objeto intencional poseido justa-
mente por la operación está eximido de ser. La operación no produce el objeto (ese 
es el error de Kant), sino que el objeto es puramente intencional y eso quiere decir 
que está exento de ser real. Lo que está exento de ser real puede ser iluminación 
de lo real, pero no puede ser de ninguna manera el conocimiento de la radicalidad 
del ser que si no es (o es eximido) no es nada”. Ibid. 
89 “Operativamente se conoce lo presente: el acto operativo se describe como pre-
sencia mental. Pero no debe sostenerse que el acto de ser sea actual o presente. 
Recuérdese que en la nota 19 de este planteamiento se expuso la distinción tomista 
del est como cópula verbal y como acto de ser. El primer sentido del est es actual, 
objetivo; por consiguiente, el segundo sentido del est no debe serlo. Así pues, si 
no se detecta el objeto como límite mental y no se abandona, no parece posible 




c) The new method is based on habitual knowledge 
Leonardo Polo finds that because the mental limit can be noticed 
in different ways, there are different ways of surpassing it, and that 
each of these methods reaches different topics, themes or dimensions: 
“It is necessary to point out that the mental limit is noticed in different 
ways, and that each is a different method that give access to different 
themes. Then it is good to point out that in order to overcome the limit 
in different ways, different acts of knowledge than the ones that are 
within the mental limit need to come into play”90; “It is suitable, above 
all, to highlight that overcoming the mental limit cannot be unique; it 
is necessary to accept several dimensions, and also that through each 
one we reach different themes”91. 
One of the difficult things to get used to is to accept differences, 
this is, to notice that the way we reach human realities gets to different, 
so to speak, sides of our being a person, and that naturally each will 
look different, and that each does not “see” the others, because they 
are reached from different angles. Only what they have in common 
ensures that they are all referring to the same being. This realization is 
important to understand synderesis and the personal transcendentals. 
They are not different things, but they are clearly distinct from one 
another and they look and feel differently. Now that we know that the 
boundary is the objective knowledge, and that to notice it means that 
automatically we are in a position to overcome the limit: “To go be-
yond the boundary is a way of using the intellectual capacity of 
infinity, which is different from merely not having a final thought-ob-
ject, which is precisely to go beyond but without abandoning the 
boundary because the boundary is to think objects”92.  
By noticing the mental boundary one is able to reach three real-
ities —three types of being — that cannot be properly known 
‘objectively’: God, man, and the non-personal realities, which Leo-
nardo Polo calls the ‘extra mental-beings’: “On the other hand, if the 
limit were detected93 one would discover what cannot be known within 
                                                 
90 “Es preciso señalar que el límite mental se detecta de diversos modos, los cuales 
son otras tantas dimensiones metódicas que marcan el acceso a temas distintos. 
Ahora bien, para abandonar el límite de diversos modos, han de entrar en juego 
actos cognoscitivos distintos de aquéllos con los que se corresponde el límite men-
tal”. Ibid., 102. 
91 “Conviene resaltar, ante todo, que el abandono del límite mental no puede ser un 
único método; es preciso admitir varias dimensiones suyas, de acuerdo con las 
cuales se llega a temáticas distintas”. Ibid., 107. 
92 “Ir más allá del límite es una manera de ejercer la infinitud intelectual, distinto del 
puro no haber un último objeto pensado, lo cual es justamente la manera de ir más 
allá sin abandonar el límite porque el límite es el pensar objetos”. Polo, L., in Cruz, 
J., “Filosofar Hoy. Entrevista con Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 40. 
93 Of the different words we wonder whether “notice” or “uncover” can reflect the 
meaning Leonardo Polo gives to “detectar”. We tend to like ‘notice’ because it 
indicates some newness, while ‘uncover’ indicates some “looking for” which in-
dicates some previous knowledge of what one is looking for. 
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the limit, i.e. the realities for which a limited knowledge is totally in-
appropriate or not adequate. One notices immediately that there are 
two realities (apart from God) for which the limited knowledge (inten-
tional knowlege) is inadequate: the human person and the extra mental 
being”94. More specifically and with regard to human beings: “I can 
only properly know that ‘I am’ if I do not know it objectively, that is, 
if I find a method to reach the ‘I’ beyond the object”95.  
And with regards to the extra mental beings: “We have an ob-
jective knowledge of things, but not of the being of things”96; “To open 
up this new transcendental level it is necessary to apply the method I 
call ‘to abandon the mental boundary’. Naming it in this way is ade-
quate if one considers that the mental operations are the inferior acts 
of knowledge, so that what is known by them is necessarily limited. 
This limitation can be detected from the intellectual habits, which are 
the intellectual acts superior to the operations. The knowledge opera-
tion is described as measured by what it knows –what I call the object. 
If one takes into account the limitation of the object, when one aban-
dons the mental boundary, one perceives the trans-objective themes: 
and if one detects the limitation of the operation, one achieves the 
trans-operational themes. The first correspond to metaphysics, the sec-
ond to anthropology”97. 
 
Act Method Science Reality 
Object Trans-Objective Metaphysics World 
Operation Trans-Operational Transcendental Anthropology Humans 
Table 3: Acts, Methods, Science, Reality. 
                                                 
94 “En cambio, si detectara el límite, llegaría a lo que no puedo conocer limitada-
mente, es decir, a aquello cuyo conocimiento limitado (objetivo) es completamente 
impropio o inadecuado. Enseguida se ve que hay dos realidades (aparte de Dios) 
cuyo conocimiento limitado (intencional) es inadecuado: la persona humana y el 
ser extramental”. Polo, L., in Cruz-Cruz, J., “Filosofar Hoy. Entrevista con Leo-
nardo Polo”, op. cit., 40. 
95 “Solamente puedo conocer propiamente que soy si no lo conozco objetivamente, 
es decir, si encuentro un método para alcanzar el yo al margen de la objetividad”. 
Ibid. 
96 “Tenemos un conocimiento objetivo de las cosas, pero no del ser de las cosas”. 
Ibid. 
97 “Para abrir este nuevo ámbito trascendental es preciso acudir al método que llamo 
‘abandono del límite mental’. Esta designación es adecuada si se tiene en cuenta 
que las operaciones mentales son los actos cognoscitivos inferiores, por lo cual, lo 
conocido con ellas es forzosamente limitado. Dicha limitación puede ser detectada 
desde los hábitos intelectuales, que son los actos cognoscitivos superiores a las 
operaciones. Ahora bien, la operación cognoscitiva se describe como conmensu-
rada con lo que conoce –a lo que se llama objeto–. Si se atiende a la limitación del 
objeto, al abandonar el límite mental se advierte la temática transobjetiva; y si se 
detecta la limitación de la operación, se alcanza la temática transoperativa. Lo pri-
mero corresponde a la metafísica y lo segundo a la antropología”. Polo, L., 
Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 23. 
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Leonardo Polo’s method should then be able to fulfil the aim of 
founding axiomatically the knowledge of ‘extra mental realities’ in 
their being and in their essence by reaching the trans-objective themes; 
the transcendentals. This will support a metaphysics of ‘being’, rather 
than a metaphysics of ‘essences’. The trans-objective realities, the re-
alities that are not personal, can be ‘objectivized’ because their being 
is ‘permanence’; they do not have the power to change themselves. 
The second way of overcoming the limit is more important be-
cause it is the foundation of the ‘transcendental anthropology’, which 
will reach the ‘being’ of the person, as unique, by analysing the activ-
ities proper to the person in a ‘trans-operational’ way. The trans-
operational realities, those that are personal, cannot be ‘objectivised’ 
because they are above objectivity, they cannot be petrified, ‘cosified’, 
because they are free. The person is the agent that through his ‘opera-
tions’ objectivizes, so he has to be above the operations. The being of 
the person is radically different from the being of the extra-mental be-
ings. Polo calls this type of being ‘co-being’ or ‘co-existing’ to 
distinguish it from the being of things which is just “being” in perma-
nence, as we saw above when discussing the personal transcendentals. 
This is the real being of personal activity, which is studied by tran-
scendental anthropology, and cannot be studied by metaphysics, 
because it transcends the object, the operations. 
 




Table 4: Reality, Type of Being. 
In order to overcome the mental limit, and still remain in the 
realm of knowledge, Polo defends the primacy and richness of two 
types of knowledge above ‘objective’ knowledge: habitual knowledge 
and personal knowledge, as mentioned above: “When one deals with 
knowledge or with other dimensions of what is immaterial and created, 
the proper distinction or the most correct is the distinction between 
degrees, hierarchical, and not the simple numeric distinctions. These 
are distinctions between what is superior and inferior. I insist, there-
fore, that operational knowledge is inferior knowledge. Above it are 
other levels of knowledge, other types of acts of knowledge, from 
which we can highlight two: habitual knowledge –I consider it being 
knowledge in act, but not actual, superior to the operational 
knowledge–, and the knowledge as act of being: as esse hominis”98. 
                                                 
98 “Cuando se trata del conocimiento o de otras dimensiones de lo inmaterial creado, 
la distinción más propia o más correcta es la distinción de grado, jerárquica, y no 
la simple distinción numérica. Se trata de distinciones entre lo superior y lo infe-
rior. Pues bien, insisto, el conocimiento operativo es el conocimiento inferior. Por 
encima de él existen otros niveles o modos de conocer: otros tipos de actos cog-




In order to know the acts, the objective method cannot be used 
because it paralyses, suspends, actualizes, makes present the object but 
not its reality as active acting. How can we know without objectiviz-
ing? Leonardo Polo says that it can be done through habitual 
knowledge. Naturally, habitual knowledge is different and cannot be 
“objectivized” because it lacks precisely the characteristics of “objec-
tivity” but it does give a new type of knowledge that according to Polo 
is above the objective knowledge. This does not mean exclusion or 
lack of appreciation for the value of objective knowledge, but just 
complementarity. It is enrichment on what the objective knowledge 
gives99. 
Method Theme 
Personal Personal Being 
Habitual Acts of Operations 
Objective Sensitive Presentations 
Internal Sensitive Acts of External Senses 
External Sensitive Acts of Body Organs 
Table 5: Method, Theme. 
d) Ontological character of habits 
The study of habits can be done from the ontological point of 
view, that is, what type of reality habits are. They can also be studied 
regarding their content, for example. whether it is intellectual or moral. 
We are going to consider first the ontological character of habits, 
which is somehow to consider the ontological character of synderesis, 
because we cannot study habits in general without somehow studying 
actual habits. 
 
e) Habit as possession  
                                                 
considero que es un conocimiento en acto, aunque no actual, superior al conoci-
miento operativo–, y el conocimiento como acto de ser: como esse hominis”. Ibid., 
21. 
99 “Conocer operativamente es conocer limitadamente, porque es conocer objetiva-
mente. Las operaciones poseen objetos; se conmensuran, como también suelo 
decir, con objetos. Si no tuviésemos más actos intelectuales que las operaciones, 
no podríamos abandonar el límite, puesto que el límite es el objeto y, correlativa-
mente, la operación. Conocer operativamente es conocer objetivamente y, por 
tanto, limitadamente. Para que el abandono del límite no pase de ser un anhelo 
irrealizable tiene que existir un tipo de actos cognoscitivos superiores a las opera-
ciones, que son los hábitos intelectuales”. Polo, L., El Conocimiento Habitual de 
los Primeros Principios (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad 
de Navarra, 1993), 9. 
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Habit comes from having, possessing100. What type of posses-
sion is it? Leonardo Polo states that Aristotle speaks of three different 
types of possession: corporeal, knowledge and habits. Habits are a spe-
cial way of having, of possessing, of belonging: “Corporeal possession 
is neither the unique nor the most intense way of having. There is an-
other way of having which is spiritual: knowledge. Intellectual 
knowledge is a way of having, a way of owning specifically different 
from the first one, because in the first, one grasps external things, 
while the holding of the intellectual operations is purely immanent. It 
is the acquisition of ideas. Knowing is the act of having: this is how 
Aristotle sees it. It is a more intense way of having than the corporeal 
which is only attachment. And above these two ways of possession 
there is a third one that perfects the spiritual operational principles of 
man, the intelligence and the will. This third way of having is what 
Aristotle calls habit. Habitual possession is to have according to vir-
tues”101.  
This distinction between the different types of ‘having’ appears 
more clearly explained in the following text which adds the consider-
ation of the three different types of habits and their mutual 
relationships: “The general characteristic of our nature is ‘having’. 
This having is not univocal, there is not only one way of having; be-
cause it is evident that is not the same, to have virtues, than the having 
of operational knowing which is immanent, or the having of things 
attached to the body. They are not the same, but all of them are types 
of having. Precisely because of this, the one who may want exclusively 
to increase his physical possessions would do it at the expense of other 
capacities or powers: of other types of human having. And something 
similar would happen if one would want only to improve the acquisi-
tion of knowledge, or only virtues despising either increasing 
knowledge or physical possessions. It is a question of synthetic com-
prehension. Having should be understood in its triple modality and 
realizing that each is assisted by the other. This is why all types should 
be considered. In this way one avoids the derogative appraisal of hav-
ing; though it is necessary to distinguish between being and having; 
there is no reason to make them incompatible, as if humans could be 
                                                 
100 “Habit; conduct", from Latin habitus "condition, demeanour, appearance, dress", 
originally past participle of habere "to have, to hold, possess”. "Habit”. Online 
Etymology Dictionary, by Douglas Harper. Dictionary.com, Accessed Dec 20, 
2014. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/habit. 
101 “El poseer corpóreo no es el único modo de poseer ni el más intenso; hay otra 
dimensión posesiva que es espiritual: es el conocimiento. El conocimiento intelec-
tual también es un modo de poseer, un modo de tener suficientemente distinto del 
primero, pues el primero es la adscripción de cosas externas, mientras que la ma-
nera de poseer de las operaciones intelectuales es justamente inmanente. Es la 
obtención de ideas. Conocer es el acto de poseerlas: así lo ve Aristóteles. Es un 
tener mucho más intenso que el tener corpóreo, que simplemente es una adscrip-
ción. Y por encima de estos dos modos de tener, está un tercer modo que 
perfecciona los principios operativos espirituales del hombre, la inteligencia y la 
voluntad. Y este tercer modo de tener es el que Aristóteles llama hábito. La tenen-
cia habitual es justamente la tenencia según las virtudes (o según vicios)”. Polo, 
L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 93. 
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without having”102. For Leonardo Polo the habits belong properly to 
the spirit, not to the body, even if in an analogical way, we can call 
habits the corporeal modifications that regular activities bring to the 
organs of our sensitive knowledge: “The organic faculties are faculties 
that are only principle of operations and not subject of habits. In them 
there is something similar to learning; it is the status of the imagina-
tion, memory and cogitative”103. 
In Aristotelian tradition the habits of knowledge were under-
stood as secondary and dependent from the actual knowledge (which 
Polo calls operational knowledge and extant knowledge)104. The habit 
was as a kind of store fed by the operational knowledge that stored 
knowledge to be later re-actualised. This consideration of the intellec-
tual habits as a store of past knowledge is what Polo calls ‘circularity’ 
in the text quoted below. A second point is that Aquinas distinguished 
innate from acquired habits. Nevertheless Polo says that Aquinas had 
some ‘fluctuations’ because Aquinas was not consistent in using this 
distinction. Polo does not point out the discrepancies he found in Aqui-
nas. He leaves it to the readers: “In Aristotelian philosophy the term 
‘hexis’ appears frequently, which we translate as habit. The awareness 
that humans have habitual knowledge brings into question the rela-
tionship between the habitual and actual-presenting knowledge. The 
first aspect that is noticed of this relationship is that habitual 
knowledge is acquired after actual knowledge. This is why we speak 
about acquired habits. From this one tends to think that proper 
knowledge is actual knowledge and that habitual knowledge is just a 
circular preparation of the actual. This circularity is not purely repeti-
tive but it is done in a way that it contributes to the progress of actual 
knowledge. Another aspect of the classic understanding of habitual 
knowledge is that it allows for the distinction between acquired and 
                                                 
102 “La rúbrica general de nuestra naturaleza es el tener, aunque no se trata de un 
tener unívoco o de un único modo de tener; porque es evidente que no es lo mismo 
tener virtudes que tener inmanentemente, según la operación del conocer, o tener 
en la forma de adscripción de cosas a un cuerpo. No es lo mismo y sin embargo 
todas son formas de tener. Precisamente por eso, el que pretenda aumentar exclu-
sivamente las tenencias corpóreas, lo haría en detrimento de otras dimensiones o 
capacidades: de otras maneras de tener que son propias del ser humano. Y algo 
semejante ocurriría si uno quisiera solamente tener en cuenta el modo de tener 
cognoscitivo, o bien obtener virtudes despreciando las operaciones del conoci-
miento, o excluyendo el tener corpóreo. Es cuestión de comprensión sintética. El 
tener hay que comprenderlo según su triple modalidad y advirtiendo que las formas 
de tener se apoyan unas en las otras. Por eso hay que considerarlas a todas. Así se 
evita la valoración peyorativa del tener, aunque es preciso distinguir el ser del te-
ner; no hay razón para oponerlas, como si el hombre pudiera ser sin tener o al 
revés”. Ibid., 95. 
103 “Las que son sólo principio de operaciones, y no sujeto de hábitos, son las facul-
tades orgánicas. En ellas cabe algo de similar al aprendizaje; es el caso de la 
fantasía, la memoria y la cogitativa”. Polo, L., El Conocimiento Habitual de los 
Primeros Principios, op. cit, 1. 
104 “Presencial” in Spanish has a double meaning: that it is now, and that it appears 
to you. Leonardo Polo uses it to highlight that the object is something that appears 
to the intelligence and only while it appears, so it is something static, not dynamic. 




innate habits. This appears in Thomas Aquinas but not without some 
fluctuations”105.  
Leonardo Polo is aware that the proposal of the habitual 
knowledge being a type of knowledge higher than the objective 
knowledge was not going to be understood easily, and therefore prob-
ably rejected by traditional thinkers: “Traditional philosophy does not 
accept the superiority of habitual knowledge over the objective 
knowledge, but defends that objective knowledge is clearer than the 
habitual. This is the reason why the abandonment of the mental limit 
is foreign to traditional philosophy”106. We must say that to understand 
this requires a wide open mind, in a double sense; because as Polo 
says, it is a novelty in history, which means that no philosopher in the 
roughly two thousand seven hundred years of philosophical history 
has thought of it, and secondly, because it is a type of knowledge 
which is very different from the sensitive and intellectual –read objec-
tive– types of knowledge. In a hierarchy what is superior cannot be 
understood from what is inferior, which also means that what is infe-
rior cannot explain what is superior: “Many years ago I made the 
proposal to find a method to overcome the limits of the mental pres-
ence in man. This proposal brings out the fact that human beings have 
knowledge powers superior to those ‘present-showing’ and these are 
the habits. Certainly this proposal is not easily acceptable to Thomistic 
philosophers. Nevertheless, among the many reasons to support it are 
the following: firstly, that habits cannot be limited to be a mere static 
repository of knowledge. Secondly that from a long time ago –remem-
ber Plato– the knowledge of truth is considered in some way like a 
transcendental memory. But this transcendentality is not proper to the 
human mental presence, which in no way, progresses intrinsically by 
the remembrance of the truth”107.  
                                                 
105 “En la filosofía aristotélica aparece abundantemente el término héxis, que se tra-
duce por hábito. El reconocimiento de que en el hombre existe un conocimiento 
habitual plantea la cuestión de su relación con el conocimiento actual-presencial. 
El aspecto que primero se capta de esta relación es que el conocimiento habitual 
es de adquisición posterior al actual. Por eso se habla de hábitos adquiridos. De 
aquí suele seguirse que el conocimiento en sentido propio es el actual, y que el 
habitual es una consecuencia y, por circularidad, una preparación de aquél. Dicha 
preparación no es meramente repetitiva, sino que contribuye al progreso del cono-
cimiento actual. Otro aspecto de esta noción clásica es la posible distinción entre 
hábitos adquiridos y hábitos innatos, que aparece, aunque con algunas vacilacio-
nes, en el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación 
y Divinidad, op. cit., 48, note 24. 
106 “La filosofía tradicional no admite la superioridad del conocimiento habitual so-
bre el objetivo, sino que sostiene que el conocimiento objetivo es más claro que el 
habitual. Por esta razón, el abandono del límite mental es ajeno al planteamiento 
tradicional”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 127. 
107 “He formulado hace muchos años la propuesta de arbitrar un método para superar 
la limitación de la presencia mental del hombre. Esta propuesta comporta que el 
hombre posee dimensiones cognoscitivas superiores a la presentificante, las cuales 
son los hábitos. Seguramente esta interpretación del conocimiento habitual no es 
fácilmente aceptable por un tomista. Pero entre los muchos motivos para mante-
nerla están los dos siguientes. En primer lugar, que los hábitos no pueden limitarse 
a ser un depósito inerte de conocimientos. En segundo lugar, que ya desde muy 
antiguo —recuérdese a Platón—, el conocimiento de la verdad es algo así como 
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Nevertheless, he pins the core of his philosophical development 
–the abandonment of the mental limit– to the understanding of the su-
premacy of habitual knowledge over actual knowledge: “Without 
denying that that this interpretation of the Greek ‘hexis’ (normally 
translated as ‘habit’) is a valid one, when one abandons the limit the 
word ‘habit’ achieves a more intense meaning. Without denying that 
habitual knowledge is acquired, habitual knowledge becomes the only 
hope to overcome the boundary. Because of this, I defend that this way 
of knowing is superior to presenting knowledge which is normally 
called, objective knowledge”108. 
f) Habits as enlarging the faculties  
What is really interesting in Polo’s conception of habits is that 
rather than being a store of previous knowledge, which is brought later 
when actual knowledge needed it, habits actually enlarge the faculties 
themselves. This will mean that the circularity —that one uses the 
same faculty in the same way as the first time— is not correct; the 
faculties themselves are empowered, become more, better faculties. 
The habit actually is a change of the faculty as faculty. This means that 
the faculty grows as faculty in the direction of the habit. This has two 
consequences, the faculty grows which means that it is ‘more faculty’ 
qualitatively, is more intense. Secondly that the faculty is actualised in 
a direction that makes it freer, that is, has more capacity than before. 
Without the habit it cannot act in that direction, either because it does 
not have the skill, or it does not reach the necessary level of actualiza-
tion. We can use the example of the roots of a tree. They grow where 
there is water, so they become more roots, they have more capacity as 
roots but only in the direction they have grown, so its capacity to feed 
the tree has grown, it will be able to process more water and to make 
the tree firmer. The habit is a perfection of the faculty, this is, it is not 
something additional, an accident added to the faculty but it is an in-
creased capacity of the faculty, a revamped faculty; a more activated 
faculty. The habit is not ontologically different from the faculty; it is 
the same but more active faculty, richer as faculty. With an example: 
if one does not understand what mathematical fractions are, one does 
not have the freedom to proceed with arithmetic’s. If one does not un-
derstand Portuguese one is not free to read Camoes, the famous poet, 
or move around easily in Portugal, Angola or Brazil. 
In the following text Leonardo Polo makes the point of the fac-
ulty growing as faculty for the intelligence: “The intelligence is able 
to actualise itself and not only through operations. The draft is already 
                                                 
una memoria trascendental. Pero esa trascendentalidad no es propia de la presencia 
mental humana, que de ningún modo progresa intrínsecamente en la reminiscencia 
de la verdad”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 251. 
108 “Sin negar que esta interpretación de la héxis sea aceptable, al abandonar el límite 
la palabra hábito adquiere un significado más intenso. Sin negar que sea adquirido, 
en el conocimiento habitual aparece la única esperanza de superar el límite. Por 
eso sostengo que este modo de conocimiento es superior al conocimiento operativo 
presencial, que suele llamarse objetivo”. Ibid. 
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in the imagination, though it is a jump down from above. The intelli-
gence does not need the addition of a ‘program’ but of a habit. The 
habit is a perfection of the faculty qua faculty, what can only happen 
in faculties that are perfect faculties”109. 
g) Type of habits: Innate and acquired habits 
There are two types of habits; innate and acquired. Acquired 
habits can be of the two faculties at the essential level; the intelligence 
and the will. The habits of the will are called virtues or vices depending 
on their moral bearing. Those of the intelligence do not have a generic 
name; they are called just intellectual habits. Nevertheless, traditional 
philosophy has a name for each of the habits of knowledge as follows: 
understanding, science, synderesis, habit of the first principles, and 
wisdom. Leonardo Polo’s novelty consists in that he says that the ac-
quired habits are less actual than innate habits. He is also original in 
having two different structural places; the place of the acquired habits 
is the essential level (intelligence and will), while the proper place of 
innate habits is the personal level which is the personal act of being. 
Synderesis is a special case as we shall discuss later. “Then I place the 
method that reaches the person –the “more”– in the habit of wisdom. 
This is what the classics call the habit of wisdom... But there are more 
innate habits, the habit of the first principles is also innate and the syn-
deresis has also to be an innate habit, and the synderesis as an innate 
habit is the ‘I’ (or self)”110. 
For Polo the innate habits –ordered from more active to less ac-
tive– are the habit of wisdom, the habit of the first principles and the 
habit of synderesis. In order to understand the text quoted below we 
should remember that “además” (more) refers to the personal level, to 
the person, the act of being, which we have translated as “more”, “be-
ing more” or “person”. The hierarchy means that what is above is more 
active than what is below but also that it activates what are below, so 
somehow shares in what is below, and is able to understand what is 
below it. An example can be to think of a mother, who is more active 
and understands her child, but the child is not as active and cannot 
understand the mother: “The superior habit naturally influences the in-
ferior ones. The inferior ones are like a less activated form of the 
superior. This is arrived at when trying to explain how the self and the 
                                                 
109 “La inteligencia es capaz de actualizarse a sí misma y no solo en la operación. El 
esbozo está ya en la imaginación, aunque el salto se da de arriba hacia abajo. A la 
inteligencia no se le ha de añadir "programa", sino un hábito. Un hábito es la per-
fección de una facultad qua facultad, lo que sólo ocurre en las facultades que son 
perfectamente facultades”. Polo, L., “Sobre los Hábitos,” (Unpublished course, 
Pamplona, 1985), 2. 
110 “Entonces el método por el que se alcanza la persona, el además, lo asimilo al 
hábito de la sabiduría, a lo que llaman los clásicos el hábito de la sabiduría. En 
cierto modo es una concesión, pero bueno, me parece que no estropea el asunto y 
me parece que aclara un poco lo que es el hábito de sabiduría. En Tomás de Aquino 
está muy bien apuntado lo que es el hábito de la sabiduría, pero yo creo que se 
puede decir algo más de él”. Polo, L., “Conversaciones en Torreblanca”, (un-
published transcription, Colombia, 1997), 181. 
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knowledge of extramental realities are possible from the ‘more’. The 
superior habit has somehow to be the condition of possibility of the 
inferior. Without the superior habit the inferior are not possible and 
therefore the ‘conversio’ not only belongs to synderesis but also to the 
habit of the first principles”111. 
The relationship between the innate and acquired habits is con-
stitutive. The innate habits constitute the acquired habits by activating 
them (it is actually activating the faculty, but the faculty acts after be-
ing modified by the habits, it cannot act otherwise than through the 
habits, unless a superior act requires it to act againt the habit). This 
means that the ontological character of the acquired habits of the in-
telligence and the will is purely habitual. Leonardo Polo expresses it 
as follows: “In this way, the will is superior to an active potency in 
that it is habitually perfected and inasmuch as the I-want constitutes 
the voluntary. In what sense are the virtues acts that perfect the po-
tency? The perfecting of the potency is indispensable for the potency 
to be open to the infinite. Properly speaking, the passive potencies are 
not infinite, but capable of infinity. Also the intelligence is infinite be-
cause it can have habits. There are intellectual and moral habits. The 
consideration of the will as perfected by habits, what we can call vol-
untas ut habitus, is more than an active potency and furthermore it has 
freedom. Freedom reaches both the intelligence and the will through 
the habits. Before acquiring habits there is no freedom in the spiritual 
potencies: this is a thesis defended by Thomas Aquinas in his Com-
mentary to the Sentences and frequently forgotten”112.  
                                                 
111 “El hábito superior naturalmente tiene que bajar a los inferiores. Los inferiores 
son como una bajada suya. Eso es ir dándole vueltas a por qué el yo y el conoci-
miento extra mental es posible desde el además. El superior de alguna manera 
tiene que ser condición de posibilidad del inferior. Sin el hábito superior no son 
posibles los inferiores y por lo tanto la conversio no sólo está en la sindéresis sino 
también en el hábito de los primeros principios. Lo que hay que ver es como el 
carácter de además se potencializa de alguna manera para que se distinga real-
mente de la esencia y al mismo tiempo de razón de la esencia, y eso es hacia abajo. 
También el hábito de los primeros principios es hacia abajo y también el hábito de 
los primeros principios es inferior a él, tiene que depender de él. Yo creo que ahí 
la clave es la libertad. El abandono del límite es siempre libre. Sin libertad no se 
abandona el límite. Por eso esto es una propuesta libre que puede ser aceptada o 
no. La libertad es trascendentalmente personal; todas las demás dimensiones del 
abandono del límite dependen de la libertad”. Polo, L., “Conversaciones en Torre-
blanca”, (unpublished transcription, Colombia, 1997), 100. 
112 “Así pues, la voluntad es superior a una potencia activa en cuanto que es habi-
tualmente perfeccionada, y en tanto que el querer yo constituye lo voluntario. ¿En 
qué sentido las virtudes son actos que perfeccionan la potencia? El perfecciona-
miento de la potencia es imprescindible para que la potencia se lance hacia el 
infinito. Propiamente hablando, las potencias pasivas no son infinitas, sino capaces 
de infinitud. Asimismo, la inteligencia es infinita porque es susceptible de hábitos. 
Existen hábitos intelectuales y hábitos morales. La consideración de la voluntad 
como perfeccionada por los hábitos, a la que cabe llamar voluntas ut habitus, es 
más que una potencia activa y además tiene libertad. La libertad llega tanto a la 
inteligencia como a la voluntad a través de los hábitos. Antes de los hábitos no hay 
libertad en las potencias espirituales; ésta es una tesis sostenida por Tomás de 
Aquino en el Comentario de las Sentencias, y con frecuencia olvidada”. Polo, L., 
La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 53. 
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Another important information taken from this text is that the 
habits open the faculties to the infinite, not because habits are infinite 
but because they can grow without limit due to the unlimited perfec-
tion of their capacity as faculties by the habits, which increase the 
faculty as faculty, not the content of the faculty, but that habits increase 
the possibilities of acting. In an example of an artisan and his tools, 
the habits will be like new tools that give the artisan capacities which 
were not there before; think, for example, of a doctor and the X-ray or 
PET machines. Polo is now speaking of the acquired habits of the will 
and the intelligence, activated by the power of the innate habits which 
are synderesis and the personal level habits (first principles and wis-
dom): “It is good to distinguish synderesis, this is, the constitution of 
the voluntary, from the acquired habits that perfect the potencies. 
Without this perfectioning action it is not possible to have the tran-
scendental possession of the good. Nevertheles the constitution of the 
‘want’ by the synderesis is still higher in that it is the connection be-
tween ‘want’ and ‘love’, which is a personal transcendental. The 
personal love co-exists with the acceptance of the loved one. But one 
needs a third element which is love. Because the human person is cre-
ated, his love, is the ‘want’. Nevertheless, even if human love is at the 
essential level, and because of this, not transcencental, it supports the 
possession of the good”113. 
Another deep suggestion on the habits by Leonardo Polo is that 
they are above the four causes or predicamental causality. The relation 
of the habit with the faculty they belong to and perfect cannot be 
properly explained by the relationship between a substance and its ac-
cidents. As an example Polo uses synderesis and states that is the apex 
of the human essence, so this habit is the one that is more remote from 
the four cause’s explanation: “The act and potency when applied to 
different creatures have to be properly distinguished. The potency 
proper of the universe is what, following Aristotle, can be called the 
‘causal analytics’ –the theory of the tetra-causality–. To distinguish 
the human potency from the material universe, it is better not to apply 
the notions of substance and accident. Human potency can be per-
fected by habits, which, properly speaking, are not accidents, because 
we can even say that the peak of the human essence is an innate habit, 
of which we have already spoken in the book Transcendental Anthro-
pology II, the synderesis, as it was called from the Medieval times”114. 
                                                 
113 “Conviene distinguir la sindéresis, es decir, la constitución de lo voluntario, de 
los hábitos adquiridos que perfeccionan la potencia. Sin dicho perfeccionamiento 
no es posible la posesión del bien trascendental. Con todo, la constitución del que-
rer por la sindéresis es todavía más alto en tanto que marca la conexión del querer 
con el amar, que es un trascendental personal. El amar personal co-existe con la 
aceptación del amante. Pero se precisa un tercer elemento, que es el amor. Por ser 
creada la persona humana, su amor es el querer. Con todo, aunque el amor del 
hombre sea esencial, y por esto no trascendental, respalda la posesión del bien”. 
Ibíd, 52, note 19. 
114 “También se debe distinguir la noción de acto y potencia aplicada a las distintas 
realidades creadas. La potencia propia del universo es lo que, siguiendo a Aristó-
teles, se puede llamar “analítica causal” –teoría de la tetracausalidad–. Para 
distinguir la potencia humana de la potencia del universo material, conviene no 
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More important though, is his definition of habit as ‘perfection 
of a non-organic faculty’. This has several consequences for our topic, 
which should be clarified later. What is the faculty that ‘synderesis’ 
perfects? What type of perfection does it gives? If it is an innate habit, 
how can it be perfected? Would we need a second habit that adheres 
in the same faculty to perfect it? Is synderesis already perfect by the 
fact of being innate or can it be improved? “Similarly, the synderesis 
is a light that lightens, but not of objects, because it is not a knowledge 
operation, but an innate habit”115. 
h) Ontological reality of habits and faculties 
This interpretation of the innate habits as compared to the ac-
quired habits makes us understand better what is the ontological reality 
of the faculties. In the text quoted above the ‘want’ which is the act of 
the will as faculty, is constituted by the synderesis actualizing it, as a 
habit. This constitutive action of the synderesis with regards to the fac-
ulty is more clearly expressed in the text below, where the intelligence, 
as a faculty, is purely an acquired habit: “The ontological statute of the 
notion of habit is shown at this moment: when does the intelligence 
become a faculty? When it acquires habits. In the meantime, it is not 
more than a capacity for operations. The intelligence is in act accord-
ing to habits (the super program with intrinsic feed-back). It is a 
potency perfected as potency, and therefore not in an organic way. It 
is then, when it becomes a reality”116. The following texts are even 
clearer regarding the ontological status of the intelligence as a faculty 
which is purely habitual; it is an acquired habit, as the next texts clar-
ify: “Esse rei non veritas eius causat veritatem intellectus, but the 
‘intellectus’ has its own ‘esse’ and that that ‘esse’ is the habit. The 
intellectual habit is not an attachment as is the case with the predica-
mental habit”117.  
Leonardo Polo’s most precise and radical statement regarding 
the ontological status of the habits is that what we call intelligence and 
will are just habits; “the ‘esse’ of the intelligence is the habit”. What 
does this mean? It means that what we call faculties are really powers, 
                                                 
aplicar al hombre las nociones de sustancia y accidente. La potencia humana es 
perfeccionable por hábitos, los cuales propiamente no son accidentes, pues incluso 
hay que decir que la cumbre de la esencia humana es un hábito innato, del que ya 
se ha tratado en la Antropología trascendental II, la sindéresis, así llamado desde 
el Medievo”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 87. 
115 “A su vez, la sindéresis es una luz iluminante, pero no de objetos, pues no es una 
operación cognoscitiva, sino un hábito innato”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos 
II, (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1998), 25, note 41. 
116 “El estatuto ontológico de la noción de hábito se perfila ahí: cuando la inteligencia 
es una facultad, cuando tiene hábitos. Mientras tanto, no es más que una capacidad 
respecto de operaciones. Ella misma está en acto según hábitos (el superprograma 
en feed-back intrínseco). Es una potencia perfeccionada en cuanto que potencia, 
por tanto, de manera no orgánica. Entonces, es cuando es ya una realidad”. Polo, 
L., “Sobre los Hábitos”, op. cit., p. 2. 
117 “Esse rei non veritas eius causat veritatem intellectus, pero es que el intellectus 
tiene su esse y ese esse es el hábito. El hábito intelectual no es un postizo como lo 
es el hábito predicamental”. Ibid., 3. 
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potencies, which are either actualised, or they do not work, they actu-
ally do not exist. Faculties actually start when they acquire the first 
habits; without the habits there are human potencies, powers that are 
not actualised, powers that need the coordinated activity of the act of 
being (personal level) with the body (natural level). So the human es-
sence has to be constituted. If there is a physical incapacity these 
powers cannot be actualised, either totally or partially, which is a mat-
ter of experience in discapacitated people. “Spiritual realities in man 
are habitual; this is the way the the soul knows itself. The intelligence 
‘esse’ is the habit”118.  
Leonardo Polo points to the same when in the text below more 
radically assimilates the faculties (intelligence and will) with the soul, 
and says that in this point he agrees with Bonaventure119: “The ‘I’ can 
be distinguished but not differentiated. The duality of the ‘I’ is not the 
duality of two different things, but the duality of the ‘distinguere’ 
which makes the ‘I’ not transcendental, but that on which the potencies 
of the soul depend –I call them potencies instead of faculties–. In my 
point of view, the soul is not different from those potencies. Here I 
side with St. Bonaventure who identifies the soul with the poten-
cies”120. 
For Polo this ontological status solves the disputed question 
whether the intelligence has its own memory or whether all memories 
belong to the sensitive memory: “The intelligence is more than nature 
thanks to habits, by which the intelligence is capable of freedom. In-
telligence with habit is no longer tabula rasa. Because of this the 
memory is intrinsic: the intelligence is its own memory”121.  
i) Summing up 
We come to a provisional conclusion that faculties in reality are 
the sum of acquired habits in a hierarchycal order. Faculties are ac-
quired by the interaction of the personal level with the natural level by 
                                                 
118 “Las realidades espirituales en el hombre son habituales, así lo es el conocimiento 
del alma. El esse del entendimiento es el hábito”. Ibid., 2. 
119 It is interesting to know that we found only a brief literal quotation of Bonaven-
ture in the book “El Yo” p. 32, in all the works I consulted, and 4 brief references 
to him as the one who starterd giving more importance to the will than to the intel-
lect that later influenced Scotus, Ockham and through them modern philosophy. 
Cfr. Polo, L., “Conversaciones en Torreblanca”, (unpublished transcription, Co-
lombia, 1997), 142 and 182. 
120 “El yo admite una distinción, pero no una diferencia. La dualidad del yo no es la 
dualidad de dos diferentes sino la dualidad del distinguere que hace que esa dis-
tinción hace que el yo ya no sea trascendental, sino aquello de que depende las 
potencias del alma (las llamo potencias en vez de facultades). Y a mi modo de ver 
me parece que el alma no es distinta de esas potencias. Aquí me apunto a San 
Buenaventura que identifica el alma con las potencias”. Polo, L., Conversaciones 
en Torreblanca, op.cit., 182. 
121 Por el hábito la inteligencia es más que naturaleza, por él la inteligencia es capaz 
de libertad. Una inteligencia con hábito no es ya s. Por ella la memoria es intrín-
seca: la inteligencia es su propia memoria. 
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the activation done by the innate habits122. Among the innate habits 
synderesis is always present and is the habit that activates the faculties. 
Synderesis is a transcendental habit, not a predicamental one. It 
is innate and linked to a potential faculty, not ‘corporeal or active’ and 
its being consists in its acting. It is neither a substance nor an accident 
because it is located at the essential level where being is acting. 
We have also seen that there are three innate habits which are 
hierarchically related, being the more active, wisdom, followed by the 
act of the first principles and lastly by synderesis. 
j) Habit as corporeal possession is subordinate 
As a corollary to the superiority of personal and knowledge hab-
its Polo explains how the spiritual habits influence the corporeal ones. 
The intellectual habits are also important because they explain the ca-
pacity, exclusive to human beings, of corporeal possessions. This is 
related to the habit of synderesis because, as we shall see in the an-
thropological consideration, synderesis is the innate habit which links 
the person to the corporeal human activities: “Man would not be able 
to possess materially or will have possessions in a very rudimentary 
way –as the hominids had– if he did not know through ideas. Thomas 
Aquinas clearly says: ‘The first requirement for one to do something 
is knowledge’ –acting is the exercise of activities in order to make the 
world habitable’123; because one cannot do anything blindly. If we did 
not have ideas, we would not be able to have things. Strictly speaking 
in order to really posses a suit, a room, we have to know; otherwise it 
will be an unconscious possession, and it would not be possible to in-
crease or to give it away”124. This explains why animals do not own 
things. One thing is to mark the boundaries of a territory in an instinc-
tive way, and quite another to have things as possessions. 
Following this Aristotelian distinction and expanding it in an 
original way Polo distinguishes the organic faculties, which he calls 
“complete faculties” or “actual faculties”, from the “potential facul-
ties” which are spiritual. He further explains that the organic faculties 
                                                 
122 “Habits are higher than the human presence [objective knowledge] and show their 
connection with the personal being”. “Los hábitos son más altos que la presencia 
humana y marcan su conexión con el ser personal”. Polo, L., La Persona Humana 
(Pamplona: Eunsa, 2015), 69. 
123 Thomas Aquinas, De Virtutibus Cardinalibus, Disputed Questions on Virtue 
(South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's), q. 1, a. 1, c. 
124 “El hombre no podría tener corpóreamente o tendría de un modo muy precario –
como los homínidos– si no conociera ideas. Tomás de Aquino (Thomas Aquinas, 
Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus, op.cit., q. 1, a. 1, c). lo dice taxati-
vamente. "Al que actúa –actuar es el ejercicio de actividades en orden a la 
constitución del mundo habitable– lo primero que hay que pedirle es que sepa"; 
porque a ciegas no se puede hacer nada. Si no poseyéramos ideas, tampoco podría-
mos poseer cosas. En rigor, para que la posesión de un traje, o de una habitación, 
sea una verdadera posesión, hace falta que se conozca; si no, sería una posesión 
inconsciente, no podría ser incrementada o transmitida”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia 
una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 106. 
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cannot have habits in the strict sense of the word: “There are faculties 
that completely fulfil the notion of faculty: they receive information 
and they are activated by it… Because of this, complete faculties can-
not support habits because they are already actualised. Their organic 
character makes habits impossible”125.  
For Polo possessing external things is, properly speaking, a 
predicamental-categorical habit to distinguish it with the intellectual 
and moral habits which are transcendental habits. While the categori-
cal habits are accidental, they belong to the substance, the 
transcendentals, because they belong to the spirit, are above and be-
yond the categories. The immateriality of trascendental habits sets 
them above the limitations of matter and of the material possessions: 
“Habits as predicamentals are attachments, which is a different way of 
having: because you have a dress, you have a house, you have culture, 
because of this the dress, the house, culture... are habits as posses-
sions”126. 
 
6. Anthropology is above Metaphysics 
The distinction and priority of Transcendental Anthropology 
from Metaphysics is a kind of corollary to Leonardo Polo’s philoso-
phy. It gives a better idea of his method and of the distinction between 
the personal act of being, the human essence and the act of being of 
the world: “The monopoly of metaphysics: the study of being is not 
exclusive to metaphysics –because as it is understood and it should 
continue being understood– metaphysics studies the being as princi-
ple. But we should study a different act of being than being as 
principle: the person. Being, as being of the human person, is also rad-
ical, but –as I suggest– such radicality should not be reduced to the 
notion of principle”127. 
That Polo does not despise or neglect metaphysics is clear in this 
text where he explains how he devotes an entire book to find the basic 
principles –or axioms– of metaphysics: “I have tried to formulate an 
axiomatic formulation of metaphysics, in a book named El Ser, I. In 
it, I proposed that metaphysics can be founded on three first principles: 
                                                 
125 “Hay facultades que realizan enteramente la noción de facultad: reciben informa-
ción y a partir de ella pueden pasar al acto… Por eso, las facultades enteras no 
pueden ser sujetos de hábitos en cuanto que ya están hechas. Su carácter orgánico 
hace imposible el hábito”. Polo, L., “Sobre los Hábitos”, op. cit., p. 4. 
126 “El hábito como predicamento es una adscripción, es otro modo de tener porque 
el vestido se tiene y la casa se tiene y la cultura se tiene, por eso la casa, el vestido, 
la cultura, la técnica... son hábitos”. Ibid. p.4. 
127 “El monopolio de la metafísica: el estudio del ser no le incumbe sólo a ella, por-
que –tal como ha sido planteada y ha de seguir siéndolo– estudia el ser como 
principio. Pero conviene estudiar un acto de ser distinto de ése: la persona. El ser 
como persona humana es también radical, pero –según propongo– dicha radicali-
dad no se debe asimilar a la noción de principio”. Polo, L., Antropología 
Trascendental I, op. cit., 98. 
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the principle of identity, the principle of no-contradiction and the prin-
ciple of causality in its transcendental meaning”128. 
But the axioms of Metaphysics are insufficient to understand the 
radical difference between the being of the things and the being of the 
persons129. Leonardo Polo understands that the object of metaphysics 
is the ‘being’ and ‘essence’ of the ‘world’ also referred to as ‘extra-
mental being’. This comprises all beings that do not have spirit or, in 
his terminology, beings that are no-personal: “Today one cannot be 
realist if anthropology is just a second philosophy; that is, if one does 
not do transcendental anthropology. Metaphysics studies transcenden-
tals; anthropology should also be a study of transcendentals, but 
human transcendentals are not metaphysical transcendentals. ‘Human 
being’ is not the being that metaphysics studies: it is different, it is 
‘another’ being. There is a radical difference: it is absolutely necessary 
to distinguish anthropology from metaphysics and correlatively distin-
guish the essence of man from the nature of the substances; of what is 
real in the universe; of what is dealt with in physics”130.  
The incapacity of modern philosophy to properly penetrate the 
realm of the person is caused by using classic philosophical concepts 
of Metaphysics, inherited from the Greek in trying to understand the 
person. This is what Polo calls the symmetry of modern philosophy. 
The simmetry between classic philosophy and modern philosophy is a 
paralelism of the method. They both coincide in the method but one 
tries to give foundation to the subject from the object (classic philoso-
phy), and in contraposition to it, modern philosophy tries to found the 
                                                 
128 “He intentado una formulación axiomática de la metafísica, en un libro que se 
llama El ser, tomo I. En él, simplemente, he propuesto que la temática de la meta-
física se puede trasladar a tres axiomas, que son los llamados primeros principios: 
el principio de identidad, el principio de nocontradicción y el principio de causali-
dad en sentido trascendental”. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, I, op. 
cit., 25. 
129 Polo is not alone in saying that the metaphysical classic concepts cannot explain 
properly the specific human characteristics. Even Ratzinger, whom we have cited 
as averse to the term synderesis voices it. “Benedict has been trying to do the same 
thing with regard to the Church and is using this surprising and scandalizing asser-
tion about condoms to get our attention. What is he saying? And what is he not 
saying? He is saying – I submit – that the human person is not adequately described 
by a Greek metaphysic, nor is morality adequately established on the metaphysical 
anthropology of substance, nor is its rational dynamic adequately accounted for by 
the intellectualist interplay of reason and will within the horizon of that anthropol-
ogy”. Connor, R.A., “From-Synderesis-To-Anamnesis” in the Blog The Truth 
makes you free Post on December 2, 2010. Accessed 14 Februry 2015. http://rob-
ertaconnor.blogspot.co.ke/2010/12/from-synderesis-to-anamnesis.html.  
130 “Hoy no se puede ser realista si la antropología sólo es una filosofía segunda, es 
decir, si no se hace una antropología trascendental. La metafísica estudia lo tras-
cendental; la antropología también debe ser un estudio de lo trascendental, pero 
los trascendentales humanos no son los trascendentales metafísicos. El ser humano 
no es el ser de que se ocupa la metafísica: es distinto, es ‘otro’ ser. Hay una dife-
rencia muy radical: es imprescindible distinguir la antropología de la metafísica y 
correlativamente distinguir la esencia del hombre de la naturaleza, de las sustan-
cias, de lo real en el universo, de lo que se ocupa la física”. Polo, L., in Cruz, J., 
“Filosofar Hoy. Entrevista con Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 40. 
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object starting from the subject. The first can develop metaphysics, 
and reach the ontological transcendentals but it is a constraint to do 
anthropology as a mere branch of metaphysics a type of “special met-
aphysics” as some authors call them especially after Christian 
Wolff131. “Trying to understand man from metaphysics brings the 
characteristic error of modern philosophy. Modern philosophy discov-
ers human subjectivity, what I prefer to call ‘person’, in a 
philosophical way for the first time. But it discovers it in a diminished 
way: and this is why it collapses and brings the precarious situation in 
which the philosophy is now. It is good to recognise that modern phi-
losophy has a broader thematic; but in order to study it, modern 
philsophy uses the categories that were already discovered by the 
Greek”132.  
This approach compromises one of the most important charac-
teristics of human beings, which is freedom: “Without freedom there 
is no creation, and without freedom there is no person: the person is 
the created free being. Subject and freedom are the two great topics of 
modern philosophy (though there are blackouts and the last one is ra-
ther serious). I call this the symmetric metaphysics: to try to expand 
the themes using the categories made by the Greek; the subject and 
freedom cannot be understood with those categories! The Greeks dis-
covered that being is the foundation; the modern thinkers think that 
freedom is the foundation. But because freedom is not the being of the 
Greeks, it has to be different from the foundation. The symmetric in-
terpretation, speculative, circular, is the mistake of modern philosophy 
because the new thematic cannot fit within the models taken from the 
classic philosophy. This mistake has to be rectified”133. 
                                                 
131 For example, Christian Wolf: “In Metaphysica primum locum tuetur Ontologia 
seu philosophia prima, secundum Cosmologia Generalis, tertium Psychologia and 
ultimum denique Theologia naturalis”. Wolff, C., Philosophia Rationalis sive Log-
ica (Verona: Dionysii Ramanzini, 1735), 30. For example Lois de Poissy: “Special 
Metaphysics treats of the world, of man, and of God; it is therefore divided into 
Cosmology, Psychology, and Natural Theology”. Poissy, L., Christian Philosophy 
(New York: 1898). Accessed December 17, 2014. https://www3.nd.edu/Depart-
ments/Maritain/etext/cp.htm. 
132 “Tratar de entender al hombre desde la metafísica da lugar al error característico 
de la filosofía moderna. La filosofía moderna detecta por primera vez, filosófica-
mente, el tema de la subjetividad humana, que prefiero llamar persona. Pero lo 
detecta de una manera insuficiente: de ahí su desplome y, como consecuencia, la 
situación un tanto precaria en que hoy se encuentra la filosofía. Conviene recono-
cer que la intención de la filosofía moderna mira a una amplia temática; pero para 
lograrla acude a categorías que ya descubrieron los griegos”. Polo, L., in Cruz, J., 
“Filosofar Hoy. Entrevista con Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 40. 
133 “Sin libertad no hay creación, y sin libertad no hay persona: la persona es el ser 
creado libre. El sujeto y la libertad son los grandes temas de la filosofía moderna 
(aunque hay apagones, y el último es bastante serio). Su equivocación suelo lla-
marla la metafísica simétrica: intentar la ampliación temática sirviéndose de las 
categorías elaboradas por los griegos ¡con las cuales no cabe entender el sujeto y 
la libertad! Los griegos descubrieron que el ser es el fundamento; los modernos 
han pretendido que la libertad es el fundamento. Pero como la libertad no es el ser 
de los griegos, se distingue del fundamento. La interpretación simétrica, especula-
tiva, circular, para la cual el modelo en que se encaja la nueva temática se toma de 
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For Leonardo Polo, Metaphysics is limited to the knowledge of 
non-spiritual, non-personal beings, for which the classic model works; 
while anthropology, more specifically transcendental anthropology, 
can give the tools to understand the spiritual beings, the persons and 
their freedom. This is why Polo says that Anthropology has more ‘en-
titative weight’ and therefore is more important than metaphysics. 
According to Polo the way forward requires two steps, the first is to 
find a method that allows the discovery of the personal act of being 
and the second, to find new transcendentals that accompany the per-
sonal act of being, which he calls “personal transcendentals” or 
“personal radicals”, which we already discussed in the previous sec-
tion. 
Anthropology studies the being and essence of human beings. 
The distinction between the act of being and its essence is based on 
the real distinction between esse and essence of Aquinas and on the 
Aristotelic distinction between nature and essence. Leonardo Polo 
contends that not all essences have nature and not all natures have es-
sence. Nature is the principle of operations. There are essences –those 
merely thought– that are not principle of operations. Only the existing 
essences are principles of operation i.e. those which are actualized by 
the act of being. Up to here Polo follows Aquinas. Leonardo Polo’s 
novelty is that he proposes that the act of being of persons has its own 
essence which is actualized by the act of being. This means that human 
beings have a double composition; firstly a hylomorphic composition 
of matter and form; and over it a composition of ‘morphe-esse’ (form 
and act of being) that together is the one that actualizes the matter to 
form the human nature. This means that the human soul is a spiritual 
form (the essence) actualised (by the act of being or person), and that 
this soul is the form of the body, the one that actualises the human 
matter, what Polo calls the human nature. 
The act of the extramental being (non free realities or world) is 
different from the personal act of each person. In the same way as the 
extramental beings are distinguished by the individuation of their na-
ture, persons are distinguished by their specific act of being, not by 
their essence which is common to all human beings, nor by the matter. 
The act of being, the “existing” is not just conceptual; it is the 
more real because it is the more active and is the root of the radical 
individuality, originality, and freedom of each person. “The personal 
being is the ‘who’ or ‘each who’. On the contrary, human nature is 
common. All human beings ‘have’ the same nature. Because of this, if 
the notion of person is applied in a common way it ceases to properly 
designate the human being. If one understands ‘person’ as a common 
term, then we are all ‘that thing’ that is called a person: I am a person, 
you are a person, he is a person; but if person is predicated one loses 
sight of the ‘who’, this is, the impossibility to reduce it to a “what” 
                                                 




that is common (general, universal). The person as ‘each who’ is dis-
tinct from every other by his irreductibility. To speak of person as a 
common name, or in a general sense, is reductive. No one is person of 
‘somebody else’, because if it were the case, persons would not co-
exist in intimate coherence with their distinction. The personal being 
is convertible with a plurality of transcendentals, but primarily it 
means irreductability, it is a “who”. Who is equivalent to irreductible 
co-exist? One can speak of ‘who’ in universal terms but it is very in-
correct”134. 
This radical difference between the being of the world and the 
being of the person requires a new approach which goes beyond met-
aphysics. As metaphysics is trans-physics, the philosophical study of 
man has to be trans-metaphysics, and Polo calls it Transcendental An-
thropology to distinguish it from all other ways of studying the human 
being. Here he applies the hierarchical approach, that what is inferior 
cannot give account of what is superior, while what is superior can 
explain what is inferior. So to try to explain the spirit by the matter is 
a type of reductionism135. 
The need to find a new method that can break the boundaries 
posed by thought was felt also by Levinas though he did not find an 
ontological method to achieve it.136 
                                                 
134 “El ser personal es el ‘quién’ o ‘cada quién’. En cambio, la naturaleza del hombre 
es, por así decirlo, común. Todos los hombres ‘tenemos’ la misma naturaleza. Por 
tanto, si la noción de persona se aplica de modo común, no es verdaderamente 
designativa del ser humano. Si se toma ‘persona’ como un término común, enton-
ces todos somos ‘eso’ que se llama persona: yo soy persona, tú eres persona, él es 
persona; pero si la persona se predica, se pierde de vista el ‘quién’, es decir, la 
irreductibilidad a lo común (a lo general o a lo universal). La persona como ‘cada 
quién’ se distingue de las demás por irreductible. Hablar de persona de modo co-
mún, o en sentido general, es una reducción. Nadie es la persona de ‘otro’, porque 
de ser así las personas no co-existirían: las personas co-existen en íntima coheren-
cia con su distinción. El ser personal humano se convierte con una pluralidad de 
trascendentales, pero ante todo significa irreductibilidad, es decir, quién. Quién 
equivale a co-existir irreductible. Se puede hablar de ‘quién’ en universal; pero esa 
consideración es sumamente incorrecta”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, 
op. cit., 98. 
135 The distinction between the person and the levels inferior to it, is also a charac-
teristic of the existencialists and well described by Guardini. Cfr. López Quintás, 
A., “La Antropología Relacional Dialógica de Romano Guardini”. Propuestas An-
tropológicas del Siglo XX, II (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2007), 156. While Guardini´s 
approach is highly motivating, it seems to need to highlight the ontological depth 
and, as we shall see, he does not mention synderesis, and does not indicate that it 
is the source of the ethical desires. 
136 “A radical and stubborn reflection, on itself a cogito that soughts itself and de-
scribes itself without being duped by any spontaneity, by any presence made and 
finished, in a greater distrust to what naturally appears to knowledge, made world 
and object, but whose objectivity actually clogs and clutters the gaze that fixes it, 
must always go up from this objectivity towards the horizon of thoughts and in-
tentions that aim at it and that she hides”. “Una reflexion radical, obstinada, sobre 
sí, un cogito que se busca y se describe sin dejarse embaucar por ninguna espon-
taneidad, por ninguna presencia hecha y acabada, en una desconfianza mayor hacia 
lo que se impone de modo natural al saber, hecho mundo y objeto, pero cuya ob-




7. Ways of overcoming the mental boundary 
How do we overcome the mental boundary and reach the being? 
We have seen above that in order to overcome the mental boundary 
we have to be aware that it exists and then find the borders that mark 
it, to go beyond them through all possible openings.  
Leonardo Polo has shown that the boundary is the ‘object’ and 
its ‘presence’ or ‘actuality’ which is constitutive of intellectual 
knowledge. He has also shown that habits are the key to this method. 
Polo says that there are two ways to overcome the mental boundary; 
one based on the limitations of the object, the other on the limitations 
of the operation that presents the object: “For the time being let us 
point out that the mental boundary can be overcome at least in two 
ways, because it is detected in what is known and in the operation of 
knowing”137. 
The object does not have any other entity than being thought. 
Take the operation of abstracting, to pass from a sensitive image to a 
concept. We can distinguish two facets: the activity of abstracting and 
what is already abstracted. This is the operation and its product which 
is coexistent with the operation: the activity of thinking and the object 
thought. It is good to remind the text already quoted. “The knowledge 
operation commensurates with what is known –which is called the ob-
ject. If one considers the limitation of the object, by abandoning the 
mental boundary one discovers the trans-objective topics; and if one 
considers the limitation of the operation, one reaches the trans-opera-
tional topics. The first corresponds to metaphysics, the second to 
anthropology (transcendental)”138. The first method discovers that the 
object is not the reality as such and the second that the operation or 
activity of the intelligence as faculty is an operation of somebody who 
exists beyond that particular operation.  
The trans-objective will take us to the essence and being of the 
world, the extra-mental (non-spiritual realities), the trans-operative to 
the essence and act of being of the spiritual creatures (human beings 
and God): “I maintain that the operational knowledge is not knowledge 
of reality qua reality, or better said, of the act qua act, and this whether 
                                                 
remontar desde esta objetividad hacia todo el horizonte de los pensamientos y de 
las intenciones que a ella apuntan y que ella ofusca”. Levinas, E., Ética e Infinito, 
op. cit., 31. 
137 “De momento, señalemos que el límite mental se abandona al menos de dos mo-
dos, puesto que se detecta en lo conocido y en la operación”. Polo, L., Antropología 
Trascendental I, op. cit., 117. 
138 “Ahora bien, la operación cognoscitiva se describe como conmensurada con lo 
que conoce –a lo que se llama objeto–. Si se atiende a la limitación del objeto, al 
abandonar el límite mental se advierte la temática trans-objetiva; y si se detecta la 
limitación de la operación, se alcanza la temática trans-operativa. Lo primero co-
rresponde a la metafísica y lo segundo a la antropología”. Ibid., 32. 
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it is the act of being of the universe, the act of being of the human 
being or the act of being God”139.  
In table 6 we summarise the habits that make possible to know  
beyond objective knowledge. The first two allow knowing the non-
spiritual creatures. What Leonardo Polo calls the habit of the first prin-
ciples makes it possible to know the existence of the universe while 
the habit of science shows us the essence of the reality. The other two 
allow us to know the existence and essence of the spiritual creatures. 
Wisdom is the habit that gives us the knowledge of the existence of 
spiritual beings –persons– and synderesis is the habit that gives us the 
knowledge of the essence of spiritual beings.  
The knowledge acquired through habits is not “conceptual” (ob-
jective) and is different for each habit. This is why Leonardo Polo 
gives each a different name that tries to reflect the peculiarity of each 
type of knowledge. The same happens with the method to make each 
type of knowledge appear to our consciousness. Our purpose in em-
phasizing this is to have a framework to understand the habit of 
synderesis by comparing it with similar trans-objective and trans-op-
erational habits. 
REALITY HABIT KNOWING METHOD SCIENCE 
1 Being of Uni-verse 
First Princi-
ples Notices Exclusion Metaphysics 
2 Essence of Universe Science Finds Tension 
Philosophy of 
Nature 
3 Personal Being Wisdom Attains Detachment Transcendental Anthropology 




Table 7 Innate Habits and Corresponding Sciences 
It is important to note that the habits related to the essence of 
man are at the essential level and that the habits that relate to the ex-
istence are at the personal level. This is because the cognitive methods 
have to be adequate to the objects they measure, especially when the 
                                                 
139 “Sostengo, asimismo, que el conocimiento operativo no es el conocimiento de la 
realidad qua realidad o, mejor, del acto en tanto que acto, y eso tanto si se trata del 
acto de ser del universo material, del acto de ser humano o del acto de ser divino”. 
Ibid., 127. 
Table 6: Acts, Methods, Science, Reality, Reaching 
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knowledge is connatural. As the themes are different, so are the meth-
ods. It is not enough to overcome the mental limit in a general way 
because the connaturality is different in each case. Leonardo Polo uses 
different verbs for each method to express the radical difference each 
has, not only with objective knowledge but also among each other. 
The first principles are ‘noticed’ (advertidos), science is ‘found’ 
(encuentra), wisdom is ‘attained’ (alcanza), and synderesis is ‘gets 
into’ (se accede). To be able to reach each knowledge the activity of 
knowing is also different: the first principles of reality require the 
knower to ‘exclude’ (exclusión); to find science one has to ‘struggle’ 
(pugna); to reach wisdom on has to ‘detach’ (desaferramiento) and to 
achieve the habit of the synderesis one needs an ‘increased lingering’ 
(demora creciente)140. (Cfr. Table 7) 
The first method allows us to reach existencially the existence 
of the world, which he calls ‘extra-mental’ reality or ‘principial being’: 
“With the habit of the first principles one ‘notices’ the originated be-
ing. The first principles are axioms, when one is aware that they are 
extra-mental then metaphysics is axiomatically formulated, which is a 
clear advantage of the realistic philosophy”141. 
The second method is the habit of science, which progressively 
shows us the essence of the world: “The second method of overcoming 
the mental limit is the finding or encounter with the extra-mental es-
sence. I call this method the explanation of the predicamental order. 
Finding the extra-mental essence is to explain the physical causes as 
co-causes. In the explanation of the co-causality the mental presence 
struggles with the predicamental principles dependant from the first 
principle, which I call persistence”142.  
The third and fourth method deal with the ‘intimacy’ of the per-
son and of his ‘essence’, respectively: “In accordance with the third 
dimension of overcoming the mental limit we reach human co-exist-
ence. Co-existence is neither ‘noticed’, nor ‘found’ and does not allow 
one to ‘linger’ on it, but it is ‘reached’. This ‘reaching’ is implicit to 
the characteristic I call the ‘more’. In other words: reaching the co-
existence methodically means the character of ‘more’. Co-existence, 
the extension of the transcendental order, is the person, the irreductible 
                                                 
140 Cfr. For a more detailed explanation: Sellés, J. F., “Claves del pensamiento de 
Leonardo Polo”, in José Luis Caballero (ed.), Ocho filósofos Españoles Contem-
poráneos (Madrid: Diálogo Filosófico, 2008). 
141 “Con el hábito de los primeros principios se advierte el ser principial. Como los 
primeros principios son axiomas, al advertir que son extra-mentales se formula 
axiomáticamente la metafísica, lo que comporta una clara ventaja para la filosofía 
realista”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 126.  
142 “La segunda dimensión del abandono del límite mental es el hallazgo o encuentro 
de la esencia extra-mental. También lo llamo explicitación del orden predicamen-
tal. Hallar la esencia extra-mental es explicitar las causas físicas en tanto que 
concausas. En la explicitación de la concausalidad la presencia mental pugna con 
los principios predicamentales dependientes del primer principio al que llamo per-
sistencia”. Ibid., 127 
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intimacy, inasmuch as it is reached: this reaching is inseparable from 
its being”143. 
Regarding the fourth way to overcome the mental limit: “On its 
part, the extra-mental essence is distinct from the physical nature be-
cause natural essences consist of the quadruple co-causality and 
natural beings are triple co-causalities. In this way the extra-mental 
essence adds to the physical natures the unity of order. This is why the 
extra-mental essence is described as the perfection of those natures. 
This perfection is the cosmos, the physical universe. (The physical uni-
verse is distinguished from its act of being which is persistence). In 
contrast, the essence of man is the perfection of his nature; but this 
perfection is growing —is habitual— and not the final cause”144.  
This is a dense text because it is rich in suggestions that should 
be understood more easily when dealing with the nature of synderesis. 
For the time being we only want to place synderesis in the context of 
the four ways of overcoming the mental limit and the corresponding 
different types of habitual knowledge each requires. 
a) Personal knowledge 
We have seen that Leonardo Polo distinguishes two types of hu-
man extra-objective knowledge, habitual and personal knowledge. We 
have seen in detail the epistemological and ontological character of the 
habitual knowledge; now we have the elements to speak about the 
highest form of human natural knowledge, which is personal 
knowledge. 
Polo identifies the Aristotelic agent intellect with the act of be-
ing: “Habitual knowledge is an illumination from the active intellect –
which can be considered as the human actus essendi”145. Personal 
knowledge is the origin of all human knowledge and by being identi-
fied with the actus essendi, this consideration should be done on the 
level of being, more than in the level of knowing: “the active intellect 
                                                 
143 “De acuerdo con la tercera dimensión del abandono del límite mental se alcanza 
la co-existencia humana. La co-existencia humana ni se advierte, ni se halla, ni 
permite demorarse en ella, sino que se alcanza. A ese alcanzar es inherente lo que 
llamo carácter de además. Con otras palabras: alcanzar la co-existencia significa 
metódicamente carácter de además. La co-existencia, la ampliación del orden de 
los trascendentales, es la persona, la intimidad irreductible en la medida en que se 
alcanza: ese alcanzar es indisociable de su ser”. Ibid., 128 
144 “Por su parte, la esencia extra-mental se distingue de las naturalezas físicas por-
que ella es la con-causalidad cuádruple y aquéllas son con-causalidades triples. Así 
pues, la esencia extra-mental añade a las naturalezas físicas la unidad de orden. Por 
eso, la esencia extra mental se describe como la perfección de esas naturalezas. 
Dicha perfección es el universo físico. (Como esencia, el universo físico se distin-
gue de su acto de ser que es la persistencia; un primer principio, como ya se indicó). 
En cambio, la esencia del hombre es la perfección de su naturaleza; pero esta per-
fección es creciente –habitual–, y no la causa final”. Ibid., 131 
145 “El conocimiento habitual es una iluminación debida al intelecto agente –el cual 
es asimilable al actus essendi humano”. Polo, L., Nominalismo, Idealismo y Rea-
lismo (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1997), 187. 
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as previous actualization, but not co-actual, of the human intelligence, 
should be understood more as an ontological level, rather than as ac-
tual activity of the intelligence already accomplished”146. Sellés puts 
it more clearly: “Saying it in a different way, what is proper of the 
human actus essendi is to be a knowing being”147.  
The reality of the agent intelligent can be known by one of its 
habits, the higest of which is the habit of wisdom. Sellés clarifies it as 
“with the wisdom habit one reaches the active intellect”, which Polo 
also calls intellect co-actus to highlight that it is part of the personal 
level which is co-existent, both personal and transcendental148. 
The knowledge the being gives or human-being-knowledge can-
not be understood by the operations nor by the habits, nor by the agent-
intellect itself because of the inherent duality within man. Complete 
self-knowledge is a privilege that only God has, being the pure iden-
tity: “The intellectus ut co-actus is the core of knowing, from which –
radically– operations and habits are activated, but by itself, it cannot 
be any of them, because it is superior to them. That the person be the 
superior intellectual act does not imply intellectual identity, because 
the identity is exclusive to God”149.  
It is natural that the topic of personal knowledge be the most 
difficult to deal with because it is beyond intellectual knowledge. Polo 
uses, as the classics, the metaphor of light. While the intellectual 
knowledge can be considered as light that illuminates, the agent intel-
lect is the transparent light, light that is not seen until it illuminates, 
but the illumination is not itself seen, only what the intellect iluminates 
can be seen. So it can be illuminating and in spite of its light, neither 
the illuminated object nor the collection of all illuminated objects, will 
exhaust its power150. This is the reason why it cannot be known in full 
ever. This is the root of the mystery surrounding all and each human 
being that no science can solve as the French existencialist Gabriel 
                                                 
146 “El intelecto agente, como actualización antecedente, pero no co-actual, de la 
inteligencia humana, debe entenderse, en todo caso, como un cierto nivel ontoló-
gico y no como actividad intelectual originariamente culminada”. Polo, L., El 
Acceso al Ser, op. cit., 121. 
147 “De otro modo, la índole del actus essendi humano es ser cognoscente”. Sellés, 
J. F., El Conocer Personal: Estudio del Entendimiento Agente según Leonardo 
Polo, (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2003), 
15.  
148 “Con el hábito de sabiduría se alcanza el intelecto agente”. Ibid., 91.  
149 “El intellectus ut co-actus es el núcleo del saber, desde el cual –radicalmente– se 
ejercen las operaciones y los hábitos; pero él no es estrictamente ninguno de ellos, 
por ser el acto intelectual superior. Que la persona sea el acto intelectual superior 
no comporta la identidad intelectual, pues la identidad es exclusiva de Dios”. Polo, 
L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 224. 
150 “According to this, the illuminating lights and the transparency of the personal 
intellect can be distinguished, which is the one farthest because it looks for the 
theme that is beyond its reach”. “Según esto, se distinguen las luces iluminantes y 
la transparencia del intelecto personal, que es la más separada, puesto que busca el 
tema que la transciende”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 25. 
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Marcel stressed in his book Being and Having by highlingthing the 
difference between solving problems and approaching mysteries151. 
This will suffice for our purpose. Synderesis, which is our topic 
is one of the person’s innate habits, and it is, according to Polo below 
the habits of wisdom and the habit of the first principles. The consid-
eration of these habits will allow us to refer to the personal radicals 
that are the source of each of the three habits and compare them with 
their sources and among themselves. 
b) On the dualities and the method 
The consideration of dualities is another important point to un-
derstand Polo’s thought. The dualities can be approached in an 
ontological or epistemological way which, in Polo terminology, will 
be to approach it as a theme or as a method. The ontological –the-
matic– considers that a human being’s most defining ontological trait 
is dual —esse and essence— and in all its aspects, as opposed to God, 
who is simplicity, and therefore unity. When talking about humans we 
should not seek unity because that can only be applied to God: “Man´s 
complexity canot be solved with simple elements but with duali-
ties”152. Piá summarises the ontological aspect of the ontological 
duality as follows: “Duality is not an external characteristic of man 
because it penetrates each of its parts. Duality is found in the deepest 
core of the human being, this is, in his act of being, that because of this 
is called co-act or co-existing. Because of being radical it spreads to 
all the transcendental and essential aspects, therefore it is fitting to de-
fine human being as a dual being”153.  
The internal all penetrating duality is not just at random but it 
has an internal order, it is a hierarchy: “When discussing knowledge 
or other aspects of what is immaterial and created, the most proper 
distinction or more correct is the distinction of degree, hierarchy and 
not the simple numeric distinction. It is a distinction between what is 
                                                 
151 “Distinguish between the Mysterious and the Problematic. A problem is some-
thing met with, which bars my passage. It is before me in its entirety. A mystery, 
on the other hand, is something in which I find myself caught up, and whose es-
sence is therefore not to be before me in its entirety. It is as though in this province 
the distinction between ‘in-me’ and ‘before-me’ loses its meaning”. Marcel, G., 
Being and Having (Glasgow: The University Press, 1949), 100. 
152 “La complejidad del hombre no se resuelve en elementos simples sino en duali-
dades”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 165. 
153 “La dualidad no es una característica extrínseca al hombre, sino que penetra cada 
una de sus dimensiones. La dualidad se encuentra en lo más profundo del hombre, 
a saber, en su acto de ser, que por esa razón se define como co-acto de ser o co-
existencia. Y al ser la dualidad del hombre radical, se extienda al resto de sus di-
mensiones transcendentales y esenciales, por tanto, es acertado definir el hombre 
como ser dual”. Piá Tarazona, S., El Hombre Como Ser Dual: Estudio de las Dua-
lidades Radicales según «La Antropología Trascendental» De Leonardo Polo, 
(Pamplona: Eunsa, 2001), 146. 
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superior and inferior”154. This has clear resemblances to the neopla-
tonic descendent path of participation from the One, the dialectic 
method of Hegel’s ascent to the Absolute and to the analogical method 
in the Scholastics, but it is more than a method, it is that reality has an 
internal link and internal order in which some beings exist in function 
of others.  
The reality is what determines the method. This means that the 
way of knowing adapts itself to the reality at hand. As Piá explains, 
“the study of the lower member of a duality can be fully explained by 
its superior member and in the last extent, each human duality will be 
explained by the dual character of the human act of being, or what is 
the same, each human cuality is dual –even the essential ones– because 
they depend on the dual character of the human radicals”155.  
Piá explains in his book El hombre como ser dual156 how an ax-
iomatization of this method allows to treat any aspect of anthropology 
as a duality. This is relevant to our study because it means that each 
element can be related to the immediate superior or inferior duality in 
a kind of chain of relationships. This may be confusing and the logic 
of it, not very linear, nevertheless it gives a new way to penetrate into 
a reality which in itself is very relational because it is organic. (Cf. 
Figure 3) 
We insert two quotations of Piá regarding the dualities at the 
transcendental and essential levels in order to have an overall view on 
the different dualities synderesis will have to relate with. 
                                                 
154 “Cuando se trata del conocimiento o de otras dimensiones de lo inmaterial creado, 
la distinción más propia o más correcta es la distinción de grado, jerárquica, y no 
la simple distinción numérica. Se trata de distinciones entre lo superior y lo infe-
rior”. Polo, L., Presente y Futuro del Hombre (Madrid: Rialp, 2012), 142.  
155 “El estudio del miembro inferior de una dualidad es explicado de manera plena 
desde su miembro superior, y en último extremo, cada dualidad humana deberá 
tender siempre al carácter dual del acto de ser humano, o lo que es igual, cada 
dualidad humana es dual -incluidas las esenciales- porque depende en última ins-
tancia del carácter dual de los radicales humanos”. Piá Tarazona, S., El Hombre 
como Ser Dual, op.cit., 123. 
156 The book, Piá Tarazona, S., El Hombre como Ser Dual: Estudio de las Dualida-
des Radicales según «La Antropología Trascendental» De Leonardo Polo, op. cit. 
incorporates discussions with Polo during the years 1992 and 2001 at the Univer-
sity of Navarra as the author says in p. 18, note 7. It is a must-read for those who 
want to get a quick glimpse of Polo’s duality method. 
Figure 3: Pia's Progressive Dualities. 
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The dualities at the transcendental, personal level are related as 
follows: “According to the dualities formed among the different radi-
cals of the human person their distinction, conversion and ordering is 
established as follows: 1) ‘being more’ is distinguished, converted and 
ordered to transcendental freedom forming a duality called intimacy, 
openness and inner co-existence; 2) the ‘interior openness’ is distin-
guished, converted and ordered to intellection forming a duality called 
“internal awareness of the innate habit of first principles”. This is the 
way in which the ‘being more’ and ‘freedom’ are cognitively enhanced 
in their opening to the cosmic creature; and 3) the ‘innate awareness’ 
is distinguished, converted and ordered to personal love forming the 
duality called ‘generosity’. This is the way in which ‘being more’, 
‘freedom’ and ‘intellection’ lovingly extend the opening to the cosmic 
creature”157. 
At the essential level they are clasified whether they relate to the 
world or to other human beings as follows: “Human action becomes 
dual with ‘work’ and ‘culture’ when relating it with the essence of the 
world, and because doing is the characteristic of the essential level 
neither work nor culture are dualities that belong to the act of being. 
The dualities when considering the relation to other human beings are 
‘history’ and ‘society’, which similarly are not transcendental duali-
ties, but dualities between different human essences; this is why these 
dualities are called inter-essential dualities”158. (Cfr. Figure 4) We 
leave it as Piá suggests, though we tend to think the inter-essential du-
alities are better related by Sellés in his Anthropology for rebels. Sellés 
                                                 
157 “Según las dualidades formadas entre los distintos radicales de la persona humana 
se establece su distinción, conversión y ordenación de la siguiente manera: 1º) el 
además se distingue, convierte y ordena a la libertad transcendental formando la 
dualidad denominada intimidad, apertura o co-existencia interior; 2º) la apertura 
interior se distingue, convierte y ordena a la intelección formando la dualidad lla-
mada advertencia innata del hábito de los primeros principios –ése es el modo en 
que el además y la libertad se prolongan cognoscitivamente en la apertura hacia la 
criatura cósmica; y 3º) la advertencia innata se distingue, convierte y ordena al 
amar personal formando la dualidad denominada generosidad –ése es el modo en 
el que el además, la libertad y la intelección se prolongan amorosamente en la 
apertura hacia la criatura cósmica”. Ibid., 262. 
158 “En la dualidad del hombre con la esencia cósmica el hacer humano se concreta 
en trabajo y cultura: por tanto como el hacer equivale a la dimensión característica 
de la esencia humana, ni el trabajo son dualidades del acto de ser. A su vez, la 
historia y la sociedad, que son los modos concretos en que el hacer humano se 
dualiza con el hacer de los demás hombres, tampoco son dualidades transcenden-
tales, sino dualidades entre diversas esencias humanas; por eso este tipo de 
dualidades se han denominado dualidades inter-esenciales”. Ibid., 204. 
Figure 4: Pia's Inter-Essential Dualities. 
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places them in the following order: ethics, society, language and 
work159. What is relevant to our topic is that ethics is the first manifes-
tation which then affects all other manifestations of the person, rather 
than being a consequence of any other manifestation, which means 
that ethics depends on the personal level more than on the essential 
level160. 
We shall see how synderesis dualises itself with relation to the 
transcendental and other essential levels when we deal with it directly 
in the following sections.  
 
8. Summary of achievements 
Have we achieved what we intended in this section? Do we have 
a rough sketch of Leonardo Polo’s philosophical world? We know that 
his main motive is anthropological, that his starting point is the real 
distinction between esse and essentia, that he wants this radical dis-
tinction to be applied in full, that he discovered that in six hundred 
years this was not achieved, and that it was because thinkers were us-
ing the metaphysical methods to explain higher, anthropological topics 
with the metaphysical trascendentals used by the classics to explain 
the foundation of the world. That a new method to deal with the esse 
was needed. That Polo had his ‘eureka moment’ in 1950 and it was the 
“discovery of the mental limit, in a way that it can be overcome”. This 
can be done thanks to the primacy of the habitual knowledge over the 
objective —operational— knowledge. The mental boundary can be 
overcome in four different ways, which are consistent with the 
knowledge habits of science, synderesis, first principles and wisdom, 
which are the habits that make four different sciences possible: philos-
ophy of nature, metaphysics, essential anthropology and 
transcendental anthropology. This new method allowed Polo to ex-
pand the traditional metaphysical transcendentals with the personal 
transcendentals (co-existence-with, freedom, personal knowledge and 
personal love), and to develop them with the complementary ‘dualities 
method’. He then had a new world type of philosophy where the top 
level is the new Transcendental Anthropology, which deals with the 
human act of being, and Metaphysics wich deals with the act of being 
of the universe, leaving the treatment of the essence to the traditional 
sciences of man and of the universe. In this philosophy the structure 
of man becomes triadic, having three levels, the level of the body, the 
level of the soul and the level of the act of being, which are referred to 
as the natural, essential and personal level. How the most active is the 
                                                 
159 Cfr. Sellés, J.F., Anthropology for rebels, op. cit., 147. 
160 Dualities can be considered at different levels; for example, Sellés has just pub-
lished an article on the internal dualities within ethics. In it he applies this relational 
method to the personal and essential levels. We shall cite it in the relevant sections. 




personal which is the human act of being, which constitutes the es-
sence with its two faculties, and how both of them constitute the soul 
which informs the natural level161. 
With this we have now a good base to position synderesis within 
this structure, and ways of knowing it. 
*** 
                                                 
161 The triadic structure of the person has some previous intuitons in classic thinkers, 
like Paul who speaks of body, soul, and spirit in 1 Thessalonians 5:23, Augustin, 
who speaks of intelligence, will and memory within the soul, and Kant when talk-
ing about the three predispositions to good, or human inclinations in Kant, I., 
Religion within the boundaries of mere reason and other writings, op. cit., 50. 
Guardini’s 3 levels of relationship are a phenomenological approach to the same 
reality (the 4th level is religious, supernatural, not natural) cfr. López Quintás, A., 
“La Antropología Relacional Dialógica de Romano Guardini”, op. cit. Ricoeur 
also has also a kind of triology in his relational constitution of the human being, 
the ‘I’ the you and the he. Cfr. Moratalla, T.D., “P. Ricoeur, Una Antropología 




















SYNDERESIS, “AN SIT?” 
 
1. Historical perspective 
It may be a surprising fact that most thinkers who have dealt with 
synderesis –including Leonardo Polo– did not find it necessary to give 
a detailed proof of its existence. It is true that they have differentiated 
it from the reason and the will. They have also discussed whether it is 
a faculty or a habit; disputed whether it was innate or not, but they 
have not seemed to feel the need to directly prove its existence. It may 
be interesting to find out why this question was not dealt with. It is 
important to note that we specifically limit ourselves to the concept of 
‘synderesis’ not to the reality which lies behind it1, which was treated 
indirectly under related topics such as natural law, will to power, or 
‘elan vital’ among others. Though we have dealt with the history of 
synderesis in Chapter IV, here we specifically summarise what was 
the general trend per period on synderesis’ existence, before dealing 
directly on the topic itself. 
a) Greco-Roman Philosophy. In Greek and Roman times the 
term ‘synderesis’ was not used. Greek and Roman philosophers did 
not discuss the topic. For them the top of human structure was reason 
and its habits. Man was a rational creature, a natural being who inte-
grated himself in the order of the cosmos through the polis. It was 
Jerome in the fourth Century the first to use it in the Commentary to 
Ezequiel2. 
Why, in one thousand years of philosophical activity, no one 
thought about synderesis? As far as we know, only Albert the Great 
asked himself this question. That Albert was the only one asking this 
question is also surprising, taking into account that synderesis was a 
regular topic of discussion for Christian philosophers during at least 
200 years. Albert deals on this topic in the 71st question of his Summa 
de Creaturis right at the end of the first article. He states that classic 
philosophers considered things just on natural terms while the ‘the-
ologi’ –Catholic Medieval authors– considered issues from the 
perspective of the eternal law, which is based in God’s justice, and that 
it is done with the ‘superior reason’, which is the one that considers 
the things related to God, or better, from God’s perspective. It is also 
                                                 
1 As Levinas says, these are pre-filosofical experiences, which later are philosophi-
cally considered, and are the base of its reasonings: “todo pensamiento filosófico 
reposa sobre unas experiencias pre-filosóficas”. Levinas, E., Ética e Infinito, op. 
cit., 26. 
2 “It is clear that the Bible must have had some considerable influence on the formu-
lation of the synderesis principle, since it does not seem to occur in the ethical 
writings of thinkers unfamiliar with the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures”. Bourke, V. 
J., “The Background of Aquinas’ Synderesis Principle”, op. cit., 352. 
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interesting to note that while Albert links synderesis with the agent 
intellect3, he does not link it to the act of being4. This observation, that 
the exclusively natural consideration of the law by the classic philos-
ophers as the reason not to discover synderesis, matches with Polo’s 
observation; he explains that the classic philosophers did not discover 
the act of being, and therefore not the personal level, due to their lack 
of the notion of creation, which is a revealed and therefore a Judeo-
Christian basic concept. 
b) Medieval Philosophy. The medieval Christian philosophers 
were the only ones who did discuss synderesis and they did not feel 
they had to prove its existence. The origin of the topic was theological, 
it was based the on the interpretation of Sacred Scripture. Therefore 
all they needed was the authority of the fathers of the Church and the 
Bible. Their purpose was more to understand it, than to explain its ex-
istence. We present question LXXI ‘De Synderesi’5 of the Liber De 
Creaturis of Albert the Great as a sample of this. Albert was one of 
the XIII Century authors closer to reality. His studies in astronomy, 
biology, alchemy are a good testimony of his closeness to science. The 
three articles of this question start discussing ‘synderesis’ definition. 
There is no previous question about its existence. Albert bases his ar-
guments entirely on the Church Fathers’ authority. With his habitual 
clarity Albert starts defining synderesis attributing it to St. Basil, in 
spite of Basil not using the actual word. He defines it as “the power of 
the mind which has within it the seeds of judgment by which we sep-
arate evil from good”6. In a similar way, he links natural law with 
synderesis, this time under the authority of S. Agustine, who did not 
use the term either: “The universal law is written by nature in the nat-
ural judgement: and he called natural judgement synderesis” 7. The 
third authority he uses is St. Jerome’s passage on Ezekiel, which he 
quotes extensively. It is interesting that he concludes that synderesis is 
the only of the four faculties Ezekiel mentions, which is spiritual, the 
other three ‘being linked to the body (irascible is linked to the gall, the 
concupiscible with the liver and reason to the brain, but synderesis is 
                                                 
3 Albertus Magnus, De bono, in Opera Omnia, 28, op.cit., tr. V, q. 1, a. 1), 265, ll. 
58–67. 
4 Leonardo Polo asserts that the act of being was Albert’s discovery which his disci-
ple Aquinas inherited. Cfr. Polo, L., El Yo, op. cit., 63. 
5 “De synderesi. Consequenter etiam quaeritur de synderesi. Primo, Quid sit secun-
dum sui substantiam et diffinitionem? Secundo, Utrum ipsam contingat peccare 
aliquando, vel numquam. Et tertio, Utrum ipsam contingat exstingui?”. Albertus 
Magnus, Summa de Creaturis, q. 71, in Opera Omnia, op.cit., 590. 
6 “Definitio synderesis, scilicet quod ipsa est virtus animi habens in se naturaliter 
sibi insita et inserta semina judicandi, per quam mala segregamus a bonis”. Alber-
tus Magnus, De Homo q. 71 a 1, in Opera Omnia, op.cit., vol. 35 p. 590. 
7 “Quod ipsa sit virtus animae habetur a beato Augustino (S. Augustinus, Lib. II De 
Libero arbitrio, cap. 10) qui dicit quod universalia juris scripta sunt naturaliter in 
naturali judicatorio: appellans naturale judicatorium synderesim”. Ibid. 
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above them)8. Following Jerome’s text he also quotes St. Paul refer-
ence to the ‘spirit’ which he links to synderesis as both being above 
reason: “synderesis is the spiritus that intercedes for us with indescrib-
able cries”9. We have seen then that there is no questioning about 
synderesis’ existence and that the discussion is supported mainly by 
arguments of authority.  
c) Post-medieval philosophy. Already in the XIII Century the 
discussion of synderesis followed divergent paths: 1) those who con-
tinue the scholastic discussion, mainly Aquinas’ commentators, who 
still use it as it was defined by him, without questioning its existence10; 
2) those who followed the nominalist path of Ockham11, who without 
denying it had little room for it; 3) those who followed Meister Eck-
hart’s interpretation and used it in a mystical way as a special direct 
knowledge of God; and finally 4) those who later denied any connec-
tion with the philosophy of the past, e.g. Jeremy Bentham. Jeremy 
Bentham´s criticism is still active in present day´s culture: “Faculties, 
powers of the mind, dispositions: all these are unreal; all these are but 
so many fictitious entities”12.  
After this short review it is time to tackle it directly. Does syn-
deresis exist? How can we prove it? 
 
2. Does synderesis exist? 
How can we show that synderesis is not a “fictitious entity”? The 
fact that most medieval thinkers believed it and that many authors still 
find it reasonable, only proves that they belived in its existence, but 
not that it actually existed. They were convinced that the sun moved 
                                                 
8 “Tertium est, quod ipsa sola inter quatuor est sine organo per omnem modum, ex 
eo quod ratio ponitur in arce cerebri, irascibilis vero in felle, concupiscibilis autem 
in jecore, ista vero extra, hoc est, supra haec”. Albertus Magnus, De Creaturis, q. 
71, a. 1, 3, in Opera Omnia, op. cit., vol., 35, p.591. 
9 “Synderesis is spiritus qui interpelat pro nobis gemitus inenarrabilitibus”. Albertus 
Magnus, De Creaturis, q. 71, a. 1, 4; Ibid., vol. 35), 591. 
10 As an example synderesis is still being taught at secondary and university levels 
in Spain and other Hispanic countries. Among the well used university level man-
uals edition we can quote: Millán-Puelles, A., Fundamentos de filosofía (Madrid: 
Rialp, 1967), 631. “También existe un hábito de los primeros principios prácticos, 
al que se llama sindéresis. La diferencia entre la ley natural y la sindéresis consiste 
en que la primera es acto cognoscitivo e imperativo de lo conveniente según nues-
tra inclinación natural al fin último, mientras que la sindéresis es, como ya se ha 
dicho, hábito y no acto”. Ibid. 
11 “It is consequently surprising that these topics receive little direct attention from 
either Duns Scotus or William of Ockham. This two great thinkers’ failure to treat 
conscience and synderesis, however, is an indication that the focus of the discus-
sion of these issues has changed to issues about the virtues”. Langston, D. C., 
Conscience and other Virtues from Bonaventure to MacIntyre, op.cit., 54.  
12 Bentham, J., The Works of Jeremy Bentham, (Edinburgh: Bowring, William Tait, 




around the earth but this did not mean that they were right; we no 
longer trust our direct experience on the sun’s movements in spite of 
seeing the sun go around us each day.  
Synderesis’ existence is more difficult to prove than the move-
ment of planets, because not astronomical records nor any of our 
senses, microscope, mechanical artefact, brain scan will ever detect it. 
We can only prove its existence by finding a number of experiences 
that cannot be explained in a different and better way. 
Synderesis can only be experienced in the intimacy of our con-
science. It is good to distinguish direct experiences from their 
rationalization. One thing is an experience which is just declarative 
from the objectivation of that particular experience. Another thing is 
to feel that something is not good and yet another to objectivise it; 
synderesis for example, can be objectivized as natural law, but syn-
deresis is the instrument that allows us to know natural law in an 
experiential way13.  
For most of us the discovery of synderesis could be an experi-
ence similar to the character in Molière’s The Bourgeois Gentleman, 
Monsieur Jourdain, who discovered he had been talking all his life in 
‘prose’ rather than in verse14. We may discover that we have ‘syn-
deresis’ without being aware of its importance. Philosophy helps us to 
deepen and distinguish better our being, and therefore discover syn-
deresis and be able to spread its knowledge faster. In our time the 
spread and depth of knowledge is faster because we have easier and 
better access to more resources, more people than ever are doing re-
search, we have better means of communication, and we have acquired 
new abilities. This means that we have new ways of knowing which 
allows us to go deeper on the knowledge inherited from our predeces-
sors. 
Coming back to the distinction between direct experiences and 




                                                 
13 While it is obvious that the moral experience is internal it is good to quote one of 
the most outstanding defenders of the singularity of human Sciences against those 
who reduce science to empirical Sciences; Dilthey: “The interior experience con-
tains in it responsibility, obligation, consciousness of freedom, forgetting-of-
oneself as a symbol of the ethical, and the sacrifice-for-itself as the most beautiful 
fruit”. Dilthey, W., El sistema de la ética, (Buenos Aires: Nova, 1973), 54. 
14 “Good heavens! For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without 
knowing it”. “Par ma foi, il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose, sans 
que j’en susse rien”. Molière, J. B., Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, (Paris: Nicolas 
Sceaux), 2014, Act II, sc. IV, 32.  
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a) Internal experiences that can lead to the knowledge of syn-
deresis: 
We perceive that we are one, that is, that we are the same who 
understands, decides and feels.  
We are not conscious while we sleep, but when we wake up we 
are the same person. 
When we are awake we notice we are awake, not so when we 
are dreaming. 
We notice that we are in control when we are sober, not so when 
we are intoxicated. 
We notice that we are inclined to do what we feel is right and we 
feel like avoiding what we feel is bad. 
We perceive that we are the one who thinks and the one who 
wants. 
We have a permanent impulse to do good; to act in a positive 
manner and we also have the opposite impulse, to do bad. 
The fact that we can correct our behaviour and others’ behav-
iour, as well. 
We feel remorse for things we feel we could have done well and 
did wrong, or did not do them at all. 
b) The reasoned, objectivized topics could be as follows: 
The existence of natural law. 
The universal moral experience. 
Parallelism between synderesis and the instinct. 
Parallelism between synderesis and the first principles of the in-
tellect. 
The link between understanding and willing. 
b) Let us analyze each independently. 
 
1) Internal Direct Experiences 
1.1) We feel we are one, i.e. that we are the same who under-
stands, decides and feels. There is a unity of perception that is felt as 
‘mine’, as ‘what I am’. This is expressed in normal terms as ‘me’, ‘I’, 
‘myself’. There is a unity of perception. This is one of Kant’s basics 
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principles15. Hume considers it just as a sum of sensations, just “a bun-
dle of perceptions”16. Is this synderesis? Not for previous thinkers but 
it is for Leonardo Polo. For him, ‘the spirit is equivalent to the person; 
the soul, however, is equivalent to the ‘I’, and the ‘I’ is not the same 
as the person’: “What is traditionally called soul is understood here as 
human essential manifestation, that encompasses synderesis (I) up to 
the immaterial powers (intelligence and will)”17.  
1.2) We are not conscious while we sleep, but when we wake up 
we are conscious and feel we are the same person as before. Polo wrote 
a short article, “Phenomenology of Awakening”, which was a com-
mentary to Millán-Puelles book La Estructura de la Subjetividad. On 
it he says: “The difference between vigil and sleep is precisely what 
allows us to discover conscience; to understand it as something differ-
ent from the subject that constitutes conscience, and that allows to 
speak of the subject himself as being constituted”18. The disappearance 
of our consciousness and its reappearance is an indication that we are 
more than consciousness. We can distinguish two levels of this awak-
ening, the one which is pure consciousness, this is the fact of knowing 
ourselves as different from the world and all other persons and sec-
ondly the fact of recognizing our accumulated experience as this 
singular person. One can be seen as the realization of being a person, 
and the second the realization of our historical baggage. There is con-
tinuity in our experience. One can object that those who loose memory 
lose their sense of identity. While not getting into discussion with psy-
chological and medical facts, Polo distinguishes, as the classics did, 
sensitive memory from intellectual memory. He considers that sensi-
tive memory is linked to the senses and kept organically, while the 
intellectual memory, being spiritual, is not. Sensitive, historical 
memory is fundamental for our sense of growth and of belonging and 
its absence is a clear sign of mental degeneration. What is not clear is 
how the spiritual intellectual memory works without the sensitive 
                                                 
15 “The ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise 
something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, which is 
as much as to say theatre representation would either be impossible or else at least 
would be nothing for me”. Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University,1998), 246. Cfr. Pereboom, D., “Kant’s Transcendental 
Arguments” Edward N. Zalta ed., in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
updated on Fall 2014. Accessed February 10, 2015. http://plato.stanford.edu/ar-
chives/fall2014/entries/kant-transcendental. 
16 “I am of willing to affirm of the rest mankind that they are nothing but a bundle 
or collection of different perceptions”. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, 
(Waiheke Island: Floating Press, 2009), 396. 
17 “El espíritu equivale a la persona; el alma, en cambio, equivale al yo, y el yo no 
se identifica con la persona’: “Lo que tradicionalmente se llama alma se entiende 
aquí como la manifestación esencial humana, que va desde la sindéresis (yo) hasta 
las potencias inmateriales (inteligencia y voluntad)”. Polo, L., Antropología Tras-
cendental, II (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2010), 15. Cf. Aquinas Summa Theologiae, op.cit. 
I, q. 78, a. 1, c. 
18 “Es justamente la diferencia entre dormido y despierto lo que permite hablar de 
conciencia, entendiendo la conciencia como distinta del sujeto constituyente de 
ella, y permite a su vez también, hablar del carácter constituido del mismo sujeto”. 
Polo, L., “Fenomenología del Despertar”, Anuario Filosófico, vol. 27, (1994), 679. 
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memory, because our experience is always unified. Those who suffer 
total loss of sensible memory cannot communicate the difference be-
cause they cannot compare the two situations. This topic is beyond the 
scope of our work; it is a matter of psychological and the medical stud-
ies of self-identity, so we leave this task to others more conversant 
with this line of research.  
1.3) When we are awake we notice that we are awake; not so 
when we are dreaming. There is a sense of reality which comes with 
the full functioning of our brain when we have full access to the fac-
ulties that are linked to the brain, nevertheless there is something 
common to the alert and semi-alert states of consciousness which is 
the sense of identity, which is directly related to synderesis: ‘Before 
fixing the cogito-sum, sleep and wakefulness are indiscernible’19. 
1.4) We notice that we are in control when we are sober, not so 
when we are intoxicated. This point is similar to the previous one. Fur-
thermore, it indicates that we have the feeling of lack of control of our 
powers, the intelligence, and the will in that situation. We are not able 
to think as straight as we want; we are not able to do what we want 
with our body. We feel lack of control of both powers, but we are the 
same person who before had full control.  
1.5) We perceive that we are above our thinking and our want-
ing. We want to want; we intend to understand. We are the ones who 
are in control of wanting and thinking. So there is something above 
wanting and thinking and it cannot be either of them. Wanting and 
thinking are instruments of something superior who, is ‘me’, ‘I’, ‘my-
self’. 
1.6) We notice that we are inclined to do what we feel is right 
and we feel like avoiding what we feel is bad. The universal moral 
experience based most of the discussions about synderesis in the me-
dieval times. It is the feeling that whatever is good or evil is not 
dependent on our will, nor on our intelligence, but on something supe-
rior, something beyond us, and our society. Our society says 
something is good because they have the same kind of feeling; ‘it 
should be done because it is good for all’. Leonardo Polo mentions this 
experience which also Plato and Augustine felt: “Anyway, when you 
note that acts intrinsically affect man, it is discovered that man is re-
warding or punishing himself internally with his moral behaviour. 
Plato argues that sense of guilt arises from the evil deeds. Hence, ac-
cording to St. Augustine centuries later, the punishment of a 
disordered mind is its own disorder. Thus it is obvious, as I say, that 
man knows himself accountable for his actions, and that he judges 
them. If external judgments cannot be made by which certain actions 
                                                 
19 “Antes de la fijación del cogito-sum, sueño y vigilia son indiscernibles. Cfr. Des-
cartes, R., Recherche de la vérité, 511”. Cited in Polo, L., Evidencia y Realidad en 
Descartes, op. cit., 138. 
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are attributed to an agent, with the ensuing punishments then there will 
be an internal trial in which one is the judge of his own behaviour”20. 
1.7) It is notice aslo as an impulse to do good, to act in a positive 
manner and the opposite sensation of not having done anything of 
worth, of omission of failure to act, to contribute. Unless one is sick 
he feels like acting. We are active by nature; not only active but also 
innovative. We want to do something new, something different. We 
want to improve on whatever we find. This is why we are never satis-
fied; no matter where we reach, we want to go further. No matter how 
much we have, we want more. What we want is good; it is something 
that improves our situation, our life, our personality. This impulse, ac-
cording to Polo, comes from the synderesis: “Sometimes it is said that 
the principle known as synderesis is ‘do good and avoid evil’. I prefer 
to express this principle in a simpler way: ‘do good, act’; do as much 
as you can and improve your performance Jump into life, contribute, 
put in your part, do not fall short”21. 
1.8) The fact that we can correct our behaviour and others’ as 
well. It is clear that we are able to rectify when we are corrected or that 
we can help others to be better. Polo gives it as a sign of real friend-
ship. “To correct is to appeal to the friend’s synderesis, the light of 
which is incompatible with the serious mistake, above all in the realm 
of willing”22. Correction does not mean necessarily to avoid evil, it 
can be to choose something better as Augustin indicates, even if he 
does not link this to synderesis. “For in all these good things, whether 
those which I have mentioned, or any others that are to be discerned 
or thought, we could not say that one was better than another, when 
we judge truly, unless a conception of the good itself had been im-
pressed upon us, such that according to it we might both approve some 
things as good, and prefer one good to another”23. 
1.9) We have remorse for deeds we realise we could have done 
well and did wrong or did not do them at all. This experience indicates 
                                                 
20 “De todas maneras, cuando se nota que los actos afectan intrínsecamente al hom-
bre, se descubre a la par que con su actuar moral él se premia o se castiga 
internamente. Platón sostiene que de los actos malos surge el sentido de la culpa. 
De donde, según afirma San Agustín siglos más tarde, el castigo de un ánimo des-
ordenado es su propio desorden. De ese modo salta a la vista, como digo, que el 
hombre se sabe responsable de sus actos, y que los juzga. Si no cabe emitir juicios 
externos por los que se imputan ciertos actos a un agente, con los consiguientes 
castigos, tampoco existe un juicio interno en el que uno es el propio juez de su 
actuar”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2014), 
123. 
21“A veces se dice que el principio que se conoce por la sindéresis es ‘haz el bien y 
evita el mal’”. Prefiero formular ese principio simplemente así: ‘haz el bien, actúa’; 
actúa todo lo que puedas y mejora tu actuación... Lánzate a la vida, aporta, pon de 
tu parte, no te quedes corto”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los 
Temas Clásicos, op.cit. 161. 
22 “La corrección es una apelación a la sindéresis del amigo, cuya luz es incompatible 
con los errores graves, sobre todo en el orden del querer”. Polo, L., “La Amistad 
en Aristóteles”, Anuario Filosófico, vol. 32, (1999), 485. 
23 Augustin, De Trinitate, ed. op. cit., vol. 3, 181. 
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that we feel bad when we are not up to what we feel we should have 
done. The feeling depens on the matter and on the person. This applies 
to our moral feelings of guilt, but also of success when we do achieve 
our best at any particular moment. This depends mainly of an internal 
perception, because it happens even when we are alone, and when we 
know, no one will ever know about what we are thinking or doing. 
This is objectivized as the moral universal feeling we discuss below. 
This is well explained by Rene Simon in his fenomenological analysis 
of remorse as contrasted with repentance24. 
 
2) The reasoned topics could be as follows 
2.1) The existence of natural law. The better known objectiva-
tion of synderesis, has been the topic of natural law already well 
developed in classic times by the stoics, Marcus Tulius Cicero being 
the most outstanding and cited author25. Natural law appeals to some-
thing within the nature of man that tells him what is good and what is 
evil. The link between synderesis and natural law is amply document 
in medieval times, and by those scholars who follow them26. Accord-
ing to Ronheimer, “the natural law is, in fact, the intrinsic principle of 
truth of practical reason and”27; it is “‘written in the heart of man’ not 
only because it is ‘something known’ but specifically because the very 
intellectual opening of the human subject to moral good constitutes a 
‘law’ for human acts, since this opening takes place in a natural 
way”28.  
In our days natural law is seen as the defence from the absolut-
ism of the State and the whimsical desires of tyrants, formulated and 
defended as human rights29. Leonardo Polo is well aware of this, be-
cause after he finished his degree in Law he obtained a grant to study 
                                                 
24 Cfr. Simon, R., Moral (Barcelona: Herder, , 1984), 15-29. 
25 While Cicero is mainly quoted regarding natural law, the most quoted properly 
stoic author is Seneca. “The single most important Roman Stoic on conscience is 
Seneca”. Colish, M., “Synderesis and Conscience: Stoicism and its Medieval 
Transformations”, in From Knowledge to Beatitude: St. Victor, Twelfth-Century 
Scholars, and Beyond, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University Notre Dame, 2012), 231. 
26 Regarding the relationship between the cognitive, and normative aspect of the 
Natural Law and its relation with synderesis: “Knowledge of the nature of a being 
and the inclinations of that nature is knowledge of its dynamic (purposeful) aspect. 
This bears with it a certain axiological message (what helps man achieve a natural 
end is valuable for man), and it bears a normative aspect (one should act in a spe-
cific way to achieve the optimum potentiae). Reflections on nature and the natural 
lead to the question of the function of synderesis in apprehending the natural law”. 
Stepien, K., “Synderesis and the Natural Law”, Studia Gilsoniana, 3 (2014), 391. 
27 Rhonheimer, M., “The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of 
Subjectivity”, The Thomist, 67 (2013), 4. 
28 Ibid., 3. 
29 “De hecho, pueden establecerse los principios legales de toda sociedad por tres 
diferentes caminos: a) siguiendo las costumbres tradicionales de la tribu o de la 
comunidad; b) obedeciendo la voluntad arbitraria y ad hoc de quienes dirigen el 
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the philosophical foundations of natural law30. For Polo natural law is 
not the same as synderesis but one of its activities: “As presiding cog-
nitively human nature, it can be said that synderesis is the source of 
natural law knowledge. In this sense it can be understood as the atten-
tive surveillance to of reality and the ability to judge”31.  
2.2) The universal moral experience. Related to the natural law 
as its foundation is the acceptance of common moral basic experiences 
in the world. They indicate that there is something in the human nature 
–one’s DNA, as people say these days– that makes us feel in a partic-
ular way regarding our moral duties. From the much quoted texts of 
Antigone32, and Cicero33, and the Commentaries and Summas of Me-
dieval Times to all the many defenders of the existence of Natural 
Law, it is clear that there is some common universal moral experi-
ence34. Kant’s practical philosophy is based on this experience as he 
writes in the first lines of his conclusion to the Critic of the Practical 
Reason: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admi-
ration and awe, the more often and the more steadily we reflect on 
them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within”35. Even the 
empiricists believe in the universality of moral experience. We just 
point to Hume (their greatest representative): “I am apt to suspect that 
reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and 
conclusions. The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces char-
acters as amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blamable; that which 
stamps on them the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or censure; 
that which renders morality an active principle and constitutes virtue 
                                                 
aparato del Estado; o c) utilizando la razón humana para descubrir la ley natural 
—resumidamente: por conformismo servil a la costumbre, por arbitrio caprichoso 
o por el uso de la razón humana. Éstas son, en esencia, las únicas vías”. Rothbard, 
M. N., La Ética de la Libertad, (Madrid: Unión Editorial, 1995), 43. 
30 “En 1952, terminados los dos años de cursos comunes en la Facultad de Filosofía 
y Letras, se presenta la oportunidad de encauzar las consideraciones sobre el ca-
rácter existencial del derecho natural con ocasión de una beca de investigación en 
Roma, concedida por el Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, pues en 
dicha ciudad se acababa de abrir una Delegación (el Istituto Iuridico Spagnolo), 
cuyo director era entonces el Prof. Alvaro D’Ors”. Franquet, M. J., “La Trayectoria 
Intellectual de Leonardo Polo”, op. cit., 306. 
31“Como preside cognoscitivamente la naturaleza humana, se puede decir que la sin-
déresis es la fuente del conocimiento de la ley natural. En este sentido se puede 
entender como vigilancia atenta a la realidad y como capacidad de juzgar”. Polo, 
L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 123. 
32 “The unwritten laws of God that know not change. They are not of to-day nor 
yesterday. But live for ever, nor can man assign when first they sprang to being”. 
Sofocles, Antigone, (New York: Collier & Sons, 1909). Accessed April 9, 2015. 
http://www.bartleby.com/8/6/antigone.pdf Lines 498-501. Lines 498-501 
33 Cfr. text already quoted in Chapter IV, note 66. 
34 “Every human being who attains self-awareness and responsibility experiences an 
interior call to do good. He discovers that he is fundamentally a moral being, ca-
pable of perceiving and of expressing the call that, as we have seen, is found within 
all cultures: “One must do good and avoid evil”. In Search of a Universal Ethic: A 
New Look at the Natural Law (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2012), #39. 
35 Kant, I., Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, 
(London: Longmans & Co., 1889), 173. 
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and happiness, and vice our misery: it is probable, I say, that this final 
sentence depends on some internal sense of feeling, which nature has 
made universal in the whole species. For what else can have an influ-
ence of this nature? But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, 
and give proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, 
that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, 
just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated re-
lations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained” 36. 
2.3) Parallelism with common sense. I personally prefer to call 
common sense the integrating sense, which expresses better its func-
tion and avoids the popular use of ‘common sense’ which tends to refer 
either to prudence or synderesis. In the same way that there is a power 
superior to the external senses that distinguishes their acts, the inte-
grating sense, in a way that it knows when each sense is acting and the 
type of act it gives and then forms a unified internal sensation called 
perception, there should be a similar power at the superior level, and 
this could be synderesis that coordinates the will and the intellect.  
Polo explains common sense as follows: “Internal senses, of 
which common sense is the first, are integrating. What does it integrate 
above all? It has to naturally mean the common sensibles. This looks 
clear. But this integration of the common sensibles by the common 
sense presupposes, and this is why it is learning that the common sen-
sibles already are present at the external senses level, and that each of 
those common sensibles is not yet integrated, because it is felt through 
the sensible proper to each of the external senses”37. “Because the ex-
ternal senses are not reflexive, and nevertheless their actualization is 
felt, there should be a new faculty that is called, the common sense”38. 
                                                 
36 Hume, D., Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the 
Principles of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1902), 172. The fact that 
Hume defended this position is also commented by Erwin: “Hence, on Hume’s 
account, legitimate moral judgments, like legitimate color judgments, are intersub-
jective judgments of fact established from a privileged perspective that imposes a 
particular set of conditions. In the moral case, these conditions involve the activity 
of particular sentiments engaged from within the ‘general (moral) view’. Again, in 
much the way color distinctions arguably ultimately rest upon universal or nearly 
universal color experience (under standard conditions), Hume argues that moral 
distinctions ultimately rest upon universal or nearly universal moral experience 
(under standard conditions)”. Erwin, E., Morality with Humean Foundation (Los 
Angeles: University of Southern California, 2008), 14.  
37 “Los sentidos internos, el primero de todos ellos, que es el sensorio común, es una 
integración. Pues bien, esta integración, ¿a qué se referirá ante todo? Tendrá que 
referirse evidentemente a los sensibles comunes. Esto parece claro. Pero esta inte-
gración de los sensibles comunes en el sensorio común presupone, y por eso es un 
aprendizaje, que existen ya los sensibles comunes en el plano de la sensibilidad 
externa, y que cada uno de estos sensibles comunes no está todavía integrado, 
puesto que es sentido a través del sensible propio de cada uno de los sentidos”. 
Polo, L., Lecciones de Psicología Clásica (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2009), 98. 
38 “Como los sentidos externos no son reflexivos y, no obstante, se siente su actuali-
zación, resulta que ha de existir una nueva facultad a la que se ha llamado sensorio 
común”. Ibid., 114. 
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“The function of the common sense is fundamentally integrating; how-
ever, this is not a synthesizing function, but discriminatory: the 
integration is precisely its distinction”39. We could see that at the su-
perior level we may need another integrating faculty that will integrate 
the will and the intelligence, because they are not reflexive either40. 
2.4) The link between understanding and willing. Willing and 
thinking are well integrated, one knows about the other, but it is not 
proper of the will to know, nor of the intelligence to want, so there 
should be a power or something that is able to understand both and 
link them. The integration of the intelligence and the will is very in-
tense. The intellect activity is directed by the will, not as its proper 
function but in its activation. It is a fact that if we do not want to con-
sider something we have to put an effort to do so. We also have 
experienced to prevent ourselves from thinking of the matters we do 
not want to consider. Conversely if the intelligence does not present 
the will all possible options, the will is blind. If the will does not un-
derstand and the mind cannot decide, there should be some way of 
getting them to work together in a very tight integration. This point is 
not exactly like the previous one, because although, it reaches a similar 
conclusion, it is founded on different experiences. The previous one is 
a parallelism between the two integrating powers; this one is based on 
the nature of the intellectual and volitive operations. It is interesting to 
see how this integration is seen as part of the decision process by Ar-
istotle but he does not think of a habit which coordinates both when 
he says: “Hence choice is either desiderative thought or intellectual 
desire, and such an origin of action is a man”41. 
2.5) Parallelism with the first principles of the intellect. This is 
a classical argument used by many medieval authors. If there are first 
speculative principles for the intellect that are the base of all reasoning 
there should be some first practical principles as well for the practical 
intellect, and these first principles are contained in the habit of the syn-
deresis. This is a classic argument which was used for the first time by 
                                                 
39 “Al sensorio común le corresponde una función fundamentalmente integradora, 
pero esta función que no es sintetizante, sino discriminante: la integración consiste 
en la distinción”. Ibid.  
40 “The thesis presiding the essential insight thesis is not too complicated: no human 
act knows itself. Iluminating is always dual, so that self-illumination is impossible. 
In this sense it has been said that the method and the theme are dual”. “La tesis que 
preside la exposición de la intelección esencial no es demasiado complicada: nin-
gún acto humano se conoce a sí mismo. La iluminación es siempre dual, de tal 
modo que es imposible la autoiluminación. En este sentido se ha dicho que el mé-
todo y el tema son duales”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 22. 
41 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 1133 b 3, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, 
op. cit., 87. It is interesting to note that a colleague and good friend of Polo does 
not mention synderesis in his article when quoting this text. Cfr. Llano, A., “¿Ac-
cidentes Morales”, in Ética sin Religión?  op.cit., 87. 
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William of Auxerre in his Summa Aurea (c. 1220)42 that later became 
a standard explanation of synderesis43. 
c) Summary 
In the first section we went through the history of lack of interest 
of proving the existence of synderesis by those who dealt with the 
topic. In the second we tried to give some experiences that can help to 
show its existence and then –more for those acquainted with philo-
sophical topics– some rational proofs based on already established 
concepts. The proofs are not conclusive for those who only trust their 
senses, but then they will not be able to understand themselves, nor 
understand others, nor any proper manifestation of human beings, 
even if they think they do by reducing the explanations to a lower level 
of knowledge.  
The next step is somehow linked with this one. If synderesis ex-
ists, how can we know, or better, discover, its existence? The 
arguments given above can clarify this a little, but what type of 
knowledge is this? Is it objective, habitual, mystical? Let us try to clar-
ify this matter. 
 
3. Knowledge of synderesis 
One thing is to-know and another to-know-how-we-know that 
we know. This is clearly stated by Sellés with regards to personal 
knowledge: “We are persons and we know it, though we have to show 
philosohically how we know it, i.e. what is the method of knowing that 
reaches the person as a theme?”44. In our case the question can be for-
mulated: what is the method that reaches synderesis as a theme? 
                                                 
42 Cfr. Farrell, D., The Ends of the Moral Virtues and the First Principles ff Practical 
Reason in Thomas Aquinas (Rome: Gregorian & Biblical Press, 2012), 37. 
43 “The intelligence can be understood in two ways with reference to the ways the 
principles are known as Aristotle says that it is proper of the intelligence to imme-
diately receive the propositions and in this acception it is always right. The other 
way the synderesis is always true regarding the first principles in doing, because 
in the same way that there are some things immediately known in speculation, 
there are others that are immediately known in acting in which the natural strengh 
consists”. “Intellectus duobus modis accipitur: quandoque dicitur intellectus cog-
nitio principiorum in unaquaque facultate, secundum quod dicit Aristóteles, quod 
intellectus est acceptio immediate propositions: et secundum hoc intellectus sem-
per est verus in speculativis. Eodem modo synderesis semper est vera quantum ad 
primam viam in faciendis. quia sicut in speculativis sunt quaedam que per se sunt 
nota, quae sunt principia speculandi ita in agendis sunt quaedam principia agendi 
per se nota. in quibus vis nature consistit”. Guillelmus Autissiodorensis, Summa 
Aurea, (Paris: Durand Gerlier, 1501), 118-129. 
44 “Somos personas y sabemos que lo somos, tenemos que dar razón filosóficamente 
de cómo lo sabemos, es decir, de cuál es el método cognoscitivo humano que al-
canza como tema al ser personal”. Sellés, J. F., “La Amistad y el Saber Personal”, 
Sapientia, vol. 60/ 218 (2005) p. 381. 
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While we cannot speak on how synderesis is known without 
knowing properly what synderesis is, which is the topic of the follow-
ing chapter, we shall try to see how habits are distinguished from their 
faculties in this section; later, once the nature of synderesis is properly 
discussed, we can be more precise regarding the type of knowledge 
that knows it and the type of knowledge it gives, since, like all innate 
habits, synderesis is actually a type of knowledge. 
One of the most frequent topics of discussion regarding syn-
deresis is whether it is a faculty, a habit or an impulse. Albert and 
Aquinas suggested it was a mixture of both, “potentia cum habitu”45, 
power with habit, perhaps to combine the impulse to do good, and its 
content. The impulse is the actual inclination to do good, the content 
of the principles that help to discover what is good46. 
a) Distinguishing faculties among themselves 
To discuss this, we have firstly to see how to distinguish differ-
ent faculties. We distinguish them by the different actions a person 
performs, which are incompatible one from the other. In this way we 
distinguish the will from the intelligence in that the will takes deci-
sions while the intellect presents many possibilities that may not be 
acted upon; so acting is different from knowing. Though they need 
each other, each approaches reality in a different way. The intelli-
gence’s object is intentional in that it refers to the reality outside it 
while in the activity of the intellect, its product, the object remains in 
the knower as an alteration, an enrichment of the intelligence47. The 
will’s intentionality is properly intentionality of other being; it tries to 
reach what is real outside the person. Polo refers usually to this as ‘in-
tentionality of other’, to mean that what it looks for is something 
different ‘other’ than the person48. 
                                                 
45 “Licet enim potentia de se non juvet potentiam vel inclinet ad bonum, tamen 
potentia cum habitu juvat et inclinat”. Albertus Magnus, De Creaturis q. 72, a. 1, 
sol., in Opera Omnia, op. cit., vol. 35, 599. 
46 Regarding synderesis, Collado seems to share the opinion that Aquinas did not 
give too much importance to the distinction between habit and faculty. “Thomas 
Aquinas says that it does not matter to say that the intellect (here he is making a 
parallel reference to synderesis) be a habit or a power perfected by a habit”. “To-
más de Aquino dice que es indiferente afirmar que el intelecto (en realidad aquí 
está haciendo tambien un paralelismo con la sindéresis) sea un hábito o bien la 
potencia perfeccionada por el hábito”. Collado, S., Noción de Hábito en la Teoría 
del Conocimiento de Polo (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2000), 63. 
47 The intentionality of the intellect and its relation with freedom is well explained 
in Di Blasi, F., “Love, Intellect and Will in Thomas Aquinas”, in Willing the good 
ed. Gabriele De Anna, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2012). His explanation could be more complete by including the intention of the 
will to the good which he does not mention. 
48 López Quintas based the entire ethics in this capacity of growing and expresses 
this increased capacity of growing in a general manner rather than referring it to 
the habits. “Quiero mostrar en este libro las inmensas posibilidades de que dispo-
nemos para crecer y alcanzar altas cotas de plenitud y felicidad”. p. xix and “el 
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b) Distinguishing faculties from their habits 
Once the faculties are distinguished by the objects of their spe-
cific actions, the second step is to know how to distinguish each 
faculty from the habits belonging to it. The difficulty consists in that a 
habit is not something that the faculty has49, but a way of acting of the 
faculty, so the faculty can hardly be distinguished from its act because 
it is always acting through its habits50. We can distinguish the faculty 
from its habits if the faculty has several habits. We have to see how 
each faculty acts and then find in their activities what is common to all 
of them and what is different to distinguish what is specific of each 
habit and how it modulates the faculty. For example, what is common 
to all intellectual habits is that they provide abstract knowledge, and 
that what is common to all habits of the will is the desire to get some-
thing specific, to do or accept something. 
An objection to seeing habits as modulations of the faculties, in-
creased powers of the faculty to act in a different way, is Polo’s 
insistence in that habits are a way of having. It is clear that the faculty 
has a new power but it will not be proper to understand this new power 
as something different from the faculty, as an addition to it. It is more 
a categorical type, a quality. Having mathematical or linguistic habits 
are modifications of the intelligence –probably accompanied by some 
neurological change– so, because the intelligence has new powers, we 
can say that something has changed, has acquired something that be-
fore it did not have. We can also say that it has it as a seed, a potency, 
which has been activated. I personally prefer to express this change as 
an activation, an improvement of the intelligence, which is a habit, 
rather than saying that it ‘has’ which sounds more as a reification of a 
spiritual quality, or can easily be confused with the categorical habit, 
e.g. ‘having a dress on’, or ‘having malaria’. This does not contradict 
what Polo and previous thinkers say about the habits, but simply tries 
to make more clear the radical difference between the category of hab-
its –a dress– and the spiritual habits of the intelligence and will –being 
able to solve equations or being just. 
c) Distinguishing habits from acts 
Once we have distinguished the faculty from the habits, a third 
step is to distinguish between the habit and the actions performed. 
                                                 
mismo proceso de crecimiento nos irá descubriendo nuevos y más altos horizon-
tes”. López Quintás, A., La ética o es Transfiguración o no es Nada (Madrid: BAC, 
2014), XX.  
49 Habit comes from have, habere. It could be clearer if they are spelled as “havits” 
in English so as to show their meaning in a clearer way. 
50 “The habits of the will are intrinsic perfections following the exercise of their acts; 
therefore, as acquired perfections, are held by the power in a most intimate way: 
they are, as faculty’s own perfections, their own growth or strengthening”. “Los 
hábitos de la voluntad… son perfecciones intrínsecas que siguen al ejercicio de sus 
actos; por tanto, como perfecciones adquiridas, son poseídas por la facultad del 
modo más íntimo: constituyen, como perfecciones suyas, su propio crecimiento o 
fortalecimiento”. Polo, L., Introducción a la filosofía, op. cit., 164.  
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From the outside we see only the actions coming from the decisions 
of the will, and the objects known by the intelligence. The acting per-
son, the one who takes the decision or comes to know something, not 
only knows the content of the specific decision taken or knowledge 
acquired, he also knows that he has done the action (conscience), that 
the action is good or bad (moral conscience), that it is properly done 
or not (prudence), that it gives him pleasure or not (moderation) and 
whether it has been difficult to take or not (fortitude). Saying it in a 
different way, the object is known by the act and is exhausted by the 
act; what is specific of the habit is to know that the act has taken place, 
and how it has taken place. In the will, similarly, I know that I like 
some particular thing or things (simple desire), that I rank them ac-
cording to a criteria and choose one in particular (decision) and that I 
do the necesary to acquire it (active use) which are the habits of the 
will preceded by habits of the practical reason. 
The distinction between the knowledge given by the habit and 
by the act is easy to distinguish in the case of intellectual knowledge. 
The objective knowledge belongs to the act, the habit is the knowledge 
that the act, the activity of the power, that has taken place. This second 
knowledge cannot be objective, otherwise it will be confused with the 
object. This means that the habit is different, not only from the faculty 
but from the object aquired by the intelligence and from the action 
performed throuth the will.  
Let us try to see it in a different way. How does the intelligence 
know that it is knowing? At the sensitive level the one that knows that 
the sight is seeing cannot be the eye, because seeing is not visible; the 
act of seeing has no colour, nor shape, and it is not outside one’s eyes. 
There is need for a sense which knows that the eye is seeing and sim-
ilarly that it knows that the other senses are also being impressed 
simultaneously by the same object, i.e., that knows the acts of all the 
senses. It should know that they are active, and know what is common 
to them, and what is different. This is the integrating/coordinating 
sense, as already mentioned. At the intellectual level, because of its 
spirituality, many authors have claimed that there is no need for such 
a distinction because the intelligence, being spiritual, is reflexive: it 
knows and at the same time knows that it knows. For Polo this is not 
to understand what knowledge is about. Polo is very clear in affirming 
that there is no reflexivity at any level of knowledge. In knowledge the 
object exhausts the capacity of the act51, so the knowledge of the act 
                                                 
51 If the object will include the thinking, in such a way that one will think when 
thinking the object, this is, if what is thought would be the thinking, the pair know-
ing-known would be a reflexive self-clarification. This never happens: the thinking 
is never thought as the object”. “Si el pensamiento estuviera en el objeto de manera 
que se pensara cuando se piensa el objeto, esto es, si lo pensado fuese el pensar, el 
par conocer-conocido sería una auto¬aclaración reflexiva. Eso no ocurre nunca: 
nunca se piensa el pensar como lo pensado.”. Polo, L.,  
Curso de Teoría de Conocimiento, II, op.cit. p.93. Sellés expresses this as follows: 
“The habit shows the act of thinking. We think ideas, but to manifest thinking 
cannot be an act because the act is exhausted in presenting the ideas”. “El hábito 
manifiesta el pensar. Pensamos ideas, pero manifestar el pensar no puede correr a 
cargo de un acto, porque el acto se agota presentando ideas”. Sellés, J. F., Hábitos 
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itself belongs to other types of knowledge, not to objective knowledge, 
and Polo says the knowledge of the act as act belongs to habitual 
knowledge. The act of knowing is a reality which is different from the 
reality known, and the ‘object’ that refers to that external reality. 
Whenever I know something I know that I know. This knowledge of 
knowing is common to all my acts of knowledge, but the objects are 
different each time. The knowledge of ‘the knowing’ is the habit. An 
interesting issue will be to find out if there is only need for one habit 
that knows when I know with the intelligence, or whether each type of 
intellectual knowledge can be just known by one habit, which could 
be synderesis, a kind of integrating sense at the spiritual level, as the 
common sense is the integrating sense at the sensitive level. Polo sug-
gests that each different type of intellectual act has a proper habit, and 
that each habit penetrates more in the initial abstract presented by the 
lower of the intellectual operations and that, nevertheless, that syn-
deresis knows of all those habits, being above them in the hierarchy of 
knowledge. 
d) What type of knowledge do habits give? 
Polo distinguishes three types of intellectual knowledge: objec-
tive (which he also calls operational), habitual and personal 
knowledge. We have already discussed them, but here we shall try to 
distinguish briefly what type of knowledge they give.  
Objective knowledge is the knowledge in act, given by the intel-
ligence; habitual knowledge is knowledge of our actions, of the 
activity of knowing or willing; and personal knowledge is knowledge 
of our being, which is neither objective nor habitual but purely actual 
because it is the act of being52. 
Leonardo Polo highlights an important characteristic of habitual 
knowledge, that it is not intentional. Intentionality is a characteristic 
of the objective knowledge, which is always referential. Habitual 
                                                 
y Virtud II, ed. op. cit., 43. Cfr. also: Collado, S., Noción de Hábito en la Teoría 
del Conocimiento de Polo, op. cit. 
52 “When one deals with knowledge or with other dimensions of what is immaterial 
and created, the proper distinction or the most correct is the distinction between 
degrees, hierarchical, and not the simple numeric distinctions. These are distinc-
tions between what is superior and inferior. I insist, therefore, that operational 
knowledge is inferior knowledge. Above it are other levels of knowledge, other 
types of acts of knowledge, from which we can highlight two: habitual knowledge 
–I consider it being knowledge in act, but not actual, superior to the operational 
knowledge–, and the knowledge as act of being: as ‘esse hominis’” “Cuando se 
trata del conocimiento o de otras dimensiones de lo inmaterial creado, la distinción 
más propia o más correcta es la distinción de grado, jerárquica, y no la simple 
distinción numérica. Se trata de distinciones entre lo superior y lo inferior. Pues 
bien, insisto, el conocimiento operativo es el conocimiento inferior. Por encima de 
él existen otros niveles o modos de conocer: otros tipos de actos cognoscitivos, de 
los cuales podemos destacar dos: el conocimiento habitual –considero que es un 
conocimiento en acto, aunque no actual, superior al conocimiento operativo–, y el 
conocimiento como acto de ser: como esse hominis”. Polo, L., Antropología Tras-
cendental I, op. cit., 21. 
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knowledge is not referential; so, what is it? As said before, it is com-
mon to understand all knowledge as actual knowledge and regard 
habitual and personal knowledge as ‘feelings’ because: habits are not 
intentional; they are not referential; they do not ‘present’ objects: “The 
habit is the ontological perfection that corresponds to a non-organic 
faculty. It is the strict noetic reality of a faculty. Consequently habits 
are not intentional and therefore they are not objective”53. 
Polo does not defend that habits are feelings; he wants just to 
point out is that they are strictly different from objective knowledge 
and therefore cannot be reduced, identified with this type of 
knowledge. By saying that it is a “strictly noetic reality” Polo is mak-
ing an ontological claim, which is that the habit is really part of the 
faculty, not something added to it, but a change in the faculty, that is 
what the classics will call a mental distinction based on reality. The 
reality is the same but it is seen as changed. He calls the type of 
knowledge the habits give as “manifestative”: “Habitual knowledge is 
manifestation (manifestative knowledge, not objective knowledge)”54.  
We shall not enter into the different habits of the intellect and of 
the will which are already well explained by Polo in his Curso de te-
oría del conocimiento and amply commented by his disciples55. We 
are only interested in the habit of synderesis. We will use the distinc-
tion he makes between the method of knowledge and the theme of the 
habits to show how the habit gives knowledge56.  
 
                                                 
53 “El hábito es la perfección ontológica que corresponde a una facultad no orgánica. 
Es la realidad estrictamente noética de una facultad. En consecuencia el hábito no 
es intencional, por consiguiente no es objetivo”. Polo, L., “Sobre los Hábitos”, op. 
cit., 2. 
54 “El saber habitual es manifestación (conocimiento manifestativo, no conocimiento 
objetivo)”. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento III, op. cit., 14. “El cono-
cimiento habitual no guarda conmensuración: no es arbitrario, pero tampoco es 
objetivo. El conocimiento habitual es manifestativo”. Ibid., 24. “Por consiguiente, 
hay que admitir otro acto de conocer, que he llamado manifestativo de la operación 
intelectual; ese acto es el hábito”. Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento IV/II (Pam-
plona: Eunsa, 2004), 156. “Dicha jerarquía sólo es posible si existe el conocimiento 
habitual adquirido, que es manifestativo de la operación y perfectivo de la potencia 
intelectual”. Ibid., 157 
55 In the ample bibliography we can highlight the studies of Juan A. García González, 
Urbano Ferrer and Juan Fernando Sellés. For more detailed references cf. García 
González, J. A., Obra de y sobre Leonardo Polo, op. cit. 
56 We have already seen that synderesis has been considered as habitual knowledge 
in the historical Chapters III and IV. Most authors have seen that habitual 
knowledge is somehow noticed, but few can explain it and integrate it through 
synderesis. An example for the need for a better explanation of habitual knowledge 
can be perceived in MacIntyre: “For that too would be an order whose underlying 
principle would need to be identified and itself put in question, but a movement 
towards the preconceptual, the presystematic, and the prediscursive which itself 
necessarily cannot but be comprehended in terms that are conceptual, systematic, 




e) Are there habits at the sensitive level? 
While personal knowledge is above the knowledge given by syn-
deresis, we have to explicitly distinguish both; personal knowledge 
being the supreme act of the person, and synderesis which should be a 
habit below it57. Below the knowledge of synderesis and the other two 
innate acts we have the knowledge of the intellect as faculty, with its 
corresponding acquired habits, and the sensitive knowledge. Not to 
confuse each level is a matter of importance so as not to reduce higher 
realities to lower ones as, for example, the empiricists do.  
Knowledge is not a piece-meal collection of knowledge, a king 
of collection of bits and pieces, as if our knowledge was just a jigsaw 
puzzle. The contrary is more akin to reality; one distinguishes specific 
bits of knowledge from a global prespective. In psychology this was 
highlighted by the Gestalt theory and in philosophy by the personalist 
theories of Scheler58. We have a global picture from which we, later, 
stopping to think about it, analyse our knowledge searching for the 
different elements that compose the whole. We have first a global pic-
ture that includes all what we have seen, heard, tasted, smelled, felt the 
heat, humidity, pressure, memory of similar situations, according to 
what we had in the imagination, and the intention we have to act or not 
on a particular direction. We go from what is complex to the elements 
that constitute it but without forgetting that knowledge is a plexus 
where most things are interrelated, because the way we see and know 
is influenced by our memories, fantasies, desires and intentions. 
To analyze our perceptions we have to stop and look deeply into 
them. See how can distinguish one sensation from the others, by trying 
to see which one remains when other sensations dissappear. Individu-
alizing external sensations is not very difficult; when we close our 
eyes, we do not see, when we take something out of our mouth, we 
stop tasting it, when we close our nose we stop smelling, when we 
close our ears we stop hearing, when we stop touching something we 
do not feel the pressure, heat, cold or pain. More difficult to notice is 
                                                 
57 Leonardo Polo insists that synderesis is at the esential level, rather than at the 
personal level, in spite of it being innate. The natural way will be to place it at the 
personal level as Sellés did in Sellés, J. F., Hábitos y Virtud II, op. cit., 49. “The 
voice that internaly speaks of knowledge and willing can be neither of the reason, 
nor of the will, but has to be superior to both. It has to be at the personal level”. 
“La voz que interiormente habla del conocer y del querer no puede ser ni de la 
razón, ni de la voluntad, sino que tiene que ser superior a ambas. Tiene que estar a 
nivel de la persona”. 
58 “Aquel acto contiene, pues, siempre percepción externa e interna, conciencia del 
cuerpo, un amar y odiar, un percibir sentimental y preferir, un querer y un no que-
rer, un juzgar, un recordar, un representar, etc. Todas estas distinciones, por 
necesarias que sean, sin embargo, reproducen tan sólo —si miramos a la persona— 
rasgos abstractos del acto concreto de la persona. Así como la persona no se ha de 
comprender como una mera conexión de sus actos, así tampoco se puede compren-
der un acto concreto de la persona como la mera suma o estructuración de tales 
esencias abstractas de actos. Más bien es la persona misma la que, viviendo en 
cada uno de sus actos, empapa por completo cada uno de ellos con su peculiari-
dad”. Scheler, M., Etica, op. cit., 516. 
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the sense of equilibrium which is also a sensation, the kinetic sense 
when we move muscles, or the feelings of tiredness, thirst, sleep, 
which are more diffuse, but whose origin is mainly organic. Imagina-
tion and memory are the easiet internal faculties to distinguish. The 
integrating sense requires already a fairly developed theory of 
knowledge, and it is even more complex to isolate the estimative. 
Both, integrating sense and estimative are normally not distinguished 
by common people. All these comprise the senses of mammals closer 
to humans, but in humans, the imagination, memory and estimative 
sense are deeply influenced by the intellect, making them radically 
different from the same faculties in animals. Polo does a fairly good 
analysis of these senses in some of his books59.  
The distinction between the intelligence and the fantasy’s higest 
levels is more difficult to establish. This difficulty can explain the an-
imism of earlier humans who, unaware of the anthropomorphism 
tendency we have, attributed feelings and decisions to animals, vege-
tals, stars and other natural forces60. Another hint of this difficulty can 
be seen in the dispute to establish a net difference between human and 
animal intelligence. Without getting the actual proofs, explained in the 
above-quoted Polo’s works and others from his disciples61, we accept 
that the estimative and imagination are the highest form of sensitive 
knowledge, while the intelligence and will are superior by being spir-
itual and that this spirituality, or total immateriality, is the radical 
difference between humans and animals. 
As we already quoted, Polo defends that there are no proper hab-
its in the sensitive faculties because they are linked to organs. The so-
called organic faculties do not grow as such62. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges some type of growing or learning mainly in the memory 
and imagination. It is something well known that skills can be acquired 
and that physical activities can even modify the organs; the hand of a 
pianist do not look like the hands of a boxer or a mason; the eyes of a 
painter distinguish more colours than of a computer coder; the ears of 
a musician distinguish many more sounds than a heavy machine oper-
ator. Similarly, the memory of an advocate usually is higher than that 
of a watchman, and the imagination of a novelist than that of a carpen-
ter. Skills are acquired also in animals, but in humans they are much 
more developed thanks to the power of the intelligence and will, so the 
habit can be more on the source, the intelligence and will, rather than 
on the imagination or memory. Similarly, humans can domesticate an-
imals and make them acquire skills they naturally will not have in the 
                                                 
59 Cfr. Polo, L., Lecciones de Psicología Clásica (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2009); Curso 
de psicología general (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2009); Curso de Teoría del Conoci-
miento I, (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2006). 
60 This anthropomorphic tendency is still alive as can be seen in the popularity of 
cartoons, where animals, vegetals, and even toys, share our feelings. 
61 Cfr. Sellés, J. F., Antropología para Inconformes, op. cit.; Yepes, R. and Arangu-
ren, J., Fundamentos de Antropología: un Ideal de la Excelencia Humana, 6ª ed. 
(Pamplona: Eunsa, 2009). 
62 Cfr. text already cited in note 103. 
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will. One just has to go to a circus to see how chimpanzees, dogs, ele-
phants, can do things they do not do in their natural environment.  
We can conclude that there are no proper habits at the sensitive 
level but that some organic changes and skills are acquired by the in-
fluence of the intelligence and will in humans and that some training 
can be done to animals to acquire skills not proper to them in the wild. 
f) Relationship of synderesis with the habits and acts of objective 
knowledge 
How is synderesis known? Synderesis is a habit and habits are 
known, neither objectively nor through images but directly. Habits are 
felt but this special type of feeling cannot be transferred properly to 
words, and even if we try, the words are not the feelings. The words 
make the habit look like an object, when it is neither an object nor an 
image. They are a kind of happenings which can somehow be sensed 
but not properly declared. The knowledge of habits has some simili-
tude with the feelings of pain, hunger or warmth but they cannot be 
easily located to a specific sense, they are diffusive. For example, we 
know the position and movement of the hands in pitch darkness but 
we do not see them. Normally we do not reflect how we can do this, 
what type of knowledge makes this possible we just know it. Later we 
may discover that we have sensors in the muscles that give us the 
movement of the muscles and we can establish the relative position of 
each. Similarly, with habits, we use them but have to stop to think to 
distinguish how we know them. The habitual knowledge was noted as 
different from the objective knowledge but assimilated to other types 
of knowledge, normally to feelings in general or to a more specific 
rational type of knowledge, such as feelings of beauty, moral feelings 
(Plato, Hutchenson, F., Butler, J., Shopenhauer, A.), even to simple 
passions, among them mainly pleasure (Hobbes, T., Locke J., Price, 
R., Hume, D.63, Baron de Montesquieu, Benthan, J, Stuart Mill, J.)64. 
MacIntyre’s words already quoted above can explain this better: “the 
preconceptual, the pre-systematic, and the prediscursive which itself 
necessarily cannot but be comprehended in terms that are conceptual, 
systematic, and discursive”65.  
Polo compares the difference between habits and feelings in de-
tail by explaining that ‘feelings’ are a response of the good or bad 
working of faculties: “Feeling is a passion because it is consequent to 
the operation of the faculty, and it reports on the status of the faculty 
regarding the operation”66. Though they give some information of 
                                                 
63 “Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judged of”. Hume, D., A treatise 
of human nature, op. cit., 716. 
64 Cfr. MacIntyre, A. C., A Short History of Ethics, op. cit. 
65 MacIntyre, A. C., Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, op. cit., 53. 
66 “El sentimiento es una pasión en tanto que consecuencia de la operación en la 
potencia, e informa acerca de la situación de la facultad respecto de la operación. 
Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento I, op. cit., 276. Also “A feeling is 
information on whether the object conforms with the faculty”. “Un sentimiento es 
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agreement or disagreement they cannot be considered acts of 
knowledge because they are not acts, but, so to speak, only by-prod-
ucts. As Polo states, “feelings, somehow resemble knowledge, but 
improperly because they are not acts. They give indications about the 
faculty”67. Furthermore, the little bit of befitting does not refer to real-
ity but to the working of the operation, though the operation is also 
some type of reality of the subject who knows: “The feeling is not 
about the adequacy of what I know with reality, but what I know with 
the same faculty. Therefore, feelings’ function is to report on capac-
ity”68. The little knowledge given by feelings is mainly about 
themselves, and somehow about the faculties’ functioning. So they de-
pend more on the state of the faculties of the subjects than on reality. 
The same external reality can give opposite reactions depending on the 
state of health of the person. We all have experienced that the same 
greeting to a friend can produce either joy or anger, depending on his 
situation. Polo explains this as follows: “What type of knowledge does 
the feeling give? It is mostly about itself though it also is a deliberate 
allusion to something else. For example, a toothache does only report 
about itself; although there is a reference to something else. And joy? 
Joy is within its own joy; the informative nature of joy is the joy itself. 
The feeling remains in itself, so to speak”69.  
Habits are special types of feelings, because they are knowledge 
acts, but not objective70. Nevertheless, the difference is subtle and re-
quires diligent contrast. “The feelings that are cognitive acts are the 
                                                 
una información sobre la conveniencia del objeto con la facultad”. Ibid., 272. We 
tend to agree with Polo rather than with Ricoeur in spite of his fine analyisis of 
sentiments. We agree they are a way of knowing, therefore an affection of con-
science, but not that there are intentional in the sense of giving a direct knowledge 
of reality. Ricoeur does not seem to distinguish the four levels of knowledge: sen-
sitive, objective, habitual and personal. “Sentiments are affections of conscience 
that give testimony (of what is felt). The sentiment is intentional; has an intentional 
object: what is felt”. “El sentimiento es un modo de conciencia que sirve de testi-
monio (de aquello sentido). El sentimiento es intencional; tiene un objeto 
intencional: lo sentido”. Cited by Sellés, J. F., “Los Sentimientos en Ricoeur”, (un-
published manuscript), 4. 
67 “Los sentimientos, en cierto modo, se parecen al conocer, pero impropiamente 
porque no son actos. Son indicaciones acerca de la facultad”. Polo, L., Curso de 
Teoría del Conocimiento I, op. cit., 275. 
68 “El sentimiento no es una información acerca de la adecuación de lo que conozco 
con la realidad, sino de lo que conozco con la facultad misma. Por tanto, función 
del sentimiento es informar acerca de la capacidad”. Ibid., 269. 
69 “El recurso al sentimiento no es ninguna simpleza, porque en cuanto hay discer-
nimiento, eso que tengo ante mí no soy yo. Solamente si el conocimiento de mí 
mismo no se separa de mí mismo, no se diferencia de mí, no se desdobla; eso puede 
ser el conocimiento como no distinto de la existencia. Pero ¿de qué da noticia el 
sentimiento? También es una alusión intencional a otra cosa, pero sobre todo de sí. 
Por ejemplo, en el dolor de muelas el dolor no informa más que de sí mismo, aun-
que haya una alusión a otra cosa. ¿Y la alegría? La alegría está en sus propios 
entresijos, el carácter informativo de la alegría es la alegría misma. El sentimiento 
está en sí mismo, por así decirlo. Polo, L., La Esencia del Hombre, (Pamplona: 
Eunsa, 2006), 246. 
70 “See straight through is peculiar to the habitual experience, neither of the feelings 
nor of the fundamental question as intended by Heidegger. Bergson’s suggestion: 
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habits. But the intelligence is the only faculty capable of habits. Habits 
are something like hyper-feelings”71.  
Among the feelings, Leonardo Polo reserves the term ‘affection’ 
to the spiritual feelings that innate habits give72 and in other texts he 
suggests the reality they point at: “Affections can be called the spirit’s 
feelings, they point to what transcends us: wisdom to God; the habit 
of first principles to being; synderesis, to the goods”73. In the same 
paragraph he also identifies these affections with what the medieval 
authors called ‘connatural knowledge’ and that the three innate habits 
show the spiritual characteristic of looking for ‘more’. This ambition 
for more is a feeling innate habits give of their limitation which can be 
described as an ever unfulfilled desire to seek completion. This ex-
plains one of the characteristics that distinguish human beings from 
animals; humans are never satisfied: “It can also be said that the affec-
tions of connatural knowledge are also dual. Firstly because they 
inform of the innate habit, secondly, they reveal the ontological limi-
tation accompanying such habits and, therefore, the honourable step 
of bringing them to completion”74. In some occasions he describes the 
specific affection of connatural knowledge, as “noticia” not meaning 
‘news’ but ‘noticing’: “Another higher form of human knowledge is 
connatural knowledge, also called notice, which is notably of affective 
nature”75.  
                                                 
‘the highest form of instinct is ilumination’, would be acceptable”. “Ver directa-
mente a través es peculiar de la experiencia habitual y no de los sentimientos ni de 
la pregunta fundamental como pretende Heidegger. Cabe aceptar la sugerencia de 
Bergson: la forma superior de instinto es la iluminación habitual”. Polo, L., Antro-
pología Trascendental II, op. cit., 80. 
71 “Los sentimientos que son actos cognoscitivos son los hábitos. Pero la inteligencia 
es la única facultad capaz de hábitos. El hábito es algo así como el hipersenti-
miento”. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento I, op. cit., 275. Clearly Polo 
defends the existence of habits in the will and of innate habits but his affirmation 
that ‘only intelligence has habits’ has to be taken within the context of his lecture, 
in which he was comparing the intelligence with sensitive knowledge. 
72 “Spiritual acts, both of intelligence as of the will, are accompanied by affections. 
Acts of sentient life are accompanied by feelings. But at present I will not develop 
this topic; it should be noted that the affections increase with the habits, to which, 
in a way, are assimilated”. “Los actos espirituales, tanto los de la inteligencia como 
los de la voluntad, son acompañados por los afectos. Los actos de la vida sensible 
son acompañados por los sentimientos. Aunque ahora no desarrollaré el tema, con-
viene indicar que los afectos se incrementan con los hábitos, a los cuales, en cierto 
modo, se asimilan”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 171. 
73 “Los afectos se pueden denominar sentimientos del espíritu, y apuntan a lo que 
nos trasciende: la sabiduría, a Dios; el hábito de los primeros principios, al ser; la 
sindéresis, al bien”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades, (Pamplona: 
Eunsa, 2005), 231. 
74 “Cabe decir también que los afectos en que consiste el conocimiento por connatu-
ralidad son duales. Por una parte, informan de la existencia de los hábitos innatos, 
y por otra, de la limitación ontológica que acompaña a dichos hábitos y, por lo 
tanto, del paso honroso de llevarlos a la culminación”. Ibid.  
75 “Otra alta forma del conocimiento humano el conocimiento por connaturalidad o 
por noticia, que es señaladamente de índole afectiva”. Polo, L., Epistemología, 
Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 250. 
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In Polo’s latest works there is a tendency to reserve the name 
notice to the affections of the innate habits: “Notices can be considered 
in the same order of the abandonment of the mental limit. It is also 
correct to call knowledge by connaturality to the innate habits as af-
fections’ knowledge”76. This will give room to differentiate the 
feelings of the innate habits from those of the acquired habits, i.e. the 
habits of the intellect and of the will77.  
At this level, the esential level, one has to distinguish the supe-
rior habit, synderesis, which is constitutive of the will, and iluminates 
the imagination to make possible the specific acts of the intelligence78, 
and of the will, which are acquired79. So synderesis is a superior habit 
in that it is innate and that it activates the acquired habits of the intel-
ligence and of the will. “However, if synderesis’ theme is the will by 
a higher reason synderesis must also illuminate the intellectual faculty. 
To start with, the intellectual power does not know itself, nor its oper-
ations –which just know objects–, nor even with the acquired habits –
which just manifest the operations. In this regard, synderesis enshrines 
the impossibility of knowing reflexively”80.  
g) Relationship of synderesis with the habits and acts of personal 
knowledge 
The distinction between feelings and affections is helpful and we 
can go further trying to see the particular way synderesis can be known 
                                                 
76 “Las noticias pueden ser integradas en la línea del abandono del límite mental. A 
la captación de los hábitos innatos según la afectividad es también correcto lla-
marla connaturalidad”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 
227. 
77 It is interesting to note the difference between the detailed and ontological ap-
proach of Polo as compared with Ricouer’s approach where the sentiments are 
somehow just consciousness, and therefore there is no good distinction between 
sensible kowledge, intellectual, apetitive at the sensible level, affections of the will 
and of the person, and the distinction between objective, habitual and personal 
habits. Ricouers fenomenological approach may end in a voluntarism based on 
feelings and a sentimental ethics, mainly subjective. Cfr. for a more detailed as-
sessment: Sellés, J. F., “Los Sentimientos en Ricoeur”, op. cit. 
78 “Moreover, the first intellectual operation is abstraction. The dependence of the 
intellectual potency to synderesis should be understood as what in traditional phi-
losophy, is called enlightenment of the phantasma, which is prior to the activation 
of the intellectual operations”. “Por otra parte, la primera operación intelectual es 
la abstracción. La dependencia de la potencia intelectual respecto de la sindéresis 
ha de entenderse según lo que, en la filosofía tradicional, se llama iluminación de 
los fantasmas, la cual es previa a la suscitación de las operaciones intelectuales”. 
Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 22. 
79 “Por su parte, la sindéresis es una iluminación superior a la de los hábitos adqui-
ridos y a la iluminación intencional; asimismo, la sindéresis ilumina la verdad de 
la voluntad”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 148. 
80 “Ahora bien, si el tema de la sindéresis es la voluntad, por mayores motivos ha de 
iluminar también la potencia intelectual. Por lo pronto, la potencia intelectual no 
se conoce a sí misma, ni tampoco con sus operaciones –las cuales simplemente 
conocen objetos–, ni siquiera con los hábitos adquiridos –los cuales manifiestan 
las operaciones–. En este sentido, cabe decir que la sindéresis consagra la imposi-
bilidad de conocer reflexivamente”. Ibid., 149. 
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by looking at how the other two innate habits, wisdom and the habits 
of the first principles, are known. Polo places these two habits at the 
personal level because they give knowledge of acts of being, as the 
likeness of being is needed to know other beings as beings81.  
Through wisdom one knows one’s intimacy, one’s personal act 
of being82. One also feels each of the personal transcendentals in dif-
ferent ways, e.g. the need to socialise, the inherent freedom one has 
when making decisions, the personal non-transferable knowledge and 
the irreplaceable personal love, wisdom is a feeling of the most inner 
spiritual intimacy. No other person has access to it, and one is aware 
that it cannot be grasped in its entirety ever, neither directly nor using 
the intelligence or synderesis, because the person is above them in the 
ontological hierarchy.  
The first principles are noticed earlier than wisdom. While wis-
dom gives knowledge of my existence as a person, this habit gives 
knowledge of the existence outside myself. One feels the world out-
side, one is immersed in it, and one feels its resistance, sometimes 
painfully. It is clear that it exists independently from one’s wishes and 
control. One feels its order, its necessity, its causality, and the need to 
look for its origin.  
How is synderesis noticed as different from wisdom and the first 
principles? It can be felt as the innate information one has of the things 
within oneself that one can have control of: thoughts, desires, imagi-
nation and some functions of the body. One knows the impulses, 
passions, virtues, health, strength, capabilities and skills, corporeal 
feelings, and senses them as belonging to oneself; they are somehow 
constitutive, and not external. One also notices that some aspects of 
our body and mind cannot be controlled well by factors that are more 
external than internal. Synderesis gives a global knowledge of what is 
at one’s disposal within oneself. It does not give notice of what I am 
as a person –that is, wisdom– and what the world offers –that is the 
habit of the first principles. This is why Polo calls it the ‘I’, or the 
‘self’. The fact that one is still the same person when one loses control 
because of sleep, drugs or serious illness is the key distinction between 
the ‘I’ which is conscious and global, and the person, who ‘is’, even 
                                                 
81 While Max Scheler had a clear distinction between objective and knowledge of 
actions as shown in the following quote, he confuses it with the sentiments claim-
ing that they were a direct intuition of objective values, which make them ideal, 
and therefore his ethic at the end becomes voluntarist. “Mas si un acto no es nunca 
objeto, con mayor motivo no lo será la persona que vive en su realización de actos”. 
Scheler, M., Etica, op. cit., 517. 
82 “As I mentioned, the act of being of the person is not capable of symbolizing. The 
human person can be somehow susceptible to be know by notice, through the habit 
of wisdom, which is closely linked to the personal level”. “Como ya he indicado, 
el acto de ser de la persona no es susceptible de simbolización. La persona humana 
es en cierto modo susceptible de conocimiento por noticia, en cuanto que lo es el 
hábito de sabiduría, que está estrechamente unido a ella”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como 
Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 225. 
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when one is not conscious. One cannot identify the ‘I’ with the person, 
which is what Descartes did, without serious distortions. 
Synderesis is therefore known as the other two innate habits are 
known, by direct experience: “Notices have a dense emotional content 
(no sense to talk about deciphering affections, because affections are 
not decoded, but experienced)”83. 
Polo, nevertheless, does not want to fall into ‘sentimentalism’, 
which is to give inordinate attention to ‘feelings’: “The feeling is an 
addition, an aesthetic-useful appendage to the act. Therefore, im-
portant as it is for man, it is secondary. Accordingly, sentimentalism 
is an error that can kill the theory of knowledge”84. He also refers to 
the limited knowledge they contribute to any ethical discourse: “Feel-
ings are not an axiological-ethical criteria, but an indication that can 
be used, but with caution. In addition, higher feelings are the sequel of 
the highest forms of knowledge. Feelings are not reduced to the level 
of sensitive knowledge. Nevertheless, it must be excluded that feelings 
rule objectivity”85. And referring more specifically to the affections he 
indicates that they somehow hide the realities they give notice of, by 
using a simile with the sense of smell: “One can also say that affections 
do not manifest the habits, but rather they hide or conceal them –sim-
ilarly as one who feels a scent does not see what the scent gives notice 
of”86. Due to this he even gives some practical and wise advice on how 
to use them based on his own experience: “The more one loves acts, 
the more one become more theoretical and less sentimental: one gives 
less importance to feelings... Putting time on the introspective analysis 
of ones’ own sentiments is meaningless. My advice is this: never do 
it. Being healthy with regards to feelings is to give them the minimum 
necessary attention (they already take care of being noticed)”87. 
                                                 
83 “Las noticias tienen un denso contenido afectivo (no tiene sentido hablar de des-
cifrar afectos, pues los afectos no se descifran, sino que se experimentan)”. Ibid., 
228. 
84 “El sentimiento es un añadido, una ampliación estético-útil, del acto. Por eso, por 
importante que sea para el hombre, es secundario. Por tanto, el sentimentalismo es 
un error: puede matar la teoría del conocimiento”. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del 
Conocimiento, I, op. cit., 277. 
85 El sentimiento no es un criterio axiológico-ético, sino un indicio que puede usarse, 
pero con cautela. Además, los sentimientos más altos son los corolarios de las for-
mas de conocimiento más altas. Los sentimientos no se reducen al nivel del 
conocimiento sensible. Ahora bien, ha de excluirse que los sentimientos rijan la 
objetividad”. Ibid., 272. 
86 “Puede decirse también que los afectos no presentan dichos hábitos, sino que más 
bien los ocultan o encubren –lo mismo que podría decirse que quien siente un 
aroma no por eso ve aquello de lo que el aroma da noticia–”. Polo, L., Nietzsche 
como Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 228. 
87 “Cuanto más se ama el acto, se es más teórico, y menos sentimental: se hace menos 
caso de los sentimientos. … Demorarse en el análisis introspectivo de los propios 
sentimientos no tiene sentido. Mi consejo es éste: no hacerlo nunca. Ser sano res-
pecto de los sentimientos es hacerles caso lo imprescindible (ellos ya se encargan 
de informar)”. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento I, op. cit., 276. 
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Because the ‘affections’ and ‘notices’ that habits give are easily 
confused with ‘feelings’ people may believe that Polo’s Trascendental 
Anthropology is purely poetical88 because the method of overcoming 
the mental boundary and therefore the most original elements of his 
philosophical proposal is based on the innate habits ‘affections’. It will 
be interesting to find a method to show in a clearer way the difference 
between ‘sentiments’ and ‘affections’ to overcome this perception, but 
this is beyond our reach for the moment. 
*** 
                                                 
88 “When one does not undestand what Polo tries to convey, his proposals may look 
inspiring, but more in a poetic or uplifting literature way than coming from philo-
sophical science or philosophical wisdom”. “Cuando no se capta aquello que Polo 
se esfuerza por transmitir, las formulaciones pueden parecer sugerentes, pero más 
en la línea de la poesía o de la literatura edificante que en la de la ciencia o el saber 
filosófico”. Murillo, J. I., “Conocimiento Personal y Conocimiento Racional en la 






SYNDERESIS, “QUID EST?” 
 
1. Introduction 
We have seen how synderesis was born as the guarantee of a 
universal code of conduct in the historical section1. Synderesis was 
considered the final guarantor of common moral principles. These 
principles are meant to be universal, unchangeable2, indestructible, 
and are the ultimate appeal when seeking moral guidance. It is, there-
fore, the source of natural human law, which is the base of all human 
rights. These norms are universal because the capacity to know them 
is inborn as part of human nature, and because of this they never fade, 
and are beyond sensitive tendencies and moral reasoning. Moral rea-
soning is ultimately based on these principles but the conclusions can 
be wrong because practical reason can be diverted by the sensitive ap-
petites or by bad intentions. As the first principles of ethical science 
their task is a foundational one3. 
In medieval times there were two versions of the ontological na-
ture of synderesis: an intellectual one whose maximum and most 
influential representative was Aquinas, for whom synderesis was an 
intellectual innate habit, and the voluntary represented by Bonaventure 
for whom conscience is the intellectual side of moral foundations 
                                                 
1 “Synderesis is ordinarily taken to be the moral conscience, which even today enjoys 
esteem, although some see it as a simple process of social adaptation. The origin 
of the concept is very old, and even popular; this is why it has been reflected in 
many metaphors and poetic comparisons. […] When the spiritual character of 
moral conscience is accentuated the term ‘synderesis’ is used. Democritus already 
used the word ‘syneidesis’ as equivalent to knowing referred to moral content. 
Aristotle also uses the term”. “Ordinariamente la sindéresis se asimila a la con-
ciencia moral, la cual también hoy goza de estima, aunque algunos la entienden 
como un simple proceso de adaptación social. El origen de la noción es muy anti-
guo, e incluso popular; por eso ha quedado plasmada en muchas metáforas y 
comparaciones poéticas. […] Cuando se acentúa el carácter espiritual de la con-
ciencia moral se usa el término ‘syndéresis’. Ya Demócrito utilizó la palabra 
‘syneidesis’ como equivalente al saber referido a contenidos morales. También 
Aristóteles usa el término”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 
136. 
2 “Synderesis does not change”. “La sinderesis no es mudable”. Polo, L., Ética: Ha-
cia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 167. 
3 “Admitted that we all have ethical awareness and that the direct knowledge of re-
ality helps to shape it (which is a traditional philosophical thesis, which includes 
the discernment of the first cognitive principles governing human action, often 
called synderesis)”. “Admitido que todos nosotros tenemos conciencia ética y que 
el conocimiento directo de la realidad contribuye a formarla (lo cual es una tesis 
filosófica tradicional, que incluye el discernimiento del primer principio cognos-
citivo que rige la acción humana, que suele llamarse sindéresis)”. Ibid. p. 24. 
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while synderesis is an impulse to do them. Nevertheless, both postures 
are not extreme because for Albert —as for his disciple Aquinas — 
synderesis is a power with habit, “For although it does not as power, 
of itself assist the power or incline to the good, nevertheless, the power 
together with a habit it both iluminates and impulses”4, and for Bona-
venture the distinction between faculties, as Polo mentions, is not 
strict: “Here I take side with St. Bonaventure that identifies the soul 
with the potencies”5, so even if Bonaventure places the intellectual 
content of morals in conscience and the impulsive one in synderesis 
both are powers of the same soul. 
In some texts Polo seems to be more inclined to follow Bona-
venture’s explanation than Aquinas, stressing the impulsive function 
of synderesis and giving a more conceptual role to conscience. For 
example: “synderesis says you can get tired, but your duty is to carry 
on. Morality deals with goods, virtues and norms based on princi-
ples”6. “Synderesis says that one cannot stop. Then, in each case one 
has to see what is proper based on the specific circumstances, consid-
ering the environment; and then comes judgment: I do or do not do 
that. So, moral judgment is not the same as moral principles, i.e. moral 
knowledge has two levels: the knowledge of the principles and 
knowledge of the concrete from the point of view of what needs to be 
done. So freedom in synderesis impulses, whereas conscience eluci-
dates and selects: I do this or that”7. Or more clearly: “synderesis does 
not say what you have to do, but that you have to do. Synderesis has 
the form of an impulse. Being true to yourself is not maintained in the 
order of one’s own will, is not that, but that you have to give, that is 
                                                 
4 “licet enim potentia de se non juvet potentiam vel inclinet ad bonum, tamen potentia 
cum habitu juvat et inclinat”. Albertus Magnus, De Creaturis q. 72, a. 1, sol, in 
Opera Omnia, op. cit., Vol 35, 99. 
5 “Y a mi modo de ver me parece que el alma no es distinta de esas potencias. Aquí 
me apunto a San Buenaventura que identifica el alma con las potencias”. Polo, L., 
“Conversaciones en Torreblanca”, (unpublished transcription, Colombia, 1997), 
182. 
6 Polo´s visión of Ethics is based on the three elements, goods, virtues and norms. 
Any ethics that highlights an element neglecting other is a faulty ethics. This 
matches with the three questions Audi says any normative ethics should answer; 
character (virtues in Polo), what to do (norms in Polo) and values (goods in Polo). 
“Normative ethics –the kind I mainly want to discuss– has traditionally considered 
chiefly three related questions. First, the character question: what is a morally good 
person? More specifically, what character traits are moral virtues? Second, the 
conduct question: What ought we to do […]? Third, the value question: What 
things in life are good as ends”. Audi, R., Moral Value and Human Diversity, (Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 5. 
7 “Pues bien, la sindéresis dice: te puedes cansar, pero tu deber es seguir. La moral 
se ocupa de bienes, de virtudes y de normas, desde principios. La sindéresis señala 
que no se puede uno parar. Luego, en cada caso uno tiene que ver qué hace situado 
en la realidad concreta, atendiendo al entorno; y entonces viene el juicio: hago o 
no hago tal cosa. Así pues, no es lo mismo el juicio moral que los principios mo-
rales, es decir, el conocimiento moral tiene dos niveles: el conocimiento de los 
principios y el conocimiento de lo concreto desde el punto de vista de lo que hay 
que hacer decidiendo. Por eso, la libertad en la sindéresis impulsa y en la concien-
cia dilucida y elige: hago esto o lo otro”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión 
Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 163. 
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synderesis”8. And finally: “ahead of norms men have moral principles 
that in fact they are reduced to this: Want! Do! This is known by syn-
deresis”9. 
Nevertheless, other texts give the impression that the content is 
more important, or as important, as the impulse, as in the previously 
quoted passage: “By presiding cognitively the human nature, it can be 
said that synderesis is the source of knowledge of natural law. In this 
sense we can understand it as attentive surveillance of reality and as 
ability to judge. Also, it can be said to be equivalent to the habit of the 
first theoretical principles with regards to morals”10. 
This ambiguity, both in the classics and in Leonardo Polo, has 
to do with the constitution of this particular habit which somehow in-
tegrates both the intelligence and the will. Aquinas is clear in this 
interdependence11. Polo in his latest works –Antropologia trascenden-
tal and Epistemología, creación y divinidad– tries to solve this 
oscillation by placing the root of both faculties within synderesis as 
the unifying factor. Doing this allows him also to identify synderesis 
with the ‘I’, which takes the place, in a way, of the ‘subject’ as used in 
modern philosophy. Polo’s progress in this topic is pointed out by one 
of his closest assistants: “at this time Polo did not distinguish between 
the appropriate method to know the personal level and the ‘I’. Later, 
                                                 
8 Leonardo Polo gave two conferences on the same topic in 1994 which were tran-
scribed. Then they were collated and published as “Ética Socrática y Moral 
Cristiana”, Anuario Filosófico, 40/3 (2007) 549-570. We had access to the original 
transcription of the one he gave in Sevilla in 1994 and because it keeps the original 
verbal style of Polo and very relevant texts on our topic I translated it and include 
it as Appendix 1. I will refer to it as Polo, Sevilla, 1994, and the paragrah number.  
“La sindéresis no dice lo que uno tiene que hacer, sino que uno tiene que hacer. La 
sindéresis tiene un carácter de impulso. Ser fiel a uno mismo no es mantenerse en 
el orden de la propia voluntad, no es eso, sino da de ti, eso es la sindéresis”. Polo, 
Sevilla, 1994, Annex 1. 
9 “Antes que normas el hombre tiene principios morales que en definitiva se reducen 
a esto: quiere, haz. Esto es conocido por sindéresis”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una 
Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 162. 
10 “Como preside cognoscitivamente la naturaleza humana, se puede decir que la 
sindéresis es la fuente del conocimiento de la ley natural. En este sentido se puede 
entender como vigilancia atenta a la realidad y como capacidad de juzgar. Asi-
mismo, se ha de decir que es el equivalente al hábito de los primeros principios 
teóricos en el orden moral. Al apuntar a Dios como último fin, la sindéresis es 
acompañada por la alegría, afecto positivo que alcanza en ella gran intensidad”. 
Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 137. 
11 “Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quia actus voluntatis et rationis 
supra se invicem possunt ferri, prout scilicet ratio ratiocinatur de volendo et volun-
tas vult ratiocinari contingit actum voluntatis praeveniri ab actu rationis, et e 
converso. Et quia virtus prioris actus remanet in actu sequenti, contingit quandoque 
quod est aliquis actus voluntatis, secundum quod manet virtute in ipso aliquid de 
actu rationis, ut dictum est de usu et de electione; et e converso aliquis est actus 
rationis, secundum quod virtute manet in ipso aliquid de actu voluntatis”. The “acts 
of the will and acts of reason can be directed toward one another—for reason rea-
sons about willing and the will wills to reason—it is possible for an act of the will 
to be preceded by an act of reason, and vice versa”. Thomas Aquinas., Summa 
Theologiae, op.cit. I-II, q.1, a. 7, co. 
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in Antropologia trascendental, he says that the knowledge of the per-
sonal act of being corresponds to wisdom, while ‘I’ is known by 
synderesis”12. 
 
2. Synderesis as link between the personal level and the natural 
level 
The brief description of the three levels of the human person’s 
structure —natural, essential and personal levels— was a necessary 
introduction to explain how for Polo synderesis is the unique link be-
tween the personal level –pure spirit– and the other levels of the 
person’s structure. Polo clearly distinguishes the ‘I’ from the personal 
level. “The personal act of being, really distinguishes itself from the 
‘I’”13. This means that it is not just a distinction of reason or as it is 
said in sociology, a ‘construct’. 
As the connection between the powers at natural level and those 
at the essential level –intelligence and will– is done through the inter-
nal senses; the imagination is the normal way to reach the intelligence 
while the estimative is the one relating to the will, the connection be-
tween the essential level and the personal level is done through this 
unifying link that is the innate habit of synderesis. Synderesis is there-
fore the link between the essential level and the personal act of being 
with its double function of ‘I-see’ and ‘I-want’. This is the bottom-up 
approach which is to start from the less perfect to the more perfect. If 
we follow the opposite approach, top-down, which is the order of per-
fection, of activity, we should start from the top, where the one that 
commands and rules is the act of being, the personal level, and then its 
activity cascades down to the essential level and from it to the natural 
level. The personal level is the one that, through synderesis, constitutes 
the intelligence and the will in their acts and consequently in their hab-
its, and through them directs the natural level activities which are 
under the will’s command. 
The way down from the act of being to the essence has different 
lines according to the specific personal transcendentals considered. 
Polo uses a different term for each of these lines which is good to take 
into account to understand his proposal in a deeper way, especially 
regarding synderesis. While the essence depends on the personal tran-
scendentals, the term ‘manifesting’ indicates its dependence on the co-
existence, and is equivalent to ‘lighting’, that express the essence’s 
dependence on the personal intellect; ‘to contribute’ points to its de-
pendence regarding the personal love and donating acceptance; and ‘to 
                                                 
12 In a conversation with Juan Fernando Sellés in Pamplona on 21st August 2015 he 
mentinoned that Leonardo Polo did not have the method to distinguish between 
the personal level and the ‘I’. It is only Antropología trascendental when he starts 
distinguishing wisdom, that is the knowledge of the personal level, from synderesis 
as the knowledge of the ‘I’.  
13 “El acto de ser personal se distingue realmente del yo”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y 
sus Actos II, op. cit., 59. 
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dispose’ a word that expresses the extension of transcendental freedom 
to the essence”14. Placing this on a chart can simplify its understanding 
and it will look as shown in table 8. 
 
Personal transcendentals Acts on the Essence by 
Co-existence Manifesting 
Transcendental freedom Disposing 
Personal intellect Lighting 
Personal love Contributing 
Table 8: Personal Transcendentals 
At the personal level there are two habits that activate syn-
deresis, because the action of the spirit cascades through habits. These 
habits are also innate. These are the habit of wisdom and the habit of 
the first principles15.  
As discussed before, innate habits are different from acquired 
habits. The faculties always act in dependence on the innate habits, so 
it is difficult to notice these habits because they can easily be confused 
with the acquired habits of these faculties. The acquired habits are de-
veloped by the natural exercise of the potencies and growth from 
childhood and, therefore, can be easily distinguished. That a child 
learns to speak, write, etc. is observable because they are new acquisi-
tions. One needs to pause and make a conscious effort to distinguish 
the innate habits. A way to discover innate habits is to look for those 
that are always present –those that accompany all our activities16– by 
contrasting them with those exercised occasionally. The permanent 
ones are the innate. The second way that could be used to distinguish 
them is by their objects. A third way could be by the faculties they 
perfect because only the acquired habits modify faculties.  
The habit of wisdom is the one that gives notice of the relation-
ship with personal intimacies: firstly, with our own intimacy that is the 
                                                 
14 “En tanto que la esencia depende de los trascendentales personales, la palabra 
manifestar indica su depender de la co-existencia, y equivale a iluminar, que sig-
nifica su depender del intelecto personal; a aportar, que señala la dependencia 
respecto del amar y del aceptar donal; y a disponer, palabra que expresa la exten-
sión a la esencia de la libertad trascendental”. Polo, L., Antropología 
Trascendental II, op. cit., 11. 
15“Tradition accepts three innate habits: the habit of the first principles or intellectus 
principiorum –the best studied-, the habit of wisdom and synderesis”. “En la tra-
dición se admiten tres hábitos innatos: el hábito de los primeros principios o 
intellectus principiorum –que es el más estudiado–, el hábito de sabiduría y la sin-
déresis”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 148. 
16 “Because the person is what is radical in man, all the proper human aspects will 
be marked by personal being”. “Como la persona es lo decisivo en el hombre, todos 
los diversos aspectos de lo humano vendrán marcados por el ser personal”. Polo, 
L., Sobre la Existencia Cristiana (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1996), 259. 
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only one of which we have direct, intimate experience and by transpo-
sition, it allows an intimate relationship to other persons and to God. 
It is, in fact, the one that gives us the deepest knowledge of our de-
pendence and intimate relationships with God. This habit explains the 
innate feeling of God, root of all religions and religious acts, common 
in all cultures, as far as human records are kept. It is not objective 
knowledge but inner experiential knowledge17. 
The habit of the first principles, that sometimes Polo calls intel-
lectus ut habitus, is the one which allows knowing the act of being of 
the extra-mental reality; this is all non-personal beings, what we nor-
mally call the act of universe, God as origin of the act of universe, and 
the transcendental dependence of the one respect to the other. These 
three themes can be expressed in three axioms or principles, and this 
is why the principle refers to them in plural. Polo explains these prin-
ciples in detail in his Curso de teoría del conocimiento: “What are 
called first principles: the principle of identity, the principle of non-
contradiction and the principle of causality in its transcendental mean-
ing”18.The identity is related to God because in him we cannot 
distinguish between the act of being and the essence; the non-contra-
diction is referred to the act of being of the universe, because if it 
exists, nothingness has no chance; the transcendental causality marks 
the dependence between the second and the first.  
Finally the habit of synderesis which Polo describes as follows: 
“Synderesis is the knowledge of the first principles of reality in view 
of practical action”19.  
These three innate habits give us a knowledge that cannot be ac-
quired objectively because their topics —themes in Polo’s 
terminology— are beyond the objective capacity of the intelligence. 
They are beyond the intelligence capacity because the intelligence is a 
faculty and is just below synderesis in the structure of the person. Polo 
                                                 
17 “The habit of wisdom, whose subject is beyond the metaphysical order. In my 
view, through this habit the co-existence of the human being with the world and, 
radically, with God is known. Therefore, the knowledge of God is also sapiential”. 
“El hábito de sabiduría, cuya temática trasciende el orden metafísico. A mi modo 
de ver, con este hábito se conoce la coexistencia del ser personal humano con el 
ser del universo y, en definitiva, con Dios. Por consiguiente, el conocimiento de 
Dios también es sapiencial”. “The habit of wisdom allows the knowledge of the 
person. One end is higher than the other and the habit of the first principlies is dual 
with wisdom, and with it, we do not know what is extra-mental, but the intimacy 
of the person”. “El hábito de sabiduría permite el conocimiento de la persona. En 
definitiva, un término es superior a otro y el hábito de los primeros principios entra 
en dualidad con la sabiduría y ya no conocemos lo extramental sino lo íntimo de 
la persona”. Polo, L., “Conversaciones en Torreblanca”, (unpublished transcrip-
tion, Colombia, 1997), 185. 
18 “Son los llamados primeros principios: el principio de identidad, el principio de 
nocontradicción y el principio de causalidad en sentido trascendental”. Polo, L., 
Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, I, op. cit., 11. 
19 “La sindéresis es el conocimiento de los primeros principios de la realidad en tanto 
que en ella se sitúa la acción práctica”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Mo-
derna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 160. 
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summarises the topics each innate habits deals with as follows: “their 
theme point to realities that transcend us: wisdom to God, the habit of 
the first principles to being, and synderesis to what is good”20. 
While we are not going to go into detail on the habits of wisdom 
and of the first principles, in the next sections we shall try to explain 
synderesis in detail, to see whether it will be able to support a person-
alist view of ethics.  
 
3. Synderesis, ‘I’, self, subject, soul 
Before proceding it will be good to clarify the different ways 
Polo refers to synderesis in his works. Polo uses different words to 
stress the different characteristics of subtle matters, and spiritual innate 
habits are rather subtle. He uses some of the words, at times, to bring 
out some implicits that were hidden in the terms previous thinkers 
used. This is the case of ‘subject’, which was used in modern philoso-
phy from Descartes to our days, also of ‘substance’ and ‘soul’ used 
since classic philosophy and the ‘I’ or ‘self’ 21favoured by the existen-
tialist and personalist thinkers22.  
 “Synderesis is an inborn habit of the personal being and equals 
the ‘I’. The ‘I’ is really different from the personal being. This distinc-
tion allows discarding the modern idea of the subject”23. Polo clarifies 
that modern philosophy does not understand the subject as the personal 
act of being: “The person is neither the classic substance nor the sub-
ject of modern philosophy”24. There is no need to say more about the 
use of ‘subject’ which he hardly uses in dealing with synderesis, or 
‘self’ which is equated to the ‘I’.  
Of all these terms the one most used is the ‘I’ (yo) because it is 
the one that better conveys the unrepeatable character of each person 
and because it represents the manifestation of the self-consciousness 
                                                 
20 “Apuntan a lo que nos trasciende: la sabiduría a Dios, el hábito de los primeros 
principios al ser y la sindéresis al bien”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de 
Dualidades, op. cit., 231. 
21 “I call the ‘I’ that enlightens the other-I, and not you, as usually personalist phi-
losophers do, because although this term is not incorrect, for the purposes of self-
knowledge it is weak”. “Llamo al yo que ilumina al propio yo otro-yo, y no un tú, 
como acostumbran a decir los personalistas, pues, aunque esa expresión no sea 
incorrecta, para los efectos del conocimiento del yo es débil”. Ibid., 215. 
22 “Synderesis is therefore what modern philosophy understdands by subject and the 
classical by the soul”. “La sindéresis es, pues, lo que la filosofía moderna entiende 
por sujeto y la clásica por alma”. Corazón, R., “Sobre la Esencia”, in Studia Po-
liana, 6 (2004) p. 213 
23 “La sindéresis es un hábito innato al ser personal y equivale al yo. El yo se distin-
gue realmente del ser personal. Dicha distinción permite desechar la idea moderna 
de sujeto”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 40. 
24 “La persona no es la sustancia clásica ni el sujeto de la filosofía moderna”. Polo, 
L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento I, op. cit., 234. 
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each one has: “Synderesis is an inborn habit of the personal being 
equivalent to the ‘I’. The ‘I’ is really different from the personal act of 
being”25. Nevertheless, one has to be careful when reading Polo since 
the meaning of the ‘I’ evolved as pointed out above26. 
Polo used the term ‘I’ to signify indistinctively the person, or act 
of being, at least up to the end of 1994. In the conference he gave in 
the University of Málaga in November 1994 one can notice some am-
biguity in the use of both terms in that while he expressly says that the 
‘I’ is existence, he also differentiates it from the ‘person’. In the fol-
lowing texts we see how in the positive and negative he identified the 
‘I’ with the act of being, whereas in later works he reserves the act of 
being for the person and the ‘I’ for synderesis. In the positive, i.e. as 
affirmation: “The journey we have made in respect to the interpreta-
tion of the ‘I’ in philosophy has allowed us to conclude that the ‘I’ is 
the act of being, and the act of being is the character of ‘more’ seen in 
its integration to the essence”27. Now in the negative i.e. as the nega-
tion of being at the essential level: “There is an intentional knowledge 
of the ‘I’; to exist is therefore the characteristic of the ‘I’ which, if 
removed, the ‘I’ ceases to be. Saying it in a different way: the self is 
not an essence, it is existence. Therefore, an essential knowledge of 
self is nothing”28.  
Within the same article we can find simultaneously the affirma-
tions that seem to both identify and separate the person and the ‘I’: “In 
the case of man act of being means person, but we will see that there 
is a distinction between self and person, even though you cannot sep-
arate the self of the person. It’s the same with the word "person”. 
Person is a common name, but as common name it does not mean be-
ing. For person we must understand each who. And the same happens 
with the ‘I’: I is each ‘I’. ‘I’ is strictly real, but it happens that we can 
speak of the thought ‘I’, but we cannot say that such thought ‘I’ is 
real”29. And even of a body ‘I’: “corporeal-I is that human unit that sits 
and is made possible by the organized human body. The animal does 
                                                 
25 “La sindéresis es un hábito innato al ser personal y equivale al yo. El yo se distin-
gue realmente del ser personal”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 40. 
26 Cfr. note 12.  
27 “El viaje que hemos hecho en torno a la interpretación del yo en la filosofía nos 
ha permitido concluir que el yo es el acto de ser, y el acto de ser es el carácter de 
además visto en su entronque con la esencia”. Polo, L., La Esencia Humana, op. 
cit., 279. 
28 “No cabe un conocimiento intencional del yo, porque al yo le es tan característico 
el existir que si se le quita deja de ser yo. Dicho de otra manera: el yo no es una 
esencia, sino que es existencia. Por lo tanto, un conocimiento esencial del yo no es 
nada”. Ibid., 237. 
29 “En el caso del hombre acto de ser significa persona, aunque ya veremos que hay 
una distinción entre yo y persona, a pesar de que no se puede separar el yo de la 
persona. Pasa lo mismo con la palabra "persona”. Persona es un nombre común, 
pero como nombre común no significa lo que significa ser. Por persona hay que 
entender aquí cada quien. Y lo mismo pasa con el yo: yo es cada yo. El yo es 
estrictamente real, pero ocurre que podemos hablar del yo pensado, pero no pode-
mos decir que el yo pensado sea real”. Ibid., 240. 
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not have ‘I’, because it does not have an organised body as the human 
body has. The corporeal-I is a psychic self, let’s say a soul-I, and that 
means that it is capable of organizing”30. And more clearly: “The “I” 
is in between the spirit and the body”31. It seems that what Polo tries 
to convey is the cascading activity of the act of being which regulates 
all what pertains to the person, understood as the ‘suppositum’, and 
the unity, the whole that each person is, which later he will find better 
ways to express, by reserving the term person for the act of being and 
the term ‘I’ for the apex of the essential level, i.e. for synderesis32. 
We use the ‘I’ in the way Polo uses it in his latest works, so it is 
equated to synderesis and it is the ‘apex of the essential level’, and 
within the essential level as the communication door with the personal 
level, or act of being, as we shall see in the next two sections starting 
with the latter. It seems as if the difference between the ‘I’ at the es-
sential level and the person is ‘consciousness’ but this will require 
further development, which may distract us from our main purpose. 
 
4. Synderesis as the door from the personal level to the essential 
level 
Synderesis does not belong to the personal level, because syn-
deresis does not deal with the ‘esse’, the being, as such. This is why it 
is placed at the essential level, just below the personal level. Leonardo 
Polo refers to the personal level as the ‘además’33 –which we translate 
                                                 
30 “Yo corpóreo es aquella unidad humana que se asienta y es posibilitada por el 
orden corpóreo humano. El animal no tiene yo, porque no tiene un cuerpo orde-
nado de esa peculiar manera como está ordenado el cuerpo humano. El yo corpóreo 
es un yo psíquico, digamos, un yo anímico, y eso quiere decir que es capaz de 
ordenar”. Ibid., 229. 
31 “El yo está a caballo entre el espíritu y el cuerpo”. Ibid., 228. 
32 It will be interesting to see how Polo´s essential ‘I’ differs from the ‘I’ of 
Ingarden´s phenomenology for whom the ‘I’ “is something that appears through 
the conscience’s structure act; and it appears as a necessary being belonging to the 
act of conscience and to the flow of vital experiences”. Ingarden, R., Spor o istnie-
nie swiata, vol II, p.170 as cited in. Bak, A. “La Conciencia, El Yo y el Cuerpo en 
Roman Ingarden”, Thémata, 46 (2012) p. 110. 
33 “It should be noted now that the personal act of being is a surplus with respect to 
the acts of the will. I usually call this surplus the character of ‘more’. That the 
person is ‘more’ than thinking is clear, since it is not part of what is thought”. “Es 
preciso señalar ahora que el acto de ser personal es sobrante respecto de los actos 
de la voluntad. Suelo llamar dicho sobrar carácter de además. Que la persona es 
además del pensar es claro, puesto que no forma parte de él”. Polo, L., La Voluntad 
y sus Actos II, op. cit., 59. The connection between the essential level and the per-
sonal level is done through a unifying link that is the innate habit of synderesis. 
The synderesis has a dual role or dual power, which makes it be able to ‘see’ and 
to ‘want’, as we shall expand later. For the time being we wish just to show how 
Polo sees the links among the three levels of the triadic structure of the person. 
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as ‘more’34– because it is more than having, more than thinking, more 
than feeling. The ‘more’ is the first finding of Polo’s original method, 
‘the overcoming of the mental limit’, already explained in chapter six 
of the first part. Similarly, the personal level, the ‘more’, is more than 
wanting. Wanting is proper of the will which is at the essential level. 
Nevertheless, the actions are of the ‘suppositum’, of the whole, be-
cause the human being is not an aggregate of parts but a living being, 
an organic whole35. This is well expressed by Polo: “The essential 
level is always a manifestation and it is at the disposition of the per-
sonal level. These two characteristics can be seen both in the will and 
in the ‘nous’, both can be attributed to the personal being. The personal 
being can say ‘my’ will, this ‘wanting’ is mine. Speaking with preci-
sion what I call growth in the essence is growth in the ‘esse’, and this 
is the character of ‘more’ that cannot stop growing, because otherwise 
it will accomplish according to ‘presence”36. 
The essence is at the disposition of the personal level. The per-
sonal level activates the essential capabilities through synderesis using 
the synderesis with the superior habits; which belong to the personal 
level. The spiritual activity is not a movement of physical parts where 
one can be moved without the others having knowledge of it, but as an 
organic action whereby the superior is in charge and therefore in-
volved in the action of the lower ones. Polo expresses this integration 
as follows: “the upper habit naturally has to go down to the ones be-
low. The lower ones are like a coming down of the upper one. This is 
mulling over why the ‘I’ and the extra-mental knowledge are possible 
from the ‘more’. The upper habit somehow has to be a condition of 
possibility of the inferior. The lower habits are not possible without 
the upper ones and therefore the ‘conversio’ of neither synderesis nor 
the habit of first principles would be possible. What needs to be seen 
is how the character of ‘more’ is somehow potential so as to, simulta-
neously really be different from the essence and, at the same, time give 
reason of the essence, which is looking towards what is inferior”37. 
                                                 
34 Though it can be translated as ‘besides’ we feel that besides can be understood as 
‘being by’, loosing the sense of going beyond, and never being satisfied which is 
what the term ‘more’ conveys, which is closer to Polo’s intended meaning. 
35 Polo expresses this same idea as follows: “Unity does not mean unicity, but integ-
rity”. “Unidad no significa unicidad, sino integridad”. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría 
del Conocimiento IV, op. cit., 201. 
36 “La esencia humana siempre es una manifestación y una disposición, y estos dos 
caracteres se ven en la voluntad y en el nous, pero eso es del ser personal. El ser 
personal puede decir “mi” querer, el querer es mío. En rigor, lo que llamo creci-
miento en la esencia es crecimiento en el esse, y eso es el carácter de además, que 
no puede dejar de crecer, pues de otro modo se consumaría según la actualidad”. 
Polo, L., La libertad Trascendental (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2005), 132. 
37 “El hábito superior naturalmente tiene que bajar a los inferiores. Los inferiores 
son como una bajada suya. Eso es ir dándole vueltas a por qué el yo y el conoci-
miento extramental es posible desde el además. El superior de alguna manera tiene 
que ser condición de posibilidad del inferior. Sin el hábito superior no son posibles 
los inferiores y por lo tanto la conversio no sólo está en la sindéresis sino también 
en el hábito de los primeros principios. Lo que hay que ver es como el carácter de 
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Polo uses a simile of a door to refer to the connection between 
the personal level and the essential level and the door is the habit of 
synderesis. With this he wants to express that synderesis is the only 
way to reach the personal level from below and the only way the per-
son can manifest itself, this is to come down to the essential and 
corporeal levels38. If the door is closed or does not work well then the 
human person shows less its personality, and, as shown in the text 
above, he grows less, he remains less a person that who it can be, and 
this is an ethical issue that we should deal with in the following chap-
ters. Some other thinkers prefer to use the simile of a window rather 
than a door because of the way Polo uses the light as example with 
reference to the agent intellect and synderesis. It is easier to explain 
how a window allows more or less light in depending on the cleanli-
ness of the window panes39 to illuminate the intelligence and warm the 
will40. 
 
5. Apex of the essence 
The characteristic of being the link between the personal and es-
sential levels means that synderesis is the highest dimension of the 
essential level. Polo refers to it as the “apex of the essential level”.41 
To be the apex means that there are some other elements at the essen-
tial level that will depend on it. These elements are the intellect and 
the will which are not only subsidiary to it but also initially constituted 
                                                 
además se potencializa de alguna manera para que se distinga realmente de la esen-
cia y al mismo tiempo de razón de la esencia y eso es hacia abajo”. Polo, L., 
“Conversaciones en Torreblanca”, (unpublished transcription, Colombia, 1997), 
100. 
38 “The subjectivist interpretation will be set straight if one accepts that the ‘I’ is not 
the personal act of being, the human person, but the open door of the personal level 
to its essence”. “La interpretación subjetivista se corrige si se acepta que el yo no 
es el acto de ser personal, la persona humana, sino la puerta abierta de ésta hacia 
su esencia”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 137. 
39 “In this way synderesis can have more light to progressively reveal the essence 
and human nature, and this is its growth”. “De esta suerte, la sindéresis puede dis-
poner de más luz para desvelar progresivamente la esencia y la naturaleza 
humanas, y eso es su crecer”. Sellés, J. F., El Conocer Personal: Estudio del En-
tendimiento Agente según Leonardo Polo, ed. cit., 135. 
40 “Most of the negative emotions affect synderesis, which being the enlighting habit 
of the human essence, when it is deprived of good it loses the clarity of the light”. 
“La mayor parte de los afectos negativos afectan a la sindéresis, que por ser el 
hábito iluminante de la esencia humana, al sufrir la privación del bien, pierde la 
limpidez de la iluminación”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades, 
op. cit., 231.  
41 “As already mentioned, the apex of the essence of man is synderesis”. Polo, L., 
Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 164. Also, in another book wrote: “I must 
say that the summit of the human essence is an inborn habit;… synderesis…In 
Medieval Philosophy the esceptical forgetfulness was avoided with the concept of 
synderesis, which is the apex of the human soul”. “hay que decir que la cumbre de 
la esencia humana es un hábito innato... la sindéresis… En la filosofía medieval el 
olvido escéptico es evitado con la noción de sindéresis, que es la cumbre del alma 
humana”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 226. 
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by synderesis. These two faculties are mere potencies by themselves 
and are constituted by the synderesis that gives them the first act. So, 
in some way we can say that synderesis is the one that initially is and 
immediately constitutes the essential level. Polo uses a comparison 
with angels to make this point clearer42. If the angels have a spiritual 
act of being they have also a spiritual essence. This composition dis-
tinguishes them from their Creator who has no distinction between the 
act of being and the essence. Similarly in humans we have the compo-
sition of the spiritual act of being and the spiritual essence. The 
difference is that in humans, while alive, the essence is linked to its 
constituted body, but the essence will remain without the body after 
death, when the person (act of being) will remain together with its spir-
itual essence. 
In order to have some directing and unifying control on the in-
telligence and will, synderesis has to be able to understand both: the 
intelligence and the will. This is why Polo, in his latest works, speaks 
of the inner duality of synderesis, as we discuss in the next section. 
 
6. Synderesis’ duality 
Polo expresses the duality of synderesis in a way that the same 
habit has two sides or functions, one which understands the will, which 
he calls ‘I-want’ and another of the intelligence, the ‘I-see’. “It should 
be borne in mind that the human ‘I’ is somehow dual. To put it quickly, 
the human essence is not like a cyclops, but has two eyes: one that I 
call I-see and another that I call I-want”43. The ‘I’ is active, conscious, 
and this is why the union of the words tries to show the activity of the 
being, to avoid considering synderesis as a mere static recipient. 
The habit of synderesis is therefore dual. It activates the facul-
ties, intellect and will, and because of this it has to ‘understand’ both; 
the universal knowledge and the universal capacity of wanting44. Polo 
speaks of these two facets of synderesis: the ‘I-see’, the facet related 
                                                 
42 “The angel is a created spirit, without body, which is correspondingly an essence 
in itself: every angel is an angelic essence, they do not share the essence among 
many”. “El ángel es un ser creado espiritual, sin cuerpo, que correlativamente es 
una esencia él mismo: no hay muchos de la misma esencia, sino que cada ángel es 
una esencia angélica”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas 
Clásicos, op. cit., 160. 
43 “Ha de tenerse en cuenta que el yo humano también es en cierto modo dual. Por 
decirlo rápidamente, la esencia humana no es un cíclope, sino que tiene dos ojos: 
aquel que he llamado ver-yo y otro al que llamo querer-yo”. Polo, L., Nietzsche 
como Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 215. 
44 “Synderesis is I-think and I-want. Or I-see seeing and I-want. Therefore it is dual. 
The higher element is I-want, that as the will the looks towards the outside”. “La 
sindéresis es yo pienso, yo quiero. O yo-veo-ver y yo-quiero-querer. Por lo tanto 
es dual. El elemento superior es el yo quiero que, como ya la voluntad mira hacia 
afuera”. Polo, L., Conversaciones en Bogotá, op.cit., 99. 
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to the intelligence, and ‘I-want”, the one related to action45. Neverthe-
less, he does not confuse the faculties with each other, nor with 
synderesis itself: “An intellectual operation can only be known by a 
superior intellectual act, i.e. a habit. Therefore, I-see is dual with I-
want; as I-want it is constitutive but as I-see it is not”46. Furthermore 
we cannot forget that synderesis is a knowledge habit; so, even when 
activating the will, it is a type of knowledge: habitual knowledge not 
objective knowledge, a kind of experiential notice47.  
For Polo it is clear that this is a novelty which is based on the 
acceptance of the pre-eminence of the habitual knowledge over the 
objective knowledge (mental presence, operational knowledge), be-
cause objective knowledge cannot reach what is above it: “One must 
abandon the mental presence. Habitual knowledge is not in itself ob-
jective knowledge. If it is not objective, it is neither presential 
knowledge nor a formal expansion of it. Instead, it allows detection of 
the presence as mental limit. This is decisive”48. 
Polo explains this in a slightly different way in another text: 
“What depends exclusively on the personal act of being is the essence 
                                                 
45 “First, because it depends on the person, synderesis is also a dual habit. It is being 
equated to the ‘I’. The duality of the ‘I’ relates to the two immaterial faculties: ‘I’ 
means seeing (I-see) and wanting (I-want). The view derives from intellectus ut 
co-actus, and wanting for the donal love, i.e. from the personal transcendentals. 
However, neither I-see nor I-want are transcendentals. As happens in all human 
dualities, one of its members is superior. In synderesis, the upper member is the I-
want”. “En primer lugar, por depender de la persona, la sindéresis es un hábito, 
asimismo, dual. Se ha dicho también que equivale al yo. La dualidad del yo es, por 
lo pronto, su respecto a las dos potencias inmateriales: yo significa ver (ver-yo) y 
querer (querer-yo). El ver deriva del intellectus ut co-actus, y el querer deriva del 
amar donal, es decir, de trascendentales personales. Ahora bien, ni ver-yo ni que-
rer-yo son trascendentales. Como acontece en todas las dualidades humanas, uno 
de sus miembros es superior al otro. En la sindéresis, el miembro superior es el 
querer-yo”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 151. 
46 “Una operación intelectual sólo es conocida por un acto intelectual superior, es 
decir, por un hábito. Por eso, conocer-yo es dual con querer-yo, pues éste es cons-
tituyente y aquél no lo es”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 56. 
47 “It is correct to call connatural knowledge the ‘awareness’ given by the innate 
habits”. “A la captación de los hábitos innatos según la afectividad es también co-
rrecto llamarla connaturalidad”. “When dealing with symbols I indicated that it is 
important to distinguish their knowledge from their decipherment. For ‘awareness’ 
that distinction is not needed. This is because ‘awareness’ has a dense affective 
content (it makes no sense to be affections, for the affections are not decoded, but 
experienced)”. “Al tratar de los símbolos indiqué que es importante distinguir su 
conocimiento de su desciframiento. En el caso de las noticias esa distinción no se 
da. Ello se debe a que las noticias tienen un denso contenido afectivo (no tiene 
sentido hablar de descifrar afectos, pues los afectos no se descifran, sino que se 
experimentan)”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 228. 
Guardini speaks of a “kind of vibration within the being” Cfr. Guardini, R., Etica, 
op. cit., 87. 
48 “Hay que abandonar la presencia. Pues bien, el conocimiento habitual no es de 
suyo un conocimiento objetivo. Si no es objetivo, no es un conocimiento en pre-
sencia, ni tampoco una amplificación de la presencia en términos formales. Pero, 
en cambio, permite detectar a la presencia como límite mental. Esto es lo decisivo”. 
Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento IV/I (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2004), 674. 
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of man. The essence is really distinct from the act of being. In sum, we 
describe the essence of man as the unification of knowledge dimen-
sions (and of the will) which depends exclusively of the personal act 
of being. This unification must extend to voluntary acts. In parallel, 
the person is not only the core of knowledge, but also the core of the 
voluntary, and, accordingly, the essence of man is the unification of a 
plurality”49. 
With what we have explained, the following text can be fully 
understood, even if all its implications need to be developed further: 
“The person considered down towards the essence, is designated as ‘I’ 
because the essence depends on the person. The ‘I’ is a duality: on the 
one hand, ‘I-see’; on the other, ‘I-want’. The distinction is that in the 
‘I-see’ the self is not constituent, while the ‘I-want’ is. According to 
this distinction the ‘I’ is not a transcendental ("towards" the essence 
equivalent to the apex of the essence, and the essence of man is not 
transcendental). The word "know" linked to ‘I’ means nothing other 
than self; ‘I’ amounts to see. ‘See’ equals the intellectus ut co-actus 
considered in order to the essence of man, i.e., while its theme is what 
is understood —any cognitive acts of the essential level. Also the will 
is understood whenever established as a voluntary act, in which case 
we say ‘I-want’ instead of ‘I-see”50. The last sentence is a bit more 
complex. It means that the ultimate power of understanding is at the 
personal level through the agent intellect (intellectus ut actus), while 
the actual operational-objective understanding is done by the intellect 
(intellect ut habitus) which is at the essential level, and it is under syn-
deresis as ‘I-see’. 
Now that we have seen how synderesis is dual it is good to dis-
cuss each of its aspects separately. We consider first the ‘I-want’ 
because it is higher in the duality. 
 
 
                                                 
49 “Lo que depende exclusivamente del acto de ser personal es la esencia del hombre. 
La esencia es realmente distinta del acto de ser. En suma, describimos la esencia 
del hombre como la unificación de las dimensiones del conocimiento (y de la vo-
luntad) que depende exclusivamente del ser personal. Esa unificación ha de 
extenderse a los actos voluntarios. Paralelamente, la persona no es sólo el núcleo 
del saber, sino también el núcleo de lo voluntario, y, de acuerdo con esto, la esencia 
del hombre es la unificación de una pluralidad”. Ibid., 548. 
50 “La persona considerada hacia la esencia, es decir, en tanto que la esencia depende 
de ella, se designa como yo. El yo es una dualidad: por una parte, ver-yo; por otra 
parte, querer-yo. La distinción estriba en que en el primer caso el yo no es consti-
tuyente, y en el segundo sí. Según dicha distinción el yo no es un trascendental 
(“hacia” la esencia equivale al ápice de la esencia, y la esencia del hombre no es 
trascendental). La palabra “conocer” vinculada al yo no significa nada distinto de 
él; yo se cifra en ver. Ver equivale al intellectus ut co-actus considerado en orden 
a la esencia del hombre, es decir, en tanto que su temática es lo inteligido –cual-
quier tema de los actos cognoscitivos de orden esencial–. También la voluntad es 
inteligida siempre que se constituya como lo voluntario, en cuyo caso no se habla 




a) The I-want side of synderesis 
Synderesis is the only way by which the will can be known by 
the person. Polo clearly states this; “synderesis illuminates what is not 
possible to know through operations (objective knowledge) namely 
the immaterial faculty called the will. The will cannot be known ob-
jectively, among other things, because all operations of the intellect 
begin with abstraction, which is the intellectual knowledge of the sen-
sible. But the will is a dimension of the human soul that cannot be 
accessed by shining on the sensible, and it does not seem to receive 
printed species. Therefore the will can only be known by a habit that 
must be innate, which precedes what is usually called practical reason, 
and has to do with the habits of the will, i.e. with moral virtues”51.  
Of synderesis’ two slopes the higher of the duality is the I-want. 
According to Polo this is because all and every one of its actions re-
quires to be constituted by the act of being, by the person himself, and 
therefore it is closer to the act of being, i.e. to the personal level. This 
constitutive need of each and every act of the will is what Polo calls 
‘the curvature of the will’: “In Thomas Aquinas this is mentioned 
briefly in what he calls the curvature of the will. The curvature of the 
will can be described mainly in two different ways; the will is curved 
because it commits our subjectivity since, unlike what occurs with 
knowledge the ‘I’ has to support the wanting for it to be real… But it 
also notices that the will’s capacity of improvement is not exhausted… 
That it is necessary to improve the will by wanting more. Therefore in 
the voluntary act there are two facets: what is loved –what is wanted– 
and the ‘I’, that at the same time that it wants the thing it also wants to 
want more”52. Saying it simply, in every act of wanting, the person 
commits himself to the object wanted. As Polo mentions often: “Nie-
tzsche says I do not despise if I do not accept myself as the one who 
despises. I cannot perform the act of contempt if I do not accept myself 
as the one who despises, [or more clearly this time placing Socrates as 
                                                 
51 “La sindéresis ilumina aquello que no es posible conocer operativamente, a saber, 
la potencia inmaterial llamada voluntad. La voluntad no se conoce objetivamente, 
entre otras cosas, porque las operaciones intelectuales comienzan con la abstrac-
ción, que es el conocimiento intelectual de lo sensible. Pero la voluntad es una 
dimensión del alma humana a la que no se puede acceder desde la iluminación de 
lo sensible, y tampoco parece que reciba especies impresas. Por tanto, la voluntad 
sólo se puede conocer con un hábito que ha de ser innato, el cual precede a lo que 
se suele llamar razón práctica y tiene que ver con los hábitos de la voluntad, es 
decir, con las virtudes morales”. Ibid., 149. 
52 “En Tomás de Aquino esta actitud se expresa de una manera breve según lo que 
él llama la curvatura de la voluntad. Esta se puede describir según dos líneas: ante 
todo, la voluntad es curva porque compromete a nuestra subjetividad, pues, a dis-
tinción de lo que ocurre en el conocimiento, el yo tiene que apoyar el querer para 
que éste exista. Pero también advierte que la mejora de la voluntad no lo realiza 
exhaustivamente. Es necesario querer mejor queriendo más. Por tanto, en la inten-
ción del acto voluntario hay dos instancias: lo amado, lo querido, y el yo, que al 
comprometerse al querer lo amado mira también a querer más”. Polo, L., “Ética 
Socrática y Moral Cristiana”, Anuario Filosófico, vol. 40/ 3 (2007) p. 567. 
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authority:] what Socrates said, the one who commits a murder be-
comes a murderer”53. The person is the agent of any act of the will, 
through the ‘I-want’ side of synderesis. 
Because the will is the faculty in which the personal act of being 
is more involved, as it has to be constituted in each act54, it is the one 
that represents best the person and its responsibilities, which is what 
links the person to ethics. Furthermore, because by themselves the acts 
of willing are blind by themselves, they need to be directed by 
knowledge and this requirement is achieved through the unitary root 
of synderesis, which the will shares with the intelligence. The task is 
not easy, though, because as Polo points out the topic of the will is a 
very hazy topic55. This is only natural because it is not the will’s task 
to understand but to want, unlike the intelligence, so the intelligence 
has a difficult time to make sense of anything related to the will; actu-
ally, since synderesis and the will are above the intelligence in the 
hierarchical order, it may mean that it actually cannot ever fully un-
derstand them. In the same way that synderesis cannot understand 
what is above it i.e. the first principles, wisdom and the personal tran-
scendentals. This is why when Polo refers to them he uses the verb 
‘advertir’, to notice, rather than ‘conocer’, to know. 
In his work La voluntad y sus actos Polo takes up the traditional 
distinction of the three aspects of the will: the will as nature –voluntas 
ut natura–, the will as rational –voluntas ut ratio– and the will as habit 
–voluntas ut habitus–. He further assigns the role of synderesis as ‘I-
want’ to the voluntas ut natura while the voluntas ut ratio is activated 
by the practical reason, and the voluntas ut habitus by prudence. “The 
intellection taken as assistance to the voluntas ut natura is called syn-
deresis, and as assistance to the voluntas ut ratio is called practical 
reason. The reason as it captures the notion of good and submits to the 
will, moves towards it”56. We can, perhaps, add a fourth way of un-
derstanding the will, voluntas ut actus, which represents what Polo and 
                                                 
53 “Nietzsche dice que yo no desprecio si no me acepto como el que desprecia. El 
acto de despreciar no lo puedo llevar a cabo si no me acepto como el que despre-
cia… lo que decía Sócrates, quien comete uno se convierte en un asesino”. Polo, 
L., Polo, Sevilla, 1994, paragraph 44. 
54 “As imperative, do! can be simplified to an internal intellectual precedent that 
classical philosophy called sindéresis, without which the specific voluntary acts 
cannot be explained. Synderesis is specific for each human being”. “Como impe-
rativo, ¡haz! se reduce a un precedente intelectual interno que la filosofía clásica 
llama sindéresis, sin el cual los actos voluntarios concretos no se explican. La sin-
déresis es propia de cada ser humano”. Polo, L. and Llano, C., Antropología de la 
Acción Directiva, (Madrid: Aedos, 1997), 125. 
55 “Thomas Aquinas makes two key observations [...] First, he points out that the 
will is an unclear theme: it has not been studied in all its dimensions, and has been 
less studied than the intelligence by all previous philosophers”. “Tomás de Aquino 
hace dos observaciones centrales sobre el estado de la cuestión. Ante todo, advierte 
que la voluntad es un tema oscuro: no se han averiguado todas sus dimensiones, y 
ha sido menos estudiada que la inteligencia en la filsofía anterior a él”. Polo, L., 
La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 7. 
56 “La intelección tomada como coadyuvante de la voluntas ut natura se llama sin-
déresis, y como coadyuvante de la voluntas ut ratio razón práctica. La razón en 
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traditional philosophy call ‘active use’, or the will commanding other 
powers. Let us see each of the different uses of the will in turn. 
a.1. Voluntas ut natura 
The first act of synderesis constitutes the first voluntary which 
was called by Aquinas ‘simplex velle’. According to Polo it is an im-
pulse to do good, an imperative that accompanies all willing. This is 
why he says that it ‘constitutes’ the willing. “The voluntary as exer-
cised can be distinguished from the voluntary as constituted which is 
the ‘simplex velle’57. This distinction corresponds to the difference be-
tween practical reason and synderesis. No act of the will can be 
performed without the practical reason (what belongs to the voluntas 
ut ratio). Instead, synderesis is an inborn habit. The innate and regular 
knowing of the will is not exactly knowing the good, but some kind of 
imperative. The imperative is the simple wish: want! Because it is 
proper to you, and at the same time, the way you are constituted by the 
‘I’, because, in fact, wanting means ‘I-want”58.  
It is important though to keep in mind that “although the will and 
synderesis are different, they are not two different parts; the simple 
will is the natural will in act as ‘I-want’”59. The will is a faculty, syn-
deresis is the habit that knows and activates the will as faculty, it 
knows that the will is willing and what it wills, and synderesis is the 
impulse which penetrates all willing60. Polo does not identify the sim-
plex velle with synderesis since the will as a faculty is different from 
                                                 
cuanto capta la noción de bien y la presenta a la voluntad, mueve a tender a él”. 
Ibid., 33. 
57 “To the will corresponds like an awakening as simplex velle, and not because of 
the practical reason, but of synderesis. To will is neither an imposed nor autono-
mous (nothing to do with the categorical imperative); it is not a spontaneous 
imperative, but an essential agreement. Synderesis is the truth of the will. A la 
voluntad le corresponde como despertar en acto el simplex velle, y no en virtud de 
la razón práctica, sino de la sindéresis. Querer es un deber no impuesto ni autó-
nomo (no tiene nada que ver con el imperativo categórico); no es un imperativo 
espontáneo, sino un acuerdo esencial. La sindéresis constituye la verdad de la vo-
luntad”. Ibid., 68. 
58 “Cabe distinguir lo voluntario ejercido y constituido, y lo voluntario simplemente 
constituido: el simplex velle. Con esta distinción se corresponden la razón práctica 
y la sindéresis. Sin la razón práctica no se ejercen los actos de la voluntad (voluntas 
ut ratio). En cambio, la sindéresis es un hábito innato. La intelección habitual e 
innata de la voluntad no es exactamente el conocimiento del bien, sino cierto im-
perativo. El imperativo es el simple querer: quiere porque es lo tuyo y, a la vez, el 
modo como eres constituida en acto por el yo, pues, en rigor, querer significa que-
rer-yo”. Ibid., 51. 
59 “Aunque la voluntad y la sindéresis sean distintas, no son dos piezas sueltas; el 
simple querer es la voluntad natural en acto en tanto que quiero-yo”. Ibid., 52. 
60 “The first voluntary act is described as the knowledge of the will according to its 
nature. Such knowledge is different from practical reason, which deals with means 
and ends. Instead, the first voluntary act is knowledge of the will as transcendental 
relationship. Aquinas calls this first act simplex velle”. “El primer acto voluntario 
se describe como el conocimiento de la voluntad según su índole propia. Dicho 
conocimiento se distingue de la razón práctica, que versa sobre los medios o sobre 
el fin. En cambio, el primer acto voluntario es el conocimiento de la voluntad como 
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synderesis as a natural habit: “Only considered in its duality with syn-
deresis, the natural will ascends to the level of velle”61. This 
constitution of the will as natural will (voluntas ut natura or simplex 
velle) is what constitutes the will’s truth, what makes it be what it 
should be, by shining its transcendental orientation to the good: “It is 
sometimes said that synderesis communicates to the will the com-
mand: do good and avoid evil. I believe that is not exactly true, but 
that synderesis starts encouraging wanting. The truth is established in 
the will in order to the good, which is what corresponds to the will as 
transcendental relationship”62.  
The transcendental relation to the truth is what the voluntas ut 
natura actually is. This relationship is awakened by synderesis, there-
fore constituting it, and it is the one that will feed each of the acts of 
the will as reasoned acts (voluntas ut ratio): “However, the oscillation 
of the will does not take place in its first awakening by synderesis. The 
constitutive truth of simplex velle is the awakening to the good. The 
will cannot resist this awakening because it is its own truth”63.  
Finally, the constitutive act of synderesis not only gives the ob-
ject to the will —the good— but does it as moved by the personal level 
of transcendental love, which is the highest of the personal radicals: 
“As I indicated, I argue that the natural will is not a spiritual power, 
but a peculiar power which, by its affinity with nature, is unable to 
exercise voluntary acts, which are spiritual themselves. Now it should 
be added that synderesis —the innate, not-acquired habit— by relating 
to the voluntas ut natura, establishes it as the first voluntary act. Thus 
voluntas ut ratio is a potency that in exercising its actions is suscepti-
ble to obtain acquired habits. Synderesis is an inborn habit through 
which the personal transcendentals connect with the so called relative 
                                                 
relación trascendental. A ese primer acto Tomás de Aquino lo llama simplex velle”. 
Ibid., 51. 
61 “Sólo considerada en su dualidad con la sindéresis, la voluntad natural asciende al 
nivel del velle”. Ibid., 52. 
62 “A veces se dice que la sindéresis comunica a la voluntad el imperativo: haz el 
bien y evita el mal. Estimo que no es exactamente así, sino que la sindéresis co-
mienza animando a querer. La verdad se establece en la voluntad en orden al bien, 
que es lo que le corresponde como relación trascendental”. Ibid., 65. 
63 “Sin embargo, la oscilación de la voluntad no tiene lugar en su primario ser des-
pertada por la sindéresis. La verdad constitutiva del simplex velle es el despertar al 
bien. La voluntad no puede oponerse a ese despertar porque es su propia verdad”. 
Ibid., 65. 
And also “I insist, the first voluntary act constituted by sinderesis is not orectic 
(wanting). The first voluntary act is the lighting of the will as transcendental rela-
tionship. So I understand the voluntary act that Aquinas called simplex velle. The 
simple I-want is a pure passive power elevated to the status of act at the essential 
level”. “Insisto, el primer acto voluntario constituido por la sindéresis no es oréc-
tico” Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 125. “El primer acto 
voluntario es la iluminación de la voluntad como relación trascendental. Así en-
tiendo el acto voluntario que Tomás de Aquino llama simplex velle. El simple 




transcendentals”64. This is what we referred above as the constituent 
function of synderesis which somehow starts the essential level 
through the faculty of the will. Something similar will be explained 
when talking about the ‘I-see” side of synderesis. 
This constitution of the voluntas ut natura is not seen by most 
authors65. This makes some who recognise synderesis as the origin of 
morals speak of two different principles moving the person to do good, 
synderesis and the voluntas ut natura, which is not correct: “Synderesis 
presents the good an attraction that requires a response from the per-
son, and this is the start of all moral life (that has also other instances 
like the natural tendency of the will to the good, voluntas ut natura)”66. 
These distinctions are somehow procedural distinctions because 
the will only acts through its habits, which are a modulation of the 
willing. This means that in any act of willing, in any decision taken, 
synderesis, practical reason and prudence are all equally involved. 
They are inseparable but three different levels that made up any deci-
sion. Synderesis gives the voluntas the impulse to do good, that 
permeates, as part of the habitual role of synderesis in all acts of voli-
tion, which are done through the virtues because “the will acts though 
its habits”67.  
These conception of the voluntas ut natura is important because 
otherwise the will would be understood as simple desire68 as –orexis– 
                                                 
64 “Como ya he indicado, sostengo que la voluntad natural no es una potencia espi-
ritual, sino una potencia peculiar que, por su afinidad con la naturaleza, es incapaz 
de ejercer actos voluntarios, los cuales sí son espirituales. Ahora conviene añadir 
que la sindéresis -hábito innato, no adquirido-, al versar sobre la voluntas ut natura 
la constituye como acto voluntario primario. De esta manera la voluntas ut ratio 
es una potencia, que al ejercer sus actos es susceptible de hábitos adquiridos. La 
sindéresis es un hábito innato a través del cual los trascendentales personales co-
nectan con los llamados trascendentales relativos”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus 
Actos I, op. cit., 42. 
65 Many traditional authors normally see the relation of voluntas ut natura and the 
norms, but its constitution by synderesis is not normally seen. Duplá, in his well 
reserarched book puts it as follows: “Specifically in the will were not naturally 
inclined to the good, the morl norms would be totally indiferent to the will, would 
slip over its surface without wetting it”. “En particular, si Ia voluntad no estuviera 
nativamente inclinada al bien, las normas morales le serian perfectamente indife-
rentes, resbalarían sobre su superficie sin llegar a conmoverla”. Rodríguez Duplá, 
L. R. D., “¿Por qué Sostiene Kant que el Hombre es Malo?”, op. cit., 20. 
66 “La sindéresis presenta el bien como algo que interpela a la persona exigiéndole 
una respuesta personal, y de este modo constituye el arranque de toda la vida mo-
ral (que tiene también otros supuestos, como la tendencia natural de la voluntad 
al bien o voluntas ut natura)”. Trigo, T., “La Sindéresis, Comienzo y Guía de la 
Vida Moral”, in “Curso de Ética”, Arvo .net. Accessed June 13, 2015. 
http://arvo.net/uploads/file/ETICA/cursoeticatt/Cap%C3%ADtulo%204.pdf. Ac-
cessed June 13, 2015. 
 67 “La voluntad se mueve desde los habitos”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, 
op. cit., 51. 
68 “Inasmuch as the development of the will depends on synderesis, the Greek inter-
pretation of the will is corrected according to which, by being just desire, the will 
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in Classical Greek philosphy, or as pure spontaneity, which is the mod-
ern version of the will. The classic view constrains the will be under 
the substance and therefore limits its power because it cannot grow 
more, cannot develop without limits; its end is already established by 
the substance, the nature. It then inherites the necessity of nature, and 
thereore support a type of ethics like the one developed by Spinoza as 
Ethica More Geometrico Demostrata. If it is understood as pure spon-
taneity, the will is somehow lost, it has no direction, and anything 
goes69. Naturally to grasp correctly how the will works has momentous 
importance for ethics. In the first case ethics can be understood as a 
series of inflexible norms, in the second as moral indifference where 
each one decides ones’ rules which in fact is the negation of morals. 
The transcendental relationship now has to become desire –
orexis– and this can only be done when the intelligence presents to the 
will something as good, because only the character of goodness moves 
the will. It is interesting to note that the intelligence’s object is the 
truth, not the good. So it has to be under synderesis to discover what 
is good, at this is what properly constitutes the practical-reason as we 
shall see in the next section. 
a.2. Voluntas ut ratio 
In the previous section we have seen that for Polo synderesis is 
mainly an impulse to act, to do good, an impulse that is habitual, in the 
double sense that it is always present and that it accompanies all the 
acts of the will. This involves the person, who in each and every deci-
sion has to give the energy, so to speak, to carry out the action, and 
consequently benefitting from it due to the curvature of the will. This 
is done at the level of the voluntas ut natura: “The voluntas ut ratio 
receives the notice of the things provided by the practical reason. 
Without such notice the voluntary acts, regarding the present good, 
cannot be exercised. The intelligence knows the truth, it makes objec-
tive what is intelligible, but it also has to capture the reason of good to 
present it to the will. Nihil volitum quin praecognitum: the voluntas ut 
ratio cannot be moved by anything that is not previously known. So, 
although the relationship with the good is constitutive of the will this 
does not mean that the will knows goods”70. The will ut nature knows 
                                                 
is subordinated to the intelligence”. “En tanto que el desarrollo de la voluntad de-
pende de la sindéresis, se corrige la interpretación griega de la voluntad según la 
cual, por ser netamente desiderativa la voluntad es inferior a la inteligencia”. Polo, 
L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 138. 
69 “Thus, the notion of natural will is preferable to the spontaneity. Firstly, because 
it is not identified with the personal act of being. Secondly, because it is pursuable 
in voluntary acts in which the ‘I’ is constituent and not constituted. Synderesis’ 
task is the passage from the passive power (voluntas ut natura) to the voluntary 
(voluntas ut ratio)”. “Así pues, la noción de voluntad natural es preferible a la de 
espontaneidad. En primer lugar, porque no se identifica con el ser personal. En 
segundo lugar, porque es proseguible en actos voluntarios en los que el yo es cons-
tituyente y no constituido. El cometido de la sindéresis es el paso de la potencia 
pasiva pura a lo voluntario”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 40. 
70 “La voluntas ut ratio recibe la noticia de los bienes que la razón práctica le pro-
porciona. Sin esa noticia no se pueden ejercer los actos voluntarios respecto del 
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that anything good is desirable, so once something good appears, it 
likes it and tends towards it. But it has to be presented as good to the 
will. 
It is important though, to note that the will is only one, as Polo 
notes: “The natural-will and the rational-will are not two different 
powers. It is the same faculty seen in two stages, because the consid-
eration of the will has to be procedural, precisely because it is a 
tendency power whose deployment must be studied. That deployment 
begins with its confluence with the intelligence”71.  
It is the task of synderesis as ‘I-see’ to assist in the specification 
of the will, of the voluntas ut ratio. The intelligence, being a 
knowledge power, gives knowledge because the will is blind since it 
is not a knowledge power. The will by itself is blind, its task is to 
move, to decide, to have things done, so it needs another power to 
guarantee that what the intelligence presents is really good: “As the 
will is not a cognitive power, such communication must also be borne 
through synderesis”72.  
This is what traditionally is called practical reason; ‘reason’ in 
that it knows the universals, ‘practical’ in that it presents them as 
goods, and goods attainable and desirable for the specific person at a 
particular situation and time. The voluntas ut ratio, is not a new power 
but a phase of the act of willing which terminates in the voluntas ut 
habitus as Polo clearly explains: “The voluntas ut ratio is not a power 
distinct from the natural will, but its continuation. It is characterized, 
firstly, by being enlightened with the knowledge of the goods, 
knowledge provided by the so-called practical reason and, secondly, 
by the exercise of the acts by which active virtues are acquired”73. 
In the following text it looks as if Polo identifies the second 
member of synderesis, the ‘I-want’, with practical reason, or at least 
as the habit that makes it possible to know the good. It is pertinent to 
                                                 
bien presente. La inteligencia conoce la verdad, objetiva lo inteligible, pero tam-
bién le corresponde captar la razón de bien en tanto que la presenta a la voluntad. 
Nihil volitum quin praecognitum: la voluntas ut ratio no puede querer nada si antes 
no ha sido conocido. De manera que, aunque la relación con el bien sea constitutiva 
de la voluntad, eso no significa que la voluntad conozca bienes”. Ibid., 27. 
71 “La voluntad nativa y la voluntad racional no son dos facultades. Es la misma 
entendida en dos momentos, pues la consideración de la voluntad tiene que ser 
procesual, precisamente porque se trata de una potencia tendencial cuyo desplie-
gue hay que estudiar. Ese despliegue comienza por la confluencia de la 
inteligencia”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, 
op. cit., 147. 
72 “Como la voluntad no es una potencia cognoscitiva, dicha comunicación también 
ha de correr a cargo de la sindéresis. Por eso puede decirse que la sindéresis armo-
niza la razón práctica con los actos de la voluntas ut ratio”. Polo, L., La Voluntad 
y sus Actos II, op. cit., 10. 
73 “La voluntas ut ratio no es una potencia distinta de la voluntad natural, sino su 
continuación. Se caracteriza, en primer lugar, por ser ilustrada con el conocimiento 
de los bienes, el cual corre a cargo de la llamada razón práctica y, en segundo lugar, 
por el ejercicio de actos con los que se adquieren las virtudes activas”. Ibid., 7.  
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remember that the innate habits are ways of knowing, as we explained 
before, not to be surprised that the will as part of the appetitive powers 
is moved by a special type of knowledge: “The second member of the 
duality of good judgment, ‘I-want’, is also an illuminating light”74. “If 
the duality of synderesis is accepted, it is then possible to understand 
the difference between the theoretical and practical reasons. The ex-
planation of the theoretical reason is the ‘I-see’; on the other hand the 
practical reason derives from synderesis. If, as said before, the rational 
will is a continuation of the natural will, and not a different power, 
then practical reason should also be understood as derived from the 
second member of synderesis. If this is not taken into account, it is 
difficult to accept that there is a rational knowledge of the goods”75.  
The voluntas ut ratio because it is open to many goods, is not a 
simple act, but a complex one that requires a successive interaction of 
the intelligence and the will until the action is done and the intended 
good achieved. The absolute good that can fill up the infinite capacity 
of the spirit is not presentable by the senses, nor by the intelligence 
that depends on the senses for its activation as Polo remarks: “The first 
act of practical reason is to conceive goods. As such, this conception 
is plural and it generally increases with age. But in any case, the first 
goods are conceived as means. Moreover, while the goods are con-
ceived as plural, they are not yet compared to each other according to 
their relative importance. Because of this, the mere conception of 
goods, is followed by other acts of practical reason, namely, enquiry 
or counsel, which are part of the process called deliberation”76.  
Because of the importance to morals, since the actual moral re-
sponsibility depends on the acts of the voluntas ut ratio, we shall study 
them in the next chapter, where we discuss the importance to morals, 
so that we can succinctly explain the voluntas ut habitus and complete 
the types of will. 
                                                 
74 “El segundo miembro de la dualidad de la sindéresis, el querer-yo, es, asimismo, 
una luz iluminante”. Ibid., 8. 
75Si se admite la dualidad de la sindéresis, es posible entender la distinción entre la 
razón teórica y la razón práctica. La explicación de la razón teórica es el ver-yo; 
en cambio, la razón práctica deriva de la sindéresis. Si, como se decía, la voluntad 
racional es una continuación de la voluntad natural, y no una potencia distinta de 
ella, la razón práctica también ha de entenderse como derivada del segundo miem-
bro de la sindéresis. Si esto no se tiene en cuenta, es difícil admitir que existe un 
conocimiento racional de los bienes. Ibid., 8-9. 
76 “El primer acto de la razón práctica es el concebir bienes. Como se ha dicho, esa 
concepción es plural y suele aumentar con la edad. Pero, en cualquier caso, los 
primeros bienes que se conciben tienen carácter de medios. Por otra parte, en tanto 
que los bienes se conciben como plurales, todavía no se comparan entre sí de 
acuerdo con su importancia relativa. Por eso, a la mera concepción de los bienes, 
siguen otros actos de la razón práctica, a saber, la inquisición o el consejo, que 
forman parte de un proceso llamado deliberación”. Ibid., 10. 
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a.3. Voluntas ut habitus 
As already cited above the “the will acts though its habits” which 
makes Polo distinguish a third level of the will which is the ‘will as a 
habit’, what in common language is called ‘will power’: “The voluntas 
ut ratio is to be regarded as a development [of the voluntas ut natura]; 
to study this development another dimension must be added: the vol-
untas ut habitus. The acts of the voluntas ut ratio, spoken of Thomas 
Aquinas, cannot be exercised without habits”77. 
The voluntas ut habitus is the root of the different moral virtues. 
The virtues help the will to strengthen but they are not different from 
the person, who through the ‘I’, —the synderesis— has to reinforce 
the will each time: “In principle, voluntary acts should not be aban-
doned. The virtues strengthen the acts, i.e. the involvement of the self 
in them. Good deeds should not be left unassisted”78. But in some 
cases the ‘I’ has to change the course of action because through syn-
deresis the person realises that the action is evil: “Of course, synderesis 
can always suggest that it is possible not to assist a specific decision. 
And that sometimes, it is an obligation to do so if the act is wrong. In 
that case, the ‘I’ is obliged to ‘turn back”79.  
For Polo the difference between the virtues is a difference of the 
intensity of the activation of the will. He also proposes a different rank 
of virtues from the concupiscible to the irascible and then to justice 
and friendship, all under the umbrella of prudence which is an intel-
lectual virtue of the practical reason. We do not need to get into the 
detailed explanation of this, suffice it to point out how the virtues link 
with the practical-reason, and the ‘I-want’ as part of synderesis80.  
                                                 
77 “La ‘voluntas ut ratio’ se ha de considerar como un desarrollo; para estudiar ese 
desarrollo hay que añadir otra dimensión: la ‘voluntas ut habitus’. Los actos pro-
pios de la ‘voluntas ut ratio’, de que habla Tomás de Aquino, no se pueden ejercer 
sin hábitos. El primer hábito es la prudencia, y el consensus una parte de la pru-
dencia”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 73. 
78 “En principio, los actos voluntarios no se deben anular. Las virtudes fortalecen los 
actos, es decir, la adhesión a ellos del yo. Los actos buenos no deben ser desasisti-
dos”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 58. 
79 “Desde luego, la sindéresis siempre puede advertir que es posible desasistir un 
acto voluntario concreto. Y que, a veces, es obligado hacerlo si el acto es malo. En 
ese caso, el yo está obligado a “echarse atrás”. Ibid., 59. 
80 While Polo’s proposal on the virtues is very interesting and he considers the vir-
tues the central topic of ethics we cannot deal with them in this dissertation. For a 
clear explanation of his proposal. cfr. Sellés, J. F., Los Hábitos Adquiridos: las 
Virtudes de la Inteligencia y la Voluntad según Tomás de Aquino (Pamplona: Ser-
vicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2000. Accessed 12 December 
2014. http://dspace.unav.es/dspace/handle/10171/5587. For an intersesting and 
easy to follow description of virtues for managers Polo, L., “La Ética y las Virtudes 
del Empresario”, Atlántida, 14 (1993) 80-92.  
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a.4. Voluntas ut actio 
Polo does not use the term voluntas ut actio to speak about what 
traditionally is called active use of the will, as mentioned above81. We 
choose to use it to highlight how the activity of the will reaches the 
action, which is, according to Polo, through the will’s intention. The 
intention of the will is ‘intention of other’, as well clarified by Polo 
following the classic authors. The will’s intentionality is a movement 
towards something external, the good to be acquired. The intentional-
ity of the intelligence, by contrast, is intention of likeness: “In my 
view, the distinction between the faculties of the spirit corresponds to 
different intentions: the intentionality, of similarity, that is specific 
character of the object thought, and intentionality of other that charac-
terizes the voluntary acts”82. 
The active use, is the purpose of the will, the action intended, 
and as such it is intrinsically related to our topic because it is the core 
of ethics as practical science. If there are no actions there is no ethics, 
and to try to study ethics without giving to actions their due importance 
will be misplaced. Polo is conscious of its importance and gives the 
reasons for it: “the topic of action, as I mentioned, is the basic theme 
of ethics because thanks to it ethics starts, virtues are acquired through 
actions, and goods are obtained through actions”83. 
While Polo highlights the importance of the active use of the will 
he would like to improve its explanation, because “the notion of active 
use presents some difficulties. It is unclear how the will influences the 
locomotor faculties. For example, what is the relationship between 
wanting to move the hand and actually moving it? And whether this 
has to be a relationship between the hand and the brain? Neither biol-
ogists nor philosophers know how the will and brain are connected”84.  
                                                 
81 “The scholastics called active use the connection of the will and action. The will 
is in the doing; just like the idea, because otherwise things would not be done ac-
cording to the thought, as one wants to do according to the idea”. “Los escolásticos 
llaman uso activo de la voluntad a la conexión del querer con el hacer. El querer 
está en el hacer; lo mismo que la idea, porque en otro caso no saldría la cosa tal 
como se piensa, tal como se quiere hacer de acuerdo con la idea”. Polo, L., Ética: 
Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 186. 
82 “A mi modo de ver, la distinción de las facultades del espíritu se corresponde con 
sus distintas intencionalidades: la intencionalidad de semejanza, propia del carác-
ter del objeto pensado, y la intencionalidad de alteridad, que caracteriza a los actos 
voluntarios”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 69.  
83 “El tema de la acción que ya dije que era el tema básico de la ética porque con él 
se inicia la ética, se adquieren las virtudes a través de la acción y con la acción se 
consiguen bienes. Polo, L., Socratic Ethics and Christian Moral (umpublished 
transcription as translated in Appendix 1, Seville, July 1994) paragraph 25. 
84 “La noción de uso activo ofrece algunas dificultades. No es claro cómo influye la 
voluntad en la llamada facultad locomotriz. Por ejemplo, ¿cuál es la relación entre 
el querer mover la mano y el efectivo moverla, si esto último corre a cargo de la 
relación de la mano con el cerebro? Ni los biólogos ni los filósofos saben de qué 
modo la voluntad y el cerebro se conectan”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, 
op. cit., 16. 
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Leonardo Polo is conscious that his proposal is different from 
the classics. He somehow identifies the action as an act of the will (not 
the physical action), but the intention, which an act of the will: “For 
example, the phrase ‘I write with a pen’, or ‘I plough with the plow’; 
the activity done is the written letter or the ploughed field. The action 
is the verb —I write, I plough— and it is constituted by the ‘I’. If the 
intention of the action would stop in the work then it would be inte-
grated in the plexus. But if action traverses through the work the action 
amounts to what traditional philosophy called intentio. In other words, 
I argue that the action and the intention are not different acts. What I 
call traversing the work is equivalent to decrypt or reveal its mean-
ing”85. He also says it more emphatically: “The term ‘active use’ is 
unacceptable. This voluntary act should be called action: it is the vol-
untary praxis whose intention is the piece of work at hand. In the piece 
of work the knowledge is passed to the motor powers, especially to the 
hands. In this communication, the form known by the immanent oper-
ation becomes configurational of what is done. In this sense, we speak 
of ‘putting legs to ideas’. ‘Legs’ is the execution of the piece of work, 
but without ideas there is nothing to ‘put legs’ to. The communication 
of the ideas to the motor powers through the imagination is quite un-
derstandable from a neurological point of view. It is the relationship 
between the activating and inhibiting nerve functions that start from 
the ideas. But, we do not know how the active use of the will could 
use the motor powers making them passive”86.  
This proposal is new and requires some development. As a first 
impression it explains better the conjunct implication of the intelli-
gence, the will, and the senses in any action that requires the use of the 
body or the sensitive faculties e.g. the imagination or the memory. It 
can also explain better the continuous care of the action needed while 
the piece of work is being done that normally requires adjustments and 
rectifications. Nevertheless, it is not clear what the status of the inten-
tions is before actualizing them and as they are being actualized. 
Furthermore, how one can reject intentions midway; that the intention 
                                                 
85 “Por ejemplo, la expresión “yo escribo con la pluma”, o “yo aro con el arado”; la 
obra es la carta escrita o el campo roturado. La acción es el verbo —escribo, aro—
, y es constituida por el yo. Si la intención de la acción se detuviera en la obra, ésta 
sería un medio integrado en el plexo. En cambio, si la acción atraviesa la obra, la 
acción equivale al acto que la filosofía tradicional llama intentio. Con otras pala-
bras, sostengo que la acción y la intención no son actos distintos. Lo que llamo 
atravesar la obra equivale a descifrar o desvelar su sentido”. Polo, L., La Voluntad 
y sus Actos II, op. cit., 19. 
86 “La expresión ‘uso activo’ es inaceptable. A este acto voluntario conviene llamarle 
acción: es la praxis voluntaria cuya intención es la obra. En la obra el conocimiento 
se comunica a las facultades motoras, sobre todo, a las manos. En esa comunica-
ción, la forma conocida por la operación inmanente, pasa a ser configurante de lo 
que se hace. En este sentido, se habla de ‘ponerle patas a las ideas’. ‘Las patas’ son 
la ejecución de la obra, pero sin ideas no hay nada a lo que ‘ponerle patas’. La 
comunicación de las ideas a las facultades motoras a través de la imaginación es 
bastante comprensible desde el punto de vista neurológico. Es la relación entre las 
funciones nerviosas inhibidoras y las funciones excitadoras que arrancan de ellas. 
En cambio, no sabemos cómo el uso activo de la voluntad podría usar las faculta-
des motoras haciéndolas pasivas”. Ibid., 18. 
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accompanies the active use is clear, but it looks different from the in-
tention which can be there in waiting until the appropriate moment 
comes, and if it does not come it is rejected or changed. We shall see 
the steps of the practical intelligence and the will when we discuss 
synderesis’ dynamics in the next chapter. 
a.5 Summary 
We have seen so far that synderesis is a natural habit at the es-
sential level that has two facets within it: the ‘I-see’ and the ‘I-want’. 
We have seen how through the ‘I-want’ synderesis constitutes the will 
as natural will, and how through the practical reason it activates the 
rational will, which, with use, becomes the habitual will, which is the 
normal way of acting; and how the active use of the will is not properly 
an active use of the will itself but a way of putting the intention of the 
will in practice through the intelligence and sensitive potencies. We 
now complete the duality of the synderesis by briefly seeing the ‘I-see’ 
side of synderesis. 
 
7. The ‘I-see’ side of the synderesis  
The I-want and I-see always work together, they cannot work 
alone, since they are the two sides of the same habit and root of the 
equally inseparable faculties of the will and the intelligence. The in-
separability of the will and the intelligence in any human action is 
clearly stated by Polo: “Thomas Aquinas notes that the first thing that 
is demanded of the one who has to do something is to know. Acting 
blindly is ineffective”87. 
The classic philosophy view of synderesis is amply covered by 
the discussion on the ‘I-want’ side of synderesis, which was the only 
one attributed to synderesis and in a more reduced way than Polo pro-
poses. Polo introduces another novelty by placing all intellectual 
knowledge under this innate habit: “now if the theme of synderesis is 
the will, by higher motives it should also be able to illuminate the in-
tellectual faculty. To start with, the intellectual power does not know 
itself, neither through its operations –through which it simply knows 
objects– nor with the acquired habits which manifest the operations”88. 
This means that the intelligence is only known in its depth by the in-
nate habit of synderesis because the intelligence by itself only knows 
objects89.  
                                                 
87 “Tomás de Aquino advierte que lo primero que se ha de pedir al que actúa es que 
sepa. Actuar a ciegas es ineficaz”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 15. 
88 “Ahora bien, si el tema de la sindéresis es la voluntad, por mayores motivos ha de 
iluminar también la potencia intelectual. Por lo pronto, la potencia intelectual no 
se conoce a sí misma, ni tampoco con sus operaciones –las cuales simplemente 
conocen objetos–, ni siquiera con los hábitos adquiridos –los cuales manifiestan 
las operaciones–”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 149. 
89 The intellectual character of synderesis has been seen well in Medieval Philosophy 
and that means, as in this citation, that it is essential for man´s rationality and for 
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The ‘I-see’ is the side of synderesis that can help to discover the 
mental limit in a more direct way than the will. If we start by analysing 
our knowledge process we eventually reach what Polo calls its ‘limit’; 
the boundary of objective knowledge. We discover that the one who 
knows exists in a different way than the thoughts he thinks. Thinking 
cannot be thought, or saying it from the source of thinking: the thinker 
is not a thought while he thinks. His thinking is different from his 
thought, even when he thinks about himself; the thought of a thinker 
does not think. In the same way that a photographer normally does not 
appear in the photograph, the thinker does not appear in the known. 
Therefore, because the thinker knows that he knows and that he is not 
his thinking, there should be a different way by which the thinker 
knows himself, and this is achieved through habitual knowledge ac-
cording to Polo90, i.e. a knowledge of acts, not a knowledge of objects. 
The act of thinking and the thought are simultaneous and correspond-
ing each to the other; there is no object without act of knowledge and 
there is no act of knowledge without a known object. So the operation 
knows objects and the operation is known by the habit. The habit 
knows the act; the act (operation) knows the object. Using the example 
of sight, the eye does not know that it is seeing, it just sees; seeing does 
not have colour. The same happens with the intelligence, it knows the 
object by abstraction, and its knowing that knows is not sensible, so it 
cannot be abstracted. 
There are two ways to give attention to the fact of knowing; ei-
ther placing the attention on the act, or to focus it on the object. If we 
focus on the act we reach the knowledge of existences –of acts of be-
ing– thanks to specific habits as follows: the existence of the universe 
is done through the habit of the first principles, and the existence of 
the persons –the personal act of being– through the habit of wisdom. 
By focusing the attention on the content rather than on the act we reach 
the essential knowledge as follows: of the world –through the habit of 
science– and the knowledge of the essence of human beings –through 
the habit of synderesis–. These are the four ways of overcoming the 
mental boundary that Polo proposes, as mentioned before. We have 
already explained this in more detail in chapter five of the first section. 
 
                                                 
social development: “Humans have innate habits without which they could never 
be rational, one of these being synderesis, which regulates human activity and is a 
solid base on which a society of peace can be built”. Sequeira, J. A., “Synderesis 
and the magisterium”, Cuestiones Teológicas, vol. 40/93, (2013), 47. 
90 “Without denying that it is acquired, habitual knowledge is the only hope to over-
come the mental boundary. This is why I defend that the habitual knowledge is 
superior to the operational presential knowledge, that is normally called, objective 
knowledge”. “Sin negar que sea adquirido, en el conocimiento habitual aparece la 
única esperanza de superar el límite. Por eso sostengo que este modo de conoci-
miento es superior al conocimiento operativo presencial, que suele llamarse 
objetivo”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 48. 
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8. Ways of overcoming the mental boundary 
Nevertheless, the discovery of these upper levels of knowledge 
–the innate habits and the personal knowledge– is not something that 
belongs to synderesis, because synderesis is below the personal level, 
while wisdom and the first principles are at the personal level. Syn-
deresis can see what is below itself but cannot see what is above it, not 
even itself91. Synderesis can be seen from above, because it is the door 
of the personal knowledge, and through it one can know the acts that 
synderesis controls92. Synderesis itself is to be known through the su-
perior habits of wisdom and first principles. 
From the innate habit of synderesis as the ‘I-see’ all and every 
act of knowledge cascades down93. Each act of knowledge has a sub-
sequent acquired habit which highlights that particular type of 
nowledge, the activity, rather than the content: habit which is normally 
hidden and passes unnoticed94. Polo has written four volumes95 ex-
plaining in detail the operations of knowledge and their corresponding 
habits. Suffice here to know that they are all dependent of the habit of 
synderesis as ‘I-see’. So the ‘I-see’ integrates human knowledge com-
ing from the rational powers and consequently of sensitivity. 
Synderesis itself is ultimately activated by the personal act of being 
and more specifically by the agent intellect or intellect of actus: “The 
first member of that habit (synderesis) ‘I-see’ encapsulates or com-
prises what it illuminates, primarily the mental limit, i.e. the 
intellectual operations”96. It is good to remember that the mental limit 
is all objective knowledge which are operations and habits of the in-
telligence which is below synderesis.  
As with the will there is a distinction between the ultimate power 
of understanding which is the intellect ut actus –also called by Polo 
                                                 
91 "According to their hierarchy, one can distinguish two symbolic levels. The bot-
tom is one that is deciphered by the sindéresis, and the upper one that is not, 
precisely cover issues of one of the upper innate habits”. “De acuerdo con su je-
rarquía, pueden distinguirse dos niveles simbólicos. El inferior es aquél que es 
descifrado por la sindéresis, y el superior aquél que no lo es, precisamente por 
versar sobre temas de uno de los hábitos innatos superiores”. Polo, L., Nietzsche 
como Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 217.  
92 "The character of ‘more’ is also able to return to the starting point. Without such 
return the essence of man would not be possible. The return of the character of 
‘more’ to the mental presence is done by the synderesis”. “El carácter de además 
es capaz de volver a su punto de partida. Sin dicha vuelta no sería posible la esencia 
del hombre. La vuelta del carácter de además a la presencia mental corre a cargo 
de la sindéresis”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 176. 
93 “Specifically, first, synderesis sheds light on the intermediate species of the inter-
nal sensitivity, and on the acts and habits acquired by the intelligence. So, in the 
progress research, Polo reserved to synderesis the abstractive role, he and tradition 
attributed, to the agent intellect. In addition, he has also assigned to this native 
habit that necessity which he had discovered extending the classical doctrine”. “En 
concreto, por una parte, la sindéresis arroja luz sobre las especies de la sensibilidad 
intermedia, sobre los actos y los hábitos adquiridos de la inteligencia. De modo 
que, con el avance de su investigación, Polo ha reservado para la sindéresis ese 
papel abstractivo que él mismo y la tradición atribuía antes al intelecto agente”. 
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the core of knowledge97, and at times simply intellectus. He describes 
the different levels of the intelligence as follows: “We distinguish 
three aspects of the intellect: intellectus ut potentia, which is often 
called intellectual ability or intelligence; intellectus ut habitus: the 
habit of first principles; intellectus ut actus: which is called agent in-
tellect that in my proposal is a personal transcendental. Of course, the 
intellectus ut potentia and intellectus ut actus are innate, but not in the 
same sense: the first is at the essential level the second is at the per-
sonal act of being level. We have proved that the intellectual habits are 
due to the illumination of the agent intellect, which does not limit itself 
to provide the impressed species to the intelligence. We can then say 
that the intellectus ut habitus comes simpliciter from the intellectus ut 
actus, and, because it is not a perfection of the intellectual faculty, then 
only the agent intellect can be properly called innate”98. These distinc-
tions, which are very relevant for theory of knowledge, are not 
                                                 
Sellés, J. F., El Conocer Personal: Estudio del Entendimiento Agente según Leo-
nardo Polo, op. cit., 106. 
94 “An intellectual operation is not an inner light, but it hides itself; this is why the 
operation has only methodical value in its object, thus said, intentional. The objec-
tive intentionality is also a transparency, albeit minimal by immediately pointing 
to a term (in-tentio-in). It is an aspectual light. On their part, the acquired habits 
have inner light inasmuch as they manifest the operation rather than the object. It 
is a light that, more than "bathe", it permeates, "soaks" the operation, which is then 
manifested by it. The operations are discontinued; the habits are not, since they are 
not lost”. “La operación intelectual no es una luz interior, sino que se oculta; por 
eso la operación sólo tiene valor metódico en su objeto, que se dice intencional. La 
intencionalidad objetiva es también una transparencia, aunque sea mínima por 
apuntar inmediatamente a un término (in-tentio-in). Es una luz aspectual. Por su 
parte, los hábitos adquiridos poseen luz interior en tanto que no objetivan la ope-
ración, sino que la manifiestan. Es una luz que más que “bañar”, interioriza, 
“empapa” la operación, la cual es por eso desocultada por ella. Las operaciones 
son discontinuas; los hábitos no lo son, puesto que no se pierden”. Polo, L., Antro-
pología Trascendental I, op. cit., 176. 
95 Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, vols. I-IV, the fourth one in two 
different books, I y II, (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1984-2004). 
96 “La manifestación de la persona humana es el proseguir del hábito innato llamado 
sindéresis; pues ese proseguir se realiza de acuerdo con lo que llamo ver-yo y que-
rer-yo. El primer miembro de ese hábito —ver-yo— abarca o engloba lo que 
ilumina, ante todo, el límite mental, o sea, las operaciones intelectuales”. Polo, L., 
Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 18. 
97 “If no one knows, it would make no sense to speak about intellectual knowledge. 
Because of this dependence I call the person, i.e., the knower, the core of 
knowledge”. Si no conoce alguien, no tiene sentido hablar de conocimiento inte-
lectual. En atención a esta dependencia llamo a la persona, es decir, al cognoscente, 
el núcleo del saber. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, IV, op. cit., 548.  
98 “Distinguimos tres sentidos del intelecto: intellectus ut potentia, que se suele lla-
mar facultad intelectual o inteligencia; intellectus ut habitus: es el hábito de los 
primeros principios; y intellectus ut actus: es el llamado intelecto agente, que en el 
planteamiento propuesto se entiende como un trascendental personal humano. 
Desde luego, el intellectus ut potentia y el intellectus ut actus son innatos, pero no 
en el mismo sentido: el primero lo es esencialmente, y el segundo en el orden del 
acto de ser humano. Hemos sentado que los hábitos intelectuales son debidos a la 
iluminación del intelecto agente, que no se limita a proporcionar especies impresas 
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essential for the discussion on ethics. They nevertheless show how the 
‘I-see’ side of the synderesis is also constitutive of the intellectual fac-
ulty.  
The constitution of the first act of the habitual intelligence is 
done by the first abstraction which enables or constitutes the habit of 
conscience: “The corresponding habit to the abstraction of the circle 
illuminates it as the symbol of the ‘I-see’ habit. ‘I’ means the human 
person as being poured into the essence. The immateriality or spiritu-
ality of the soul is shown in this notion. So the ‘I’ is entirely 
inseparable from the two lines of deployment of the human essence 
manifestation. This is why I speak always of the ‘I-see’ and the ‘I-
want’ and not in isolation of the ‘I’, because that would be to consider 
it a reality in itself. An important difference between the two sides is 
that ‘I-see’, whose symbolic continuation I describe as cascade of 
events, only preserves the ‘I’ in its culmination. Only because of this 
fact is why other symbols are possible, whom I call vicarious symbols, 
i.e. the symbol that we are now considering is relieved by them”99. 
This text is particularly important to show: 1) the reason of not speak-
ing of the ‘I’ in isolation; 2) the inseparability of the two sides of 
synderesis as the ‘I’; 3) the circle being the symbol of the ‘I-see’; 4) 
why in the intellectual operations the ‘I’ does not appear as it is hidden 
under the object but it appears only in the first habit ‘the conscience’; 
5) the reason for the ‘I’ appearing as ‘conscience’ in all acts of 
knowledge. We prefer to discuss this point later because at this stage 
it will be more difficult to see the moral side of it since it appears as 
‘consciousness’ rather than as moral conscience.  
Finally, and to set the base for the discussion on the moral expe-
rience in the next chapter, it is good we refer to the intellectual 
experience, which sums up the habitual knowledge at the synderesis 
level.100 Polo understands the knowledge of the habits of the intelli-
gence by the ‘I-see” side of synderesis as ‘intellectual experience’. 
                                                 
a la inteligencia. Pues bien, el intellectus ut habitus se debe simpliciter al intellec-
tus ut actus, y, al no ser una perfección de la potencia intelectual, sólo puede 
decirse innato al intelecto agente”. Ibid., 679. 
99 “El hábito correspondiente a la abstracción de la circunferencia la ilumina como 
símbolo de ver-yo. Yo significa persona humana vertida hacia la esencia. En esta 
noción se cifra la inmaterialidad o espiritualidad del alma. Por eso el yo es entera-
mente inseparable de las dos líneas de despliegue de manifestación de la esencia 
humana. También por eso hablo siempre de veryo o de quereryo y no aislada-
mente del yo, porque sería una realidad en sí. Una diferencia importante entre las 
dos vertientes es que veryo, cuya prosecución simbólica describo como cascada 
de actos, sólo conserva el yo en su culmen. Sólo por esto son posibles otros sím-
bolos, a los que por esta razón llamaré vicarios, es decir que toman el relevo al 
símbolo que estamos ahora considerando”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de 
Dualidades, op. cit., 219. 
100 The view of synderesis as a special intuition is also seen by other authors, e.g. 
Jaroszynski, P., Anderson, M., Etica, op. cit., 67. “The intuition of the first princi-
ples is called synderesis that could also be described as the first and original level 
of human conscience”. “La intuición de estos primeros principios se llama sindé-




Which is different from ‘moral experience’ which is given by the hab-
its of the will to the ‘I-want’: “I call intellectual experience the 
acquired habits as they are known by synderesis. While intellectual 
experience is superior to symbolic knowledge, includes symbols, but 
this does not imply that all are deciphered. It is very important to set 
these distinctions to avoid the mistake that is to understand the issues 
of intellectual experience as terminal intuitions, because human 
knowledge does not stop at this level”101. Polo is referring to the 
knowledge of the innate habits and the personal knowledge as superior 
levels of knowledge. 
 
9. Synderesis and the soul 
In order to relate better the classic concept of the soul to the tri-
adic structure proposed by Polo, it is relevant to notice that Polo places 
the soul within the triadic structure of man equating it to the human 
essence, and that therefore is composed of synderesis, the intellect and 
the will. “I understand what is traditionally called —immortal— spir-
itual soul as human essential manifestation, ranging from synderesis 
to the immaterial powers and the psychosomatic expressions. Aquinas 
argues that the reality of the soul is known by a habit. Naturally, such 
habit is innate, and this is equated to synderesis”102. We can say that 
this means basically that Polo considers the soul to comprise the es-
sential level, but we should not forget that it is hierarchically ordered, 
so synderesis can at times be used to mean the global essence and 
therefore the soul. 
Polo’s ontological soul’s explanation modifies the classical view 
to adjust it to the triadic structure of the man, as he says: “The reality 
of the soul lies not only on the spiritual powers, but in their apex: the 
habit of synderesis. The reception of the body is an inborn habit, so 
that the reference of the soul to the body is not the first act, and still 
less its formal cause. Also, I do not believe that the disembodied hu-
man soul is an incomplete substance because an innate habit is actually 
superior to a substance”103. So in this text it seems that synderesis will 
                                                 
101 “Llamo experiencia intelectual al tema de los hábitos adquiridos en tanto que 
manifiestos por la sindéresis. En tanto que la experiencia intelectual es superior al 
conocimiento simbólico, engloba a los símbolos, pero esto no implica que los des-
cifre a todos. Es muy importante sentar estas distinciones para evitar el desliz que 
consiste en entender los temas de la experiencia intelectual como intuiciones ter-
minales, porque el conocimiento humano no acaba en este nivel”. Polo, L., 
Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 226. 
102 “Lo que tradicionalmente se llama alma espiritual —inmortal— se entiende aquí 
como la manifestación esencial humana, que va desde la sindéresis hasta las po-
tencias inmateriales y la expresión psicosomática. Tomás de Aquino sostiene que 
la realidad del alma se conoce habitualmente. Como es claro, ese hábito es innato, 
y aquí es equiparado a la sindéresis. Desde la sindéresis se entiende el alma como 
refuerzo vital”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 15. 
103 “Por tanto, la realidad del alma estriba, no sólo en las potencias espirituales, sino 
en su ápice habitual: la sindéresis. La recepción del cuerpo es un hábito innato, de 
manera que la referencia del alma al cuerpo no es la de un acto primero, y menos 
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encompass the soul after death, in the state of the decomposition of the 
body. Simply said it will mean that what will remain after death will 
be the person –the personal level– and its essence, which will distin-
guish each person from any other person and from the angels, rather 
than a separated soul as a self-supporting substance. In a conversation 
with three of his disciples he asserted this more clearly: “Synderesis 
cannot disappear because then the soul would also disappear”104. 
 
10. Synderesis as adding life 
When talking about the relationship between the personal tran-
scendental co-existence and synderesis in the second volume of his 
Antropologia transcendental, Polo uses the term ‘manifestation’. This 
is another way to express the difference between the natural and the 
essential levels of the man’s triadic structure. He suggests that the nat-
ural level is ‘received life’ while the essential level becomes the 
‘added life’: “By depending on the co-existence, the essential mani-
festation is, so to speak, permeated by freedom. The activity of the 
essence is based on this penetration of freedom. So the essence is life, 
and this life is immortal. In this regard, two things should be noted: 
first, the distinction between living and life; and secondly, the distinc-
tion between added-life –vital reinforcement– and received-life”105. 
The added life if what really constitutes one’s personal task and there-
fore a moral duty106 
 The added life is built by the intelligence and the will under the 
instigation of the personal level through synderesis. The added life is 
the manifestation of the person. It is developed by using what has been 
received. The person can avail of what has been received to improve, 
neglect or even misuse and destroy himself. Polo calls inspiration to 
the activity of using the capacities available as received life, while he 
                                                 
aún la de una causa formal. Asimismo, no estimo acertado sostener que el alma 
humana separada del cuerpo sea una sustancia incompleta, pues un hábito innato 
es realmente superior a una sustancia”. Ibid., 16. 
104 “La sindéresis no puede desaparecer porque entonces desaparecería el alma”. 
Polo, L., Conversaciones en Bogotá, op. cit. 6-7. “synderesis is enough to explain 
the soul; the soul belongs to the essential level and without the ‘I’ there is no soul, 
but the soul is not the person and soul emerges then and in fact what is created is 
the person and by implication also the soul”. “La sindéresis basta para explicar el 
alma, o sea que el alma pertenece al orden esencial y sin el yo no cabe alma, pero 
el alma no es la persona y el alma surge entonces y en rigor lo que es creado es la 
persona y por derivación también el alma”. Ibid. 
105 “Al depender de la co-existencia, la manifestación esencial está, por así decirlo, 
‘atravesada’ por la libertad. Esta extensión de la libertad es la actividad de la esen-
cia. Por eso la esencia es vida, y su vivir es inmortal. Al respecto, conviene señalar 
dos distinciones: en primer lugar, la distinción entre viviente y vida; y en segundo 
lugar, la distinción entre vida añadida -o refuerzo vital- y vida recibida”. Polo, L., 
Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 13. 
106 “So, life coming from parents [received life] should be reinforced [adding life] 
by the son in order to become one’s own life”. “Asi pues, la vida que viene de los 
padres tiene que ser reforzada por el hijo para que sea vida propia”. Ibid., 14. 
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calls reinforcement to what the person adds as shown in this text: “The 
vital reinforcement is able to take inspiration from the life received. 
That inspiration does not mean precisely encompassing the corporeal 
life, but strengthening it. Synderesis can then be described as global 
inspiration and therefore as manifestation and global reinforcement. 
There is no possibility of an inspiration to be unilateral, or without 
reinforcement. Therefore, it must be done by the involvement of the 
intelligence and the will on the body”107. 
The received life is received mainly from the parents, not only 
as inherited biological and psychological characteristics, but also all 
bits and pieces received through informal and formal education that 
the family and society interactions leave in the person, many times 
without oneself having control, and many times without even being 
aware. Polo, nevertheless, points out that the act of being does not 
come from the parents and this is why each person is independent and 
unrepeatable and can gradually take over his life through one’s intel-
ligence and will to maturity108.  
As one matures one gradually takes command, gets inspiration 
on what one has available, and reinforces it, by directing one’s life, 
making increasingly manifest the person one is becoming. The person 
core also changes as we shall see: “Thus, the life received from the 
parents has to be reinforced by the son to be his own life: it is added 
to the life received from the sex cells. Reinforcement has to be added 
to the life that comes from parents and this depends on the person of 
the child. Such reinforcement is the manifestation of the person. If the 
life of a human being proceeded entirely from their parents, no one 
could speak of one’s life as the essence of the person of the son. How-
ever, we must not overlook that the human species is social, and life 
received places the person in history. If man is isolated, his essential 
freedom growth will be impossible”109.  
                                                 
107 “El refuerzo vital es capaz de inspirarse en la vida recibida. Esa inspiración no 
significa precisamente comprender la vida corpórea, sino reforzarla. La sindéresis 
se describe como inspiración global y, por tanto, como manifestación y refuerzo 
globales. No cabe que la inspiración sea unilateral, o sin refuerzo. Por tanto, debe 
cifrarse en la inclusión de la inteligencia y la voluntad en el cuerpo”. Ibid., 15. 
108 “The reproductive cells come from the parents; however, the person of the child 
is created by God: even if different generations give birth to different children, the 
personal character of the children is not from their parents”. “Las células repro-
ductoras proceden de los padres; en cambio, la persona del hijo es creada por Dios: 
por más que a generaciones distintas correspondan hijos distintos, el carácter per-
sonal del hijo no procede de sus padres” Ibid., 14. 
109 “Así pues, la vida que viene de los padres tiene que ser reforzada por el hijo para 
que sea vida propia: se añade vida a las células sexuales, que están vivas. A la vida 
que procede de los padres se ha de añadir un refuerzo que depende de la persona 
del hijo. Dicho refuerzo es la manifestación de la persona. Si la vida de un ser 
humano procediera enteramente de sus padres, no se podría hablar de la vida como 
esencia de la persona del hijo. Sin embargo, es preciso no pasar por alto que la 
especie humana es social, y que la vida recibida emplaza a la persona en la historia. 
Si el ser humano se aísla, el crecimiento de su libertad esencial es imposible”. Ibid. 
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It is important to note how Polo recognises not only the im-
portance of what is received from the parents but what has been 
received from society, which does not end at any particular time. Fur-
ther to it we shall see that the manifestation of the person requires the 
attention of other people to be recognised and that one´s happiness 
consists in contributing so that other people develop themselves as 
persons. 
This distinction between the received life and the acquired life 
is very interesting for ethics, because it gives a series of tools to see 
what a person is responsible or not responsible for and of duties and 
rights, topics which will be discussed in Chapter Ten. We now have to 
see whether synderesis and the personal act of being do change; which 
is vital for ethics. 
 
 
11. Changes in synderesis 
It is good to notice that an inborn habit does not mean that it 
cannot change: as the bones are innate and they do grow, similarly 
happens with most of the physical, psychological and personal char-
acteristics one is born with. 
Medieval philosophers were almost unanimous in that syn-
deresis, being the first principles of moral life, could not be lost, even 
in the worst criminals. Most also said that synderesis was the guaran-
tee of a universal moral standard. This was practically synderesis’ only 
function, and therefore it could not change. It was clear that it could 
be obscured, one may not pay attention to it, but its contents could 
never change. Evil judgements of criminals were due to the poor judg-
ment done by their conscience in applying the principles badly to the 
specific laws and situations, or by the vices acquired. Leonardo Polo 
agrees to this, at least in some texts: “Synderesis is not changeable. 
Limit situations of difficult solution, human incoherent attitudes are 
not lacking”110.  
Nevertheless, of the many activities synderesis controls in 
Polo’s proposal there is either improvement or diminishing in the ‘I-
see’ and ‘I-want’ depending on personal acceptance or rejection. One 
can speak of people who have better or worse synderesis, more or less 
clarity about the knowledge of human nature. As one can grow in wis-
dom and the use of the first principles, the other two innate habits, it 
will be surprising that the one under them will not change. This is 
clearly stated by Sellés: “together with what we have mentioned it 
should be added that all these innate habits can grow; development 
which is due to the activity of the agent intellect, and that also benefits 
                                                 
110 “La sindéresis no es mudable. Situaciones límites de difícil solución, incoherencia 
en las actitudes humanas, no faltan”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna 
de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 167. 
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the agent intellect”111 and more specifically regarding synderesis: “in-
nate habits are also susceptible to growth. In this way, synderesis can 
have more light to progressively reveal the essence and human nature, 
and that is the way it grows”112. Leonardo Polo’s affirmation that syn-
deresis cannot change must then refer to the content or natural moral 
law, rather than to synderesis as an innate habit and the acts it per-
forms113.  
Leonardo Polo did not directly treat this issue, nevertheless he 
recognises its potential character, so its acts will somehow modify it: 
“By being the apex of the human essence, synderesis has a potential 
character (otherwise, the real distinction cannot be supported)”114. The 
cause of its worsening is evil, the deprivation of the good the person 
needs. “Most negative affections perturb synderesis, which being the 
illuminating habit of the human essence, loses clarity and its capacity 
to give light by being deprived of the good”115. It can also reflect those 
changes by the affections it shows, feeling either some smoothness 
when things go well or some grittiness when disturbed116. In a more 
informal way in a conversation in Bogotá he mentioned that in our 
                                                 
111 “A la par, sobre los precedentes planteamientos cabe un añadido, y es que todos 
esos hábitos innatos son susceptibles de crecimiento; desarrollo debido al intelecto 
agente y en orden a él”. Sellés, J. F., Antropología para Inconformes: Una Antro-
pología Abierta al Futuro (Madrid: Rialp, 2006), 406. 
112 “Los hábitos innatos son también susceptibles de crecimiento. De esta suerte, la 
sindéresis puede disponer de más luz para desvelar progresivamente la esencia y 
la naturaleza humanas, y eso es su crecer”. Sellés, J. F., El Conocer Personal: 
Estudio del Entendimiento Agente según Leonardo Polo, op. cit., 135. 
113 We have seen that the medievals discussed at legnth whether synderesis could 
dissappear, and that at the end the view that it always remains, but that it can be 
almost obnubilated by bad behaviour. In our days this has happened in totalitarian 
anti-human communist countries and in hedonist cultures as pointed out by Jaro-
szynski, P., Anderson, M., Etica, op. cit., 68. “En el Tercer Reich y bajo el 
comunismo, la gente, de hecho, llegó a perder la capacidad para distinguir el bien 
y el mal. Incluso en sistemas no totalitarios, ciertas fuerzas, como por ejemplo los 
medios de comunicación de masas, tienen poder para distorsionar o silenciar la 
conciencia. En muchas de las sociedades occidentales y también en otras partes del 
mundo, los jóvenes son formados e influidos por la cultura pop, que difumina las 
fronteras entre lo correcto y lo erróneo”. 
114 “En cuanto que ápice de la esencia del hombre, la sindéresis tiene carácter poten-
cial (en otro caso, la distinción real no se puede sentar)”. Polo, L., Antropología 
Trascendental I, op. cit., 155. 
115 “La mayor parte de los afectos negativos afectan a la sindéresis, que por ser el 
hábito iluminante de la esencia humana, al sufrir la privación del bien, pierde la 
limpidez de la iluminación”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades, 
op. cit., 231.  
116 “Usually, the smooth feeling of synderesis is disturbed by moral issues; for ex-
ample, it will be affected by the sense of guilt. Ailments of the received-life can 
also affect the ‘soft feelings’ of synderesis, which are largely narrated by patients 
in their symptoms”. “Por lo común, la turbación de la suavidad de la sindéresis es 
moral; por ejemplo, el ser afectada la voluntad por la culpa. También puede ser 
afectada la suavidad de la sindéresis por indisposiciones de la vida recibida, que 
estriban en buena parte en los síntomas narrados por los enfermos”. Ibid., 230. 
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days synderesis is a bit spoilt, so this means it can improve and can 
worsen, so synderesis does change117. 
We have to keep in mind that there is some type of ontological 
explanation needed regarding the immutability of the principles of 
synderesis and its growth or decrease. It looks as if there is a compo-
sition within synderesis on top of the ‘I-see’ and the ‘I-want’ of which 
Polo has not said much. He has nevertheless written on it when touch-
ing upon the first principles that synderesis keeps, so in the next next 
section we deal with synderesis’ content. 
 
12. Synderesis’ content 
Leonardo Polo usually distinguishes between method and the 
theme in any type of knowledge, faculty or habit. Synderesis’ method 
is what corresponds to an innate habit at the apex of the essential level 
which is known by the affection it provokes in the person, as has al-
ready been discussed in the previous chapter. Its theme was also 
discussed, which are all activities that the person can control, starting 
with the spiritual ones directly under it: the intelligence and the will, 
and through them the sensitive and corporeal faculties. Nevertheless 
this control has a characteristic that should be taken into account: it is 
limited. In this section we shall see the characteristics of this limita-
tion.  
The theme of synderesis as seen mainly from the personal tran-
scendental of personal freedom, is to dispose, which means to have the 
capacity to use. Polo stresses that to dispose is not the same as to be at 
one’s disposition. This means that the activity of synderesis –all habits 
are acts– is more an action of marshalling resources than having abso-
lute power over them. To say it in Polo´s words first is to get 
inspiration and from it to reinforce the capacities one has been en-
dowed with. As quoted before, “Synderesis can then be described as 
global inspiration and therefore as manifestation and global reinforce-
ment”118. One thing is to use a tool, another to be the maker of the tool. 
One can drive a car, and that is marshalling a resource, which is dif-
ferent from being able to build the car. One cannot use the car as a 
submarine, a task for which it was not made, which will be ruinous for 
both the car and the driver. Polo applies this distinction of ‘disponer’ 
and ‘disponible’ to explain synderesis’ area of action: “The word dis-
pose can be used in a similar way with the double meaning when used 
to explain the essential activities. The essence is to dispose about what 
is at one’s disposition, and to have that what is at one’s disposition; 
                                                 
117 “Yes, synderesis is a bit battered. But it is better not to talk much about it, because, 
as Saint Teresa says, it is best not to speak ill of the human soul because it is God’s 
creation”. “Sí, la sindéresis está estropeadilla. Pero es mejor no hablar mucho de 
eso, porque es lo de Santa Teresa, que es mejor no hablar mal del alma humana 
porque es creación divina”. Polo, L., Conversaciones en Bogotá, op.cit. 6. 
118 La sindéresis se describe como inspiración global y, por tanto, como manifesta-
ción y refuerzo globales”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 15. 
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not only that, but there are modalities of disposing, because one does 
not dispose of them together or in blocks, but the way to dispose each 
depends on the different types of availability. In the case of man, it is 
evident that one can use the will, the intelligence and some faculties 
of the body. The person can dispose of what he knows, and according 
to the way one disposes it can be seen how much freedom penetrates 
the essence, i.e., how much one controls his intelligence, will and body 
faculties, rather than being controlled by them. The capacity to dispose 
is to look at the essence from the point of view of personal freedom, 
because the person is free and his essence is to dispose”119.  
This means that synderesis has some knowledge of the way 
things should be used, that are some engraved rules in the realities that 
synderesis has to marshal. These can be called natural rules, in the 
sense that come with nature, that they are inborn. Traditionally these 
rules are encompassed in what was called “natural law”. Now the nat-
ural law has been ascribed to synderesis since the medieval times, and 
even identified with it as we have seen when discussing the history of 
the evolution of the concept of synderesis. For Leonardo Polo this is 
the case: “Natural law’s knowledge belongs to synderesis, to which is 
somehow equivalent”120. So it is not only the knowledge of something 
external but it looks as if it synderesis knows something that is consti-
tutive of one’s identity. This may mean that natural lawis an activity, 
rather than an object to be known, a habitual activity, which is pre-
cisely what synderesis is, an innate habitual habit121.  
                                                 
119 “En ese doble sentido se puede emplear la palabra disponer cuando se trata de la 
esencia humana. La esencia es un disponer respecto de lo disponible, y es un dis-
poner de lo disponible; no solamente eso, sino que el disponer tiene modalidades, 
pues no se dispone en bloque, sino que se dispone según las modalidades de dis-
poner que pueden ser varias. En el caso del hombre es evidente que se puede 
disponer con la voluntad, también con el cuerpo. La persona dispone de lo que 
conoce, pero según ese disponer se ve cómo la libertad pasa a la esencia. Disponer 
es la esencia vista desde la libertad de la persona, porque la persona es libre, su 
esencia es disponer”. Polo, L., La esencia humana, op. cit., 163. The same idea is 
also expressed in the following text: “Acquired habits, the intelligence operations 
and the acts of the will are synderesis’ dispositive modalities”. “Los hábitos adqui-
ridos, así como las operaciones de la inteligencia, y los actos de la voluntad son 
modalidades dispositivas de la sindéresis”. Ibid., 17. 
120 “El conocimiento de la ley natural corre a cargo de la sindéresis a la que, en cierto 
modo, equivale”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 41. 
121 “As it cognitively presides human nature, we can say that synderesis is the source 
of knowledge of natural law. In this sense it can be understood as surveillance 
attentive to reality and ability to judge. Also, it must be said that it is equivalent to 
the habit of the theoretical first principles in the moral realm. By pointing to God 
as the ultimate goal, synderesis is accompanied by joy, a positive affection that can 
be very intense”. “Como preside cognoscitivamente la naturaleza humana, se 
puede decir que la sindéresis es la fuente del conocimiento de la ley natural. En 
este sentido se puede entender como vigilancia atenta a la realidad y como capaci-
dad de juzgar. Asimismo, se ha de decir que es el equivalente al hábito de los 
primeros principios teóricos en el orden moral. Al apuntar a Dios como último fin, 
la sindéresis es acompañada por la alegría, afecto positivo que alcanza en ella gran 
intensidad”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 137. 
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We come back to the consideration of synderesis’ duality, either 
as an impulse or as a set of principles. We may conclude that it is both, 
one view highligths the act; the other the direction human nature spec-
ifies the direction of the action. These are the traditionally defended 
immovable first principles of morals which belonging to human essenc 
are applicable to all human beings. As Polo remarks: “There are 
global-reach directive principles in the depths of the intelligence that 
are super-normative. The traditional term to name them is syn-
deresis”122. These according to Leonardo Polo are ‘not disposable’. 
We have discussed what synderesis is and the elements that re-
late to it. The next step is to see how they work together, which we do 
in the next chapter. 
                                                 
122 “En lo más hondo de la inteligencia existen principios directivos de alcance global 
o supernormativo. Para nombrarlos, el término tradicional es sindéresis”. Polo, L., 








1. Why this chapter? 
“At the heart of Aquinas’s ethics lies the will. Moral acts are 
willed acts […]. It comes as no surprise, then, that Thomas should de-
vote an extended discussion to the will and willed action. Nor is it 
surprising to find the will appearing prominently in all the other major 
aspects of his moral theory”1. It appears clear then that in order to dis-
cuss ethics we should discuss the stages of the will. 
Polo agrees with Aquinas’ opinion. As he says the central issue 
of ethics is the action2. So far we have described Polo’s Anthropology, 
which is the frame where synderesis finds its place, given the proofs 
of its existence, its structure and how it is known. All these can be 
considered as the structural or static consideration of synderesis, but 
the most important issues for ethics are not structures but operations, 
the dynamics of human acts. The structure is not static, it is there to 
make life possible, it is for action, and the root of human actions is 
personal love, and therefore highly important for ethics, as we shall 
see in this chapter. 
We have described the three human levels of the person; now 
we need to see how they work together, how the top level transcen-
dentals cascade down to daily actions. From the act of being, which is 
the source of all activity the cascading down is done in a chain of du-
alities, formed by the four constitutive transcendentals in their 
hierarchical order3. The personal love dualizes with personal 
knowledge (agent intellect), and then they both together do it with per-
sonal freedom and co-existence-with, which then is dual with the 
habits of wisdom and of the first principles. Then they dualize with the 
next level, the essential level. This cascading of activity is what Polo 
calls redundancy, or the influence that the upper habits have on the 
                                                 
1 Gallagher, D. M., “The Will and Its Acts”, in Stephen J. Pope (ed.), The Ethics of 
Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 69. 
2 “Here appears the subject of the action and I already said that it was the basic theme 
of ethics because through it ethics begins, virtues are acquired by acting and 
through action we acquire goods”. “Aquí aparece el tema de la acción que ya dije 
que era el tema básico de la ética porque con él se inicia la ética, se adquieren las 
virtudes a través de la acción y con la acción se consiguen bienes”. Polo, L., So-
cratic Ethics and Christian Moral, Seville, July 1994, Annex 1, paragraph, 25.  
3 As quoted before, Polo established the hierarchy of personal transcendentals in 
Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 262.  
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lower ones. We could say that Polo uses the term dualities to express 
the structural relationship and the term redundancy to express their 
dynamics4. The cascading continues at the essential level between the 
duality of synderesis: the ‘I-want’ and ‘I-see’. The ‘I-want’ which is 
the highest dualizes with the will and the ‘I-see’ with the intelligence. 
Through them the activity initiated at the personal level finally reaches 
the natural level through the sensitive knowledge, the appetitive pow-
ers and finally it is translated into motions.  
It is important to note that the activity process is only down-
wards. There is no cascading upwards. The person knows and wants 
because he is active. One is able to sense, understand, want, because 
one is active, is alive. A lower power cannot modify what is above it. 
It is what is above what can successively ‘sense’ at the natural level; 
‘abstract’ at the essential level; ‘destine’ at the personal essential level. 
This is counter-intuitive because we normally feel we are wakened by 
the alarm clock, whereas the alarm clock can wake us up only if we 
have active senses. A corpse will not be woken up because it is not 
active, cannot hear. The same can be applied to the other two levels. 
This already quoted text in the second chapter of thi section, can 
give some clues to understand the human action dynamics, and help to 
link the structural elements together through a cascading of acts that 
ends up in the action taken. Polo links the beginning with the comple-
tion of the action: “It should be emphasized, first of all, that the 
intention of other [the decision] is the piece of work to be done. How-
ever, the action´s intention of other does not stop in the piece of work 
produced, but runs through it. Hence the closeness of the link between 
the action and the piece of work allows describing the action as a ver-
bal value; for example, in the phrases ‘I write with the pen’ or ‘with 
the plow’, the piece of work is the written letter or the plowed field. 
The action is the verb –I write, I plough– and is constituted by the I-
want. While the intention of the action does not stop in the piece of 
work, the piece of work is a means within the plexus, and while it runs 
through, the action links to the intentio. In other words, I argue that 
while the action does not stop in the piece of work, the intention in-
creases that specific voluntary act”5. 
                                                 
4 For the redundancy of the three innate habits cfr. García González, J. A., “El saber 
Procedente de la Libertad”, in Sellés, J.F., El hombre como Solucionador de Pro-
blemas (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2015), 
13-23. 
5 “Conviene poner de relieve, ante todo, que la intención de otro de la acción es la 
obra. Sin embargo, la intención de otro peculiar de la acción no se detiene en la 
obra, sino que la atraviesa. De aquí la estrecha vinculación de la acción a la obra, 
que permite describir la acción como un valor verbal; por ejemplo, en la expresión 
‘yo escribo con la pluma’ o ‘yo aro con el arado’ la obra es la carta escrita o el 
campo roturado. La acción es el verbo —escribo, aro—, y es constituida según 
querer-yo. En tanto que la intención de la acción no se detiene en la obra, ésta es 
un medio integrado en el plexo, y en tanto que la atraviesa, la acción desemboca 
en la intentio. Con otras palabras, sostengo que en tanto que la acción no se detiene 
en la obra, la intención incrementa dicho acto voluntario”. Polo, L., Antropología 
Trascendental II, op. cit., 168. Cfr. also a parallel text, already cited: Polo, L., La 
Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 19. 
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This text establishes the beginning of an action which is the ‘in-
tentio’, the intention, and its end, which is the piece of work. For Polo 
both things are inseparable, “I defend that the action and the intention 
are not two different acts”6. We understand that Polo does not mean 
this from the point of view of the intention, but from the side of the 
action once done —the piece of work— because there are many inten-
tions that are never effected, either because one changes one’s mind, 
or because of the incapacity of bringing it into effect. Seen it from the 
completed action, the piece of work reflects the intention which was 
already active from the beginning. This is why Polo in the same text 
explains “what I call ‘to run through the piece of work’ is equivalent 
to decrypt or reveal its meaning”7. 
What is directly relevant for our topic is that the intentio that 
runs through to the completion of the work starts with the ‘I-want’ 
which is the impulsive side of synderesis. This is confirmed in a par-
alel text in which Polo attributes the intention to the ‘I’ which is a more 
understandable name for synderesis: “The action is the verb —write, 
plough— and is constituted by the ‘I’8.  
One may ask who actually decides the intention; is it the will, 
the I-want, the ‘I’ or the person? Using the classic saying that states 
that ‘all actions belong to the suppositum’, which in our case is the 
human being, it will mean that the subsequent cascading elements are 
distinctions needed to explain the organic complexity of the person, 
which is an integration of spirit and matter, an act of being actualizing 
an essence, that informs the body9. This is why, at times Polo refers a 
particular activity either to the higher or to any of the sub-elements 
that constitute the human being, and this may create some confusion 
among the interpreters. 
We shall try to use Polo’s example ‘writing with a pen’ to illus-
trate the action dynamics when possible. To make it more specific we 
can consider a letter from one spouse to the other spouse who is stay-
ing away for an extended period of time. Even if the spouses may text 
each other daily, or speak once a week on the phone, a letter is longer 
lasting, can be read many times, has to be better thought, and conveys 
better one’s personality through the type of paper, envelope, handwrit-
ing and even its smell. It can also include some small mementos such 
                                                 
6 “Con otras palabras, sostengo que la acción y la intención no son actos distintos”. 
Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 19. 
7 “Lo que llamo atravesar la obra equivale a descifrar o desvelar su sentido”. Ibid. 
8 “La acción es el verbo —escribo, aro—, y es constituida por el yo”. Ibid. 
9 “Spiritual life means life that reinforces the corporeal life —received. And this 
implies that the soul is not only the form of the body, but its end. The spirit is 
inspired by the body and organizes the body in a global way. This organization is 
very intense because the spirit is a higher end than the final physical cause”. “Vida 
espiritual significa vida que refuerza la vida corpórea —recibida—. Y esto com-
porta que el alma no es sólo forma del cuerpo, sino fin suyo. El espíritu se inspira 
en el cuerpo y lo organiza de modo global. Esta organización es muy intensa por-
que el espíritu es un fin superior a la causa final física”. Polo, L., Antropología 
Trascendental II, op. cit., 291. 
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as a dried flower, a ribbon, a child’s drawing, which can add to the 
affection shown in the text. 
 
2. Dynamics at the Personal level  
As we have already commented, activity starts from the highest 
ontological level and cascades down. We are therefore starting at the 
personal level and see how the activity influences the essential level 
and how from the essential level it is transmitted finally to the natural 
level, to the body. 
Any free action involves the personal transcendentals: personal 
love, personal knowledge, personal freedom and co-existence, in a hi-
erarchical way.  
a) Personal Love dynamics. What is guiding the spouses’ deci-
sion to write the letter? Personal love; thinking what is best for the 
other person. This is to give, to donate, to do what the other person 
will easily accept and will inspire both spouses to become better, more 
united, more generous to each other and subsequently to their children. 
To do this one has to know oneself and the spouse at the personal 
level, as much as the intimacies are being shared. Regarding oneself 
one has to see what one can donate, so one has to tailor the content of 
any communication to the intimate knowledge one has of the other 
person. This needs pause and reflection on oneself which is personal 
knowledge. The better one knows oneself, the more one is able to 
know others. The openness to oneself is openness to others. This open-
ness necessarily includes acceptance of what one is, and what one can 
be, and that one is linked to the origin, which means to accept oneself 
as a creature, receiving being as a donation, to be one more of God’s 
people, like any other person. Acceptance of what one has received, 
means acceptance of one’s capacity, which means acceptance of a des-
tination, a target to reach, a way of being that will get one there. This 
acceptance of God as creator10 —origin and somehow destination— 
                                                 
10 Other authors have reached similar conclusions based on Aquinas: “When so-
meone reaches the age of reason, finds his freedom as a call and desired by the 
good. Discovers that such good -which appears as absolute and calls for the abso-
lute of freedom- and cannot be done without him, but it is, above all, in a call to 
engage personally in the response. And, though the person may not know it, that 
absolute call is, in fact, a call from the Absolute, God's call. When that person 
answers yes to the call to the good, in fact he is responding yes to God”. “Cuando 
alguien llega al uso de razón, descubre su libertad precisamente como llamada y 
esperada por el bien. Descubre que ese bien -que se presenta como absoluto y llama 
al absoluto de la libertad- no se hace sin él, sino que consiste, antes que nada, en 
una llamada a comprometerse personalmente en la respuesta. Y, aunque el intere-
sado no lo sepa, esa llamada absoluta es, de hecho, la llamada del Absoluto, la 
llamada de Dios. Cuando esa persona responde que sí a esa llamada del bien, de 
hecho está respondiendo que sí a Dios”. Gotzon Santamaria, M., “Otra vuelta de 
tuerca”, in Trigo, T., (ed), En busca de una ética universal, (Pamplona: Eunsa, 
2011), 201. “This is our reality, and of each person on earth”. “Although we might 
not have the cultural parameters that allow us to identify the call as God's call, that 
247 
 
conveys the need to accept others as having their own capacities and 
need to destine themselves accordingly.  
This destination is done in freedom11 which is the next radical to 
consider.  
The acceptance of a spouse is a serious matter, a deep ac-
ceptance, which requires a deep donation, because it means a co-
destination, which is an acceptance of a mutual destination; this im-
plies a mutual recognition and commitment of each one’s relationship 
to God, and what each one should give the other to achieve it12. While 
one can have many friends, in which the acceptance and donation can 
be very intense, only in marriage is the donation total, because it in-
cludes all natural powers: man gives his masculinity in full and the 
woman her femininity in full, which normally is procreative13. The use 
of personal freedom is at its best because it not only makes the spouses 
grow as persons, by accepting, donating, reaching the highest levels of 
human love, but pro-creates, that is, assist in the creation of new per-
sons, new freedoms. Similarly the co-existence grows, as the most 
intimate human co-existence of intimacies, between the spouses, and 
between the spouses and their children and relatives14. It also requires 
a deeper co-existence with the world, because reality knocks harder 
                                                 
call –because we all feel it inside as it is the essence of our person– being is, in 
fact, God's call. What would be the personal knowledge of that reality depends 
firstly on education, then of each personal search for truth. And that knowledge 
establishes what is found in each as what calls him. If we want to understand the 
real freedoms of specific people living on this earth, we must take this fact into 
account”. “Ésta es nuestra realidad, la de cada una de las personas sobre la tierra”. 
“Aunque no tengamos los parámetros culturales que nos permiten identificar esa 
llamada como llamada de Dios, esa llamada que todos sentimos dentro -porque es 
la esencia de nuestro ser personal- es, de hecho, la llamada de Dios. Cuál sea el 
conocimiento personal de esa realidad depende primero de la educación, y luego 
de la búsqueda personal de la verdad. Y ese conocimiento establece qué se encuen-
tra la persona concreta como bien que le llama. Si queremos entender las libertades 
reales de las personas concretas que viven en esta tierra, hemos de tener en cuenta 
este dato”. Ibidem, p.215. 
11 “The superiority of the being that is not depleted in the situation of its essence is 
freedom of destination. This superiority is extended to man’s essence: the essence 
that belongs to the free being is notoriously irreducible to any other, in such a way 
that disposes and is not limited to cause. Its essential richness is not simply at-
tached, but it is to have at its disposal. The essence of man is ‘have-as-available’. 
Such having is susceptible of degrees”. “La superioridad del ser que no se agota 
en la situación de su esencia es la libertad de destinación. Esta superioridad se 
extiende a la esencia del hombre: la esencia que pertenece al ser libre es notoria-
mente irreductible a cualquier otra, de manera que dispone y no se limita a causar. 
Su riqueza esencial no le está simplemente adscrita, sino que se retrae al tener en 
disposición. La esencia del hombre es el tener como disponer. Tal tener es suscep-
tible de estados”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 263. 
12 This point is clearly stated in the book by Fulton Sheen, “Three to get married”, 
Sheen, F.J., Three to get married, (Princeton, N.J: Scepter Publishers, 2004). 
13 Cfr. “The Humanizing role of sexuality”, within Burke, C., Man and Values: a 
Personalist Anthropology, (New York: Scepter Publishers, 2007).  
14 Cfr. “La Función Educativa de la Familia”, within Polo, L., Ayudar a Crecer: 
Cuestiones de Filosofía de la Educación, op. cit. 
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once one has to take care of the physical needs of the spouse and the 
children.  
b) Personal Knowledge dynamics. Personal knowledge is the 
second personal transcendental. One knows oneself deeply, beyond 
what the intelligence as a faculty can do because the intellectual 
knowledge is through abstracts, which are abstracted from what we 
perceive through the senses, and the person and its transcendentals and 
faculties, being immaterial, cannot be reached by the senses15. Polo 
identified personal knowledge with the classic philosophy acting in-
tellect, as we already explained16. Polo characterizes the agent intellect 
as transparent light to distinguish it from synderesis and the faculty of 
intelligence which are characterized as illuminating agents of opera-
tions and objects respectively: “According to this, the illuminating 
lights are distinguished from the transparency of the personal intellect, 
which is the most separated, since it seeks a theme that transcends it”17. 
The theme that transcends personal knowledge is God as a person, not 
as uncaused cause which can be reached through metaphysics as a sci-
ence based on the habit of the first principles.  
Both personal knowledge and personal love seek: the intelli-
gence is searching for unity, identity, that Polo calls ‘replica’18 which 
is naturally personal, and personal love is looking for acceptance, total 
acceptance. Polo states that both can only be achieved by a person who 
is the Creator. In order to transcends the person God has to be the su-
preme person who will enable all other persons to know themselves as 
they are known by God —their real reality— and feel that they are 
totally accepted. “Suffice it to point out that the replica sought by the 
transparency [agent intellect], as the sought acceptance [personal love] 
transcends the human person. However, this transcendence is intimate, 
as it is Creator of the person”19. 
                                                 
15 “There is no abstract knowledge of the will, because the will cannot be lighten as 
sensible things are. We know that we are beings with will by an innate intellectual 
habit [synderesis], not in an objective way”. “No cabe un conocimiento abstracto 
de la voluntad, porque la voluntad no es iluminable como lo sensible. Sabemos que 
somos seres con voluntad por un hábito intelectual innato, no de modo objetivo”. 
Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 68. 
16 “The equivalence between the agent intellect and the personal intellect iresolves 
the serious issue raised by the Aristotelians’ denial of the agent’s intellect capacity 
to know”. “Con la equiparación del intelecto agente al intelecto personal se re-
suelve la grave cuestión que plantean los aristotélicos al negar que el intelecto 
agente sea cognoscente”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 20. 
17 “Según esto, se distinguen las luces iluminantes y la transparencia del intelecto 
personal, que es la más separada, puesto que busca el tema que la transciende”. 
Ibid. 
18 “The identity in thinking would require that, when I think myself, my thought will 
at the same time think me, so that it will by my replica”. “La identidad del pensar 
exigiría que, cuando me pienso, mi yo pensado me pensara a su vez, y fuera así mi 
réplica”. García González, J.A., “El Saber Procedente de la Libertad”, op. cit., 15. 
19 “Baste apuntar que la réplica que la transparencia busca, al igual que la aceptación 
buscada por el dar trasciende la persona humana. Con todo, esta trascendencia es 
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c) Transcendental Freedom dynamics. Personal acceptance re-
quires freedom20. The decision to freely accept oneself is not 
automatic; one can reject oneself totally by committing suicide, or par-
tially by becoming a trans-sex for example, or reject God and live as 
if He did not have to do anything in ones’ life. One can, though, accept 
one’s constitutive filiation, which will include a special and unique 
relationship with God. To find one’s destiny is not an easy task. It has 
to be done by interpreting the ‘notices’ of one’s synderesis and other 
‘affections’ at the essential and personal levels. To distinguish the 
meaning of the ‘notices’ and personal ‘affections’ requires care since 
they can be objectivized in many different ways. They are felt through 
the habit of wisdom, first principles and synderesis. Acceptance of 
one’s endowments and freely choosing one’s final end is what Polo 
calls ‘to destine’. Proper destination increases one’s freedom in two 
ways: one in that the personal path in life is made easier because it is 
in accordance with one’s possibilities, and secondly because it makes 
all faculties at the essential level and the powers at the natural level 
grow to their full capacity21. The improved faculties allow to get more 
and new things done in a better and more satisfactory way.  
Personal freedom is the transcendental that shows best the dif-
ference between the knowledge of the world’s existence through the 
first principles (where necessity is the rule and causality is the final 
explanation) and the personal act of being where there is no such 
mechanistic explanation. The person’s decisions do not have causes, 
they have freedom. This is why Polo says that freedom does not have 
a theme, that personal freedom is ‘athematic’. It has, though, a rela-
tionship with the other personal transcendentals and especially with 
personal understanding and love22. It can also convert with its imme-
diate lower transcendental –the co-existence; “Freedom is the 
                                                 
intima, pues es creadora de la persona”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, 
op. cit., 12. 
20 “Transcendental freedom is an integral character of ‘more’ by which co-existence 
is reached”; “Freedom allows the distinction between the situation and being”. “La 
libertad trascendental es integrante del carácter de además con el que se alcanza la 
co-existencia”. Ibid., 262. “La libertad permite la distinción entre la situación y el 
ser”. Ibid., 263. 
21 It is important to distinguish fate from destiny. Fate is not chosen, it is chosen by 
the gods, by nature or by chance, instead destiny is chosen by oneself within the 
many possibilities one has, which are made possible by one’s endowments, and 
the historical situation one is in, which has been made up by free decisions of other 
people, especially one’s parents, family members, colleagues and social leaders. 
God may make special calls but one is free to answer and the succession of those 
answers may also modify the subsequent calls. That God already knows our re-
sponses, does not mean that He makes them. For those who have faith it is 
interesting to see this within the context of a simple life like the one of Francisca 
Javiera del Valle Cfr. del Valle, F.J., About the Holy Spirit (Princeton N.J.: Scepter, 
1998). 
22 “Transcendental freedom was described as a theme that does not refer to another 
theme except for conversion with seeking [agent intellect]. Hence its thematic 
value equals entirely the ‘non-des-futurization’ of the future: as theme freedom 
issue is not dual”. “La libertad transcendental se describió como un tema que no 
remite a otro tema –salvo por conversión con el buscar-. De aquí que su valor 
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anthropological transcendental which converts more directly with co-
existence, since it is the activity of the co-act of the personal act of 
being”23 and cascades down to the essential level as ‘disposing’. “The 
essential capacity to dispose is articulated by freedom”24.  
d) Co-existence dynamics. The co-existence with God, other per-
sons, and the world is constitutive of the human being. Co-existence-
with as a personal transcendental is the deepest explanation of hu-
man’s social nature, since it is constitutive of the act of being. We are 
born to share our intimacy with others. Intimacy will not make sense 
if it cannot be shared. This is why Polo repeats frequently that an iso-
lated person makes no sense, it is contradictory25. Intimacy is always 
possible with God who is always available. Polo indicates that we un-
consciously look for it through the acting intellect, by saying that God 
is the theme of the acting intellect. The person seeks busca a replica26. 
The search for a replica intends to express the eagerness for total iden-
tity, which is total self-knowledge and total self-control. This total 
self-knowledge will only be achieved in knowing how one is known 
by the Creator. There is the feeling of co-existence with God as Crea-
tor and care-giver in a continuous way, and an everlasting way, that is 
characteristic of the innate habit of wisdom. Coexistence is habitual 
also with the external world, which resists our will and intelligence, 
and that one has to comply with the world peculiar characteristics, ac-
commodate to its own being. This is a not as difficult task as 
accommodating to other people, who demand recognition and they 
keep changing; and of God, who is known objectively through His ex-
ternal works, and intimately through the notices left in our act of being 
and essence, or by his direct action in the intimacy of the person in 
extraordinary cases.  
e) Dynamics of the personal level habits. The four personal tran-
scendentals operate –so to speak– through two innate habits: the habit 
                                                 
temático equivalga por entero a la no desfuturización del futuro: como tema la 
libertad no es dual”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 13. 
23 “La libertad es el trascendental antropológico que se convierte más directamente 
con la co-existencia, puesto que es la actividad del co-acto de ser persona”. Ibid. 
24 “El disponer esencial es vertebrado por la libertad”. Ibid., 17. 
25 “As we think in universals, we can transpose the notion of person to a universal, 
i.e., understand it as a concept. But we have to realize that it is not so: the person 
is not a universal, because its co-exist unicity is not superior to it. A single person 
is absolutely impossible”. “Como pensamos en universal, podemos trasponer a 
universal la noción de persona, es decir, entenderla como un concepto. Pero tene-
mos que darnos cuenta de que no es así: la persona no es un universal, porque en 
virtud de su coexistir el uno no es superior a ella. Es absolutamente imposible una 
sola persona”. Polo, L., Presente y Futuro del Hombre (Madrid: Rialp, 1993), 167. 
26 “At the personal level, the intellect seeks the replica it lacks and personal love 
seeks acceptance. The essential love gets involved in this search. And that trans-
lates into an increased intention of other. The characteristic of voluntary love is 
that it abides by what is granted”. “En el nivel personal, el intelecto busca la réplica 
de que carece y el amar la aceptación. El amor esencial se asocia a esta búsqueda. 
Y eso se traduce en el incremento de la intención de otro. Lo característico del 
amor voluntario es que acata el otorgamiento”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascenden-
tal II, op. cit., 204. 
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of wisdom and the habit of the first principles; one looks to the inside 
the other to the outside. Wisdom looks to the inside, to the personal 
intimacy, the intimacy of God and those of other persons by empathy. 
The first principles’ habit looks to the external world. Both beings, the 
persons and the world are higher, have more being than the individual 
person; this is why Polo says that the theme of these innate habits is 
greater than the method27. Because of the themes being greater than 
the capacity to know them Polo uses the word ‘advertir’, which can be 
translated by ‘to notice’, while when the theme is lower than the fac-
ulty he uses the word ‘inspirar’ translated as inspiration.  
In normal life, the innate habits tend to be assimilated to the ac-
quired habits; as if they were also just actualizations of a faculty. The 
faculty works as potency and the habit will be its actualization, in the 
specific way of that particular habit. Can we consider the act of being 
as potency, and the habit of wisdom as its actualization? Not really, 
because the act of being is not potential, but purely actual, though it 
can grow. If we say that only the essence grows, then wisdom and the 
habit of the first principles cannot grow, which seems contrary to ex-
perience because one can see how one grows in these habits from 
childhood to maturity and how they grow differently in different peo-
ple according to what they do in life, and because of this we know 
people who are wiser than others, who at the beginning were alike. 
How can the act of being grow? By being more actual, by being some-
how stronger, and this is noticed in the way one is able to activate the 
acquired habits of the intelligence and will, which then work in a better 
and faster way. We can also apply this type of growth to synderesis, 
and then the term Albert the Great used for synderesis ‘semina virtu-
tum’ has full meaning. It means that synderesis has an innate capacity 
to grow through the virtues it activates, but unless it is properly wa-
tered and taken care of it will not produce the virtues or will produce 
them in a stunted way, because it has not developed its potentiality. So 
wisdom, the first principles and synderesis, being innate, are innate as 
initial endowments, and this initial endowment should be worked on 
to grow in strength by the right decisions and actions of the person. 
e.1) The dynamics of the habit of wisdom. The knowledge of God 
as a person and of oneself increases, and this increase is the growth of 
the habit of wisdom. The habit of wisdom is the clear light that is trans-
parent in Polo’s words, to distinguish it from the illuminating light that 
                                                 
27 “I insist: the theme of the habit of first principles and of the habit of wisdom is 
higher than them, but the first habit is illuminating light and the second transparent 
light, which in solidarity with its theme —devoid of replica— can be described as 
‘seeking-himself’: “The illuminating light called habit of first principles distin-
guishes clearly itself from its themes, to which is less”. “Insisto: la temática del 
hábito de los primeros principios y la del hábito de sabiduría es superior a ellos, 
pero el primer hábito es luz iluminante y el segundo luz transparente, que por so-
lidaridad con su tema —carente de réplica— puede describirse como ‘buscar-se”; 
“La luz iluminante llamada hábito de los primeros principios se distingue neta-




illuminates objects and is proper of the first principles and of syn-
deresis. Properly speaking the illuminating light is the acting intellect 
as transcendental but it acts through the habits, or at any rate one nat-
urally knows it through the innate habits.  
One is tempted to use the image of a projector, wisdom being 
the transparent light given by the lamp hidden on the inside, which is 
not seen, while synderesis will be the lens that allows the light to come 
out and illuminate or radiate it to objects of the intelligence and warm 
the will. And yet, this light is not seen unless it illuminates the screen 
or dust in its path. This habit knows the person as person. This is know-
ing the person as personally free. Similarly God and other persons as 
persons, not as abstract objects. It cannot be confused with the objec-
tive knowledge given by the intellect or by the habitual knowledge 
given by the first principles of God as origin and of the world (people 
are part of the world if they are considered at their natural level)28.  
The habit of wisdom is key to the development of the moral 
character of a person. While one’s destination is decided by the act of 
being –love and personal freedom– the habit of wisdom is the way it 
is known. Being innate it gives the knowledge of one’s most intimate 
direction towards God as person. As we said above God is the identity 
and total acceptance sought and felt as ‘notice’ whose ‘affection’ can 
be described as savouring, best of flavours, kept as in a sponge that 
one holds and can squeeze and manifest at the essential level29.  
e.2) The habit of first principles. The second innate habit, the 
habit of first principles, allows one to relate to the world by knowing 
its real existence. The first principles two or three, depending on 
                                                 
28 “Freedom activates the methodical sense of wisdom’s habit, and therein lies the 
solidarity of method and theme according to the inexhaustibility of the character 
of ‘more’ [person]. Inexhaustible does not mean unfathomable. It is said that the 
habit of wisdom is in solidarity with the person because it reaches the character of 
‘more’. As the innate habits are not subsistent, without solidarity with its theme 
such interpretation would not have been possible. Nevertheless, the distinction be-
tween method and theme is not cancelled”. “La libertad activa el sentido metódico 
del hábito sapiencial, y en ella estriba la solidaridad de método y tema de acuerdo 
con la inagotabilidad del carácter de además. Inagotable no significa insondable. 
Se dice que el hábito de sabiduría es solidario de la persona porque alcanza el 
carácter de además. Como los hábitos innatos no subsisten, sin la solidaridad con 
su tema dicho alcanzar no sería posible. De todos modos, la distinción entre mé-
todo y tema no se anula”. Ibid., 211. 
29 “The notice given by the habit of wisdom is savoury — like the word itself—, i.e., 
a spongy footprint; this sponge is soaked, steeped, with the intimacy of the person. 
I want to say that the notice as such is not methodical; However, while it is impos-
sible without moral experience, it can be squeezed as is expressed by the motto 
sapere aude, an encouraging cry so much alive in Augustine of Hippo, that reso-
nates in history: don’t go outside; inside man inhabits the truth —it is soaked— 
that has to be brought to light”. “La noticia del hábito de sabiduría es sabrosa —a 
ello obedece la palabra misma—, o sea, una huella esponjosa; en esa esponja está 
prendida, imbuida, la intimidad de la persona. Quiero decir que la noticia en cuanto 
tal no es metódica; sin embargo, en tanto que es imposible sin la experiencia moral, 
cabe exprimirla como expresa el lema sapere aude, un grito de ánimo tan vivo en 
Agustín de Hipona, que resuena en la historia: no quieras salir fuera, en el interior 
del hombre habita —se esponja— la verdad que ha de sacarse a la luz”. Ibid., 223. 
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whether the link between the first two is considered as an independent 
principle or not. These principles are identity, non-contradiction and 
causality. The principle of identity refers to the Origin, perfect Iden-
tity, and source of the second principle which is the principle of non-
contradiction which is the existence of the world as persistence. The 
third one is the reference of the dependence of the world to its Origin, 
and is the principle of dependence, more commonly known as the prin-
ciple of causality. Causality is not simple but quadruple, because Polo 
recognizes the importance of the four Aristotelian causes in metaphys-
ics. Polo refers to it as the tretracausality. We do not need to explain 
this principle at present. We shall see more of it when dealing on its 
relationship with synderesis. 
f) Coming back to the example. How can we distinguish the de-
gree of wisdom and of the first principles the spouse has? To know 
intimate things, one has to open up and show one’s intimacy in the 
written letter. One needs to be wise to notice wisdom. We can notice 
it naturally which is the common way, or, based on this natural 
knowledge, one can analyse it using the transcendental anthropologi-
cal tools, procedure that is not very common at present. In the first way 
one will notice the four personal transcendentals through the innate 
habit of wisdom –because they are at the personal level and only wis-
dom looks into the inside of the person– but in an unconscious way. 
In the second way one may discover the cascading of the four tran-
scendentals by reflecting on them and this will make the unconscious 
use of the personal transcendentals somehow conscious, though no 
philosopher before Polo did it explicily, so it will be innacurate to say 
that everyone notices them. One is able to know oneself, others and 
their relation with God in a real ‘daily’ way but, as Polo says, through 
notices, symbols and in an instinctive kind of way and this mainly 
through the innate habits, in a silent way30. Later it can be reflected on, 
if one has a philosophical streak, and objectivize the reflections.  
One can be aware of the personal transcendentals by noticing 
that personal love is the main impulse to write the letter, and that it is 
a free act by the spouse, where one is trying to convey the personal 
intimacy in a way that only the spouse will understand and that is a 
means to co-exist in the most intimate way. Regarding the innate habit 
of wisdom one may notice it in the spouse’s references to religion, 
their mutual betterment, the care for their children, relations and 
friends in seeking their total happiness, which necessarily relates to 
each personal self-knowledge and their relation to their ultimate end. 
One can see the growth or decrease of wisdom by seeing how these 
indices grow or decrease over time if the correspondence between the 
spouses lasts for a long time.  
                                                 
30 The effort needed to discover wisdom can be said using the words of Maria de 
Agreda, “Raise your mind to consider and understand your intimate paths and the 
ways God has taught you to look for him in your secret place and find him without 
danger of deceit”. “Levanta tu mente a considerar y entender los caminos de tu 
interior y las sendas que Dios te ha enseñado para buscarle en tu secreto y hallarle 
sin peligro del engaño”. Agreda, M. de J. de, Mistica Ciudad de Dios, (Madrid: 
Fareso, 1970), 333. 
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Though wisdom cascades down to the first principles31, the use 
of the first principles can be more difficult to notice in such an intimate 
letter. The references to this habit will be probably very few in this 
type of letter because the content will be mainly about personal rela-
tionships and not about the world. One would have to look for 
passages that show how one objectivizes the reality of God (as Origin 
and Identity)32. This knowledge of God, though, is not the knowledge 
of God as person, which belongs to the habit of wisdom33. The use of 
the first principles can also be discovered by the accuracy on factual 
observations and the analysis of the cause-effect of the facts and events 
mentioned in the letter. One can object that such facts are proper of the 
habit of science or of the virtue of prudence, and therefore it will depict 
more the acquired habits of the intelligence than the first principles’ 
habit. This is true, and it can confirm what we already mentioned; that 
the human person is an organic unity. Therefore, we can say that there 
is no possibility of writing without using all human innate habits and 
faculties simultaneously. The hand, the imagination, the intelligence, 
will and personal habits are all simultaneously involved in all the free 
actions needed to write the letter. We cannot know the intimacy of 
persons without them acting, manifesting their thoughts and feelings 
in a conversation, or us guessing sympathetically what they think and 
want from what they actually do.  
We have seen the involvement of the four radicals and the two 
innate virtues at the personal level in this example. Now we proceed 
down to the essential level, the ‘added life’, starting with the innate 
habit of synderesis. 
                                                 
31 “Knowledge comes from the person: from what one knows about oneself, human 
wisdom expands; and continues enriching the lower knowledge by redundancy, in 
accordance with their own fertility and in accordance with free decisions”. “El 
saber procede de la persona: desde lo que ella sabe de sí misma, la sabiduría hu-
mana se extiende; y va enriqueciendo los conocimientos inferiores por 
repercusión, conforme con su propia fecundidad y de acuerdo con un proceder 
libre”. García González, J. A., “El saber Procedente de la Libertad”, op. cit., 14. 
32 “Wisdom´s redundancy on the habit of first principles is required to notice the 
unfathomable Identity”. “El redundar de la sabiduría habitual en el hábito de los 
primeros principios es requerido para advertir la Identidad insondable”. Polo, L., 
Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 211. 
33 “The human person is created and, therefore, not identical to itself. However, the 
person notices its relationship to the Identity. As such connection cannot be not 
noticed, it is habitual: an innate habit dual with synderesis. The Identity is the 
Origin: the usual notice of the Origin is the summit of metaphysics. The cognitive 
connection of intimacy to the Origin is not achieved operationally, because it is 
impossible that the Original identity be immanently possessed. Therefore, even if 
the person is capable of manifesting itself beyond the immanent possession, it is 
impossible for it to express the Origin”. “La persona humana es creada y, por tanto, 
no idéntica consigo. Sin embargo, la persona advierte su respecto a la Identidad. 
Como ese respecto no puede dejar de ser advertido, es habitual: un hábito innato 
dual con la sindéresis. La Identidad es el Origen: la advertencia habitual del Origen 
es la cumbre de la metafísica. El respecto cognoscitivo de la intimidad al Origen 
no se logra operativamente, pues es imposible que la Identidad Originaria sea po-
seída inmanentemente. Por eso, aunque la persona es capaz de manifestación más 




3. Essential level dynamics 
Unlike the Identity (God) who has no duality, all creatures have 
duality esse-essentia. In the case of human beings it is what Polo calls 
the human essential level. The essence, in the case of human beings, 
is particularly important because the fruits of the persons’ activity as 
properly human are mainly at this level. The search for the replica is 
the search for identity, which affects mainly the agent intellect and 
that, being impossible to achieve at the personal level, one tries to seek 
it at the essential level: “The search of replica is transcendental —at 
the personal level—, and because it is not found it is sought as its es-
sential manifestation, but it is a vain attempt because the person cannot 
be reduced to its manifestations. Inasmuch as the lack of replica looks 
down, it splits: this is the origin of the I-see and I-want”34. 
A confused or rejected relationship with the Creator, felt through 
the habit of wisdom, can place the search of identity at the essential 
level, rather than accepting one being as a donation and bring the con-
frontation with God, which indicates lack of self-knowledge: “Self-
awareness and self-realization are chimeric pretensions; attempts to 
identify the essence with the person”35.  
The search of one´s identity belongs to the personal level, and 
only there can be found as acceptance and proper destination of all that 
the person has. To look for it at the essential level is what normally is 
called seeking one’s self-identity, in the synderesis, which is done by 
inflating the importance of the ‘I’ or self. Synderesis is the innate habit 
that links with the personal transcendentals. “The essence is the man-
ifestation of the person. The essence whose apex is the innate habit 
called synderesis, and depending on the anthropological transcenden-
tals”36. In this way one discovers that the essence is not the place to 
seek the transcendental Identity but it is just a manifestation of the 
personal radicals.  
                                                 
34 “La busca de réplica es trascendental, y de su carencia surge la manifestación 
esencial, que no lo es. En tanto que la carencia de réplica se vuelve hacia abajo, se 
bifurca: de ella derivan el ver-yo y querer-yo”. Ibid., 12. 
35 “La autoconciencia y la autorrealización son pretensiones quiméricas, intentos de 
identificar la esencia con la persona” Ibid., 76. Such attempt implies to be self-
sufficient, which comes from the control synderesis has on the will and the intelli-
gence. It is clear in Nietzsche and in Hegel and that it implies the death or at least 
the rejection of being created, of depending on God. This is why Polo says: “I-see 
is distinguished from the person because if it were radical like the person, it would 
confront God”. “Ver-yo se distingue de la persona porque si fuera radical como 
ella, se enfrentaría con Dios”. Ibid., 83. 
36 “La esencia es la manifestación de la persona. La esencia cuyo ápice es el hábito 
innato llamado sindéresis, y que depende de los transcendentales antropológicos”. 
Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 11. 
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The transcendental closer to synderesis is the one that is next to 
the personal manifestation: “The word manifest suggests that the hu-
man essence depends on the transcendental co-existence”37. The 
essential level opens one to understand other persons through their 
own manifestations and grow through contact with them in dialogue: 
“There is a plurality of human beings who encounter one another 
through their respective essences. In this sense the human essence is 
dialogic; it founds the human society and the linguistic communica-
tion”38. Through this intersubjective communication there is more 
possibility of discovering one’s true being,39 because there is always 
an appeal from others to be accepted (personal love) which in this text 
Polo calls ‘appeal’; an appeal is a call made to be recognized by others: 
“By being a manifestation, the human essence is to be understood as 
an appeal, i.e., as calling and giving attention. And as that appeal is 
not anonymous, it requires I-see and I-want”40. All this is done through 
the innate habit of synderesis. 
a) Synderesis´dynamics. “Synderesis is a different habit from the 
habit of the first principles. Though they are two ways of searching; 
the first principles are not ‘a-seeing’, while synderesis ‘is-seeing’. To 
access the first principles does not mean to see, because by plying it to 
the different acts of being the focused attention is exhausted by 
them”41. In this text Polo explains the different ways of knowing of 
these innate habits, the first principles and synderesis. All innate habits 
give knowledge, and in this they are similar, but each knows in a dif-
ferent way. What is proper to the first principles is to mould 
themselves to reality, to the external beings discovered, and this ex-
hausts its purpose, and its activity. It is so in our daily life. We do not 
really think about how we know, we are not worried about ourselves 
but about things: the air we breathe, the light we have, the floor that 
supports us; any reality we have around us. We know they exist and 
that they are different from us. This is direct, habitual knowledge; it 
does not need any reasoning. It is also different from what we dream 
or imagine –which can be just imaginary–precisely because through 
                                                 
37 “La palabra manifestación indica que la esencia humana depende de la co-exis-
tencia”. Ibid., 12. 
38 “Existe una pluralidad de personas humanas que se encuentran a través de sus 
respectivas esencias. En este sentido la esencia humana es dialógica; instaura la 
sociedad humana y la comunicación lingüística”. Ibid., 12. 
39 “Human language should be placed at the essential level as a manifestation, i.e. 
reciprocal communication by which certain replica is possible”. “El lenguaje hu-
mano ha de colocarse en la esencia como manifestación, es decir, en la 
comunicación reciproca con que cierta replica es posible”. Ibid., 12. 
40 “En tanto que manifestativa, la esencia humana se ha de entender como apelación, 
es decir como prestar y llamar la atención. Y como esa apelación no es anónima, 
comporta ver-yo y querer-yo”. Ibid., 13.  
41 “La distinción del hábito de los primeros principios con el ápice de la esencia. Tal 
distinción se centra en que son dos modos de encontrar; el primero no es un ver y 
el segundo sí. Acceder a los primeros principios no significa ver, porque al ple-




the habit we know their existence and their intimate relationship as 
caused; as being interrelated and therefore having an Origin. The 
senses give us the specifics of reality and in this we may have in com-
mon with animals, but to know them as ‘reality’ is what is proper of 
humans, through these principles. 
Synderesis sees. Unlike the first principles it makes us aware of 
the powers –faculties– we have when they act, we see whether we 
know or do not know something or that we want or do not want to do 
something, or that we are fresh or tired, that we are using our eyes or 
not, our hands or not, etc. Synderesis is the ‘I’42, the self, which means 
consciousness. It means that the personal level is a source, but a hidden 
source of all activities. It does not appear —not their habits— when 
we are unconscious; and when we are conscious the previous uncon-
sciousness appears as lack of consciousness but not lack of identity, 
nor lack of activity. Synderesis notices the personal level as the un-
known support of itself43, this is, the support of consciousness and 
semi-consciousness. The ultimate source of activity is not only un-
known, but unreachable, and uncontrollable from synderesis, because 
they are at a superior level, the personal level. This tells us that we are 
more than consciousness, that there is something greater than and 
above consciousness. So wisdom, the first principles and synderesis 
itself are hidden to consciousness. Consciousness includes more than 
‘objective’ knowledge —i.e., as present, conceptual—, it includes the 
feelings of the body, the affections and notices of the spirit. Polo uses 
‘manifestation’ to indicate that synderesis is the way that the personal 
level relates to the essential level, and more specifically through the 
personal transcendental ‘co-existence’44 as we have seen in chapter 
two of the second section.  
To distinguish the knowledge side from the appetitive side of 
consciousness, Polo speaks of the I-see and the I-want as constitutive 
                                                 
42 “As I propose, in man person means co-act of being, and should be taken in the 
sense that the person is really different from the ‘I’, because the ‘I’ is the apex of 
the human essence. Now, if the ‘I’ is essentially real it is impossible that it be 
identical to an object, because, on the one hand, nothing essential is identical and, 
secondly, because objects are not real but intentional”. “Según propongo, en el 
hombre persona significa co-acto de ser, y se debe admitir que la persona se dis-
tingue realmente del yo, porque el yo es el ápice de la esencia humana. Ahora bien, 
si el yo es esencialmente real es imposible que sea idéntico a un objeto, porque, 
por un lado, nada esencial es idéntico y, por otro, porque los objetos no son reales 
sino intencionales”. Ibid., 45. 
43 “The idea of consciousness is pending explanation because its notice cries out for 
a deeper than the concomitant awareness”. “La idea de conciencia está pendiente 
de explicación porque la noticia clama por una conciencia más profunda que la 
concomitante”. Ibid., 221. 
44 Polo, mainly in Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades distinguishes between 
the different types of non-objective forms of knowledge at the essential level and 
below synderesis: symbols, clarities and notices. They are not relevant for our 
quest and they are well described in: García González, J. A., “Leonardo Polo: Di-
mensiones Inobjetivas del Saber (Primera Parte)”, Límite, vol. 2, (2007), 15; and 
García González, J. A., “Leonardo Polo: Dimensiones Inobjetivas del Saber (Se-
gunda Parte)”, Límite, vol. 2 (2007), 16. 
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duality of synderesis. They are both constitutive of this innate habit 
because they appear together in the ‘I’. They appear as acting, not as 
something that is being acted upon. Unless the method of overcoming 
the limit is discovered the personal level acts silently, without being 
noticed. Both the I-see and the I-want appear together, there is no will-
ing without understanding and vice-versa, though, at times, we can 
direct the attention more to the I-see or the I-want when reflecting on 
our consciousness. The habit is permanent and tells one whether the 
specific acts of the will (am I willing now?) or the intelligence (am I 
thinking now?) are actively being used. This means that somehow it 
constitutes them and knows their activities from above, integrating 
them. It is not synderesis the habit of abstraction or of the virtue of 
fortitude, which belongs to the intelligence and will respectively, but 
consciousness knows them as acting and the way they act. So the I-
want is the way the will can be directed by the personal love, and the 
I-see is the way the intelligence can be directed by the agent intellect. 
Consciousness can be called illumination, and is different in 
each of synderesis’ dualities, but this does not mean that synderesis is 
divided; there are not two ‘I’s’; it is the same person: “I-see and I-want 
are essential active lights that are distinguished by their intensity. The 
illumination of the media belongs by redundancy to the practical rea-
son and is an extrapolated objectification in the actions, but lighting of 
the voluntary acts is provided by I-want, this is of their constitution. 
The question about the two I’s still remains: I already said that the 
person is not Polyphemus; neither is it cross-eyed. The duality of the 
apex’s essence does not entail two souls, but its redundancy from the 
co-existence, i.e., from the personal being always more. The theme 
can be understood as wealth or fertility of the essence”45.  
To speak about the elements that are above the intellect one has 
to use a non-objective language, which is practically impossible be-
cause human language is an intellectual habit, as Polo explains and we 
have already commented on, so it is no surprise that Polo uses the 
comparisons cited before46 to make clearer how the dualities syn-
deresis work. Placing them in a chart gives an idea of how subtly 
Polo’s thinking style is, and how confusing it could be if one is not 
aware of the exact meaning he gives to each word. 
                                                 
45 “Ver-yo y querer-yo son iluminaciones esenciales que se distinguen por su inten-
sidad. La iluminación de los medios pertenece por redundancia a la razón práctica 
y es una objetivación extrapolada en la acción, pero la iluminación de los actos 
voluntarios corre a cargo de querer-yo, esto es, de su constitución. ¿Queda todavía 
en pie la pregunta acerca de los dos yoes? Ya dije que la persona no es Polifemo; 
tampoco es bizca. La dualidad del ápice de la esencia no comporta dos almas, sino 
el proceder de la co-existencia, es decir, de la ademaseidad personal. El tema puede 
enfocarse como riqueza o fecundidad de la esencia”. Polo, L., Antropología Tras-
cendental II, op. cit., 213. 
46 Cfr. Ibid., 209. 
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The I-want is higher in the duality than the I-see. The I-want is 
constitutive of the will, first of the will as nature (voluntas ut natura) 
and consequently of any act of the will through its habits (voluntas ut 
habit). Similarly the I-see is constitutive of the intelligence through 
the process of abstraction and of the subsequent intellectual acquired 
habits. Polo attributes the illumination of the images to the acting in-
tellect but not directly, but through synderesis. Synderesis therefore, 
will be the one habitually illuminating our intellectual knowledge47.  
While it is relatively easy to distinguish between the acts of the 
intelligence and will in writing a letter, it is difficult to show how syn-
deresis in its two aspects can be noticed. We have to interpret the 
notices and affections which are above the intelligence, and therefore, 
are not so clear. Polo utilizes many different names in order to express 
the duality of synderesis as shown in Table 9. Let’s look at some pos-
sible topics that may be touched upon in the letter as a way to highlight 
some possible affection that can indicate the use of the I-want and I-
see. The spouse wants to refer to a summer they spent together, and 
                                                 
47 “The lighting of the phantasm is attributed to the agent intellect. But if the agent 
intellect is assimilated to the transparent light, which is superior to the illuminating 
lights, it is more proper to hold that lighting of the phantasms corresponds to syn-
deresis, i.e. an illuminating light that is equivalent to inspiration towards added 
life”. “La iluminación de los fantasmas se atribuye al intelecto agente. Pero si el 
intelecto agente se asimila a la luz transparente, la cual es superior a las luces ilu-
minantes, es más ajustado sostener que la iluminación de los fantasmas 
corresponde a la sindéresis, es decir, una luz iluminante a la que equivale el inspi-
rarse en la vida añadida”. Ibid., 17. 
 
Table 9: Names used by Polo for I-see, I-want. 
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does not remember the hotels they stayed in. The will starts command-
ing the memory to recall the places while at the same time the 
intelligence is suggesting other approaches to find the data; look at the 
photos taken during the vacation or in the diary kept, search in the 
internet, ask a friend, etc., and at the same time one notices that it is 
getting too warm and that perhaps it will be good to open the window 
or perhaps use a fan; that it is getting late, and it maybe better to stop 
and continue writing the following day in order not to neglect other, 
more important, activities, which would be morally incorrect. Syn-
deresis is the awareness that all this is happening but it does not appear 
to one as something one can control unless one stops and reflects the 
being aware of all these things at the same time.  
We can ask ourselves: who takes the decision between pause or 
continue writing, to call a friend or to seek the data in the internet, and 
any other of the innumerable decisions that can be taken? Traditionally 
it is the will, based on the information given by the intelligence. In 
Polo’s structure all activity comes and is attributed to the person via 
synderesis. If the will takes the decision, then it seems as if the per-
sonal level and synderesis are mere spectators of what the will decides. 
This seems not quite correct in that the inferior faculty will be some-
how guiding and deciding for the higher levels. 
Such a question shows that one may not understand Polo 
properly, which is only natural, since our tendency, the intelligence´s 
tendency, is to ‘reify’, to understand distinctions as diversities. We 
distinguish characteristics of the same thing, so, for example, the per-
sonal transcendentals are distinctions, but not diversities of being; they 
are all the same act of being, analyzed from different angles. Similarly 
the intelligence and will are not diverse from the one who decides. One 
decides through the intelligence and will, one cannot be separated 
from them. This text explains it with reference to will as nature: “Giv-
ing and accepting are equivalent to the act of being of the human 
person. But the human person is not able to ‘make personal’ the per-
sonal love, which is then constituted in the person’s essence as I-
want”48 and from the I-want to the will. This dependence of the will is 
stressed by Polo as follows: “whose darkness [of will] can fade taking 
into account the constitutive character of synderesis. Thus the essential 
dependence of the voluntary, with respect to the personal love, is 
stated”49.  
Utilizing Polo´s well-loved term ‘plexus’ we can say that any 
decision requires the integrated intervention of each component of the 
personal structure, even the corporeal ones. Going to the extreme in 
order to exemplify this, if we are sleeping we cannot take decisions; 
                                                 
48 “El dar y el aceptar se convierten con el acto de ser personal humano. Pero la 
persona humana no es capaz de ‘personalizar’ el amor, el cual es constituido en su 
esencia como querer-yo”. Ibid., 146. 
49 “Cuya oscuridad [de la voluntad] puede disiparse al tener en cuenta el carácter 
constitutivo de la sindéresis. De este modo se sienta la dependencia esencial de lo 
voluntario respecto del amar personal”. Ibid., 207. 
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for example, if we are sleepwalkers and commit a felony, we will not 
be accountable for it. Less extreme examples can be to to notice that 
our willpower depletes itself during the day, so decisions taken in the 
evening are less thought out than decisions taken in the morning, or 
how a damaged brain can change one’s temperament. This exemplifies 
that changes in the body can also reflect in changes in knowledge or 
that previous decisions influence how we see the world and influence 
present decisions. We are, nevertheless, going to analyse the integra-
tion of all elements in the best of cases, when everything works well, 
to see how each element of the essence fulfills its function. 
a.1) I-want as higher synderesis´ activity. Polo uses a special 
term to indicate the influence of higher innate habits on the lower ones: 
‘to redound’, or to ‘have impact on’ (redundar, repercutir)50. The 
higher habits activate the lower ones, but without taking over the spe-
cific tasks of the lower ones. In this way wisdom redounds on the first 
principles by, for example, seeing the connection of the Origin or Iden-
tity –which is proper of the first principles– with the personal 
relationship with God sought by the agent intellect at the personal 
level51, and to the body as having a finality beyond the external world. 
Similarly the first principles redound on synderesis and within syn-
deresis, the I-want redounds into I-see.  
The reververation of the habit of the first principles with the up-
per side of synderesis, can be seen through the ‘I-want’52. Through this 
reecoing the highest personal transcendental, love, cascades to syn-
deresis as I-want. This enables the constitution of morals that tells 
conscience if what we are doing is consistent with the objective desti-
nation of personal freedom53.  
                                                 
50 “Empleo las palabras redundar (redound) o repercutir (impact on) sobre todo para 
designar el respecto de los hábitos innatos superiores a los otros, y del primer 
miembro de la sindéresis al segundo. La sabiduría repercute en el hábito de los 
primeros principios y los dos en la sindéresis –que también por eso es dual– es el 
hábito que procede de la persona y es apoyado por el redundar de los otros dos, y 
así el ápice de la esencia humana, desde el cual se desciende a los otros actos esen-
ciales suscitándolos o constituyéndolos”. Ibid., 210. 
51 “The superiority of the themes to the method requires attention to focus on the 
first principles; we cannot look even in the act of being created because its validity 
refers to the unfathomable Identity”. “La superioridad de los temas al método exige 
que la atención se concentre en los primeros principios; no cabe mirar ni siquiera 
al acto de ser creado porque su vigencia remite a la Identidad insondable”. Ibid., 
83. 
52 “I-want, as making the will’s truth, marks the duality of synderesis with the habit 
of first principles”. “Querer-yo como verdadear de la voluntad marca la dualidad 
de la sindéresis con el hábito de los primeros principios”. Ibid., 23. 
53 “Freedom is the priority activity regarding the essence and, therefore, the active 
flow of its behaviour. Only in this way the upper habits redound on synderesis. 
Also, without free linking I-want would not redound on I-see”. “La libertad es la 
actividad prioritaria respecto de la esencia y, por tanto, el caudal activo de su pro-
ceder. Sólo así cabe que los hábitos superiores redunden en la sindéresis. 
Asimismo, sin vinculación libre querer-yo no redundaría en ver-yo”. Ibid., 86. 
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This reflow between the two personal innate habits to synderesis 
is expressed by Polo as follows: “Synderesis is distinguished from the 
habit of first principles, which is also an innate habit. The distinction 
lies in that first principles are noticed as acts of being external to the 
human person; on the other hand, synderesis, by constituting the vol-
untary acts, makes possible the intentional link to the other as good. 
The first principles are the other as being, and do not constitute them 
because they are habitually noticed; on the other hand, the voluntary 
intentionality regards the other as good, and has to be constituted in 
order to link with personal love”54. 
 The reververation of personal love to the I-want side of syn-
deresis cascades down to the will, not only to the constituted natural 
will but as the actual constitution of the wanting and from it to the 
action: “It is important to distinguish synderesis, i.e. the constitution 
of the voluntary and acquired habits that perfect the faculty. The pos-
session of the transcendental good [goods outside man that transcend 
the will] is not possible without such improvement. However, the con-
stitution of wanting by synderesis is still higher because it stresses the 
connection of wanting with donating love, being a personal transcen-
dental. Personal love co-exists with being accepted by the lover. But 
there is need for a third element, which is wanting. Because the human 
person is created, his love is I-want. Although human love [wanting] 
is essential, and therefore not transcendental, it is consistent with re-
spect to the transcendental good”55. 
a.2) I-see activity. The first principles redound also on the sec-
ond side of synderesis, the I-see, and it has a more direct relationship 
with synderesis’ name. In this text there is a clear reference to 
Heidegger´s view of man as shepherd of the being, which Polo uses to 
signify the care of the personal level of each person towards the lower 
essential level:  
“The word synderesis is appropriate because it means vigilant 
attention”56. “On the other hand, with the habit of first principles the 
                                                 
54 “La sindéresis se distingue del hábito de los primeros principios, que también es 
un hábito innato. La distinción estriba en que los primeros principios se advierten 
como actos de ser externos a la persona humana; en cambio, la sindéresis, al cons-
tituir los actos voluntarios, hace posible el respecto intencional a lo otro como bien. 
Los primeros principios son lo otro como ser, y no se constituyen por ser habitual-
mente advertidos; en cambio, el respecto intencional voluntario versa sobre lo otro 
como bien, y tiene que ser constituido para enlazar con el amor”. Ibid., 127. 
55 “Conviene distinguir la sindéresis, es decir, la constitución de lo voluntario, de los 
hábitos adquiridos que perfeccionan la potencia. Sin dicho perfeccionamiento no 
es posible la posesión del bien trascendental. Con todo, la constitución del querer 
por la sindéresis es todavía más alta en tanto que marca la conexión del querer con 
el amar donal, que es un trascendental personal. El amar personal co-existe con la 
aceptación del amante. Pero se precisa un tercer elemento, que es el amor. Por ser 
creada la persona humana, su amor es querer-yo. Aunque el amor humano sea 
esencial, y por eso no trascendental, es congruente con el respecto al bien trascen-
dental”. Ibid., 133. 




being is not monitored: it is not correct to say that man is ‘being’s 
shepherd’. But, the human person does shepherd his essence. Because 
of this one can talk of the first practical principles. In sum, the vigilant 
attention involves the redounding of the attentional concentration; so 
the synderesis depends on the person through a filter, which is the 
habit of first principles. Insofar as the synderesis looks down it moni-
tors and organizes. The faculties are required so that the arousing or 
the constitution [activities of the I-see and I-want] are not creations”57. 
Nevertheless neither synderesis nor the personal level are creative, and 
this is because the action does not remain in the synderesis but is ef-
fected through the potencies, the intelligence and will, that are linked 
to nature through the senses and the cogitative. 
There is a symbol that expresses this side of synderesis, mani-
fested in an idea: “The idea of consciousness is silent, concomitant or 
coincident; non-linguistic, but verbally undoubted, and symbolizes the 
second member of synderesis [the I-see]”58. It is interesting to see that 
Polo does not refer, in our understanding, to moral conscience, but to 
the concomitant conscience that is the first intellectual habit. Moral 
conscience is not a different type of conscience but because it accom-
panies all properly human acts it should be at the synderesis level. This 
gives way to the study of the intelligence, as faculty and its acquired 
habits.  
b) The dynamics of intelligence. Synderesis is illuminated and 
illuminates, it is habitual knowledge that empowers other types of 
knowledge. While personal knowledge ‘acting intellect’ is transparent 
light, synderesis receives light from it through the other two innate 
habits and then illuminates the intelligence. This illumination is done 
by degrees. Polo distinguishes between the illumination of the opera-
tions done by the habits (he calls them manifestative lights) and the 
illumination by which the operations light their objects (that he calls 
intentional lights)59. The habits manifest, show what is within, the op-
erations, while the operations act like torches that light objects outside 
                                                 
57 “En cambio, con el hábito de los primeros principios no se vigila el ser: no es 
correcto decir que el hombre es el pastor del ser. En cambio, la persona humana sí 
que ‘pastorea’ su esencia. Por eso se puede hablar de primeros principios prácticos. 
En suma, la atención vigilante comporta el redundar de la concentración atencio-
nal; de manera que la sindéresis depende de la persona a través de un filtro, que es 
el hábito de los primeros principios. En cuanto que la sindéresis va hacia abajo 
vigila y organiza. Las potencias son requeridas para que el suscitar o el constituir 
no sean creaciones”. Ibid. 
58 “La idea de conciencia es muda, concomitante o consectaria; no lingüística, pero 
verbalmente indudable, y simboliza el segundo miembro de la sindéresis”. Ibid., 
219. 
59 In the following text Polo explains the terminology he uses in other texts: «See 
means directly understood» is formulated now like it. See: illuminating act (illu-
minated by another illuminating act). Directly understood: act or current object 
illuminated, intact by being potentially different from the illuminating act (the il-
luminated act is as matching illuminating method downwards). The highest raised 
acts are extremely clear, but they do not light I-see. This means that raising up-
wards inevitably ends without saturating the faculty”. «Ver significa directamente 
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them. Polo defends that all intellectual acts are not constituted in a 
cascading way, that is, that each is not moved by the preceding one in 
a kind of ladder. This could mean that they, somehow, depend directly 
on synderesis: “The distinction between I-see and what it explains is a 
distinction according to degrees. They are levels of what I call illumi-
nating light. I-see is a global illumination; acquired intellectual habits 
are manifestative illuminations; and the operations are intentional 
lightings according to objects with which the act of knowing commen-
surates. But, I repeat, none of those degrees of illumination is 
constituted by the others”60.  
The relationship of the intelligence with the personal level is pri-
marily with the acting intellect (personal knowledge) but also with 
transcendental freedom. The habits are voluntary in their making, not 
only those of the will, but those of the intelligence. If we decide to 
study mathematics, or cooking, the resulting habits are a consequence 
of our decisions, and are intellectual. “Human intelligence, as the in-
tellectual in potency, is of the order of the essence; thus understanding 
is perfectible by habits. Habits [acquired] are at the essential level de-
pendence on freedom, which is also a personal transcendental”61.  
The intelligence has to be “empty” so as to be capable ‘to be-
come everything’, i.e. empty of content, which Aristotle expressed as 
being a “clean slate”. Polo prefers to use the expression “forgetting 
about oneself” because it shows better the freedom it requires in order 
not to exclude any reality and also to express how the intelligence re-
fers directly to the object, hiding the person, and the innate habits, in 
order to interfere the least with reality: “Note that in the cascading of 
the illumination, both upward and downwards, the forgetfulness of it-
self is corroborated. In the intellectual potency, the forgetfulness of 
itself is the character of tabula rasa, in the mental presence is the con-
cealment that hides itself, and in the acquired habits being 
manifestative of the mental operations. So, I insist, in the essential 
lighting of the intellectual acts play in favour of the lower ones, that 
they highlight, without which not any of them refers to themselves”62. 
                                                 
inteligido» se formula ahora así. Ver: acto iluminante (iluminado por otro acto ilu-
minante). Directamente inteligido: acto u objeto actual iluminado, intacto por 
potencialmente distinto del acto iluminante (el acto iluminado es iluminante en 
tanto que método coincidente hacia bajo). Los actos suscitados más altos son su-
mamente claros, pero no iluminan ver-yo. Esto quiere decir que suscitar hacia 
arriba acaba sin saturar la potencia. Ibid., 73. 
60 “La distinción entre ver-yo y lo que explica es una distinción según grados. Se 
trata de niveles de lo que he llamado luz iluminante. Ver-yo es una iluminación 
global; los hábitos intelectuales adquiridos son iluminaciones manifestativas; y las 
operaciones son iluminaciones intencionales de acuerdo con los objetos con los 
que se conmensuran al poseerlos. Pero, repito, ninguno de esos grados de ilumina-
ción es constituido por los otros”. Ibid., 158. 
61 “La inteligencia humana, como lo intelectual en potencia, es del orden de la esen-
cia; así entendida es perfeccionable por los hábitos. Los hábitos son la dependencia 
esencial respecto de la libertad, que es asimismo un trascendental personal”. Polo, 
L., Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento IV, op. cit., 445. 
62 “Nótese que en la cascada iluminante, tanto hacia arriba como hacia abajo, se 
comprueba el olvido de sí. En la potencia intelectual, el olvido de sí es el carácter 
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The first activity corresponds to synderesis, which is the illumi-
nation of the objects of the imagination –fantasy–to be able to be 
understood by the intelligence and form the abstract object63. Notice 
that this is a radical correction to classic philosophy’s position in 
which the agent intellect (personal knowledge in Polo) is the one illu-
minating the ‘phantasm’. Ultimately all human knowing activity has 
its origin in the personal knowledge as act of being, but now Polo de-
fends that the activity of making intelligible the sensible, is done 
through synderesis, through the I-see. This makes sense because syn-
deresis is closer to the faculties and unifies the habits of the 
intelligence and will, which are interrelated64. This is why Polo distin-
guishes the illumination of the objects of fantasy, which belongs to 
synderesis, and the illumination, now made possible, of the intellect, 
which is the one that actually abstracts (different illumination) the con-
cepts. “Also lighting phantasm does not equate with the object of 
fantasy as term of the abstract intentionality: the abstract object does 
not light up the phantasm as the synderesis, it ‘does not’ make it intel-
ligible, but it commensurates to it without being its lighting. From the 
point of view of intentionality, there is a strict difference of levels be-
tween the abstract object and the object of phantasy” 65. The distinction 
is subtle but important to distinguish synderesis from its faculties. 
Polo’s theory of knowledge is very refined and is a great help to 
distinguish the different types of objective knowledge and their rela-
tionship. It is important to distinguish the different levels of 
intentionality: perceptive, imaginative, abstractive, and mathemati-
cal66. Polo also distinguishes the different operations of the 
                                                 
de tabula rasa; en la presencia mental, el ocultamiento que se oculta, y en los há-
bitos adquiridos, el ser actos manifestativos de las operaciones mentales. Así pues, 
insisto, en la iluminación esencial los actos intelectuales juegan a favor de los in-
feriores, a los que destacan, sin que ninguno de ellos se refiera a sí mismo”. Polo, 
L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 80. 
63 “The lighting of the phantasm is attributed to the agent intellect. But if the agent 
intellect is assimilated to the transparent light, which is superior to the illuminating 
lights, it is more accurate to hold that lighting the phantasm corresponds to syn-
deresis, i.e. an illuminating light that is inspired by the added life”. “La iluminación 
de los fantasmas se atribuye al intelecto agente. Pero si el intelecto agente se asi-
mila a la luz transparente, la cual es superior a las luces iluminantes, es más 
ajustado sostener que la iluminación de los fantasmas corresponde a la sindéresis, 
es decir, una luz iluminante a la que equivale el inspirarse en la vida añadida”. 
Ibid., 22. 
64 It seems that positioning the activity of illuminating the phantasm in the synderesis 
is a late formulation in Polo. For example, he states that it depends on the acting 
intelligence. Cfr. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 36. Cfr. also: Curso 
de Teoría del Conocimiento IV, op. cit., 443. 
65 “Asimismo, la iluminación de los fantasmas no se equipara al objeto de la fantasía 
en tanto que término de la intencionalidad abstracta: el objeto abstracto no ilumina 
el fantasma como la sindéresis, no lo ‘hace’ inteligible, sino que se convierte a él 
sin detentar su iluminación. Desde el punto de vista de la intencionalidad, hay una 
estricta diferencia de nivel entre el objeto abstracto y el objeto de la fantasía”. Polo, 
L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 22. 
66 “Is not the same perceived than the imagined; not the imagined than the abstracted 
and is not the same the abstracted than the mathematical intentionality”. “No es lo 
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intelligence as faculty. Among the operations Polo distinguishes them 
by the aim they have as operations into: theoretical and those of prac-
tical reason. Then within the theoretical there are two ways of 
proceeding from the abstract: a) the universalising or conceptual (from 
concept, to judgment and finally to reasoning) or b) the generalizing 
which goes from less general to more general ideas, and can proceed 
without end because there is no absolute general). There is a third op-
eration which is unifying all intellectual operations and in a way Polo 
places it as the source of the operations that constitute mathematics 
and logic which he calls logos, and should not be confused with the 
science of logic. By the way he describes it, it resembles the I-see, but 
we cannot commit orselves to this interpretation. “Considered in its 
dependence of freedom, the essence of man is called to dispose... If 
disposing is taken as unifying unit –as really distinct from the core of 
knowledge [personal level]– it is called logos. The meaning of the 
logos looks not only to the unification of intellectual operations, but 
also to the union with the practical reason”67. All these are the different 
types of objective knowledge and one should not forget that the objec-
tive knowledge, being so rich, is still less rich than the other two types 
of knowledge: habitual and personal knowledge68. 
Of all these intellectual activities what is more relevant to our 
topic is practical reason, but it needs to be developed after the initial 
consideration of the will, because the will is the one that transforms or 
impels the intellect to look for something new, the good, within the 
intelligence’s direct object, that is truth. The practical reason is the one 
that actualises the general impulse to the good of the voluntas ut 
natura, and then —the same will in a different use— is considered as 
voluntas ut ratio. “The notion of voluntas ut ratio. It expresses the 
will´s union with practical reason. The voluntas ut ratio receives in-
formation of the goods provided by the practical reason”69 This is 
because the will is blind, and is only moved by the good, it has to see 
the goodness of whatever is known to act, and for this it needs the 
intellect. “The intelligence knows the truth, objectivizes what is intel-
ligible, but also corresponds to it capturing the reason of good to 
present it to the will. Nihil volitum quin praecognitum: the voluntas ut 
ratio cannot want anything if it has not been known before”70 . 
                                                 
mismo lo percibido que lo imaginado; no es lo mismo lo imaginado que lo abs-
traído y no es lo mismo lo abstraído que lo intencional matemático”. Polo, L., 
Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, IV, op. cit., 437. 
67 “Considerada en dependencia de la libertad, la esencia del hombre se denomina 
disponer... Si se toma el disponer como unidad unificante —distinto realmente del 
núcleo del saber— se denomina logos. Esa acepción del logos mira no só1o a la 
unificación de las operaciones intelectuales, sino también a la unión con la razón 
práctica”. Ibid., 445. 
68 For the distinction between the generalization and universalization ways of the 
intelligence cfr. the same Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, IV.  
69 “La noción de voluntas ut ratio. Con ella se expresa la unión de la voluntad con la 
razón práctica. La voluntas ut ratio recibe la noticia de los bienes que la razón 
práctica le proporciona”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 27. 
70 “La inteligencia conoce la verdad, objetiva lo inteligible, pero también le corres-
ponde captar la razón de bien en tanto que la presenta a la voluntad. Nihil volitum 
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A key topic for ethics is that the practical reason cannot present 
the absolute good71, which will have the character of total good be-
cause no abstracted reality has such quality. So all what it presents has 
the character of means towards it72, and since reality is complex in its 
relationships, a plexus, it never presents only one mean but several, so 
it is up to the will to accept them as proper means, and then choose the 
one it considers best among them, or the least bad, depending on the 
circumstances. “Strictly speaking, the distinction between good and 
evil is proper to acts that are means. The bad means do not link with 
acts referred to the end; this constitutes the middle act as evil. If this 
act is exercised, a moral error occurs. Also this error occurs if the con-
nection of that act to the end is overlooked, because that act, which is 
medium, is wrongly taken as the end, and therefore wanting stops in 
it. Therefore, ethics has to want with the will, i.e., with the tendency 
in proportion with intelligence, which is able to capture the formality 
of means and can decide the choice of a mean, which requires that the 
mean is highlighted as such [reason of being a mean]”73.  
The means presented by the practical reason have to be chosen, 
and that is the ultimate task of the will, as we see in the next sections, 
and morality belongs properly to the will, not to the reason, though 
they cannot be isolated one from the other.  
c) The will’s dynamic. There is a brilliant passage in which Polo 
describes the relations among the will, personal love, first principles 
and synderesis’ I-want. The love referred to in this passage is the vol-
untary love, which is the gift, third stage of human love. The two first 
phases of love, acceptance and donation, are at the personal level but 
the third, the gift, cannot be at the personal level because humans can-
not grant the esse, only the Creator can give the esse. “The similarity 
of I-want with the habit of first principles is the otherness of the good, 
and its dependence on the person is that love [wanting] is the third 
element of the donating structure. The voluntary designates the con-
fluence between its dependence on the personal level and the habit of 
                                                 
quin praecognitum: la voluntas ut ratio no puede querer nada si antes no ha sido 
conocido”. Ibid. 
71 “Practical reason presents, primarily, a plurality of goods, not only one nor the 
supreme good”. “La razón práctica presenta, ante todo, una pluralidad de bienes, 
no uno solo ni tampoco el bien supremo”. Ibid. 
72 “Knowing the reason of medium is proper of the practical reason”. “Conocer la 
razón de medio es propio de la razón práctica”. Ibid., 28. 
73 “En rigor, la distinción entre bueno y malo se da en los actos que son medios. El 
medio malo no enlaza con los actos referidos al fin; eso constituye la maldad del 
acto medio. Si se ejerce dicho acto, tiene lugar el error moral. También se da este 
error si se prescinde de la conexión de ese acto con el fin, porque ese acto que es 
medio se confunde con el fin, y el querer se detiene en él. Por tanto, la ética tiene 
querer con la voluntad, es decir, con la tendencia proporcionada con la inteligencia, 
que es capaz de captar la formalidad de medio y puede decidir la elección de un 
medio, lo cual requiere que el medio se destaque como tal”. Ibid., 29. 
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first principles. (Inasmuch as the voluntary is love [wanting] it de-
pends on the person, and while it is intention of another it depends on 
the habit of first principles)”74.  
The relationship with the highest personal transcendental, per-
sonal love is what gives the I-want preeminence over the I-see, 
together with the fact that each act of the will requires a direct rela-
tionship with the personal act of being. This is why Polo calls the 
operations depending on the I-want as constitutive (constituir), while 
the ones depending on the I-see as just arousing (suscitar). “In such a 
way that I-see and I-want are only potentially distinguished. The po-
tency is the fissure introduced by the pronoun us: a mutual play in 
favor of each member to the extent of their ability. They are two lights 
that accompany each other without diffractions, because one arises and 
the other constitutes, in a way that the object thought is extrapolated 
in the action, ‘is made true in the action’. Such extrapolation is not 
illuminated by I-see”75. 
As we already mentioned, the first act of the I-want is to consti-
tute the natural will (voluntas ut natura), which makes it discover its 
unique and unshakeable aim; that is, to look for the good. Nevertheless 
the will does not know where the good is, neither in general, nor in 
particular. Everything has to be presented to it, as good for the will to 
choose76. And this is the trickiest part of the human dynamics to ex-
plain77. The intellect has to present the good to the will. In principle 
the intellect’s proper task is to see the correspondence of the thoughts 
                                                 
74 The text does not refer to the habit of wisdom, which is the way to know the 
personal intimacy, probably because what Polo wants to highlight is the relation-
ship between the wanting and the transcendental personal love. “La semejanza del 
querer-yo con el hábito de los primeros principios es la alteridad del bien, y su 
dependencia de la persona estriba en que el amor es el tercer elemento de la es-
tructura donal. Lo voluntario señala la confluencia del depender de la persona y 
del hábito de los primeros principios. (En tanto que lo voluntario es amor depende 
de la persona y en tanto que es intención de otro depende del hábito de los primeros 
principios)”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 294. 
75 “Hasta tal punto que ver-yo y querer-yo sólo se distinguen potencialmente. La 
potencia es la fisura del pronombre nos: mutuo jugar a favor de cada miembro en 
la medida de su capacidad. Se trata de dos luces que se acompañan sin difracciones, 
porque una suscita y la otra constituye, de manera que el objeto pensado se extra-
pola en la acción, ‘verdadea en la acción’. Dicha extrapolación no es iluminada 
por ver-yo”. Ibid., 214. 
76 “Another issue is the notion of voluntas ut ratio. It expresses the will´s union with 
practical reason. The voluntas ut ratio receives news of the goods provided by the 
practical reason”. “Otro asunto es la noción de voluntas ut ratio. Con ella se ex-
presa la unión de la voluntad con la razón práctica. La voluntas ut ratio recibe la 
noticia de los bienes que la razón práctica le proporciona”. Polo, L., La Voluntad 
y sus Actos I, op. cit., 27. 
77 “Tomás de Aquino made two key observations about the state of the question. 
First and foremost, he warns that the will is an obscure theme: all its dimensions 
have not been figured out, and that Aquinas’ previous philosophers devoted less 
attention”. “Tomás de Aquino hace dos observaciones centrales sobre el estado de 
la cuestión. Ante todo, advierte que la voluntad es un tema oscuro: no se han ave-
riguado todas sus dimensiones, y ha sido menos estudiada que la inteligencia en la 
filosofía anterior a él”. Ibid., 7. 
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to reality, to discover reality, to discover the truth. This is the theoret-
ical intellect or the intellect acting as such. Knowledge, nevertheless, 
is not the most important action of the human being; it is the person, 
which is the most active part of the human ontological structure, and 
he is stubbornly and indefatigably seeking his identity as personal 
knowledge and even more, he seeks to be accepted in personal love. 
This looking for identity is, we repeat, what Polo calls ‘looking for the 
replica’. The person wants to know who he is, and to whom one can 
donate oneself in full. In other ways the aim of the person is to achieve 
the knowledge and acceptance that is personal and in full. This makes 
synderesis move the intelligence to look for the means that can help to 
fulfil those intimate desires. But how does the intelligence distinguish 
what is good? What is the criteria of good, and how does it know it? 
This is the key to our quest. 
So synderesis has two tasks regarding this: 
a) to set the criteria of goodness, whatever will fulfill the per-
sonal level desires, and  
b) to ask the intelligence to check where to find it.  
According to Polo voluntas ut natura is directly constituted by 
synderesis, and this is somehow part of human nature and therefore it 
is not free, it is, consequently, natura. Everyone looks for the good, 
whatever it consists of. This will as nature, then, is the one rightly con-
stituted as the principle of practical action: do good78. Voluntas ut 
ratio, this is after it has been presented a particular good by the prac-
tical intelligence, is the will that has to choose the means to achieve 
the good. “Intellection taken as an adjunct of the voluntas ut natura is 
called synderesis, and as an adjunct of the voluntas ut ratio;[is called] 
practical reason”79. One should take into account that in this text when 
using the word ‘intellection’ Polo refers to intellectual knowledge in 
general and not to the intelligence as faculty. 
According to this, synderesis states the final end, and it has to do 
with the proper end of human beings, and the practical reason with the 
means. One is habitual, the second is operational and deals with the 
                                                 
78 “The voluntas ut ratio exercises medial acts: instead, the exclusive ordination to 
the end belongs to the voluntas ut natura. And this is the primordial status of the 
will before relating with to the practical reason”. “La voluntas ut ratio ejerce actos 
mediales: en cambio, la ordenación exclusiva al fin es propia de la voluntas ut 
natura. Y éste es el estatuto primordial de la voluntad, anterior a su proporción con 
la razón práctica”. Ibid., 32. 
79 “La intelección tomada como coadyuvante de la voluntas ut natura se llama sin-
déresis, y como coadyuvante de la voluntas ut ratio razón práctica. La razón en 
cuanto capta la noción de bien y la presenta a la voluntad, mueve a tender a él. Por 
eso, la voluntad no es potencia pasiva como la materia prima, la cual es relativa a 
la causa formal; en cambio, la tendencia es relativa al bien: requiere su presenta-
ción”. Ibid., 33. 
270 
 
means to achieve the end, which then are presented to the will (volun-
tas ut ratio) and subsequently the will chooses. There are some 
precisions that should be taken into account:  
a) The will is one, not two, though it acts differently:” The vol-
untas ut natura is not a faculty other than the voluntas ut ratio, but just 
its first stage”80.  
b) That it is proper of the essential level, not of the natural level. 
Animals cannot distinguish means as means, which requires the uni-
versal notion of mean, and this belongs to the intelligence: “To 
understand a means as means is beyond sensitive knowledge. There-
fore the tendencies arising from sensitive knowledge, although they 
use means, do not capture them under the reason of means, because 
they do not capture the end as such, but, let´s say, go for it by their 
own impulses. Knowing means as means belongs to practical rea-
son”81.  
c) The interaction between the will and the intelligence cannot 
be compared with the hylomorphic composition between the substan-
tial form and the prime matter, since the intelligence is not conforming 
the will: “Reason insofar as it captures the notion of good and presents 
it to the will, moves to tend to it. For this reason, the will is not a pas-
sive power as the prime matter, which is relative to the formal cause; 
on the other hand, the tendency is relative to the good: it requires its 
presentation”82. 
d) The will is not moved in a physical way as an efficient cause, 
but it has its end beforehand, it is a free decision that cannot be under-
stood by the categorical causes, the tetracausality: “The will is not a 
potency due to the efficient cause, but because of the end”83. 
e) The reason of the goodness of the means is in their participa-
tion in achieving the end, the purpose of the action, and ultimately the 
final end: “Firstly the means appears as good; in principle it is, and in 
                                                 
80 “La voluntas ut natura no es una facultad distinta de la voluntas ut ratio, sino un 
estadio precedente”. Ibid., 26. Check also: “The rational will is not another faculty, 
but a phase of the development of the will: where intelligence has operated and 
known good, the will exercises correlative acts”. “La voluntad racional no es otra 
facultad, sino una fase del desarrollo de la voluntad: en tanto que la inteligencia ha 
operado y conocido el bien, la voluntad ejerce actos correlativos”. Ibid., 35. 
81 “Entender un medio como medio rebasa el conocimiento sensible. Por eso, las 
tendencias que se proporcionan con el conocimiento sensible, aunque utilicen me-
dios, no los captan bajo la razón de tales, porque tampoco captan el fin como tal, 
sino que, digámoslo así, se dirigen a él por su propio impulso. Conocer la razón de 
medio es propio de la razón práctica”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 
28. 
82 “La razón en cuanto capta la noción de bien y la presenta a la voluntad, mueve a 
tender a él. Por eso, la voluntad no es potencia pasiva como la materia prima, la 
cual es relativa a la causa formal; en cambio, la tendencia es relativa al bien: re-
quiere su presentación”. Ibid., 33. 




a way, is a purpose, because it is indispensable, and therefore partici-
pates in the reason of end [purpose]”84.  
f) To discover the reason of means implies that there are many 
possible means, so in choosing, the person can make mistakes; the 
practical knowledge is not as exact as the theoretical knowledge: “In 
sum, considering the will as spiritual tendency in its relation with the 
reason, it appears the notion of means and the possibility of choosing 
between means; man as a causa sui controls his own life to a certain 
extent, because one can go wrong. To capture the notion of means is 
not strictly a knowledge of the invariable” 85.  
The arousing of the I-see and the constitution of the I-want has 
a purpose, which is the action, as Polo indicates in this text, but the 
action cannot be accomplished without the faculties, the intelligence 
and will. The intelligence as involved in the action under the syn-
deresis is what we shall see in the next subsection on the practical 
reason: “Another distinction is between to create or to constitute, and 
to exercise. While the first two refer to the two members of the syn-
deresis, the third, exercise, is borne by the potencies, which is a 
redundancy of the greatest interest, as without it language is impossi-
ble —for example, writing this book”86 . 
 “To arise and to constitute are terms describing the apex of the 
human essence; their distinction lies in power. Power means to satu-
rate the potency. Only the will is a saturable passive power. Raise is 
distinguished from power; hence the mental limit and the unreality of 
the object tought”87. 
c.1) Voluntas ut ratio and practical reason dynamics. Following 
Aquinas, Polo distinguishes six operations of the will, three related to 
the end and three related to the means towards the end: “Thomas Aqui-
nas distinguishes three acts of the will with respect to the end and three 
                                                 
84 “El medio tiene de entrada razón de bien; en principio lo es, y a su modo, es un 
fin, porque es imprescindible y, por tanto, participa del fin”. Ibid., 30. 
85 “En suma, al considerar la voluntad como tendencia espiritual en su proporción 
con la razón, aparece la noción de medio y la posibilidad de elegir entre medios; 
el hombre como causa sui controla su propio vivir hasta cierto punto, porque se 
puede equivocar. Captar la noción de medio no es un saber estrictamente necesa-
rio”. Ibid., 31. 
86 “Otra distinción es la que media entre suscitar o constituir y ejercer. Mientras que 
los primeros corren a cargo de los dos miembros de la sindéresis, el ejercicio corre 
a cargo de las potencias, una redundancia del mayor interés, pues sin ella es impo-
sible el lenguaje —por ejemplo, escribir este libro—”. Polo, L., Antropología 
Trascendental II, op. cit., 215. 
87 “Suscitar y constituir son términos que describen el ápice de la esencia humana; 
su distinción estriba en poder. Poder significa saturar la potencia. Sólo la voluntad 
es potencia pasiva saturable. Suscitar se distingue de poder. De ahí el límite mental 
y la irrealidad del objeto pensado”. Ibid., 209. 
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acts with regard to the media. The first are the velle, the intentio and 
the fruitio. The latter are the electio, the consensus and the usus”88.  
Polo also explains the acts regarding the end, which are the di-
rective ones. “According to the Thomists, voluntary acts that have to 
do with the end are three: simple love, intention and fruition. The three 
relate to the final end, but not in the same way. Fruition refers to the 
ultimate good where it is present, and one enjoys it. If this property is 
present the will culminates. The intention refers to the ultimate good 
as absent, i.e., is the act which puts the means in relation to the end 
and is considered the ultimate good as not yet reached”89.  
It is interesting to note that Polo hardly mentions the acts of the 
practical reason when dealing with the will90, though he mentions 
                                                 
88 “Tomás de Aquino distingue tres actos de la voluntad con respecto al fin y tres 
actos con respecto a los medios. Los primeros son el velle, la intentio y la fruitio. 
Los segundos son la electio, el consensus y el usus”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus 
Actos II, op. cit., 11. 
89 “Según los tomistas, los actos voluntarios que tienen que ver con el fin son tres: 
el simple querer, la intención y la fruición. Los tres se refieren bien último, pero 
no de la misma manera. La fruición se refiere al bien último en tanto que está 
presente y se goza en él; si ese bien está presente la voluntad culmina. La intención 
se refiere al bien último en tanto que ausente, es decir, es el acto que pone los 
medios en relación con el fin y considera el bien último como todavía no alcan-
zado”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 68. 
90 “Here we must remember the voluntary acts that precede the practical action. The 
consilium is an act of the practical reason that presents a set of middle goods with-
out attending to their relationship. This set is variable and not organized. The 
gnome is the corresponding voluntary act, and contributes to the formation of pru-
dence. These acts are developed with deliberation, followed by the election, the 
command, which is an act of reason, and the practical action. Therefore, the organ-
ization of the means is gradual and progressive”. “Aquí tenemos que recordar los 
actos voluntarios que preceden a la acción práctica. El consilium es un acto de la 
razón práctica que presenta un conjunto de bienes mediados sin atender a su rela-
ción. Ese conjunto es variable y no organizado. La gnome es el acto voluntario 
correspondiente, y contribuye a la formación de la prudencia. Estos actos se desa-
rrollan con la deliberación, a la que sigue la elección, el imperio, que es un acto de 
la razón, y la acción práctica. Por tanto, la organización de los medios es gradual 
y progresiva”. Ibid., 82. 




them when dealing with prudence91. As term of comparison one can 
cross-check some other authors like Grassl92, from whom we have 
taken the chart above (figure 5), where the different stages of the prac-
tical reason are shown in rounded squares and the acts of the will as 
irregular hexagons; or Gallagher 93 which reflects the 12 traditional 
steps of the voluntary act and a table below (table 10) that includes 
references to Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae.  
We shall refer to each act of the will and comment on it when-
ever Polo’s approach differs with the traditional one. 
Simple Volition. Traditionally simple volition is the appreciation 
of good things, but without desiring them, just a simple seeing them 
as goods, just appreciating their goodness, similar to when one 
browses through a commercial catalogue just out of curiosity without 
any intention of buying. For Aquinas the simplex velle, or simple will, 
is different from the voluntas ut natura, being the latter the natural 
intention to the ultimate good. Instead, the simplex velle for Aquinas 
is the appeal any good as presented by the practical reason has on man, 
without any intention or desire. We can translate it as liking94. One can 
like safari trips, boat rides, ice cream, playing well the piano, and any 
other good things that are good in themselves, but they are not moving 
the person at that particular moment. 
 Polo, on the contrary, seems to understand the first step of the 
will as the natural will: “Simplex velle is not an act of the rational will, 
                                                 
91 “According to Thomas Aquinas, in addition to the simple practical apprehension, 
the acts of practical reason are counsel, judgment, and the command”. “Según To-
más de Aquino, además de la simple aprehensión práctica, los actos de la razón 
práctica son el consejo, el juicio y el imperio”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos 
II, op. cit., 32. 
92 Cfr. Grassl, W., “Aquinas on management and its development”, Journal of Man-
agement Development, 29, 7/8 (2010) 706-715.  
93 D. M. Gallagher, “The Will and Its Acts”, in Stephen J. Pope (ed.), The Ethics of 
Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002). 
94 “En la cuestión sexta del De Malo XXII se sostiene que el objeto, para mover a la 
voluntad, debe presentarse al sujeto no sólo como bonum, sino también como con-
veniens, porque si así no sucede la voluntad permanecerá inerte. Y agrega De 
Finance: ‘Más aún: no basta, para ponerla en acción, que el objeto sea captado 
como conveniens in universali: el obrar se desarrolla siempre en el orden de la 
existencia y sólo lo singular existe: es necesario que el objeto aparezca hic et nunc 
deseable, conveniente para el sujeto tal como existe hic et nunc. Santo Tomás tiene 
aquí en vista la moción del querer que coincide con el acto mismo de la elección’”. 
Ballesteros, J. C. P., “Valor, Razón y Subjetividad en Joseph de Finance”, Sapien-
tia, 58 (2003) p. 307. 




but of the native will”95. Polo’s considers it as the general impulse to 
the good, as if it were the voluntas ut natura96 or even synderesis. The 
following passage can also be interpreted as if the simplex velle is the 
impulse given by the voluntas ut natura, rather than an operation of 
the voluntas ut ratio. The simplex velle seems to be constituted directly 
by the I-want even before the activity of the practical reason, needed 
to activate the voluntas ut ratio97.  
 “The exercised and constituted voluntary can be distinguished 
from the simply constituted voluntary: the simplex velle. Practical rea-
son and synderesis correspond to this distinction. Without the practical 
reason the acts of the will cannot be exerted (voluntas ut ratio). Instead 
synderesis is an innate habit. The common and innate insight of the 
will is not exactly the knowledge of what is good, but certain impera-
tive. The imperative is the simple love: want because it is what is 
proper to you and, at the same time, the way you are constituted in act 
by the ‘I’, strictly speaking, love means I-want. Such imperative in-
volves an agreement, because if I do not want, the will be just pure 
passive potency. Although the will and synderesis are different, they 
are not two unrelated things; the simple love is the natural will in act 
as I-want”98. 
                                                 
95 “El simplex velle, que no es un acto de la voluntad ut ratio, sino de la voluntad 
nativa”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 17. 
96“The simplex-velle as awakening in act corresponds to the will, and not by the 
practical reason, nor by acquired virtues, but by synderesis. Wanting is an imposed, 
not an autonomous duty; It is not a spontaneous imperative, but an essential agree-
ment. Synderesis is the truth of the will. (There is no abstract knowledge of the 
will, because the will cannot be enlightened because it is not physical. Each one 
knows that one´s essence includes the faculty of the will by an innate habit, not in 
an objective way)”. “A la voluntad le corresponde como despertar en acto el sim-
plex velle, y no en virtud de la razón práctica, ni de las virtudes adquiridas, sino de 
la sindéresis. Querer es un deber no impuesto ni autónomo; no es un imperativo 
espontáneo, sino un acuerdo esencial. La sindéresis constituye la verdad de la vo-
luntad. (No cabe un conocimiento abstracto de la voluntad, porque la voluntad no 
es iluminable como lo físico. Cada quién conoce según un hábito innato —no de 
modo objetivo— que su esencia engloba la potencia voluntaria)”. Polo, L., An-
tropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 145. 
97 Cfr. “The simplex-velle as awakening in act corresponds to the will, and not by 
the practical reason, but by synderesis”. “A la voluntad le corresponde como des-
pertar en acto el simplex velle, y no en virtud de la razón práctica, sino de la 
sindéresis”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 68. 
98 “Cabe distinguir lo voluntario ejercido y constituido, y lo voluntario simplemente 
constituido: el simplex velle. Con esta distinción se corresponden la razón práctica 
y la sindéresis. Sin la razón práctica no se ejercen los actos de la voluntad (voluntas 
ut ratio). En cambio, la sindéresis es un hábito innato. La intelección habitual e 
innata de la voluntad no es exactamente el conocimiento del bien, sino cierto im-
perativo. El imperativo es el simple querer: quiere porque es lo tuyo y, a la vez, el 
modo como eres constituida en acto por el yo, pues, en rigor, querer significa que-
rer-yo. Dicho imperativo comporta un acuerdo, porque si yo no quiero, la voluntad 
no pasa de ser la pura potencia pasiva. Aunque la voluntad y la sindéresis sean 
distintas, no son dos piezas sueltas; el simple querer es la voluntad natural en acto 
en tanto que quiero-yo”. Ibid., 51. 
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Coming back to Aquinas the simplex velle is the first step of any 
action, the discovery of the character of good in anything; later if one 
sees it as good for oneself, one has to see it as desirable and achievable, 
then one may decide to go for it and that is the intention99. Both activ-
ities are preceded by the corresponding acts of the practical reason that 
present the different known objects as goods. No decision though, has 
been taken yet, but are the preliminary steps to the first actual decision, 
which is the intention, which for us is the first commitment of the will 
as such —constituted and exercised if we use Polo’s terminology—. 
The next act of the will after the simplex velle is the intentio according 
to Aquinas. 
Intention. It seems that Polo does not explain properly the inten-
tion as the second step of the will´s stages. He seems to jump from the 
simplex velle to the consent, at least in the two volumes of La Voluntad 
y sus Actos which we cite repeatedly. “The voluntary act which corre-
sponds to the conception of the goods is the consent. This voluntary 
act is the first of the voluntas ut ratio”100. 
In Aquinas, first comes the intention, which is the decision to 
act, after which the means to achieve it are looked for101. Properly 
speaking the consent is the act by which the will assents to the different 
means presented by the practical reason, all of them as possible. To 
these the will consents, then the practical reason evaluates and ranks 
them proposing the best one, which if the will assents, is what is called 
election. 
Consent. As quoted above the consent is the agreement to the 
multiple means the practical intelligence presents via the deliberation 
of the means to the will. Nevertheless, there seems to be what Polo 
says, that deliberation should follow consent rather than the other way 
round. It seems as if Polo uses deliberation as the act of the practical 
reason immediately previous to the election. It looks as if he uses the 
term deliberation, as what Aquinas calls ‘practical judgement’ which 
is the act of the practical reason that recommends the best mean avail-
able, while deliberation for Aquinas is simply the consideration of all 
                                                 
99 “In intending an end a person is committed to actually carrying out the actions 
needed to achieve that end. Simple willing, on the other hand, is simply the willing 
of some good as perfective of me (or those united to me by love) without any 
necessary reference to whether or not I intend actually to acquire that good. To 
take an example, for years I may want —taken as something that would be good 
for me— to go see Paris. During those years, I never do anything about actually 
going there. This is simple willing. But suppose that I finally decide actually to go; 
I am now ipso facto committed to employing all the means necessary for this trip. 
At this point, I intend to go to Paris”. Gallagher, D. M., “The Will and Its Acts”, 
op. cit., 81. 
100 “El acto voluntario que se corresponde con la concepción de los bienes es el con-
sentimiento. Este acto voluntario es el primero de la voluntas ut ratio”. Polo, L., 
La Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 11. 
101 Cfr. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae op.cit., I-II, q. 12; q. 19, a. 7-8. 
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available means without recommending any in particular102. Neverthe-
less he uses Aquinas’ practical judgement term later in the traditional 
way: “Thomas of Aquinas studied three virtues that correspond with 
deliberation or with the practical judgement by which deliberation 
ends”103. Whatever the reason may be, it seems as if Polo is not very 
consistent in the use of the terminology regarding the acts of the will 
which makes it more difficult to follow his discourse.  
Election, (choice). Taking into account what we have mentioned 
above regarding Polo’s use of the term deliberation the following text 
refers to what is considered the central act of the will, which is the 
election of the most adequate104 means to carry on the intention. “In 
effect, deliberation precedes another act of the will that is the election 
[choice]. The means chosen are those which are within the ability and 
capacity to perform them, which is variable in every man and in the 
various circumstances of one’s life”105. 
That it is the central act of the will is partially because the con-
sideration of the means can take a long time, since there is no necessity 
in the election, it is free, and the interrelations of the means among 
them and the possibilities to achieve the end in different ways are mul-
tiple. As is a well-known topic in management sciences, excessive 
“analysis leads to paralysis”. This is a classic sickness of the will; in-
decisiveness. “Deliberation cannot be carried to infinity, because in 
that case election would not take place. Therefore, it seems correct to 
hold that ending the deliberation process corresponds to the will, ac-
cording to the will’s act which is to choose... As it is clear, the choice 
is not done just once, because man has to choose many times”106. 
                                                 
102 “Considering consent as prior to deliberation, and not only in correspondence 
with her, is because the means form a plexus. (Inquisition, deliberation and advice 
are used as synonyms by Thomas of Aquinas). To Thomas of Aquinas consensus 
always follows the advice. This is because for him the means do not constitute a 
plexus, but different particular things”. “Considerar el consentimiento como ante-
rior a la deliberación, y no sólo en correspondencia con ella, está en que los medios 
constituyen un plexo. (Inquisición, deliberación y consejo son sinónimos para To-
más de Aquino). Para Tomás de Aquino el consenso sigue siempre al consejo. Ello 
es debido a que para él los medios no constituyen un plexo, sino cosas particulares 
distintas”. Ibid., 12. 
103 “Tomás de Aquino estudia tres virtudes que se corresponden con la deliberación 
o con el juicio práctico con que ésta termina”. Ibid., 13. 
104 “The end is what you want, but when the appetite is contrasted with the practical 
reason the characteristic of being a mean is highlighted as well as the issue of its 
suitability. Precisely there appears the election; to consider the advantage of one 
medium over another”. “El fin es lo que se apetece, pero cuando el apetito se pro-
porciona con la razón práctica se destaca el acto medial y la cuestión de su 
adecuación. Precisamente ahí aparece la elección, el ponderar la ventaja de un me-
dio sobre otro”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 30. 
105 “En efecto, la deliberación antecede a otro acto de la voluntad, que es la elección. 
El medio, o los medios, elegidos son los que están al alcance de la capacidad de 
realizarlos, la cual es variable en cada hombre y en las diversas coyunturas de su 
vida”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 11. 
106 “La deliberación no puede prolongarse al infinito, porque en ese caso la elección 
no tendría lugar. Por tanto, parece acertado sostener que terminar la deliberación 
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This act should not only consider the intention, but also the in-
terrelation of the means. Polo distinguishes two types of relationship 
between the different means presented, the horizontal one which is the 
relationship between the means among them, and the vertical which is 
the relationship of the means with the intention107.  
The election is also linked to the main habit of the practical rea-
son, which is prudence. One can say that the election properly belongs 
to the practical judgement as final recommendation. It can also be at-
tributed to the previous act of the practical reason, to the deliberation 
that considers all possible means. To consider the possibilities as 
means requires confronting them with the intention and follow the 
chain of intentions up to the final end, and this requires close contact 
with synderesis. “To choose a habit is needed; therefore, the thesis that 
freedom gets in contact with the will through habits should be main-
tained, albeit they may be weakly acquired habits (for this reason, the 
choice can be more or less trivial). Ultimately, all acts of the voluntas 
ut ratio require habits because they are not the first act, if one admits 
the simple love (and its constitution by synderesis)”108.  
Polo places properly the first habit before the consensus, this be-
ing prudence. “The first habit is prudence and the consensus part of 
prudence”109.  
For the purpose of this dissertation there is no need to go into 
more details regarding virtues, since what we are interested in is what 
makes the habits, virtues and not vices, which is the formal reason of 
goodness. What makes them have the reason of goodness is given by 
synderesis110: “If voluntary actions do not take place, the moral habits 
                                                 
corresponde a la voluntad, según ese acto suyo que es elegir... Como es claro, la 
elección no es un acto único, pues el hombre ha de elegir muchas veces”. Ibid., 14. 
107 “The means maintain a dual respect: one in the same order of the means, which 
is called horizontal, or connection means-means; and another to the end, which 
might be called vertical. The latter takes into account the intentio, but without for-
getting the previous one. Practical action warns that means always refers to another 
means”. “Los medios mantienen un doble respecto: uno en el orden mismo de los 
medios, que cabe llamar horizontal, o conexión medio-medio, y otro con el fin, 
que se podría llamar vertical. Este último respecto lo tiene en cuenta la intentio, 
pero sin prescindir del otro. En la acción práctica se advierte que un medio siempre 
se refiere a otro”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 80. 
108 “Para elegir hace falta hábito; por tanto, la tesis de que la libertad toma contacto 
con la voluntad a través de los hábitos se debe mantener, aunque sean hábitos dé-
bilmente adquiridos (por eso, la elección puede ser más o menos trivial). En 
definitiva, todos los actos de la voluntas ut ratio exigen hábitos porque no son el 
primero, si se admite el simple querer (y su constitución por la sindéresis)”. Ibid., 
73. 
109 “El primer hábito es la prudencia, y el consensus una parte de la prudencia”. Ibid. 
110 Prudence directs all other virtues by directing them properly to the final end, 
which is received from synderesis, so synderesis is the key for morality as is well 
seen by Trigo: “De todas formas, la prudencia no es la única condición para que 
se dé la virtud moral. Previamente, se requiere conocer el fin al que se dirige la 
misma prudencia y las demás virtudes, y este conocimiento previo y superior es 
propio de la sindéresis o hábito de los primeros principios prácticos”. Trigo, T. 
(ed), En Busca de una Ética Universal, op.cit., 128. 
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are not acquired or become weak. According to this, moral habits are 
derived from synderesis, i.e., of I-want and its continuation”111. From 
prudence112 the other virtues emanate as a kind of similar voluntary 
strength applied to the body in order to direct it to the end: “As you 
cannot replace those appetites or transform into them, the will sorts 
them seeking its own perfection which consists of virtue. Virtue is 
communicable to the lower tendencies, even if they are not exactly 
their subjects. The irascible appetite is controlled with fortitude and 
the concupiscible appetite with temperance”113. 
It may be interesting to show how the election process can also 
be election of a life style. We can train our character, try to acquire 
some virtues we lack, what Spaemann calls a hierarchy of likings114. 
Once the election has been made one has to effect it and this is 
the task of the act of the will called active use. 
                                                 
111 “Si los actos voluntarios no tienen lugar, los hábitos morales no se adquieren o se 
debilitan. Según esto, los hábitos morales derivan de la sindéresis, es decir, del 
querer-yo y de su continuación”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 52. 
112 “The first acquired virtue, expressing the will, linked with intelligence, is pru-
dence. For this reason, prudence is virtutum genetrix, and without it no other virtue 
is possible”. “La primera virtud adquirida, que expresa el enlace de la voluntad con 
la inteligencia, es la prudencia. Por eso, la prudencia es genetrix virtutum, y sin 
ella no se puede adquirir ninguna otra virtud”. Ibid. 
113 “Como no puede sustituir a esos apetitos ni convertirse en ellos, la voluntad los 
ordena de acuerdo con su propio perfeccionamiento, que consiste en la virtud. La 
virtud es comunicable a las tendencias inferiores, sin que sean exactamente sus 
sujetos. El apetito irascible se controla con la fortaleza, y el apetito concupiscible 
con la templanza”. Ibid., 27. 
114 “Living rightly, living well, above all means establishing a hierarchy of prefer-




Active Use. Polo rejects the term ‘use’ when referring either to 
he active-useof the will115 or the passive-use116 of the practical reason, 
even if the term was used by Aquinas117. He does so mainly based on 
the non-reflexivity of the will. There are no elicit acts of the will on 
itself. To want, to will, does not refer to the will wanting itself, but to 
synderesis wanting the wanting to will118. ‘The curvature of the will’, 
an expresion that Polo uses frequently, is the relationship of depend-
ence of the will from synderesis. This is, that any act of the will has to 
be referred as its activating instance to the person via synderesis. “The 
expression ‘active use’ is unacceptable. This voluntary act should be 
called action: it is the voluntary praxis whose intention is the piece of 
work. In the piece of work knowledge is communicated to the motor 
faculties, especially the hands. In that communication, the form known 
by the immanent operation becomes the shape of what is done. In this 
sense, this is to ‘put legs to the ideas’. The ‘legs’ are the execution of 
                                                 
115 “Thomas Aquinas faced the problem. He calls active use, the relationship be-
tween the wanting and doing and says it is the act of will that controls other 
faculties”. “Tomás de Aquino afrontó el problema. A la relación entre el querer y 
el hacer la llama uso activo, y estima que es un acto de la voluntad que dispone de 
otras facultades”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 16. “No act of want-
ing should be called active use, because use is equivalent to dispose, and as I argue 
elsewhere, none of the dimensions of the essence of man are modifiable. What is 
modifiable is what is being modified. But one can only modified what is external 
to the essence of the man. Voluntary acts are ways of modifying inasmuch as they 
are curved, and their relationship regarding what is modifiable is the intention of 
other”. “Ningún acto de querer conviene denominarlo uso activo, porque usar equi-
vale a disponer, y como sostengo en otros lugares, ninguna de las dimensiones de 
la esencia del hombre son disponibles. Lo disponible es aquello sobre lo que versa 
el disponer. Pero sólo se dispone de lo externo a la esencia del hombre. Los actos 
voluntarios son modos de disponer en tanto que son curvos, y su respecto a lo 
disponible reside en la intención de otro”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. 
cit., 17. 
116 “The notion of passive use is invalid when applied to human cognitive or motor 
activities, dimensions which are different ways of dispose and in no way modifia-
ble”. “La noción de uso pasivo es inválida si se aplica a las dimensiones humanas 
cognoscitivas o motoras, que también son modos de disponer y en modo alguno 
disponibles”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 17. 
117 “Thomas Aquinas calls it the active use practical action”. “El uso activo, como 
lo llama Tomás de Aquino, es la acción práctica”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos 
I, op. cit., 79. “Volitum autem non solum est finis, sed id quod est ad finem. Ulti-
mum autem quod pertinet ad primam habitudinem voluntatis, respectu eius quod 
est ad finem, est electio, ibi enim completur proportio voluntatis, ut complete velit 
id quod est ad finem. Sed usus iam pertinet ad secundam habitudinem voluntatis, 
qua tendit ad consequendum rem volitam. Unde manifestum est quod usus sequitur 
electionem, si tamen accipiatur usus, secundum quod voluntas utitur executiva po-
tentia movendo ipsam. Sed quia voluntas etiam quodammodo rationem movet, et 
utitur ea, potest intelligi usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in consi-
deratione rationis referentis ipsum in finem. Et hoc modo usus praecedit 
electionem”. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, op.cit. I-II, q.16, a.4, co. 
118 “To choose some good it is required to want to choose (better: I-want choose). 
To enjoy the good, it is also needed to want. Wanting is an irreducible, although 
in humans it belongs to its essence and not to the act of being”. “Para elegir un 
bien se requiere querer elegir (mejor: querer-yo elegir). Para disfrutar el bien tam-
bién hace falta querer. Querer es un irreductible, aunque en el hombre pertenece a 
su esencia y no al acto de ser”. Ibid., 67. 
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the work, but without ideas there is nothing to ‘put legs on’. Commu-
nication of ideas to the motor powers through the imagination is quite 
understandable from the neurological point of view”119. 
In our opinion ‘action’ will be confused with the actual work 
done, when sometimes, even if the will has decided to put something 
into practice, it does not come out, either because the body is not ca-
pable at that moment to put it into action or it is just an internal 
decision which has no external repercussion at that moment, for ex-
ample, to make an internal act of repentance. Praxis is not a good term 
either because, it is usually used to refer to the external actions, due to 
the influence of Marxism in political life, rather than to the internal 
acts which is its original Greek meaning. Perhaps a better term could 
be undertaking or processing which conveys also the meaning of con-
tinuity until the piece of work is finished120. Another confusing term 
is ‘command’ which can be applied both to the action of the practical 
reason or to the will indistintively; perhaps it will be better to leave 
command as an act of the practical reason and imperium to the will, 
following Enriquez’s suggestion: “Commanding, then, is an act of rea-
son, of will and of the appetites, but in various senses, depending on 
whether we emphasise the ordering, the end or movement”121. 
The action finishes the volition, so to speak, and therefore is re-
lated with the intention and in fact is the purpose of the intention122, 
unless it is a vain intention, not a real one, which will be lack of sin-
cerity of the will. This makes one realize that all other activities were 
means to achieve this particular end, so that one can say that the aim 
of the intention was the use123.  
                                                 
119 “La expresión ‘uso activo’ es inaceptable. A este acto voluntario conviene lla-
marle acción: es la praxis voluntaria cuya intención es la obra. En la obra el 
conocimiento se comunica a las facultades motoras, sobre todo, a las manos. En 
esa comunicación, la forma conocida por la operación inmanente, pasa a ser con-
figurante de lo que se hace. En este sentido, se habla de ‘ponerle patas a las ideas’. 
‘Las patas’ son la ejecución de la obra, pero sin ideas no hay nada a lo que ‘ponerle 
patas’. La comunicación de las ideas a las facultades motoras a través de la imagi-
nación es bastante comprensible desde el punto de vista neurológico”. Polo, L., La 
Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 18. 
120 For the two different meanings of use in Aquinas, internal as elicit act of the will 
and as action cfr. Brock, S. L., “What is the Use of Usus in Aquinas’ Psychology 
of Action?”, in Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle Ages (Ottawa: Le-
gas, 1995), 654-664. 
121 Enríquez, T., “«Imperium», Instinct and Natural Law”, in A. N Garcia (ed.), Nat-
ural Law: Historical, Systematic and Juridical Approaches (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2008), 340. Accessed August 27, 2015. http://pub-
lic.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1106970. 
122 “If the action is the last act of the regarding the means, it has to link with the 
intention, i.e., with the formal relationship between means and end, which man 
understands and the animal does not”. “Si la acción es el último acto respectivo a 
los medios, ha de conectar con la intención, es decir, con la relación formal entre 
medio y fin, que el hombre entiende y el animal no”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus 
Actos I, op. cit., 79. 
123 Although sometimes this is forgotten, the intentio is globalizing; this is why it 
should be added immediately to the active use. The integration of means can only 
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Nevertheless, there is one step more, which is related to the suc-
cess in the use or undertaking; and this is the joy of having completed 
the intention. 
Fruition. There is always a risk of not accomplishing what one 
has wanted to achieve. Then one has a feeling of despondency, and 
either has to choose different means to achieve it or give up the origi-
nal intention. The achievement gives a different affection of the will, 
which is the joy (fruitio) of achievement. “Practical reason can be 
wrong because the knowledge of the formal reason of means is not 
foolproof: when projecting a series of means trying to achieve an end 
there is a risk of failure, or cause counter-productive side effects. 
Therefore, the proportionality between practical reason and will is in-
sufficient, since the ordination of the means to the end is intrinsic and 
practical reason knows slightly such order”124. 
There are some interesting aspects regarding the different out-
comes of the act of willing.  
a) One is the creation of virtues, which come out of repetition of 
acts of the will to the point that contrary actions to virtues, decreases 
the will capacity for further good actions, so they can be lost, and even 
synderesis can be obscured. The intelligence works more autono-
mously than the will with respect to the synderesis, and therefore does 
not need to repeat actions to acquire its habits. 
b) Another one, related to the previous one, is what Polo calls 
moral experience, which is different from the intellectual experience, 
and refers to the global habits that one has at a particular moment, 
based naturally on the acts exercised previously125. The growth both 
                                                 
be by the end”. Aunque a veces esto se olvida, la intentio es globalizante; por eso 
se ha de añadir enseguida al uso activo. La totalización de los medios solamente 
se puede hacer por el fin”. Ibid., 81. 
124 “La razón práctica se puede equivocar porque la captación de la razón formal de 
medio no es infalible: al proyectar una serie de medios se intenta alcanzar un fin, 
pero se corre el riesgo de fracasar, o de provocar efectos secundarios contraprodu-
centes. Por tanto, la proporcionalidad entre razón práctica y voluntad es 
insuficiente, puesto que la ordenación del medio al fin es intrínseca y la razón 
práctica conoce débilmente dicha ordenación”. Ibid., 31. 
125 “So to say, I-see is a guide that falls short and is entrusted to the voluntary without 
accompanying it to the end. At the same time, the intellectual experience —the 
highest raised light—- is distinguished from moral experience. According to my 
proposal, the sentence means that the voluntary retains better the non-futurization, 
so it comes after intellectual acts, because it is a more intense act. Unless the vice 
ruins the moral experience, entrusting the voluntary-after is safe, and in no way 
irrational because it is a surrender to the monitoring of synderesis that provides —
constitutes— the relay. The election cuts the deliberation in this sense”. “Por así 
decir, ver-yo es un guía que se queda corto y se encomienda a lo voluntario sin 
acompañarlo hasta el final. Paralelamente, la experiencia intelectual —la luz sus-
citada más alta— se distingue de la experiencia moral. Según mi propuesta, la 
sentencia significa que lo voluntario conserva mejor la no desfuturización, por lo 
que viene después de lo intelectual, porque es un acto más intenso. A no ser que el 
vicio arruine la experiencia moral, la encomienda al después voluntario es segura, 
y en modo alguno irracional porque es una entrega a la vigilancia de la sindéresis 
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of intellectual and moral experience assists in making the successive 
decisions more successful. “As the election is a voluntary act followed 
by the so-called active use, a new decision may be due to the increase 
of knowledge of goods that provides the active use. Among those 
goods some have a marked character of end, because use has a close 
relation with the intentio, which is another voluntary act which refers 
at the end”126. 
c) A third one is that neither in Polo nor in the classical account 
is there a description of the continuous rectification that any decision 
has while it is being implemented. This may be because they use an 
analytical method and any alteration to the course is considered a dif-
ferent voluntary act127, but perhaps it can be explained in a better way 
by giving a bit more leeway to the active use, and the corresponding 
act of the practical reason, which can be considered a continuous 
check-rectification-countercheck of the actions being undertaken with 
respect to the intention. This is like ship pilots who continuously cor-
rect the course according to the place they intend to reach. Polo uses 
the cybernetic approach to virtues, but mainly to express the redun-
dancy that they have in increasing the capacity of the respective 
faculties, but he has not brought the same approach to the stages of the 
will. The pragmatist Pierce, seems to have done it as self-control ac-
cording to Boero128. 
 
Summary 
We have seen how from the personal level (which decides about 
where to destine one’s love), the action has to cascade down through 
                                                 
que aporta —constituye— el relevo. La decisión corta la deliberación en este sen-
tido”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 214. 
126 “Como la elección es un acto voluntario al que sigue otro llamado uso activo la 
nueva decisión puede ser debida al aumento del conocimiento de bienes que pro-
porciona el uso. Entre esos bienes descubiertos se encuentran algunos que tienen 
un marcado carácter de fin, pues el uso guarda una estrecha relación con la intentio, 
que es otro acto voluntario que se refiere a fines”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos 
II, op. cit., 14. 
127 “But in spite of being several the elections are not isolated. According to the 
classical approach, the connection between elections is understood according to 
various criteria. First, a choice can be altered again”. Also "The plurality of choices 
is sorted by the virtue of prudence. This virtue also belongs to the act of command-
ing [imperium], which moves election to use. Prudential coordination is extremely 
important, because without this virtue, the correction of the wrong election cannot 
be maintained”. “Pero no por ser plurales las elecciones están aisladas. Según el 
planteamiento clásico, la conexión entre las elecciones se entiende según varios 
criterios. En primer lugar, con una elección se puede corregir otra, Ibid. “La plu-
ralidad de elecciones está ordenada por la virtud de la prudencia. A esta virtud 
pertenece también el acto de imperio, con el que se pasa de la elección al uso. La 
coordinación prudencial es sumamente importante, pues, sin esta virtud, la correc-
ción de las elecciones equivocadas no se puede mantener”. Ibid., 15.  
128 Boero, H., “Tomás de Aquino y C. S. Peirce”, (blog) Seminario del Grupo de 
Estudios Peirceanos, University of Navarre, January 17, 2008. Accessed Decem-
ber, 12 2014. http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminarioBoero.html. 
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synderesis to the will helped by the practical intelligence to finally be 
effected at the natural level by the sensitive and physical faculties of 
the person. The destination marks the general orientation, which then 
helps the innate habits to work on the direction it gives. This makes 
the first text quoted in this section more understandable. 
The lack of a systematic description of the relationship between 
the operations of the will and of the practical reason, and the lack of 
clarity regarding the simple willing and perhaps the ambiguity in the 
distinction and use of deliberation and practical judgement may indi-
cate that Polo was not too interested in such distinctions. What was 
important for him, probably, was to point out the role that freedom 
through synderesis has in ethics. Polo explains that traditional philos-
ophy placed freedom on the will and specifically in one of the moment 
of choosing129, while for him, freedom is not in the will but it is a per-
sonal transcendental. As such it acts through synderesis that activates 
the will –and intelligence. Synderesis constitutes the will, giving it the 
natural final end, and permeates all the will stages, regarding both the 
intermediate ends and the means to achieve them.  
Regarding the practical reason, what is interesting for Polo is the 
dependence it has from synderesis through the I-want and not directly 
from the I-see. Being the same faculty as the theoretical intelligence, 
its use is commanded by synderesis to find the aspect of goodness in 
the realities the will discover, or also to find out the good the person is 
craving for, and does not know, because synderesis is an impulse to 
do good, but the specific good has to be found and presented by the 
intelligence, because the will is ‘blind’.  
Another issue to highlight regarding the stages of the will is that 
Polo would like to improve how the passive use of the faculties by the 
will is done. He believes that it is done mainly through the sensitive 
faculties, mainly the cogitative regarding the affections and the imag-
ination regarding the content.  
Polo showed interest in bringing down the strict separation be-
tween the agere, the elicit acts of the will (praxis, agere) and the use 
of the other faculties (poeisis, facere)130. He bases his arguments on 
the preeminence of work and culture as part of the constitutive social 
nature of man. Both have strong moral connotations because they both 
                                                 
129 “From the moral point of view, the most significant acts are those in which the 
will, taken as free-will, exercises dominion over its own act. Such acts are proper 
to the will as will (q. 10, a. 1, ad 1). Thomas also says that what one wills in the 
mode of free-will one wills simpliciter (IIIa, q. 2 1, a. 4). Choice, as the act of free-
will, is the most significant act from the moral point of view, and, as such, it is the 
first act to consider”. Gallagher, D. M., “The Will and Its Acts”, op. cit., 79. 
130 An example of the radical separation between facere and agere can be seen in 
García Junceda, J. A., “La Sindéresis en el Pensamiento de Santo Tomás”, op. cit., 
43: “Para hacer una mesa un carpintero, tiene que vivir, e, incluso, 1a mesa hecha 
puede representarle un gran beneficio para su. vida, puede ayudarle a vivir; mas el 
hacer la mesa no es un acto vital. Por el contrario, odiar, amar, sufrir, son acciones 
vitales, como acción vital es contemplar la verdad, y esta la más representativa de 
la vida humana”.  
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improve man –a person who does not work is not following syn-
deresis’ command ‘do’, ‘do good’. An idle person does not improve, 
does not perfect himself, and does not help others, does not improve 
the culture either. 
After seeing synderesis dynamics, its activation from the per-
sonal level, and the constitutive and directive actions at the essential 
level through the intelligence and the will, we have all the elements to 
discuss whether synderesis as understood by Leonardo Polo could be 











In this section we should be able to discuss at length the initial 
question posed at the beginning: whether Polo’s proposal regarding 
synderesis is accurate and whether it can be a good approach for a 
personalistic view of ethics. We now have all the elements that can 
allow us analyse whether Polo’s Transcendental Anthropology can be 
a good base for a personalist ethics. We have seen the different histor-
ical views of synderesis and Polo’s expanded role of synderesis within 
his philosophical proposal as compared to the traditional view of syn-
deresis. In order to proceed with some order we have chosen first to 
see how Polo understands morals and ethics, then the criteria of good-
ness, followed by how Polo relates ethics to three areas: goods, norms 
and virtues, that according to him consitute the study of ethics, and 
then we shall study each in particular1. 
Polo affirmed that anthropology was the main interest of his 
philosophical endeavour. He never stopped developing his thoughts, 
even after retirement. Gifted with a great memory, which was noticed 
in the way he taught without papers and starting wherever he left the 
previous class, and in the similar expressions, almost textual, in differ-
ent texts, he nevertheless found it difficult to express himself in 
writing. This is why he tended to use older writings –both published 
and unpublished– in his later ones as he acknowledges in several 
places. In spite of this he used to correct each new edition with his 
latest discoveries. His book, Epistemología, creación y divinidad, re-
flects the ultimate development of his thought, because it was the last 
one he wrote and was posthumously published. There he uses the tran-
scendental way of doing anthropology to see whether it can help to 
understand better some topics of supernatural anthropology based on 
                                                 
1 The triple structure of an integral ethics has been well seen by J.F. Sellés. Cfr. 
Sellés, J.F., Antropología para inconformes, op. cit., 366. and by Liliana B. Irizar 
in her introduction to Dewan, L. O., Fundamentos metafísicos de la ética, op. cit., 
10. Dewan does not mention synderesis offering an alternative view to Polo’s un-
derstanding of the ontological foundation of morals.  
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Christology2. Christ is, for Polo, the “perfect God and perfect man”3, 
and he refers to Him not as God but as perfect man, because Polo’s 
main philosophical interest, as we noted before, is anthropological. 
Polo was a practicing Catholic and he took Revelation as an inspiration 
for his philosophy, but without confusing theology or faith with phi-
losophy. The figure of Christ and other religious topics appear 
frequently in his works, mainly as examples, or as a way to clarify a 
point knowing that his audience mostly shared his faith, except on this 
posthumous work where he uses the philosophical tools to try to see 
how it may assist the understanding of Christian theology. Ethics also 
had special resonance in his works, since from his youth he was trying 
to understand freedom –and therefore responsibility– which led to his 
discovery that freedom cannot be discussed with the same mental tools 
used for the non-personal world, as we indicated in the Introduction. 
 
2. Ethics according to Polo 
“The study of human action cannot be complete if it is not done 
in moral terms”4. Polo’s wholesome affirmation gives an idea of the 
importance he gives to the study of ethics. Ethics is what allows each 
human being to grow in one’s humanity and therefore what allows for 
the progress or regression of one’s biography, which actually is the 
development of one’s personal life: “Ethics, from the temporal point 
of view, is the organization of human life, i.e., what allows man live 
one’s time without yielding to the discontinuities of fashion, etc.; what 
allows one to grow”5.  
In our postmodern society a great number of people have a soci-
ological view of ethics, as it was in Greek and Roman times, etched in 
the words they used to speak about it. ‘Ethos’ in Greek and ‘mores’ in 
Latin originally meant the accepted good behaviour in a particular so-
ciety; later, mainly through Stoic philosophers, it was applied to the 
universal society. Polo was aware of this modern misconception of 
ethics: “Ordinarily synderesis is assimilated to moral conscience, 
which even today enjoys esteem, although some see it as a simple pro-
cess of social adaptation. The origin of the concept is very old, and 
even popular; in fact, it has been reflected in many metaphors and po-
etic comparisons... When the spiritual character of moral conscience 
                                                 
2 “This book is somehow a summary of my philosophy steered towards Christology”. 
“Este libro es, en cierto modo, una recapitulación de mi filosofía orientada hacia 
la cristología”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 17. 
3 This formula is taken from the ‘Athanasian Creed’. Cfr. Denzinger, E., El Magis-
terio de la Iglesia, Herder, Barcelona, 1963), 12. 
4 “No cabe un estudio completo de la acción humana si no es en términos morales”. 
Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 18. 
5 “La ética desde el punto de vista temporal es la organización de la biografía hu-
mana, es decir, lo que permite al hombre vivir en el tiempo sin ceder a las 
discontinuidades de la moda, etc.: lo que le permite crecer”. Ibid., 152. 
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is accentuated the term ‘synderesis’ is used”6. He was also aware that 
the cause of the negative view of ethics was partly that it was used 
mainly to punish misbehaviour; this is in a negative view of ethics, as 
already pointed out in the Introduction.  
Polo’s conception of ethics is radically different; it is primarily 
a personal matter rather than social and it is eminently positive rather 
than negative: “It can be argued that, thus understood, ethics is over-
whelming. On the contrary, ethics is concerned with happiness and 
pointing its inexcusable conditions”7. Its aim is the personal perfection 
of each unique, unrepeatable human being8. We can say that from the 
morals of the don’ts Polo suggests a moral of the do’s, of doing, of a 
moral of increased perfection, a moral of personal and social happi-
ness. 
 
3. Historical differentiations 
Polo sees the discovery of philosophy, and of ethics, as part of 
philosophy, as an historical fact; as a step forward from the mythical 
and magic thinking9. A breaking away from obscure forces of the past 
or the present to open oneself to personal responsibility of the present 
in view of the future: “It must be said, in short, that the practical 
knowledge is freed from the obsessions of myth and magic by the Ar-
istotelian prudential ethics”10. 
                                                 
6 “Ordinariamente la sindéresis se asimila a la conciencia moral, la cual también hoy 
goza de estima, aunque algunos la entienden como un simple proceso de adapta-
ción social. El origen de la noción es muy antiguo, e incluso popular; por eso ha 
quedado plasmada en muchas metáforas y comparaciones poéticas. […] Cuando 
se acentúa el carácter espiritual de la conciencia moral se usa el término ‘syndére-
sis’. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 136. 
7 “Cabe alegar que, así entendida, la ética es abrumadora. Todo lo contrario: la ética 
se ocupa de la felicidad y señala sus condiciones inexcusables”. Polo, L., Ética: 
Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 108. 
8 “It is not only that moral does not disagree with nature, more important, it is that 
morality is the improvement of nature. But not just in a quantitative way or just by 
use, no, it is the improvement of nature. The people who have improved their na-
ture are good people and morals can be learned from them”. “No es que la moral 
no esté de acuerdo con la naturaleza, es mucho más, es que la moral es el desarro-
lllo de la naturaleza. Pero no el despliegue en un sentido extensivo o en un sentido 
de puro ejercicio, no, es la intensificación de la naturaleza. Los seres humanos que 
tienen intensificada su naturaleza son los hombres buenos y en ellos se puede 
aprender la moral”. Polo, L., “Socratic Ethics and Christian Moral”, Unpublished 
manuscript, paragraph 12, Seville, July 1994. 
9 Polo explains these steps in the first chapter of Epistemología, Creación y Divini-
dad. 
10 “Cabe decir, en suma, que el saber operativo es liberado de las obsesiones del mito 
y de la magia en el modo de la ética prudencial aristotélica”. Polo, L., El hombre 




Polo finds the key to understand ethics in Socrates’ discovery 
that any action a person does, not only changes the world, but more 
important, it changes the person who acts11. The agent is changed by 
his action. He either grows or diminishes as a person. For Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle a bad person is less person than a good person12. 
No free action is indifferent to personal development and therefore to 
ethics13. 
With Christianity a personal God is the key to ethics, not just 
logos, the cosmos or an intellect who understands itself. And “to im-
prove oneself means to be more like God, to highlight in oneself the 
image of God”14. The opposite is also true; to do bad actions means to 
be less image of God, which is to betray one’s own true being, which 
is to be “an image of God”15. To make this clearer God incarnates him-
self in Christ, who is the perfect man, the perfect image of the Father, 
                                                 
11 “The first who raised this issue in a clear manner was Socrates, who is the founder 
of Western ethical philosophy, when he asked a question that Plato stated in the 
Gorgias, 527 b: ‘what must be guarded more: to suffer an injustice or commit it?’ 
Who comes out worse, the victim or the one who commits the injustice? This ques-
tion is very deep. If we do not answer it properly, we must recognise the partiality 
of our ethical knowledge”. “El primero que planteó este asunto de una manera clara 
fue Sócrates, que es el fundador de la filosofía ética occidental, al plantear una 
pregunta que Platón recoge en el Gorgias, 527 b.: ‘¿de qué hay que guardarse más: 
de sufrir una injusticia o de cometerla?’ ¿Quién sale más perjudicado, el que es 
víctima de la injusticia o el que la comete? Esta pregunta es muy profunda. Si no 
acertamos a responderla correctamente, habrá que confesar la parcialidad de nues-
tro saber ético”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas 
Clásicos, op. cit., 82. 
12 “Plato assumes the topic in a great way, he says that clearly this is the origin of 
the sense of guilt. What does it mean to be responsible for an act? Notice, above 
all, that the sense of responsibility of one’s acts is found here: that the act is at-
tributed to the one who did it. From the point of view of the judge, there is an 
external judgment that imputes the act, but there is an internal trial, a trial in the 
ontological sense: one is to judge oneself, one punishes himself by becoming evil. 
Evil is not a vague term, to be evil is to be less, to be less real”. “Platón retoma el 
asunto hasta puntos enormes, dice que, claro y aquí surge el sentido de culpa. Fi-
jaos que todo el sentido de la responsabilidad de los actos está aquí: ¿qué quiere 
decir ser responsable de un acto? Que el acto se le achaca a uno. Desde el punto 
de vista del juez, hay un juicio externo que le imputa el acto, pero hay un juicio 
interno, un juicio en sentido ontológico: uno es juez de sí mismo, uno se castiga a 
sí mismo haciéndose malo. Malo no es una denominación vaga, malo es ser menos, 
desrealizarse”. Polo, L., “Socratic Ethics and Christian Moral”, Annex 1, op. cit., 
paragraph 25.  
13 “In these pages I have tried to show that no dimension of human action is alien to 
ethics. If this were not so, grace would not be able to reach and fully inform the 
conduct of men in this world”. “En estas páginas he procurado mostrar que ninguna 
dimensión del actuar humano es ajena a la ética. Si no fuera así, la gracia no alcan-
zaría a informar enteramente la conducta del hombre en este mundo”. Polo, L., 
Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 12.  
14 “Por lo pronto, a partir de la Biblia se averigua que hacerse mejor comporta pare-
cerse más a Dios, destacar el propio carácter de imagen divina”. Polo, L., 
Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 141. 
15 “However, by becoming wicked, man incurs in a lie about his being, and deserves 
the damning judgment of God, which says, as we read in the Gospel: ‘I do not 
know you’. This divine declaration is only possible if the man has violated the 
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so it is easier for men to have the right model, the moral pattern of 
decision, which basically is love, because God is love16. This is par-
tially natural theology as part of philosophy and theological 
knowledge inasmuch as it refers to Christ, but the lived theology in-
fluences philosophy, in the search for the truth that as reality, truth is 
one.  
In the Bible man finds also the relationship with the world 
around him, not only with the rest of the people, which is to rule it, as 
a good governor, which means to take care of it, to improve it, to bring 
it to full fruition, enjoying of its fruits as well, because man is the only 
creature willed by himself, not for any other purpose, due to his spir-
ituality. The world, the matter of which man is also part of it —by 
being made out of clay— was made good, so the task is to embellish 
it, to ornate it. Unfortunately using freedom badly, man is not being 
faithful to his image and mission and rather than ruling properly 
started killing others and destroying the world rather than embellishing 
it. All this is realated to morals and Polo gives account of it philosoph-
ically: “The doctrine of the Bible is consistent with the Socratic 
approach because from its very first book, Genesis17, where we read 
that in creating the universe God said that it is good, and that man is 
even better: he is very good. Also it states that man is made to domi-
nate the earth. Wherefore the relationship that man has with the 
universe is active, being that of the very good [man] with the good [the 
world]: this implies that the very good should improve the good”18. 
Because of this task man is “perfective”, he should perfect all he 
does, he is good but can make things better; this is his perfective task, 
and perfecting others and the world he perfects himself. This is why 
Polo likes to define man as the perfectible perfecter (‘perfeccionador 
perfectible’)19. Unfortunately, the first couple was induced to take 
morals to themselves and to declare what was good or evil by them-
selves. From there on ethics rather than be the progression from good 
to better, became a task of avoiding evil: “Perhaps the biggest mistake 
man has committed is to admit the knowledge of good and evil as his 
                                                 
divine image in his being”. “En cambio, al hacerse el hombre malvado, incurre en 
mentira respecto de su ser, y merece el juicio condenatorio de Dios, que declara, 
como se lee en el Evangelio: «no te conozco». Esta declaración divina sólo es po-
sible si el hombre ha vulnerado la imagen divina en su ser”. Ibid. 
16 “Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love”. 1 John 4:8, 
The Holy Bible: New International Version: NIV. N.p.: n.p., n.d. 
17 Cf. Génesis, 1:26; Ibid., 2:15. 
18 “La doctrina de la Biblia resulta compatible con el planteamiento socrático ya 
desde el primer libro, el Génesis, donde se lee que al crear el universo Dios declara 
que es bueno, y que el hombre lo es aún más: que es muy bueno. Igualmente se 
afirma que el hombre está hecho para dominar la tierra. De donde la relación que 
el hombre ha de guardar con el universo es activa, por ser la de lo muy bueno con 
lo bueno: comporta el mejoramiento de lo bueno por lo muy bueno”. Polo, L., 
Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 142. 
19 “The following practical definition of man: perfective perfectible”. “La siguiente 
definición práctica del hombre: el perfeccionador perfectible”. Polo, L., Ética: Ha-
cia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 181. 
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own20, a task which is not man’s but God’s. Man has not enough cog-
nitive endowment to declare what is good and what is bad. The 
characteristic of being perfective and perfectional is not compatible 
with the knowledge of good and evil, but with the knowledge of good 
and better”21. This decision distorted their vision of reality becoming 
more negative than positive, which is an inaccurate vision of the 
world. “Indeed, when man admits the idea of evil, which happens only 
because it seeks to seize the knowledge of good and evil, he appears 
primarily to accept the untruth thought that there is something wrong, 
which is false: because nothing God made is bad”22.  
This attitude distorted also the image one has of God which is at 
the base of many vital and subsequently philosophical errors: “Is typ-
ical of all Gnosis the idea that there is a creator god whose clumsiness, 
would be noticed in the existence of evil that has to be remedied by a 
saviour god. Because had God created a being who can pervert radi-
cally himself then God the creator made a mistake. The redemption 
then becomes the correction of a divine error and only extrinsically, 
justification of man. This man will be even perverted in heaven, be-
cause God does not correct man’s sin, He simply hides it”23.  
This latest vision of ethics as taking the task of avoiding evil or 
more to rectify the morals inherited from religion has influenced most 
relevant modern philosophers as Polo refers in his works. Polo often 
quotes the testimony of a surprising witness, the one who takes the 
modern approach to its limits: “As noted by Nietzsche, the great bold-
ness of German idealism is to put evil in God”24. One of them, who 
                                                 
20 Cf. Génesis, 2: 9. 
21 “Quizá la equivocación más grande que se ha cometido es admitir como propia, 
del hombre, la ciencia del bien y del mal, que no compete al hombre sino sólo a 
Dios. El hombre no se basta para declarar desde su dotación cognoscitiva qué es 
lo bueno y qué es lo malo. El carácter suyo de ser perfectivo y perfectible no es 
compatible con la ciencia del bien y del mal, sino con la ciencia del bien y de lo 
mejor”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 146. 
22 “En efecto, cuando el hombre admite la idea de mal, lo que sólo sobreviene porque 
pretende apoderarse de la ciencia del bien y del mal, en él aparece ante todo la 
mentira de estimar que existe algo malo, lo cual es falso: nada de lo que Dios ha 
hecho es malo”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 146. 
23 “Es propia de toda gnosis la idea de que existe un dios creador cuya torpeza, que 
se notaría en la existencia del mal, ha de ser remediada por un dios salvador. Por-
que si Dios ha creado un ser que se puede pervertir radicalmente, Dios creador se 
ha equivocado. La redención sería entonces la subsanación de un error divino y, 
sólo extrínsecamente, la justificación del hombre. Éste sigue, incluso en el cielo, 
siendo pecador, pues Dios no elimina el pecado humano, sino que se limita a ocul-
tarlo”. Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 146. 
24 “Según apunta Nietzsche, la gran osadía del idealismo alemán es poner el mal en 
Dios”. Polo, L., “Socratic Ethics and Christian Moral” Unpublished manuscripto 
as translated in Appendix 1, op.cit. paragraph 34.  
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shares somehow Polo’s vision of God as origin, and man’s sin as re-
jecting and subsequently looking for its replica is Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
though there is no reference to him in any of Polo’s works25.  
After this quick vision on Polo’s view on the evolution of morals 
up to our days, we can deal on how he believes ethics should be. 
 
4. Ethics as the science of moral life 
We said that Polo uses indifferently the terms ethics and moral 
to refer both to the moral actions and to its study as science, though he 
is aware of their difference26. In this section we want to see how he 
considers ethics as a science, and more specifically its method and 
theme.  
The metaphors regarding the duty of self-betterment are numer-
ous along history, from agricultural, (developing one farm), academic 
(writing the book of life), architectural (building one’s house), naval 
(taking the boat to the adequate port, or swimming to shore). There are 
also numerous quotations from notable authors who indicate the per-
sonal effort needed to live ethically like Seneca ‘strong men who climb 
over their own shoulders’, Bonaventura, ‘nisi supra semetipsum as-
cendant’, Nietzsche, ‘now I see myself under me’27. Some even state 
that it is constitutive of ethics to demand serious sacrifices28.  
Polo agrees with this vision: “The seriousness of ethics is that 
man makes himself good or evil. Therefore, whatever improves man; 
that is ethical: what worsens man; that’s unethical”29.This quotation 
                                                 
25 The following passage can show the similarities we mentioned; “But man cannot 
be rid of his origin. Instead of knowing himself in the origin of God, he must now 
know himself as an origin. He interprets himself according to his possibilities, his 
possibilities of being good or evil, and he therefore conceives himself to be the 
origin of good and evil. Eritis sicut Deum. “The man is become as one of us, to 
know good and evil”, says God (Gen., III, 22). Originally man was made in the 
image of God, but now his likeness to God is a stolen one. As the image of God 
man draws his life entirely from his origin in God, but the man who has become 
like God has forgotten how he was at his origin and has made himself his own 
creator and judge”. Bonhoeffer, D., Ethics, (New York: 1st Touchstone ed, Simon 
& Schuster, 1995), 17. 
26 “Ethics comes from ‘ethos’ as moral comes from ‘mos’ (mos and ethos mean 
practically the same in Greek and Latin)”. “Etica viene de ethos, como moral de 
mos (mos y ethos significan prácticamente lo mismo en griego y en latín)”. Polo, 
L., “Los Sentimientos Humanos”, op.cit. 4. 
27 Marina, J. A., Etica para Náufragos, op. cit., 15. 
28 “It is an outstanding characteristic of morality that it demands substantial sacri-
fices”. Baier, K., The Moral Point of View (Pittsburg: Cornell University, 1958), 
1. 
29 “La seriedad de la ética reside en que el hombre se puede hacer bueno o malo. Por 
tanto, lo que mejora al hombre, eso es ético: lo que empeora al hombre, eso es 




expresses well both the importance of ethics for any human being as 
its inescapable link to anthropology. There is no ethics if there is no 
model of what one should be and this cannot be known unless one 
knows what it is to be human. The study of what is human corresponds 
to the highest forms of anthropology, an anthropology which is all in-
clusive and for Polo that is achived with his transcendental 
anthropology as already discussed. Without a proper anthropology one 
cannot do proper ethics. We have seen the epistemological status of 
transcendental anthropology; now we have to see ethics’ status. 
For Polo ethics has its own realm and therefore it should not be 
subjected to sciences below it. Because it deals with human perfection, 
it cannot be subordinated to sciences that limit their scope to what is 
empirical, formal or any other specialization: “To expose the relation-
ship between ethics and other sciences that deal with the human world, 
we must start from ethics itself, i.e. studying ethics simply as ethics. 
We must show what I just said: that ethics is not an addition to a human 
dynamism sufficiently established by other factors. Human dynamism 
cannot be considered strictly without proper regard to what is intrinsic 
to it. Therefore, the study of human action is to identify what is ethical 
in its start and its finish”30. 
Polo is aware that the reduction of the field of philosophy to the 
empirical cannot reach what is properly human and those who try to 
do it risk much, because it means to lose what is properly human, what 
is really important and worth living for: “The result of any human ac-
tion is something outside him, but also some inner change, i.e., a 
change in one’s nature, which is called virtue. The will as it gets in 
touch with the intelligence becomes capable of virtues. This is the clas-
sic approach. An empiricist can pose difficulties: how can one support 
a passive spiritual power, a spiritual capacity which is an unrestricted 
opening, but that alone is unable to be activated? If the intelligence is 
involved, then it acts; but if not, it remains quiet. It is previous, pre-
rational, and possibly un-used. It is an ontological thesis to say that it 
is possible that a person incapable of thinking can have his spirit open 
to happiness. What proof can we give? We cannot give empirical evi-
dence; but what is at play is the respect for the human being. The only 
evidence we have is that man is a rational being and acts as such; but 
what if it does not act in this way? How to know that his spirit is un-
reservedly open, that there is voluntas ut natura? If the question is still 
asked, it will be improper, because what is at stake is the respect for 
human beings. If we do not admit this, it will be indifferent to kill a 
                                                 
30 “Para exponer la relación de la ética con las otras ciencias que se ocupan del 
mundo humano, debemos arrancar de la ética misma, es decir, estudiar la ética 
simplemente como ética. Debemos mostrar lo que acabo de decir: que la ética no 
es un añadido a un dinamismo humano suficientemente constituido por otros fac-
tores. No cabe considerar con rigor el dinamismo humano sin atender a lo que le 
es intrínseco. Por eso, el estudio de la acción humana ha de detectar lo ético en su 
arranque y en su acabamiento”. Ibid., 23. 
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man when he does not fulfil his role or when he is no longer useful, as 
we do with animals”31.  
Not only empirical sciences but most sciences other than ethics, 
as part of philosophy, cannot have the last say of what is good or evil 
for men. Polo is clear about this: “Human behaviour can be studied in 
many ways: private, individual or organizational behaviour. The plu-
rality of sciences on these issues: psychology, sociology, etc. is not in 
vain. But none of them is all-embracing and teaches us all about the 
human action; only ethics is able to do so”32. Also “everything that 
man does has to do with ethics. There is no comprehensive study of 
human action if it is not done in moral terms”33. This does not mean 
that ethics deals on everything or that it is a finished science but the 
one that, as part of wisdom, is the guiding science, the one that orders 
human actions, and the other sciences, which are also human activities: 
“One cannot think that ethics is already completed –in actu signato–, 
as if we knew all about it, or as if it enjoyed a separate objective sta-
tus”34. As ordering all other sciences and regulating all human 
behaviour ethics is more wisdom than science. It is good to remember 
the difference between the lived ethics, that any human being does, 
from its study, which is proper to philosophy, but it is also good that 
the philosopher does not forget that ethics is primarily life, living wis-
dom: “The real science of action is ethics. In another sense, ethics is 
not science, but something more: it is a type of wisdom”35. 
                                                 
31 “Del actuar humano se sigue un resultado exterior, pero también un resultado in-
terior, es decir, una modificación de su propia naturaleza, a la que se llama virtud. 
La voluntad en cuanto toma contacto con la inteligencia se hace susceptible de 
virtudes. Este es el planteamiento clásico. Un empirista puede oponer dificultades: 
¿cómo admitir una potencia pasiva espiritual, una capacidad espiritual que es aper-
tura irrestricta, pero que ella sola es incapaz de pasar a actuar? Si la inteligencia 
interviene, sí actúa; pero si no, queda inédita. Es una apertura preracional, previa, 
eventualmente inédita. Que una persona incapaz de pensar tenga su espíritu abierto 
a la felicidad es una tesis ontológica. ¿Qué prueba se puede dar? Prueba empírica, 
ninguna; pero nos jugamos el respeto al ser humano. La única prueba que tenemos 
de que el hombre sea una persona racional es que actúe como tal; pero ¿y si no 
actúa? ¿Cómo saber que su espíritu está irrestrictamente abierto, que existe la vo-
luntas ut natura? Si la pregunta pide una verificación, es impertinente, porque lo 
que está en juego es el respeto al ser humano. Si no lo admitimos, sería indiferente 
matar a un hombre en cuanto no cumpla sus roles o deja de ser útil, como a un 
animal”. Ibid., 145. 
32 “Esto es claro. Hay muchas formas de estudiar la conducta humana; la conducta 
privada, individual, y la conducta en las organizaciones. No es ociosa la pluralidad 
de ciencias acerca de estos asuntos: psicología, sociología, etc. Pero ninguna de 
ellas es abarcante o nos lo enseña todo acerca del actuar humano; sólo la ética es 
capaz de lograrlo”. Ibid., 18. 
33 “Todo lo que el hombre hace tiene que ver con la ética. No cabe un estudio com-
pleto de la acción humana si no es en términos morales”. Ibid. 
34 “No hay que ver la ética in actu signato, como si ya supiéramos todo acerca de 
ella, o como si gozara de un estatuto objetivo separado”. Ibid., 23. 
35 “La verdadera ciencia de la acción es la ética. En otro sentido, la ética no es cien-
cia, sino algo más: una forma de sabiduría”. Ibid., 189. 
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Nevertheless, human acts are not studied in general terms be-
cause ethics’ specific angle of study is the goodness or evilness of 
these acts, and goodness and evilness is an intimate affair that requires 
knowing the intimacy of people. Scheler was also aware of this36. Polo 
quotes Aristotle as his source: “as Aristotle warns, morality is not 
learned in books, but through good men. You learn it in good men 
because moral reality is actually the good men and reality should be 
known where it is. Books are neither moral nor immoral… they are a 
few pieces of paper where there are some few expressions of experi-
ences which one can assimilate by empathy or insight. But the block, 
the reality in bulk of morality, is the human being”37.  
Because of this we should try to find out which actions make 
men good or bad by studying the behaviour of good people and, by 
doing this, find the specific method and object of morals: “How does 
man become good or bad? Through one’s actions; this is how the clas-
sics see it. That is important because the origin of morality is in the 
acts, and the acts are determined by their objects, therefore the moral 
object must be studied”38. 
The classics classified sciences using two types of objects: the 
material and the formal. The material considers the reality studied; the 
formal, is the angle or the aspect under which the material object is 
considered. Polo uses this distinction though he prefers to speak of 
method and theme; the method resembles the formal object, and the 
                                                 
36 “Clearly, therefore, Ethics as philosophical discipline can not ever, due to an es-
sential law, exhaust moral values; it has only to do with values and preferential 
connections that have general validity. But it has also to explicitly show and make 
understandable the undoubtable facts, this is, it can explain that there is an ethical 
knowledge by wisdom far beyond Ethics, without which the immediate ethical 
knowledge of the generally valid values (not to mention the scientic explanation 
of what is already known) is essentially incomplete. Ethics, therefore, cannot and 
should never replace the individual conscience”. “Es evidente que, por tanto, la 
Ética como disciplina filosófica no puede jamás, por ley esencial, agotar los valo-
res morales; únicamente tiene que ver con los valores y las conexiones de 
preferencia que poseen validez general. Mas tócale también mostrar expresamente 
y hacer comprensibles los hechos indudables, es decir, puede explicar que hay un 
conocimiento ético por sapiencia muy por encima de ella misma, sin el cual el 
conocimiento ético inmediato de los valores generalmente válidos (por no hablar 
de la exposición científica de lo ya conocido) es, por esencia, incompleto. La Ética, 
por consiguiente, no puede ni debe nunca sustituir a la conciencia moral del indi-
viduo”. Scheler, M., Etica, op. cit., 642. 
37 “Como advierte Aristóteles la moral no se aprende en los libros, sino en los hom-
bres buenos. Se aprende en los hombres buenos porque la realidad moral es el 
hombre bueno y la realidad se conoce ahí donde está. Los libros no son morales 
ni inmorales ni nada, son unos trozos de papel donde hay expresión de algunas 
experiencias y por empatía o comprensión lo puede uno asimilar. Pero el bloque, 
la realidad en bloque de la moral, está en el ser humano”. Polo, L., “Socratic Ethics 
and Christian Moral”, Unpublished manuscripto as translated in Appendix 1, op. 
cit., paragraph 1.  
38 “¿Cómo se hace bueno o se hace malo? A través de sus actos; así lo ven los clási-
cos. Por eso es importantísimo puesto que el origen de la moralidad está en los 
actos y como los actos se determinan por los objetos, pues hay que estudiar el 
objeto moral”. Polo, L., Appendix 1, op. cit., paragraph 4.  
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theme the material object. We discuss first ethics’ material object in 
the next section. 
a) Ethics´Material object. What ethics studies are human ac-
tions, not actions of man39. This is a traditional distinction found in 
classic ethics and moral manuals that indicates that only those actions 
that are free can be imputable to men and that therefore only those can 
be considered either good or evil. Free actions are the ones that con-
stitute the material object of ethics. One has to be aware that for Polo 
action means any act, that is, not only those that conclude in an exter-
nal transformation which classic Greeks called ‘poiesis’ and Latin 
translated as ‘agere’, but include also those that are purely internal 
which are called ‘praxis’ in Greek and ‘facere’ in Latin. Polo reminds 
of this distinction in his Lecciones de Ética: “The material object of 
ethics are human actions insofar as they are beyond what animals do. 
Ethics deals on our pragmatics. If we were not pragmatic we would 
not be ethical, but ethics cannot be confused with pragmatics (this is 
only its material object)”40. And as part of the material object whatever 
influences human free decisions can be included: “All this is important 
from the point of view of the material object. Since the will is not in-
dependent of history, culture and society, it is necessary to consider 
them”41.  
The object of ethics are the human acts; not any act but only 
those that are free, or as Polo likes to say, ethics is to study the human 
actions coming from a ‘free system’: “We must always bear in mind 
that man is extremely complex. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate 
ethics as a science of man, which in principle is philosophical. Ex-
pressed in aphorisms, then intuitively started by Socrates and 
organised systematically by Aristotle, ethics is the science which con-
siders man as a free system”42. Freedom is not a small thing, an 
attachment to man, but the root of his specific way of being which 
distinguishes him from all other animals, and because of this requires 
specific philosophical attention and a new anthropology: “Not that eth-
ics, again, considers everything in order to become a complete 
                                                 
39 “This serves to distinguish the human acts from man’s actions. Human acts are 
performed in response to an end, or not performed”. “Esto sirve para distinguir los 
actos humanos de los actos del hombre. Los actos humanos se realizan en atención 
al fin, o no se realizan”. Polo, L., Lecciones de Ética, op. cit., 32. 
40 “El objeto material de la ética son las acciones humanas en cuanto que el hombre 
las ejerce más allá de cómo lo hacen los animales. La ética versa sobre nuestra 
pragmática. Si no fuéramos pragmáticos no seríamos éticos, aunque la ética no se 
confunde con la pragmática (ésta es su objeto material)”. Ibid., 73. 
41 “Todo esto tiene importancia desde el punto de vista del objeto material. Puesto 
que la voluntad no se independiza de la historia, de la cultura y de la sociedad, es 
necesario considerarlo”. Ibid., 132. 
42 “Siempre se ha de tener en cuenta que el hombre es sumamente complejo. Por eso, 
es necesario formular la ética como una ciencia acerca del hombre, que en princi-
pio es filosófica. Expresada en aforismos, elaborada a partir de Sócrates de manera 
intuitiva, y de modo sistemático por Aristóteles, la ética es la ciencia que considera 
el hombre como sistema libre”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de 
los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 109. 
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anthropology. But its approach is consistent with a complete anthro-
pology, because it takes into account radical factors, even if it is 
indirectly; among others, freedom, which is the most important and 
most characteristic human dimension”43. And this is yet another rea-
son it cannot be replaced by any other science44. 
The consideration of freedom is then basic for ethics. One has to 
be able to understand it in depth to see when an action is done with 
full, partial or no freedom at all. By applying the triadic level structure 
of the man to freedom we can distinguish three levels of freedom, in 
Polo’s texts and in reality: physical, essential and transcendental free-
dom. Not distinguishing these levels brings confusions that mar human 
relationships. At the natural level physical freedom is easy to see, it is 
the lack of physical limitations to implement what a person may decide 
to do, for example this freedom is removed by chaining or locking 
people. These people can think and want whatever they feel like but 
they cannot exercise those desires that require physical movement. 
This level of freedom is attributed to animals and even to material 
things by analogy and this is why we speak of caged or free animals, 
of an attached or free standing statue, free or obstructed flow of water, 
for example. 
The essential level freedom is exclusive to human beings. This 
level of freedom has been traditionally recognised and associated to 
the will. Polo accepts this but defends that actual radical freedom does 
not belong to the will as its origin but to what is above it in the onto-
logical hierarchy, that it belongs to the personal level. For Leonardo 
Polo the will has freedom, but the will is not the root of freedom. Free-
dom is given to the will by the act of being by the radical, 
transcendental freedom. 
The proper freedom, root of the other two freedoms, is personal 
transcendental freedom, which means that one does not have freedom, 
but that one is one´s freedom. Each person can say: ‘I am my freedom’. 
‘If you take it away at this level I cease to exist as a person. I become 
an animal or a stone, not a person’. At the lower levels, which are lev-
els of possession, I can say ‘I have freedom’ either at the natural or 
essential level, but not at the personal level; at the personal level I do 
not have freedom; I have to say, that ‘I am free’. Because of this no 
one can take it away it from me, nor give it to me, once I exist as a 
person. They may take away the other two freedoms, lock me or pre-
vent me from being in control of my mind and will by depriving me 
of information or drugging me, but they can never take away my rad-
ical freedom which is my being as a person.  
                                                 
43 “No es que la ética, insisto, lo considere todo, que sea una antropología completa. 
Pero su planteamiento es coherente con una antropología completa, porque, aun-
que sea de modo indirecto, tiene en cuenta los factores radicales; entre otros, la 
libertad, que es la dimensión más importante del ser humano y la más caracterís-
tica”. Ibid., 23. 
44 “Ethics is a knowledge about human action that can not be replaced by others”. 
“La ética es un saber acerca de la acción humana que no puede ser sustituido por 
otros”. Ibid., 189. 
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These remarks can help to understand this dense quotation in 
which the three levels of freedom are stated: “The sensitive faculties 
are not free, but neither are the passive potencies; habits are the means 
by which freedom comes to them. Freedom does not belong primarily 
to nature; it is a personal transcendental; from the person it gets 
through acquired habits, to passive potencies. And as a weaker partic-
ipation freedom reaches the sensitive appetites; fortitude, for example, 
is a habit of the irascible appetite (one can speak of a certain contact 
with bodily freedom)”45.  
There is much Polo has said about personal, essential and phys-
ical freedom but for this topic it is enough to know that only free 
actions are the material object of ethics. Now we have to see the formal 
object. 
b) Ethics’ formal object. For Polo all free human actions are ei-
ther ethical or unethical, since no action is beyond moral 
consideration, as already seen. What does ethics look for within these 
free actions? Or expressing it differently, what makes an action good 
or evil? What makes a moral habit either a virtue or a vice? Polo first 
states that the action has to be free: “good and evil are strictly ethical 
notions that are only understood if one is free”46 and that what is 
looked in free actions is their goodness or evilness47. In Scholastic phi-
losophy the goodness or evilness of any specific action was 
determined by the three fountains of morality: the object, the intention 
and the circumstances. In principle all three had to be good for the 
action to be good, or more accurately it is enough for one of them to 
be evil to make that particular decision evil. But the question remains, 
what does make the object, intention and the circumstances good or 
evil? We are looking for the key of goodness, that is, the ultimate foun-
dation of ethics. 
Scholastic philosophy, as found in Aquinas, considers the crite-
ria as ordo ad finem or simply recta ratio48. It means that whatever 
                                                 
45 “Las facultades sensibles no son libres, pero tampoco lo son las potencialidades 
pasivas; los hábitos son la vía por la cual la libertad llega a ellas. La libertad no 
pertenece primariamente a la naturaleza, sino que es un trascendental personal; 
desde la persona se comunica, a través de los hábitos adquiridos, a las potencias 
pasivas. Y según una participación más débil llega a los apetitos sensibles; la for-
taleza, por ejemplo, es un hábito del apetito irascible (cabe hablar de de un cierto 
contacto de la libertad con lo corpóreo)”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. 
cit., 42. 
46 “Donde realmente aparece su original sentido es en la ética: bien y mal son nocio-
nes estrictamente éticas que sólo se captan si se es libre”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia 
una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 61. 
47 “Ethics’ formal object is the qualification of acts. Such decisions qualifying is on 
decisions domain, if it’s good, it ratifies it, and if bad, it rectifies it”. “El objeto 
formal de la ética es la cualificación de los actos. Tal cualificación respecto a de-
cidir es justamente un dominio sobre la decisión que, si es buena, la ratifica, y, si 
es mala, la rectifica”. Polo, L., Lecciones de Ética, op. cit., 108. 
48 “Man’s good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is 
twofold, [...] viz. human reason and Divine Law”, Summa Theologiae, op. cit., I-
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leads to the final end, and therefore leads to human perfection, is good; 
what separates one from the final end, is bad and makes one imper-
fect49. There is a consequence of this approach in a normative way, 
which is the coincidence of norms between the eternal law and the 
natural law as reflection of the eternal law. This interpretation, if taken 
on its own, without reference to the personal call of each individual 
person, tends to foster the understanding of ethics in naturalistic terms, 
as expressed by Sousa-Lara: “In other words, the rule of the morality 
of a human act is its agreement or not with the eternal law, that law 
which, as we have seen, is participated in by man through the light of 
natural reason. In fact, according to Aquinas ‘there are two rules of the 
human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human rea-
son; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God’s 
reason, so to speak, (Regula autem voluntatis humanae est duplex, una 
propinqua et homogenea, scilicet ipsa humana ratio; alia vero est 
prima regula, scilicet lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei. Summa 
theologiae, I-II, q. 71, a. 6, c.)’”50. Ethics is a matter of agreement 
between my decision and a universal and impersonal code, already de-
creed, and that is the recta ratio, understanding the convergence of 
one’s behaviour with the eternal natural law. 
This is why some authors refer to conscience as the ‘moral com-
pass’; the instrument that gives the right direction to actions. The 
degree of goodness or evilness will depend on the degree of closeness 
or separation from the final end; it is not the same a gentle deviation 
that can easily be corrected, as running in the opposite direction. Nat-
urally, these are physical similes to a spiritual reality which will never 
be totally adequate. This image is not bad by itself, what is not that 
accurate is the uniformity of the rule to be followed, as we mentioned 
above. 
Polo shares this traditional vision with several caveats, and states 
that morality, in fact, is to choose the means towards the final end. 
This clearly states that the final end is the key to ethics. Its proper de-
termination will be the key to moral success, to human perfection. 
“Well, these acts are performed because they are means required to be 
proportionate to practical reason. These acts can be good or evil: 
aligned to the end or mistaken. In fact, the distinction between good 
and evil is only proper of the acts that are means. A bad mean does not 
lead to the end; this middle act is evilness. If the act is exercised, the 
moral error occurs. This error also occurs if one ignores the connection 
of this act with the end, because that act which is a means is taken as 
end; and then the action stops in it. Therefore, ethics has to do with the 
will, i.e. with the tendency provided by the intelligence, which is able 
                                                 
II, q. 63, a. 2, c.: “oportet quod bonum hominis secundum aliquam regulam con-
sideretur. Quae quidem est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio humana, et 
lex divina”. Translation from Sousa Lara, D., “The Ordo Rationis and the Moral 
Species”, Josephinum Journal of Theology, 17/1 (2010) p. 81. 
49 Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, op. cit., lib. 3, cap. 128, n. 2. 
50 Sousa Lara, D., A Especificação Moral dos Actos Humanos segundo São Tomás 
de Aquino, (Rome: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce, 2008), 433. 
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to capture the formality of medium and can decide the choice of a me-
dium, which requires that the mean is highlighted as such”51. 
So the most important question for ethics is to find and establish 
the final end, and only then can one establish whether or not each ac-
tion is aligned to that specific end. Since Aristotle there is something 
that is universally agreed and that is, everyone strives to be happy52. 
This was subsequently taken by most authors and particularly by Aqui-
nas: “For Aquinas, the human spirit is made in such a way that it can 
only tend to happiness, but it can only do it effectively through reason 
that will give information on what makes one happy, and the will will 
seek it… From the beginning, our spirit is directed to happiness before 
we know it. This is not an epistemological thesis but an ontological 
thesis: the will does not know what happiness is”53. 
The proper final end will not be found, or will be distorted if 
there is no radical decision to do good, to seek the good for which one 
has been created. That internal disposition is well expressed by Trigo 
in this text, but rather than the decision belonging to the will it is at the 
superior level of the person, where this radical distinction belongs to: 
“The good disposition of the will is needed to ‘know’ and recognise 
the moral truth. ‘The will is no indifferent to the judgment of the in-
telligence. On the contrary, it is the will who directs the gaze of 
intelligence to see what it likes. If the will is firmly adhered to the 
good; if it is the will of a righteous person, with a clean heart, truly 
free, he will lead the intelligence to the consideration of truth. There 
is no truth if there is not love for it; one does not know the truth if one 
does not want to find it”54.  
                                                 
51 “Pues bien, esos actos que son realizados en cuanto que son medios exigen la 
proporción con la razón práctica. Esos actos pueden ser buenos y malos: ajustados 
al fin o equivocados respecto de él. En rigor, la distinción entre bueno y malo se 
da en los actos que son medios. El medio malo no enlaza con los actos referidos al 
fin; eso constituye la maldad del acto medio. Si se ejerce dicho acto, tiene lugar el 
error moral. También se da este error si se prescinde de la conexión de ese acto 
con el fin, porque ese acto que es medio se confunde con el fin, y el querer se 
detiene en él. Por tanto, la ética tiene que ver con la voluntad, es decir, con la 
tendencia proporcionada con la inteligencia, que es capaz de captar la formalidad 
de medio y puede decidir la elección de un medio, lo cual requiere que el medio se 
destaque como tal”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 29. 
52 “Man is capable of being happy: we all know it, simply by the desire for happiness, 
which is inborn in us”. “El hombre es capaz de ser feliz: todos lo sabemos, sim-
plemente por la aspiración a la felicidad, que es innata en nosotros”. Etica IV In 
Aristotle’s words “that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of 
something else”. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097 a 30-34. 
53 “Para Tomás de Aquino, el espíritu humano está hecho de tal manera que sólo 
puede tender a la felicidad, pero sólo lo hace efectivamente cuando toma contacto 
con la razón: la razón le dará información de lo que hace feliz, y a eso irá… Desde 
el inicio, nuestro espíritu es respectivo a la felicidad antes de saberlo. Esta no es 
una tesis gnoseológica, sino una tesis ontológica: la voluntad no sabe qué es la 
felicidad. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. 
cit., 134. 
54 “La buena disposición de la voluntad es necesaria para ‘conocer’ y ‘reco-nocer’ la 
verdad moral. ‘La voluntad no es ajena al juicio de la inteligencia’. Por el contrario, 
es ella la que dirige la mirada de la inteligencia hacia lo que le gusta ver. Si la 
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Aristotle also pointed out that the problem is to find out what 
happiness actually is, because different people understand happiness 
differently55. This issue then, requires clarification56. We have two dif-
ferent approaches; one subjective –how one feels about happiness– 
and another, objective –what is really what makes one perfect. The 
first one is normally called happiness, or ‘subjective happiness’, and 
the second more technically, ‘final end’ or ‘objective happiness’. Irre-
spective of whether the subjective coincides with the objective or not 
—and the best solution is that they coincide—, the desire for happiness 
is part of human nature and therefore it is impossible to go against it, 
which links it to synderesis, as we shall see later. “The act dealing with 
the ultimate end, i.e., to the happiness of man, does not entails uncer-
tainty and, therefore, this act is not free, but necessary”57. 
One thing is what ‘one thinks’ makes him happy, and quite an-
other ‘what really’ makes one happy. If this distortion did not happen 
all people would be happy, but life teaches us that this does not actu-
ally happen. In the next section we shall see how subjective happiness 
moves us to act, followed by discussion on objective happiness. 
 
5. Subjective happiness 
Subjective happiness can be approached from a psychological58 
point of view by finding the different feelings on happiness59, or a so-
ciological point of view and, for example, classify countries according 
to a happiness index60, or what makes people feel happier. Polo does 
                                                 
voluntad está firmemente adherida al bien, si es la voluntad de una persona recta, 
de corazón limpio, verdaderamente libre, dirigirá a la inteligencia hacia la consi-
deración de la verdad. No se encuentra la verdad si no se la ama; no se conoce la 
verdad si no se quiere conocerla”. Trigo, T., En Busca de una Ética Universal, op. 
cit., 129. 
55 Cfr. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095 b 20. 
56 A good introduction to the different conceptions of happiness can be found in 
Abbà, G., Felicidad, Vida Buena y Virtud, op. cit., 27.  
57 “El acto que mira al fin último, es decir, a la felicidad del hombre, no entraña 
indeterminación y, por eso, dicho acto no es libre, sino necesario”. Polo, L., La 
Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 16. 
58 For an introduction to Positive Psychology also called Psychology of Happiness a 
good resource is the Positive Psychology Centre of the University of Pensilvania; 
http://www.positivepsychology.org/ 
59 “The classics understand happiness as ‘the psychological situation corresponds to 
the possession of the desired good’. This good is desired over any other and is 
considered sufficient. It is therefore clear that the notion of happiness is equivalent 
to the preferred situation of equilibrium”. “Los clásicos entienden por felicidad ‘la 
situación psicológica que se corresponde con la posesión del bien deseado’. Ese 
bien se desea por encima de cualquier otro o se considera suficiente. Por tanto, es 
claro que la noción de felicidad equivale a la de situación de equilibrio preferido”. 
Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 111. 
60 There are different happy indexes; the HPI, Happy Planet Index available at: 
http://www.happyplanetindex.org/, the WHR, World Happiness Report done by 
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not refer to any of them, he has an ontological approach61, which is the 
one we shall follow, since it is the one that this dissertation is about 
and because neither psychology, nor sociology, nor other science can 
give the ultimate foundation of ethics, as we have already seen above. 
Subjective happiness can be understood either as what the per-
son thinks about what happiness is, or how he feels about it, which 
includes affections and sensations. Regarding the subjective feeling it 
helps to distinguish three types of feelings following the triadic struc-
ture of the man. At the natural level, the level of sensations, happiness 
can be the feeling of happiness which can be somehow similar to what 
a satisfied animal feels after eating, sleeping, drinking, etc. At the es-
sential level, happiness is the affection of achievement, when one 
understands something difficult, when one completes a difficult pro-
ject: getting a promotion, climbing a mountain, marrying, etc. Such 
achievements require the use of the intelligence and the will. Finally, 
at the personal level, happiness is more difficult to express because it 
is more intimate and it is a relationship with other people of our level 
and with God, and basically it involves personal love. With others, the 
personal positive relationships corresponded by friends, spouse, chil-
dren, and relatives. With God it is the personal relationship well 
described by such mystics as Theresa of Avila, St. John of the Cross, 
Maria Valtorta, and Gemma Galgani, among others. Leonardo Polo 
distinguishes sensations from affections62 and among these sometimes 
he speaks as notices being the sensation on moral issues63. 
Among moral affections, a singular one is regret or repentance. 
It is a fact that one makes moral errors, and commits evil acts, some-
times willingly and at other times without full knowledge. It is also a 
fact that, at times, we repent and would like to correct our actions and 
make up for past mistakes. All we try to do is to achieve happiness, 
but errors show that we can be mistaken on how to reach happiness. 
Polo is more radical, establishing that at the bottom of moral misdeeds 
there is a latent error regarding happiness. “Moral errors are due to 
                                                 
the United Nations; http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/Sachs%20Writ-
ing/2012/World%20Happiness%20Report.pdf. For an introduction to different 
measurements check http://www.theguardian.com/world/happiness-indices. 
61 "From the beginning, our spirit is bent to happiness before one knows it. This is 
not an epistemological thesis, but an ontological thesis”. “Desde el inicio, nuestro 
espíritu es respectivo a la felicidad antes de saberlo. Esta no es una tesis gnoseoló-
gica, sino una tesis ontológica”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de 
los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 135.  
62 “The affections can be called feelings of the spirit, and point to what transcends: 
wisdom to God; the habit of first principles to the being; synderesis, to the good”. 
“Los afectos se pueden denominar sentimientos del espíritu, y apuntan a lo que nos 
trasciende: la sabiduría, a Dios; el hábito de los primeros principios, al ser; la sin-
déresis, al bien”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 231. 
63 “To the intellectual experience must be added the moral experience, which I call 
knowledge by connaturality or to notice, to use a Thomist expression. It is the 
emotional affective notice of innate habits”. “A la experiencia intelectual debe aña-
dirse la experiencia moral, a la que llamo conocimiento por noticia o por 
connaturalidad, para emplear una expresión tomista. Es la noticia afectiva de los 
hábitos innatos”. Ibid., 227. 
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misunderstandings regarding happiness. Now this thesis is not pessi-
mistic; it is supported by an ontological-anthropological optimism: we 
are made for happiness”64. Polo remarks that this opinion is also Aqui-
nas’: “The big problem is that it is not known what happiness is. 
Thomas Aquinas says that happiness is the vaguest notion that exists, 
that if you take ‘frui’ as happiness there can be all kinds of errors and 
man then places happiness in inferior goods. A man can enjoy food 
and believe that in there lies happiness”65. “If knowledge presents 
something as good, the will is drawn towards it. However, this is in-
sufficient, because as the will is determined to happiness, the will 
never acts against felicity”66. 
It is easy to seek happiness in the wrong plases, because the 
knowledge we receive from the senses –feelings– is easily confused 
with the emotions given by the faculties’ acquired habits, which we 
can call, with Polo, ‘affections’67, and furthermore confused with the 
type of ‘notices’ given by the three innate habits. One needs a very 
refined moral life and a clear reason to be able to distinguish them with 
the precision of Polo after a life devoted to studying these anthropo-
logical topics. “Feelings are important, but they are only 
consequences. Happiness is in the acts. Happiness is not pleasure, but 
is accompanied by pleasure. Happiness is the end; it is the possession 
of the end, or being in it”68. Polo is pointing here to the difference 
between subjective and objective happiness. 
                                                 
64 Los errores morales son debidos a una equivocación en lo que respecta a la felici-
dad. Ahora bien, esta tesis no es pesimista, sino que es sostenida por un optimismo 
ontológico-antropológico: estamos hechos para la felicidad. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia 
una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 137. 
65 “El gran problema es ese, que no se sabe qué es la felicidad. La felicidad es la 
noción más vaga que existe y por eso dice Tomás de Aquino que si se toma el frui 
como la felicidad ahí cabe todo tipo de errores y el hombre pone la felicidad en 
bienes inferiores. Un hombre puede disfrutar de la comida y creer que ahí está la 
felicidad”. Polo, L., “Ética Socrática y Moral Cristiana”, op. cit., paragraph 53. 
66 Si el conocimiento presenta algo como bueno, la voluntad se mueve a ello en 
cuanto movida. Sin embargo, esto es insuficiente, porque como está determinada 
a la felicidad, la voluntad no actúa nunca en contra de la felicidad, Polo, L., Ética: 
Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 148. 
67 “Affections can be called feelings of the spirit, and point to what transcends us: 
wisdom to God; the habit of first principles to the being; synderesis, to the goods. 
It can also be said that connatural knowledge affections are also dual. First they 
report the existence of innate habits, secondly, they report the ontological limita-
tion accompanying such habits”. “Los afectos se pueden denominar sentimientos 
del espíritu, y apuntan a lo que nos trasciende: la sabiduría, a Dios; el hábito de los 
primeros principios, al ser; la sindéresis, al bien. Cabe decir también que los afec-
tos en que consiste el conocimiento por connaturalidad son duales. Por una parte, 
informan de la existencia de los hábitos innatos, y por otra, de la limitación onto-
lógica que acompaña a dichos hábitos”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de 
Dualidades, op. cit., 231. 
68 “Happiness is the implicit of the A axiom. Happiness belongs to the order of the 
acts, not the potency. The act is happiness. The feeling is a useful-aesthetic exten-
sion of the act. Therefore, important as it is for man, it is secondary”. “Los 
sentimientos son importantes, pero son sólo consecuencias. La felicidad está en los 
actos. La felicidad no es el placer, sino que va acompañada de placer. La felicidad 
es el fin; es la posesión del fin, o el estar en él: la felicidad es el implícito del 
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The error of the intelligence, for whatever cause, has not only 
the consequence of provoking bad acts but also of corrupting the will 
ontologically, through vices, which are not attachments to the will but 
the corruption, the diminishing of the will itself: “The confusion is 
possible because of the defective knowledge of happiness; if what in-
telligence presents as happiness polarizes the will, then an error about 
the ultimate goal takes place which affects the ontological root of the 
will”69. This means that the subjective idea one has made of happiness 
influences the way one feels about it, at least at the level of affections, 
and this because the human person is an organic unity and the upper 
levels in the ontological hierarchy have more influence in his behav-
iour than the lower ones, unless one renounces to behave as a person. 
When one queries what happiness consists of, one is trying to 
find what happiness actually is, distinguishing between the subjective 
and objective happiness. One starts the path to wisdom, to look inside 
oneself to find out objectively what happiness is in reality is and how 
to find it. This is what we discuss in the next section: objective happi-
ness. 
 
6. Objective happiness 
To be truly happy the subjective approach to happiness requires 
validation so that it coincides with objective happiness. A tendency, 
an inclination to happiness, is necessary (synderesis) but it cannot be 
left unspecified. This is why the practical reason needs to present to 
the will where the final end is and the ways to reach it70. It is an im-
portant task because if the end is wrongly placed the moral system will 
be distorted.  
Leonardo Polo places the finding of happiness in knowing the 
end, i.e. what is ones’ purpose in life. This requires not only freedom 
to decide to go towards it or not, but above all, knowledge which is to 
possess intellectually the end. The intelligence, the final end, freedom 
and happiness are inseparable in morals. Polo goes back to Aristotle 
as his immediate inspiration: “The happiness – eudaimonia– is one of 
the great Aristotelian ideas. Who is really happy? Among the animals 
                                                 
axioma A. La felicidad es del orden del acto, no de la potencia. El acto es la feli-
cidad. El sentimiento es un añadido, una ampliación estético-útil, del acto. Por eso, 
por importante que sea para el hombre, es secundario”. Polo, L., Curso de Teoría 
del Conocimiento I, op. cit., 277. 
69 “La confusión es posible por el defectuoso conocimiento de la felicidad; si lo que 
la inteligencia le presenta como felicitario polariza a la voluntad, se produce un 
error acerca del fin último que afecta a la raíz ontológica de la voluntad”. Polo, L., 
Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 137. 
70 “Though the human spirit can only tend to happiness, the power of the human 
spirit alone is not capable of tending to happiness without having an idea of it. It 
is a far-reaching thesis: that the native will is a transcendental relationship”. “La 
mera potencia del espíritu humano no es capaz de tender a la felicidad sin tener 
idea de ella, aunque no puede tender más que a eso. Es una tesis de mucho alcance: 
la voluntad nativa es una relación trascendental”. Ibid., 134. 
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only man is. A stone, an animal, cannot be happy. Who can it be? One 
in which the relationship with the final cause is clear to himself. Free-
dom is a need only for one who can be happy. And the reverse: only 
one who is able to be happy can appreciate freedom. Placing freedom 
in an ant is absurd because the ant does not know its purpose, it does 
not direct itself knowingly, or knowing that the end is for herself: the 
ant cannot be happy”71.  
So, to find out what true happiness is, is a question of finding 
out the end, the final end, what one’s purpose in life is. This is a task 
of the intelligence but an intelligence which is not the ultimate end, 
since it is at the service of happiness, as Leonardo Polo indicates in the 
following text in which the ontological tripartite hierarchy can be seen 
in its first two stages; the productive which requires the use of the nat-
ural level powers and the intellectual which is at the essential level. 
Later we shall see how happiness is not at any of these two levels but 
at the personal level where true happiness can be found, in a way that 
normally integrates the three levels harmonically in this life: “As 
holder, the man is not simple, one-sided but he is extremely rich, and 
his possessions are at various levels (not as independent layers because 
that would not be Aristotelian). There are upper and lower levels, but 
not isolated: they all have to be coordinated. The first form of coordi-
nation, proposed Aristotle, is that of means and ends: what is highest 
is the end, and what is less is medium. Immanent, or cognitive, pos-
session exceeds production, manual, etc., so production is at the 
service of the intellect. And if virtue is superior to immanent posses-
sion, then reason is at the service of happiness, of the ultimate 
activation of the human being in terms of eudaimonia”72.  
We use happiness in at least four different senses and we can 
assign an specific name to each: as satisfaction at the natural level, 
achievement at the essential level, fulfilment at the personal level in 
satisfactory relationships with other persons at our level, and bliss in 
our relationship with God at the personal level. This distinction is very 
helpful so as not to confuse them and expect bliss from a spouse, or 
                                                 
71 “La felicidad -eudaimonía- es una de las grandes ideas aristotélicas. ¿Quién es 
propiamente feliz? Entre los animales solamente el hombre. Una piedra, un animal, 
no pueden ser felices. ¿Quién puede serlo? Aquel en el que la relación con la causa 
final es clara para sí mismo. Ser libre sólo se justifica si uno puede ser feliz. Y al 
revés: sólo en aquel que es capaz de ser feliz tiene sentido la libertad. Poner libertad 
en una hormiga es absurdo porque la hormiga no conoce su fin, no se dirige a éste 
sabiendo que es poseído, o para ella misma: no puede ser feliz”. Polo, L., Intro-
ducción a la Filosofía, op. cit., 210.  
72 “Como poseedor, el hombre no es un ser simple, unilateral, sino sumamente rico, 
pues su tener está constituido por distintos niveles (no capas; entenderlo así no 
sería aristotélico). Hay niveles superiores e inferiores, aunque no aislados: todos 
ellos se han de coordinar. La primera forma de coordinación que propone Aristó-
teles es la de los medios y los fines: lo que es superior es fin, y lo que es inferior 
tiene carácter de medio. La posesión inmanente, o cognoscitiva, es superior a la 
tenencia productiva, manual, etc., de manera que ésta estará al servicio de aquélla. 
Y si la virtud es superior a la posesión inmanente, la razón está al servicio de la 
felicidad, de la última actualización del ser humano en términos de eudaimonía”. 
Ibid., 162.  
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fulfilment from a cat. These names and distinctions are based on 
Polo’s texts but never used by him as such; nevertheless they are very 
intuitive and probably helpful to understand Polo’s proposals73. We 
are going to see each type of happiness in the next sections. 
a) Natural level happiness. Objective human happiness cannot 
be only at the natural level, it cannot be mere satisfaction of material 
needs, or just sensitive pleasure. Material things, because they are ex-
ternal, can be lost and this gives us permanent fear74. They cannot be 
integrated in one’s being and therefore they do not make one better. 
“The good to attain can be seen as something external to the free sys-
tem that can be reached and, therefore, one may possess; but the first 
kind of possession, namely the corporeal possession, is not enough, 
because it is not immanent, and one cannot say that the good is reached 
and that one has achieved the final good if it does not saturate one’s 
capacity to understand”75. They do not satisfy our unending desire for 
more, which is the characteristic of our spirit, unlike animals, and ra-
ther than producing permanent satisfaction, which is one of the 
characteristics of happiness, they end up giving suffering and blocking 
higher affections: “Sensuality in the animal is almost always right; in 
man it is abnormal whenever the spiritual part aims to satisfy his great 
urges on the sensible. That mistake is a nett loss: instead of control, 
                                                 
73 For more details on this 4 levels of happiness check Branya, J., “Antropological 
Foundation of the Levels of Happiness: Spitzer, Maslow and Polo”, Miscelanea 
Poliana, 46, (2014).  
74 Cfr. “Thomas developed the matter with his habitual clarity and rigour. He states 
that complete happiness cannot be something that one has the possibility of losing 
(which is what happens to all the material goods). Complete happiness cannot in-
clude the fear of being unhappy because lossing the goods (whih is what happens 
with all material things)… Therefore, those who place happiness, in possessing 
material things, neither understand it nor achieve it. They condemn themselves to 
never be completely happy”. “Santo Tomás desarrolló el asunto con la lucidez y el 
rigor que le son propios. Afirma que si se trata de un bien que implique la posibi-
lidad de perderlo (que es lo que ocurre a todos los bienes materiales), no se puede 
decir que la felicidad sea completa, pues no cabe ser feliz albergando a la vez el 
temor de dejar de serlo por la pérdida del bien. La felicidad en la que pueda fallar 
el término de ella, es decir, el bien, no es entera; por tanto, aquellos que ponen la 
felicidad, o la hacen consistir en poseer cosas materiales, no la entienden ni la al-
canzan. Se condenan a no poder ser completamente felices”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia 
una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 111. 
75 “El bien se puede considerar como algo externo al sistema libre, que se puede 
alcanzar y, por tanto, que se puede poseer; pero si la posesión del bien es el primer 
tipo de tener, es decir, la posesión corpórea, no basta, porque no es inmanente, y 
no se puede decir que se alcanza y se tiene el bien si no satura la capacidad de 
entender”. Ibid. 
Level Happiness Achieved 
Natural Satisfaction 
Essential Achievement, Success 
Personal with other people Fulfillment 
Personal with God Bliss 
Table 11:  Four  Levels of  Happiness. 
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the soul ceases to direct and is carried away by the lower tendency. 
The incontinent destroys sensitivity and, basically, by seeking happi-
ness in sensuous pleasure what it finds is suffering”76. 
Not only are the external goods external, but its inordinate pur-
suing can detract from seeking and getting the higher inner goods: 
“The sensitive appetite goods are such immediate goals that one 
should be suspicious when they are exaggerated: if we abuse them, we 
lose other higher purposes which, because they require means, they 
take longer time to achieve, and are better, with total certainty likely 
to provide greater satisfaction than the purely sensual”77. 
The cause of the suffering brought on by placing happiness ex-
clusively at the natural level are the demands that the essential level 
faculties, intelligence and will, inordinately demand of it, pretending 
to obtain total happiness at a level that cannot be achieved in plenitude: 
“In the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that man abuses his sensuality because 
he has logos. In fact, the disordered pursuit of pleasure is due to the 
logos giving up control on sensuality. This happens when one searches 
–through sensuality– the satisfaction soul’s desires, which are infi-
nite”78. So satisfaction is not properly speaking the whole of human 
happiness, and to look for it exclusively at this level brings dissatis-
faction, boredom and anguish. Kierkegaard describes this well and 
Polo comments that most people live at this level79. 
This does not mean that we should not seek satisfaction. Satis-
faction is a physical need, but neither the only, nor the most, important 
feeling. It should be subordinated to the higher level pursuits which 
are needed for total human happiness. There are states of happiness 
that bring physical pain, so happiness cannot be confused with pleas-
ure. It does not mean that total happiness does not bring pleasure, but 
                                                 
76 “La sensualidad en el animal es casi siempre normal; en el hombre es anormal 
cuando la parte espiritual pretende satisfacer su gran anhelo en la parte sensible. 
Esa equivocación es una pérdida neta: en vez de controlar, el alma deja de dirigir 
y se deja arrastrar por el tender inferior. El incontinente destroza su sensibilidad y, 
en el fondo, al buscar la felicidad en el placer sensible encuentra el sufrimiento”. 
Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 109. 
77 “Los bienes del apetito sensible son fines tan inmediatos que hay que sospechar 
de su exageración: si abusamos de ellos, perdemos otros fines que, por exigir me-
dios, son más prolongados y, con toda seguridad, mejores, susceptibles de 
proporcionarnos una satisfacción mayor que la puramente sensual”. Ibid., 108. 
78 “Aristóteles dice en la Retórica que el hombre abusa de su sensualidad porque 
tiene logos. En rigor, la búsqueda desordenada del placer se debe a una renuncia 
del logos a controlar la concupiscencia. Ello acontece cuando se busca a través de 
la sensualidad la satisfacción de la capacidad de fin del alma, que es infinita”. Polo, 
L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, op. cit., 25. 
79 “Kierkegaard is clearly aware that pleasure does not allow stable satisfaction Kier-
kegaard adds that immediatism transpires distress… All that the aesthete says –in 
despair– is true, if taken the other way round”. “Kierkegaard es netamente cons-
ciente de que el placer no permite satisfacción estable… Kierkegaard añade que el 
inmediatismo trasluce la angustia. Todo lo que dice el esteta –desesperado– es 
exacto a condición de volver su sentido al revés”. Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pen-
sador de Dualidades, op. cit., 81. 
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it is a combination of sensations of different levels; the highest ones 
are what Polo calls affections, rather than sentiments. Each level of 
happiness has characteristics and exclusive feelings that are good to 
distinguish because, as we saw, even habits can be confused with feel-
ings: “The concupiscible appetite does not make us happy, because the 
pleasure and happiness are not exactly the same. However, happiness 
is accompanied by a pleasure that may be called affective”80. The next 
step is to see whether happiness is at the essential level. 
b) Happiness at the essential level. What about happiness being 
at the essential level? There is a natural tendency to the infinite: “The 
will, which is the human spiritual tendency, is not finalized by the spe-
cies, nor by the intellect, but by the full happiness that can only be 
achieved by the virtuous adherence to the real and highest good”81.  
The longing for happiness is felt mainly at this level, though its 
achievement, according to Leonardo Polo is not at this level. Polo goes 
back to Aquinas with whom he agrees: “For Aquinas, the human spirit 
is made in such a way that it can only tend to happiness, but only when 
it actually makes contact with reason: reason will give the information 
on what makes the will happy, and then the will seeks what reason 
presents. The will from its very root cannot ever go for anything but 
happiness”82. 
The characteristics of the perfect and final good for Polo are the 
classic ones: it has to be eternal, infinite, all powerful, all wise, etc.83 
to match the unlimited capacities of the intellect and will. Furthermore 
Polo says that there is an inbuilt knowledge, a type of habitual 
knowledge, that tells us about the orientation humans have towards 
happiness and how only something everlasting Supreme Being can 
quench it. He also points out that one’s reason can only present partial 
                                                 
80 “El apetito concupiscible no nos hace felices, pues el placer y la felicidad no son 
exactamente lo mismo. Sin embargo, la felicidad va acompañada de un placer que 
cabe llamar afectivo”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 108. 
81 “La tendencia espiritual humana, la voluntad –lo mismo sucede con el intelecto–, 
no está finalizada por la especie, sino por la felicidad plena, que sólo se puede 
conseguir por la adhesión virtuosa al bien verdadero y más alto”. Polo, L., Ética: 
Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 158. 
82 “Para Tomás de Aquino, el espíritu humano está hecho de tal manera que sólo 
puede tender a la felicidad, pero sólo lo hace efectivamente cuando toma contacto 
con la razón: la razón le dará información de lo que hace feliz, y a eso irá. Pero lo 
que no puede nunca la voluntad desde su raíz misma es ir a algo que no sea la 
felicidad”. Ibid., 134. 
83 “Of course, it is necessary that the good be eternal, that it will never fail or fade, 
that it is infinite, that meets all my spiritual aspirations or desires, and that there is 
nothing superior to it. If the property were not so, it would not satisfy entirely the 
spiritual tendency of man, which is potentially infinite”. “Desde luego, es preciso 
que el bien sea eterno, que no falle o se desvanezca, que sea infinito, que satisfaga 
todas mis aspiraciones o todos mis deseos espirituales, que no haya nada superior 
a él. Si el bien no fuera así, no podría satisfacer del todo a la tendencia espiritual 
del hombre, que es potencialmente infinita”. Ibid., 113. 
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goods due to its limitations –which is the need for the sensitive phan-
tasm– and without full certainty so the will is never satisfied following 
what the intelligence presents84.  
Polo recognises that God is the ultimate end of spiritual beings, 
and by this he means human beings: “in fact, the only thing that can 
provide happiness to spiritual potencies is God. But the will as nature, 
does not know this in such a way that adequate knowledge is extremely 
important for the will, i.e. improving the capacity of human think-
ing”85. As discussed before, this has, nevertheless, to be known and 
accepted by each person to become an intimate reality, so it is neces-
sary to have some understanding of its meaning, and this means some 
objectivation of the final end, and the way to reach it: “Therefore, the 
only thing that can make man completely happy is an imperishable, 
and therefore immaterial, good. The good must be infinite, spiritual 
and that is God. The only thing that can make man entirely happy is 
the possession of God, the joy of being with Him, because God is an 
incorruptible spiritual good, eternal and infinite; the only one who fills 
all the longings of the human heart. This psychological consideration 
of happiness is quite obvious, but we should not forget that man is a 
free system. This is the only way to correctly insert the strictly ethical 
notion of good alongside happiness”86. 
But the possession of the final end will be neither intellectual nor 
by virtues. Polo disagrees with the classics in that contemplation, as 
                                                 
84 “Though we may not know exactly what happiness is, we do know that our spir-
itual power is determined ad unum for happiness and that happiness can only be 
achieved if the good is infinite. The only thing that can make us happy is the infi-
nite good. So the natural tendency to happiness would be frustrated if there were 
none, or if intelligence found none, but finite goods. But in the stage where the will 
comes into contact with intelligence (voluntas ut ratio), the presentation of the 
good is always it is finite and therefore unsatisfactory to the will as infinite power. 
Therefore, whilst it is true that only wants what is known, the knowledge of good 
must grow”. “Aunque no sepamos exactamente qué es la felicidad, sí sabemos que 
nuestra potencia espiritual está determinada ad unum por la felicidad y que la feli-
cidad solamente se puede alcanzar si el bien es infinito. Lo único que nos puede 
hacer felices es el bien infinito. De manera que la tendencia natural a la felicidad 
quedaría frustrada si no hubiese, o la inteligencia no encontrara, más que bienes 
finitos. Pero en la fase en que la voluntad toma contacto con la inteligencia (vo-
luntas ut ratio), la presentación del bien es finita y, por tanto, insatisfactoria para 
la voluntad como potencia infinita. Por consiguiente, aunque es cierto que sólo se 
quiere lo que se conoce, el conocimiento del bien debe crecer”. Ibid., 137. 
85 “Lo único que puede proporcionar la felicidad a una potencia espiritual es Dios. 
Pero eso la voluntad como naturaleza no lo sabe. De manera que un conocimiento 
adecuado, es decir, el perfeccionamiento de la capacidad de pensar humana, es 
sumamente importante para la voluntad”. Ibid., 149. 
86 “Por consiguiente, lo único que al hombre puede hacerlo feliz es el bien impere-
cedero, y por tanto inmaterial. El bien tiene que ser infinito, espiritual, y eso es 
Dios: lo único que puede hacer enteramente feliz al hombre es la posesión de Dios, 
gozar de El, porque Dios es un bien espiritual incorruptible, eterno, y además infi-
nito, que colma todos los anhelos del corazón humano… Esta consideración 
psicológica de la felicidad, es bastante obvia, pero no conviene olvidar que el hom-
bre es un sistema libre. Sólo así se introduce correctamente con la felicidad una 
noción plenamente ética: la noción de bien”. Ibid., 111. 
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an act of the intellect, can be the highest human happiness, even if it 
is the contemplation of God. For him the object of happiness is not 
God as supreme good but God as a person. He takes from Augustine 
the term ordo amoris which is a personal way of resting on the person 
loved, even in the person of God. This is why he can say that: “fruition 
is the contemplation of the ordo amoris, and should not be called a 
possessive act, but the act of desiring the highest. This for two reasons: 
first, because as a voluntary act, it is intention of other; and the second 
reason is that human love has to be accepted by God; without that, the 
agreement would be void”87.  
An interesting feature of man’s capacity to decide on his final 
end, subjectively, is that one can always change it, while in this life. 
So the decision regarding the final end has to be supported continu-
ously, and this is done regularly in every action. It accompanies every 
decision since in every decision the alignment with the final end is 
judged and our conscience indicates whether is in line or not to the 
final end. Furthermore, conscious that its achievement is beyond time, 
it is in the future, as Polo likes to say; a future that never stops being a 
future, always future-able: “Therefore, it is impossible to fully 
achieve, at any given time, one’s life purpose to which the will is di-
rected. This equates to establish the eminence of the future in human 
biographical time: we live open to a future that never ends while we 
live, that is, to a future that continues to be: a future without de-futur-
ization. Relating to the end in a completely potential way implies that 
the end is totally in the future, or that life is entirely destine-able. 
Therefore, an empirical verification is not appropriate: the pure future 
is not empirical”88.  
We can conclude this section by saying that for Polo, the final 
end of human beings is the loving resting in God, a resting that is an 
ever-increasing love, which is at the personal level as root, and it will 
be everlasting, but that in this life is reached through the will moved 
by synderesis. How this is done will be discussed in the next section.  
c) Happiness at the personal level. The consideration of happi-
ness at the essential level reaches to a happiness that is the quietness 
of having, a possession that can only be intellectual. The intellect can 
possess the good intentionally without any transformation of the good 
                                                 
87 “La fruición es la contemplación del ‘ordo amoris’, no debe decirse que sea un 
acto posesivo, sino el acto de desear más alto. Y ello por dos razones: primera, 
porque como acto voluntario, su intención es de otro; y la segunda razón es que el 
amor humano ha de ser aceptado por Dios, de manera que sin esa aceptación se 
anularía”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos II, op. cit., 25. 
88 “Por consiguiente, es imposible alcanzar plenamente el fin al que se abre la vo-
luntad en algún momento de la vida. Esto equivale a sentar la eminencia del futuro 
en el tiempo biográfico humano: vivimos abiertos a un futuro que no acaba nunca 
mientras vivimos, es decir, a un futuro que no deja de serlo: a un futuro no desfu-
turizable. Relacionarse con el fin de manera enteramente potencial, comporta que 
el fin está totalmente en el futuro, o que la vida es enteramente destinable. Por eso, 
la verificación empírica no es procedente: el futuro puro no es empírico”. Polo, L., 
Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 145. 
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possessed. This cannot be done by the will because it is intention of 
other; its object is on the outside. So happiness, both for Aristotle89 
and Aquinas90, consists in contemplation of God. The final end of hu-
mans will satisfy the most elevated potency which is the intellect.  
Polo, noting that the final end will quieten these potencies, nev-
ertheless considers that the proper, higher happiness cannot be at the 
essential level. God cannot be just a good.91 A person cannot be satis-
fied with a relationship with another person just as a good that just 
satisfies one’s needs. There should be a personal relationship. Polo ba-
sically says that Aristotle’s and Aquina’s theories of happiness, even 
if they are not wrong, they fall short and therefore should be comple-
mented; that there is something better than the good, which is the 
person: “The one who discovers he is a person knows that he either 
                                                 
89 “Contemplation moves man out of history, and even from the polis, because it is 
not a topic of practical philosophy. The connection freedom-necessity is teleolog-
ical (from telos). The end of the polis is the good life, virtuous life, ie, a kind of 
happiness which is less than contemplation. By contemplating man reaches au-
tarky, independence and therefore a higher situation than being member of the 
polis (autárkeia is more than enkrateia or moral adequacy) … Summing up, for 
Aristotle happiness is the contemplation of the divine”. “La contemplación saca al 
hombre de la historia, e incluso de la polis, porque no es asunto de la filosofía 
práctica. La conexión libertad-necesidad es teleológica. El fin de la polis es la vida 
buena, virtuosa, es decir, un cierto tipo de felicidad inferior a la contemplación. Al 
contemplar, el hombre alcanza la autarquía, la independencia y, por tanto, una si-
tuación superior a la de miembro de la polis (la autárkeia es más que la enkráteia 
o suficiencia moral)… En suma, Aristóteles cifra la felicidad en la contemplación 
de lo divino”. Polo, L., Introducción a la filosofía, op. cit., 212. This is clearly 
stated by Aristotle: “What choice, then, or possession of the natural goods— 
whether bodily goods, wealth, friends, or other things—will most produce the con-
templation of God, that choice or possession is best; this is the noblest standard, 
but any that through deficiency or excess hinders one from the contemplation and 
service of God is bad; this a man possesses in his soul, and this is the best standard 
for the soul –to perceive the irrational part of the soul, as such, as little as possible”. 
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, VII, 1249 b 24-1249 b 25, in The complete Works of 
Aristotle, op. cit., 75. 
90 “According to Thomas Aquinas happiness resides mainly in wisdom (cfr. In Et-
ichorum, l. X, c. 10 n. 17). This implies that wisdom directs human life not only 
by human rules, but also according to divine reasons. (cfr. Summa Theologiae, II-
II, q. 19, a. 7, c.)”. “Según Tomás de Aquino en la sabiduría se encuentra máxima-
mente la felicidad (cfr. In Etichorum. l. X, c. 10 n. 17). Ello implica que la sabiduría 
dirige la vida humana no sólo según las reglas humanas, sino también según las 
razones divinas (cfr. Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 19, a. 7, c.)”. Polo, L., An-
tropología Trascendental I, op. cit., 149. 
91 Other authors reach to a personal God through the will, as for example: “Then 
where can come the absolute value from the bottom of our soul –if we are sincere- 
we give to first moral principles? If the one who gives the command is to be a 
person who has a will –because commanding is an act of will– the ultimate foun-
dation of those commands –in this case, the moral duties– is the will of God, but a 
loving will”. “Entonces este valor absoluto que en el fondo de nuestra alma –si 
somos sinceros, reconocemos a los primeros principios morales, ¿de dónde pueden 
venir? Si el imperante ha de ser una persona de voluntad –porque el imperio es un 
acto de voluntad– el último fundamento de lo imperado –en este caso, los deberes 
morales- es la voluntad de Dios. Pero una voluntad amorosa”. Millán-Puelles, A., 
Ética y Realismo, op. cit., 68. 
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realizes himself personaliter with respect to someone else, or he be-
comes either pure calamity, or something he has himself to bear with. 
But this should not be like this. So the classical notion of happiness is 
insufficient. Indeed, man is not called to a happiness which consists 
just on attainment of the infinite good. In addition, this happiness is 
not assured, because man can fail and therefore one may fear not to be 
able to reach it. Humans cannot be happy simply with the good. That 
would be a kind of absolute hedonism”92. 
We mentioned that happiness at the personal level is dual, 
though this is an addition to what Polo suggests. He did not speak of 
the four levels of happiness as we are doing. The first is the happiness 
that comes from the relationship with other persons which we called 
fulfilment, and the second is bliss which is the happiness that comes 
from the intimate personal relationship with God. Here we are only 
interested in discussing bliss, since it is clear that another human per-
son cannot give others total happiness which they themselves do not 
have93.  
While the quotation is a lengthy one, it is better we do not 
shorten it because it expresses clearly what is the final good and indi-
cates the double condition to achieve it: one related to each the person, 
and the other to God. It also gives the characteristics of infinitude and 
eternity that human spiritual potencies require: “Virtue is a condition 
for happiness, which consists of the possession of the final end, the 
culmination of life. If at the end life is separated from its end, life has 
failed. To possess the final end is necessary: 1st that the end does not 
abandon one. This means that it should not be fickle. It should be per-
fect and that cannot be lost as end. In order to be entirely perfect it has 
to be entirely faithful. Because the means cannot provide happiness, 
because they are particular ends, temporal, and as such do not accom-
pany one for ever. Perfect good does not only mean the sum of all 
goods, but also that it never fails. The Final Good has to give full se-
curity, an intrinsic strength, so that it cannot ever expire. 2nd on the 
part of the faculty, also total strength is required, because if one’s sup-
port is not always there, one would withdraw from the Final Good 
once possessed (in this case one could not be happy either). Happiness 
is synthesis of two loyalties: God’s and man’s. Virtue is the ultimate 
potency when there is no desire, but possession, because adhesion is 
the strength of the potency. How to enter heaven without virtues? ‘If 
you’re not faithful in little you will not be faithful in much’. Virtue is 
                                                 
92 “El que descubre que es persona sabe que, o se realiza ‘personaliter’ respecto de 
otra persona, o es la desgracia pura, o tal vez su persona es una cosa que soporta. 
Pero eso no puede ser. Por eso la noción clásica de felicidad es insuficiente. En 
efecto, el hombre no está llamado a la felicidad si por ésta se entiende la consecu-
ción del bien infinito. Además, esa felicidad no está asegurada, porque el hombre 
puede fallar y, en consecuencia, puede temer no alcanzarla. El hombre no puede 
ser feliz meramente con el bien. Eso sería una especie de hedonismo absoluto”. 
Polo, L., Epistemología, Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 282. 
93 Fulfilment is mainly achieved through the different types of friendship. For this 
Polo’s article on friendship can be a good introduction. Polo, L., “La Amistad en 
Aristóteles”, op. cit. 
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the highest of the potencies. If the potency is not strong, there is no 
virtue. One has to be as solid to the Final Good as the Final Good is to 
you”94. 
To know whether one is on the path towards subjective or ob-
jective happiness is different at each level. At the natural level, when 
one is satisfied, at the essential level when one is successful, one has 
attained the goals ear-marked; at the personal level it depends a lot on 
the acceptance of others, of the significative ones, and at the personal 
level relationship with God depends a lot on one´s religious convic-
tions and the action of God in one´s soul. Chalmeta gives three hints 
on how to disitinguish the path to true happiness95 which refer mostly 
to the awareness one has at the personal level. 
d) How does one relate to God at the personal level? That God 
is the final end, is a topic that can be reached at the essential level 
through metaphysics. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle reached the 
knowledge of God’s existence. Aquinas summarised the ways of prob-
ing the existence of God in his Summa Theologiae. At the 
metaphysical level God is not found as a person, but as a cause not 
caused, an immobile mover, greatest good, great ordered, ultimate 
beauty, but He has not reached as a person. One can reach Him as a 
person through the notice of the agent intellect which is at the personal 
level. Then He is known as a person and one relates to Him with the 
personal transcendentals, and more specifically with the highest one, 
personal love, something that mystics had intuition of96. This is im-
portant to our topic because in Polo’s view, even if not specifically 
                                                 
94 “La virtud es una condición de la felicidad, que radica en la posesión del fin, la 
culminación de la vida. Si al final la vida está apartada de ese fin, la vida fracasa. 
Si lo posee es necesario: 1º. Que el fin no nos desasista, que no sea veleidoso, que 
no se nos dé y en algún momento pueda no darse. El fin debe ser lo perfecto que 
no puede perderse en cuanto fin. Para que el fin sea enteramente perfecto tiene que 
ser enteramente fiel. Por eso los medios no proporcionan felicidad, porque son 
fines particulares, caducos y no acompañan siempre. Bien perfecto no significa 
sólo suma de todos los bienes, sino que nunca falla. Por parte del Bien tiene que 
haber una seguridad, una fortaleza intrínseca, de modo que no pueda caducar. 2º. 
A su vez, por parte de la facultad, se exige una solidez entera, porque si mi adhe-
sión no fuera siempre fiel, podría desistir del Bien una vez poseído (tampoco en 
este caso podría ser felíz). La felicidad es síntesis de dos fidelidades: la fidelidad a 
Dios y la del hombre. La virtud es lo último en potencia cuando ya no hay tenden-
cia, sino adhesión, porque la adhesión es la firmeza de la potencia. ¿Cómo entrar 
en el cielo sin virtudes? ‘Si no se es fiel en lo poco tampoco se es fiel en lo mucho’. 
La virtud es lo último de la potencia. Si la potencia no es firme, no hay virtud. Se 
tiene que ser tan firme respecto del Bien como el Bien lo es de ti”. Polo, L., Lec-
ciones de Ética, op. cit., 168. 
95 “1. The human desire for true happiness as desire for infinitude; 2. True happiness 
to be found using the personalistic principle; 3. True happiness requires ascesis”. 
“1. El deseo humano de verdadera felicidad (beatitud) como deseo de infinito; 2. 
La felicidad verdadera (beatitud) como deber de actuar según el principio perso-
nalista. 3. La felicidad verdadera (beatitud) como ascética”. Chalmeta, G., Etica 
Especial: el Orden Ideal de la Vida Buena (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1996), 22. 
96 We have seen this approach in Bonaventure, Eckhart, Gerson and Marcel among 
others in Chapter 4. 
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indicated by him in this way, the personal love of God will be the key-
stone of ethics, the foundation of a personalist view of ethics97, what 
determines whether one’s personal actions are good or evil, this is, 
whether or not they are aligned with one’s personal Final End, if they 
please God as a loving person. This should be properly explained to 
avoid either assigning to Polo words and thoughts there is no proof he 
said, or that this proposal may be understood in a voluntarist way, as 
if morals depended entirely on a capricious decision of God and there-
fore that blind faith be a requirement for happiness, a theory that Polo 
clearly rejected. In his words it sounds like this: “With this we link up 
with the highest topic of ethics: love, which is the only human activity 
at the same level as contemplation... Ethics links virtue-good well with 
the final end, and the final end is love. Clinging to the good is happi-
ness, but not the fundamental key, because the culmination is what 
Augustine called ordo amoris”98. 
This love is not the love of the will, but personal love, the one 
who one is, because it is a personal transcendental committed in a per-
sonal relationship. At the personal level we can somehow say that ‘we 
are our love’. This is why the love that brings happiness is total love 
that includes our natural and essential level faculties, as Polo remarks: 
“God must be loved above all things and beyond that, with all one’s 
heart, with all one’s mind and with all one’s strength. It is also com-
manded to love one’s neighbour as oneself. Thus, love is superior to 
any act of the will, even if it is an act of the virtue of piety”99. Polo 
expresses the same idea more clearly in the following text: “The rela-
tionship loving-loved is metaphysical because the beloved is a good. 
But if behind the good there is no person, such a good is inferior to the 
person and then the classical notion of happiness falls short. Happiness 
                                                 
97 Scheler already distinguished general moral rules valid for all men and others tai-
lored to each person: cfr. ¨But, I pointed, man, inasmuch as he is for the person, is 
both an individual and unique, different from any other, and therefore his value is 
also an individual and unique value (…) According to this, in addition to the valid 
objective good and general good —and the content of duty resulting from that— 
also exists for each singular person (…) a good of individual validity, but no less 
objective and intuitive in principle, for which apprehension we resort to the "moral 
conscience" in the bare meaning of the term”. “Pero —indicaba yo— el hombre, 
en la misma medida en que es para persona, es a la vez un ser individual y único, 
distinto de cualquier otro, y, por consiguiente, su valor es también un valor indivi-
dual y único. (...) Conforme a esto, además del bien objetivo y generalmente válido 
—y además del contenido de deber resultante de aquél—, existe también para cada 
persona (…) un bien de validez individual, pero no menos objetivo e intuitivo en 
principio, para cuya aprehensión recurrimos a la "conciencia moral", en el sentido 
escueto de la expresión”. Scheler, M., Etica, op. cit., 658. 
98 “Con esto enlazamos con lo más alto de la ética: el amor, que es lo único en el 
hombre que está a la altura de la contemplación. … La ética vincula virtud-bien 
con el fin, y el fin es amar. Aferrarse al bien es la felicidad, pero no la clave básica, 
sino la culminación de lo que San Agustín llamaba ordo amoris”. Polo, L., Lec-
ciones de Ética, op. cit., 182. 
99 “A Dios hay que amarlo por encima de todas las cosas y, aparte de eso, con todo 
el corazón, con toda la mente y con todas las fuerzas. También se manda amar al 
prójimo como a uno mismo. De esa manera, el amor es superior a cualquier acto 
de querer, incluso si es un acto de la virtud de la piedad”. Polo, L., Epistemología, 
Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 154. 
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is to achieve the ultimate goal, the absolute good and if absolute good 
does not tell me my identity, who I am, then it is insufficient”100.  
We can summarise that now we know that Polo places human’s 
final end as the active love of God in a personal relationship with him. 
It will be good then to discuss what personal love means for Polo be-
fore we see how synderesis knows and directs all faculties towards this 
final end. From the topic of happiness, we climb to love, which is the 
top level of happiness.  
 
7. Personal love of God as final end 
When talking about love we can use the triadic structure to dis-
tinguish the different levels of human love as we have done with 
happiness, and repeat that though Polo did not express it as we are 
doing what we say is inspired by his texts as will be seen by the nu-
merous quotations. Naturally love and happiness are related in that 
love achieved at each level is happiness at that particular level. 
At the natural level we can speak of love of food, love of com-
fort, love of cars, love of exercise, etc., which can be also attributed to 
animals; we can say that cats love fish and dogs love meat, for exam-
ple. We can name this love just ‘desire’. At the essential level we can 
love mathematics, love the country, love money, love virtue; this is 
whatever can be achieved by the use of intelligence at will. We can 
call this second level of love interest, or interested love. One should 
not despise this type of love, because firstly, it does not prevent the 
highest love, but should accompany it because those who love other 
persons work for the best interest of the beloved. It is only bad if one 
remains at this level, because it will be selfish, even if the selfish in-
terest is shared by the people involved. Finally love at the personal 
level is what Polo calls donating love (or giving love), love from per-
son to person. This can be among human persons. It can also be the 
love between the human person and the person of God, and then it can 
be called adoration or worship. (Cfr. Table 12) There are some psy-
chological theories which speak of triadic love, such as those of Robert 
Sternberg101, Zick Rubin102, and John Lee103 that, in our opinion, can 
                                                 
100 “Relación amar-amado: eso es metafísico porque el amado es el bien. Pero si 
detrás del bien no está la persona, ese bien es inferior a la persona y la clásica 
noción de felicidad se queda corta. La felicidad es lograr el fin último, el bien 
absoluto, y el bien absoluto como tal no me dice quién soy, luego no basta”. Polo, 
L., “La Ética y las Virtudes del Empresario”, op. cit., 88.  
101 Cfr. Sternberg, R.J., “A Triangular Theory of Love”, Psychological Review, 93 
(1986) 119-135.  
102 Cfr. Zick, R., “Measurement of Romantic Love”, Journal of Personality and So-
cial Psychology. 16 (1970) 265-273. 
103 Cfr. Lee J.A., “Love styles”, in Barnes MH, Sternberg R.J., The Psychology of 
Love, New Haven, Conn, Yale University Press, 1988), 38–67. 
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find ontological support from Polo’s triadic structure of the man. Sim-
ilarly one can classify the theories of contemporary philosophers and 
say that for example Sartre and Marcuse understand love reductively 
at the first level, just as something passional; that Zubiri, Pieper, Von 
Hildebrand, understand it at the essential level either as an act of the 
will or a status and that like Polo some understand it as part of the 
personal most intimate being, the personal intimacy, above the intelli-







C.S. Lewis, who matches the Greek terms to a more contempo-
rary understanding of love with his intuitive theory of the four loves105, 
can also benefit from Polo’s proposal though they are different from 
Polo’s understanding of the Greek terms106. The interesting compari-
son between the different theories will divert us from the main topic 
which is to find out what is the ultimate criterion of morality, what 
decides what is good or evil, which is the purpose of this dissertation, 
so we shall have to leave it for further research. What is linked to our 
topic is to see how the personal love of God is the ultimate guide of 
morality according to Polo and how it links with his proposal regard-
ing synderesis. 
To give a brief explanation of the ontological foundation of Polo 
personal love and the implications this has on ethics, it is good to see 
how he distinguishes the Greek concept of love and personal love. The 
Greek, represented by Aristotle, his highest peak, understands the will 
as desire, as orexis, which can also be translated as want107. Wanting 
                                                 
104 Cfr. Sellés, J. F., “Love: Passion, Emotion, Frame of Mind? Review of Some 
Relevant Theses of XX Century”, Endoxa. Series Filosóficas, 32, (2013), 107-113.  
105 Cfr. Lewis, C. S., The Four Loves (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 
1960). 
106 “Christian love elevates and integrates the three Greek senses of love: eros, philia 
and agape. The first, for the Greeks, was the love of the superior; the second, the 
love of friendship, that is, the love between equals. Agape is the love of the lower”. 
“En el amor cristiano están unificados y elevados los tres sentidos griegos del 
amor: eros, filía y ágape. El primero, para los griegos, era el amor a lo superior; el 
segundo, el amor de amistad, es decir, el amor entre iguales. El ágape es el amor 
a lo inferior”. Polo, L., “Ética Socrática y Moral Cristiana”, op. cit., 570. 
107 “Neither for Aristotle, Plato, nor any Greek, the will is possessive: it is precisely 
not possessive, i.e. it is a tendency; it is even noteworthy that ‘voluntas’ which is 
Latin word does not have an equivalent in Greek. The closest equivalent in Gree 
is ‘orexis’ which means desire or, more graphically, ‘want’. Medical jargon uses 




Personal with other people Donating 
Personal with God Worship 
Table 12: Four Types of Love. 
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is imperfect and has an end. Once the end is achieved, the desire, the 
want, is satisfied. This interpretation of love limits it to the first two 
levels. It works well for the natural level –desire– and the essential 
level –interest– and for an ontology based on telos where the final end 
is the act that fulfils the potency that has given rise to the desire or the 
interest.  
For Polo the personal love is beyond orexis, it is not just essen-
tial because it is not nature but spiritual act of being and as such is 
always more, is an un-restricted capacity to grow: “Man as a self-giv-
ing being sets superior goals for himself than the mean-end or interest-
target. The meaning of the Greek telos fits the concept of nature. The 
person gives rise to activities beyond-telos, it is hypertelos”108. The 
same idea is repeated in different ways by Polo because he wants it to 
be properly understood. It can be seen that in this one he includes un-
der the general term of ‘desire’ what we call desire and interest types 
of love, and stresses the all-englobing nature of love, which includes 
desire and interest, because in a hierarchy the higher act always in-
cludes the acts under it: “The distinction between love and desire 
requires transcending the idea of finality. To put it briefly, the under-
standing that not only is man ‘hyper-formal’ but ‘hyper-telos’… True, 
the man wants (it is a fact of experience); true that the will is a desiring 
faculty in man; not in God, but in man. However, it is not true that man 
only desires”109.  
The source of the dignity of the will above the intelligence is its 
link with the person, and the person has a perfection that the Greek 
could not grasp: “The will is a much higher faculty than what the 
Greeks had dared to think. Love is an initiative, not a pure wake-up to 
                                                 
have; you do not desire what you already have. Therefore, strictly perfect opera-
tions, are the immanent intellectual operations; by no means can a tendency be 
perfect. Knowledge does not tend to be known, by no means is a tendency between 
thinking and what is thought, but if you think, you already have the thought; both 
are in strict simultaneity”. “Ni en Aristóteles, ni en Platón, ni en ningún griego, la 
voluntad es posesiva: es precisamente no posesiva, es decir, tendencial; incluso es 
de notar que la palabra voluntad, que viene del latín, no tiene equivalente griego. 
Lo que se corresponde con lo que nosotros llamamos voluntad es la palabra órexis, 
que significa deseo o, de una manera más gráfica, ‘gana’. La jerga médica utiliza 
la palabra anorexia: falta de deseo, falta de gana. Ahora bien, se tiende o se desea 
aquello que no se posee; no se tiende a lo que se posee. Por eso, la operación es-
trictamente perfecta, es decir, la operación inmanente intelectual, de ninguna 
manera es una tendencia. El conocimiento no tiende a lo conocido, de ninguna 
manera hay una tensión desiderativa entre el pensar y lo pensado, sino que si se 
piensa, ya se tiene lo pensado; ambos están en estricta simultaneidad”. Polo, L., La 
Esencia Humana, op. cit., 56. 
108 “El hombre como ser que da de sí se propone metas superiores a las que permite 
la relación medio-fin o tendencia-objetivo. El significado del télos griego se en-
cuadra en la naturaleza. La hiperteleología arranca de la persona”. Ibid., 63. 
109 “La distinción del amor con el deseo requiere trascender la idea de finalidad. Para 
decirlo rápidamente, la comprensión no solo ‘hiperformal’, sino ‘hiperteleológica’ 
del hombre… Cierto que el hombre desea (es un hecho de experiencia); cierto que 
la voluntad es una facultad deseante en el hombre; no en Dios, pero sí en el hombre. 




what is desirable, but has an intimate source. Love leads to discover 
the personal character of man”110. 
Polo explains that personal love is structured. He refers to it as 
‘estructura donal’ which can be translated in many ways. We choose 
to translate it as ‘donating structure’, which keeps both words and it is 
easy to refer to in the original Spanish text. This structure that is at the 
top level of the personal transcendentals hierarchy explains better than 
the others the singularity of each person and the other personal tran-
scendentals. It is triadic, and the first of its elements is curiously 
‘acceptance’, the second being ‘donation’ and the third one the ‘gift’ 
or what is donated.  
To place ‘acceptance’ as the first of the elements is counter-in-
tuitive but for Polo donating, which is ‘to give’ at the personal level, 
is not constituted until the donation is accepted. So, the acceptance is 
what really constitutes the donation, not the intention to donate: ac-
ceptance is what makes donation a real donation, something in act. In 
other words it does not become a donation until it is accepted. The gift 
is somehow constituted as a relationship between the two previous 
members, what is accepted and what is donated. Polo often quotes 
Aquinas when explaining this point, that there is no true love if it is 
not corresponded111. Unrequited love is not true love and should be 
killed112. 
For God the three elements are at the personal level but not for 
humans. This is because humans have not given themselves their being 
nor their essence; therefore they are neither in possession of their being 
nor of their essence and consequently they cannot give them away. 
They can give only what they have control over, which are the opera-
tions of their faculties, the will and the intelligence, and the body and 
sensitive faculties. At the essential level we are not in command of our 
essence, but of its growth. Only the Creator is the one who can change 
essences, because they intrinsically are associated to the act of being. 
“The donating structure in God is personal. In man only the first two 
members –accept and give– are personal. Instead, human love –the 
                                                 
110 “La voluntad es una facultad mucho más alta de lo que los griegos se habían 
atrevido a pensar. El amor es una iniciativa, no un puro despertarse ante lo desea-
ble, sino que tiene una fuente intima. El amor lleva a descubrir el carácter personal 
del hombre”. Ibid., 63. 
111 “Thomas Aquinas says that not reciprocated love is monstrous; therefore, abso-
lutely speaking, it does not exist”. “Tomás de Aquino dice que un amor no 
correspondido es monstruoso; por tanto, hablando en absoluto, no existe”. Cfr. 
Aquinas, Th., Summa Contra Gentiles, op. cit., l. III, cap. 151; Polo, L., Antropo-
logía Trascendental I, op. cit., 62. 
112 “The adjustment is guided by a Thomist text that says: ‘the main intention of a 
lover is to be corresponded in love by the beloved [...]; and if this correspondence 
does not take place, it would be necessary to destroy such love’”. “Dicha rectifica-
ción está guiada por un texto tomista que dice: ‘lo principal en la intención del 
amante es ser correspondido en el amor por el amado […]; y si esta corresponden-
cia no tuviera lugar, sería necesario destruir el amor’. Thomas Aquinas, Summa 




gift– is not personal, but essential. I repeat this observation because it 
helps to understand the real distinction between being and essence in 
anthropology, which is not rigid, since otherwise love will not be in-
tegrated into the donal structure”113. We understand that when Polo 
refers to love at the essential level he refers to the manifestations of 
the personal love that necessarily have to be through the intelligence, 
the will and the body114. 
Once we have seen the donating structure of personal love we 
can see how the ultimate end of humans, which is to relate personally 
with God, can be implemented according to Leonardo Polo. 
 
8. Personal Love to God as the ultimate end 
We take as premises that we already know the existence of God 
at the essential level, following the arguments of Aquinas and that, 
following Polo’s method of overcoming the mental boundary, we can 
relate to God at the personal level. We also give as explained that the 
ultimate end of man is to reach to him in a personal relationship and 
as the Origin of the world and of each person.  
For Polo the four personal transcendentals apply to all persons, 
that is, to all spiritual beings, and therefore, in a very distinct and sin-
gular way, to God. In the same way that we can apply analogically the 
intelligence and will to God we should be able to speak of love, per-
sonal knowledge, freedom and coexistence as belonging to God.  
In the same way that many theologians use existence, knowledge 
and love to help rationalise the intimate relationship of the three divine 
persons, Polo uses the donating structure. This is an interesting devel-
opment but we only bring it here to show how Polo distinguishes 
between theology and philosophy and the benefits his method as an 
instrument can bring. Our interest is to see how the donating structure, 
the three elements of personal love, affect the human being in his re-
lation to God. 
                                                 
113 “En Dios la estructura donal es personal. En el hombre son personales sus dos 
primeros miembros: dar y aceptar. En cambio, el amor humano no es personal, 
sino esencial. Repito esta observación porque contribuye a entender la distinción 
real de ser y esencia en antropología, la cual no es rígida, pues en ese caso el amor 
no se integraría en la estructura donal”. Polo, L., Antropología Trascendental II, 
op. cit., 173. 
114 “As mentioned when discussing the structure donal, loving –giving and accept-
ing- are personal transcendentals. Instead, in human love -the gift- is not 
transcendental but essential, and is equivalent to the constituent nature of the will-
ing, of the I-want”. “Como se ha dicho al hablar de la estructura donal, el amar –
el dar– y el aceptar son trascendentales personales. En cambio, el amor –el don– 
en el hombre no es trascendental sino esencial, y equivale al carácter constituyente 




The first one is acceptance. One should accept what he has re-
ceived. The first, is the act of being, the personal being is exclusive, 
unrepeatable, and the richest thing one has, without which all other 
perfections have no support. Acceptance includes also of all what the 
act of being brings with it, which is the body with its characteristics, 
sex, temperament, and associated features; even when the received 
characteristics are deficient, such as being born blind, crippled or with 
other limitations. Acceptance also that we had no control over our de-
velopment, which are, among many others, the place of birth, family 
set up, education received, historical situation, culture, etc. All these 
are gifts one has received. Some people receive more, others less, but 
as one Spanish dramatist, Calderón de la Barca, in his work The Great 
Theatre of the World115 expresses, life is a great theatre where each is 
given a different role to play, some as kings, noble people, and others 
as common citizens, or servants, but they will be judged by the way 
they act out their character, not the character assigned to them. The 
gifts received are not what counts, but how they are played. 
The second one is donation. Donation is what one gives back to 
God. As we quoted above, Polo explains that one can only donate what 
one has control over, and these are only the operations of the soul, the 
essential potencies, intelligence and will. But one only has control on 
‘the use’ of the potencies, not of the potencies themselves, which are 
received. He expresses it saying that ‘one can use but not dispose of 
them’116. The potencies are used by the person but they are not the 
principal actor, who is the person. The person has to make a decision 
to use them as a gift, to direct them towards the final end. There is a 
conscious decision, which precedes the use of the faculties of the in-
telligence and the will. Leonardo Polo calls this decision ‘to destine’ 
and this decision will permeate all ulterior decisions. This is, to have 
in mind that whatever one does, is directed to please the Person that 
has given one whatever one has received. And this destination cannot 
                                                 
115 Cfr. Calderón de la Barca, P., The Great Theatre of the World, John W. Parker & 
Son, London, 1856. 
116 “The word ‘dispose’ can be used in that double meaning when it comes to the 
human essence. The essence is to dispose about what is available, and to have what 
is available; Not only that, but there are modalities of disposing, because one does 
not dispose in blocks, but the way to dispose depends on the different types of 
availability. In the case of man it is evident that one can use the will, and also the 
body. The person can dispose of what he knows, and according to the way one 
disposes it can be seen how freedom penetrates the essence. The capacity to dis-
pose is to look at the essence from the point of view of personal freedom, because 
the person is free and his essence is to dispose”. “En ese doble sentido se puede 
emplear la palabra disponer cuando se trata de la esencia humana. La esencia es 
un disponer respecto de lo disponible, y es un disponer de lo disponible; no sola-
mente eso, sino que el disponer tiene modalidades, pues no se dispone en bloque, 
sino que se dispone según las modalidades de disponer que pueden ser varias. En 
el caso del hombre es evidente que se puede disponer con la voluntad, también con 
el cuerpo. La persona dispone de lo que conoce, pero según ese disponer se ve 
cómo la libertad pasa a la esencia. Disponer es la esencia vista desde la libertad de 
la persona, porque la persona es libre, su esencia es disponer”. Polo, L., La Esencia 
Humana, op. cit., 163. 
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just be another limited person, who cannot fulfil the desire of infini-
tude, of total perfection one has117. In his habitual concise way Polo 
expresses this as follows: “To destine leans on the recipient. To put it 
another way, taking stock of all that comes from the personal level, 
man finds that all that is not enough, one has to find a target that is not 
the end of desire, but of the act of offering”118. Not to destine properly 
would mean a radical bad decision that compromises one’s life, one’s 
perfection, one’s happiness119. Another issue is the intensity and acti-
vation of such destination alongside one’s life activities. 
The gift would be varied and will be all the specific activities 
conducted through one’s life, not only those directed specifically to 
God in acts of worship, but all activities, because the activities only 
have full meaning if they are related, somehow to accomplish one’s 
mission in life120, done freely, not only in the election of the direction 
of achieving what one thinks God’s wishes, but freely also in the way 
one chooses to accomplish it121. 
                                                 
117 A realistic description of the destination process can be found in Rodríguez Luño: 
“Las características específicas de la condición humana (corporalidad, temporali-
dad, etc.) hacen que la dirección de la totalidad de la vida no pueda ejercerse 
normalmente por media de opciones puramente espirituales (lo que se suele llamar 
«opción fundamental») Esa dirección existe, y está en nuestro poder, pero se ejerce 
normalmente mediante un complejo proceso de interacción recíproca entre refle-
xión y vida práctica, así como entre la persona y el ambiente social (leyes, 
costumbres, modelos, etc.) en el que tiene lugar la educación gradual de las ten-
dencias y la formación de hábitos morales que configuran la identidad personal. El 
ejercicio de la libertad personal sobre los principios primeros de la vida moral (y 
el fin último es el primer principio de la razón práctica) es extremamente complejo, 
y en él se pone de manifiesto de forma privilegiada la naturaleza social y cultural 
de la persona humana. En virtud de nuestra naturaleza social y cultural la reflexión 
ética acerca del fin último puede aspirar a ser un motivo desencadenante de la re-
flexión acerca del bien”. Rodríguez Luño, Á., Ética General, Pamplona: Eunsa, 
2010), 210. 
118 “La cuestión del destinar reside en el destinatario. Por decirlo de algún modo, al 
hacer el balance de todo lo que es desde la persona, el hombre se encuentra con 
que eso no le basta, sino que tiene que encontrar un término, que no es el término 
de deseo, sino el del ofrecimiento”. Polo, L., La Esencia Humana, op. cit., 61. 
119 “Not to accept being who one is, is extremely serious; wanting to be another is 
the product of desperation. Because each one is a gift due to a love of predilection. 
The human person is a radical novelty that is created directly by God”. “No aceptar 
ser quien se es, es sumamente grave; querer ser otro es producto de la desespera-
ción. Pues cada quién es un don debido al amor de predilección. La persona 
humana es una novedad radical porque es creada directamente por Dios”. Polo, L., 
Antropología Trascendental II, op. cit., 205. 
120 “We have to behave as who we are. Therein lies the justification of ethics. When 
asked why do I do this? One should answer: because if I don’t, I let God down. 
The love of predilection must be matched by deeds, and not in a cursory or lazy 
way”. “Tenemos que comportarnos como quienes somos. En ello reside la justifi-
cación de la ética. A la pregunta ¿por qué debo hacer esto? Se ha de responder así: 
porque si no lo hago defraudo a Dios. El amor de predilección debe ser correspon-
dido con obras, y no de forma leve o perezosa”. Ibid., 207. 
121 The idea of mission is related to the idea of life meaning, life purpose, which also 
has a deep psychiatric application, as proved by the Austrian Victor Frankl and his 
‘logotherapy’. Without developing this idea full of connotations lets’ quote two 
texts related to this: “Finalmente, todo hombre busca que su vida esté llena de 
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What does this have to do with our topic? That whatever is in 
line with God’s plan for each person is good for that particular person; 
whatever is against it is evil. So the same action could be meritorious 
for one person, for example getting married, and could be evil for other 
if one is called to celibacy, or renouncing to marry out of fear or self-
ishness when one’s call was for a married dedication. 
Love, personal love, looks for the good of the other, not for per-
sonal desires, so the one who is the recipient of love, is the one the 
lover looks at, listens to his or her wishes, learns them and tries, to the 
best of one’s abilities, to put them into practice. In the case of the final 
end, one has to listen to God, who being Love also wants the best for 
the one who loves Him. This makes the lover perfect, which in reli-
gious terms is called sanctity. Sanctity equates to personal perfection, 
which is personal love if fully developed. So this is part of the curva-
ture of the will, but now we can call it the curvature of love. The lover 
grows by loving, the more one loves actively, the more one grows as 
a person, the more one perfects oneself, the more one acquires more 
happiness. So happiness, love, grow by giving oneself to a person who 
corresponds to such offering. Only God can accept all we can offer, 
which is unlimited.  
What is the relationship between synderesis and this personal 
love? Polo expresses it in the following quotation: “Precisely because 
man can improve he can resemble God in holiness, but it is an analo-
gous holiness, not the pure holiness of God that is unique. The moral 
from synderesis is seen as an incentive to improve and act: that is your 
destiny, you have to destine yourself to be holy, you have to realize 
what is in you is a seed of holiness and that it is your ability to act 
because that capacity is to contribute. So instead of the categorical im-
perative, act, contribute! No longer is the will taken as the centre but 
the person, because the person can be described as being who contrib-
utes, who expands reality”122.  
                                                 
sentido. Pero descubrir un sentido para la propia vida, es tanto como descubrir ella 
una misión. Y la idea de misión remite facilmente a Alguien que envia a participar 
en ella”. García-Huidobro, J., “¿Dios en la Ética?”, in Ética sin Religión?: VI Sim-
posio Internacional: Fe Cristiana y Cultura Contemporánea, Instituto de 
Antropología y Ética, Universidad de Navarra (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad 
de Navarra, 2007), 131. “I had always felt life first as a story: and if there is a story 
there is a story-teller”. Chesterton, G.K., Orthodoxy, IV. Accessed 13th June 2015, 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/chesterton/orthodoxy.vii.html#vii-Page_6. 
122 “Justamente porque el hombre puede mejorar puede parecerse a Dios en la santi-
dad, pero es una santidad parecida, no la pura santidad que es exclusiva de Dios. 
La moral desde la sindéresis se ve como una incitación a mejorar y a actuar: ese es 
tu destino, tienes que destinarte a lo santo, tienes que darte cuenta de lo que hay en 
tí de semilla de santidad y eso es tu capacidad de actuar porque esa capacidad es 
aportativa. De manera que en vez del imperativo categórico, haz, aporta. Entonces 
ya no se toma como centro la voluntad sino la persona, porque la persona se puede 
describir como el ser que aporta, que incrementa la realidad”. Polo, L., “Ética 
Socrática y Moral Cristiana”, pro manuscrito, paragraph 43, Seville, July 1994. 
“En definitiva, de la sindéresis se desprende la indicación de que es deber humano 
desarrollar la imagen de Dios. De esta manera disminuyen los temores y las inhi-
biciones humanas. Para parecerse a Dios en santidad, el hombre tiene que mejorar. 
El destino del hombre es la santidad; es preciso darse cuenta de que en cada quién 
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Synderesis is therefore an impulse, which is the source of one’s 
desires to give, to contribute to the loved, and if the love is the personal 
relationship with God, that impulse makes one love all that God loves, 
in a hierarchical way, this is, following the order of perfection, other 
persons first, and all related to their needs.  
We are now in a position to answer the initial question of this 
dissertation, which we do in the next and final section. 
*** 
                                                 
hay una semilla de santidad que reside en su capacidad de actuar, es decir, de apor-
tar. Así pues, en vez de imperativo categórico, es conveniente hacer, aportar. De 
esta manera no se toma como centro la voluntad, sino el acto de ser personal. En 
este sentido la persona se puede describir como el ser aportante, que incrementa la 
realidad, porque de él depende que algo nuevo sea”. Polo, L., “Ética Socrática y 







Traditional manuals on ethics or morals are normally based on 
metaphysics, which leans on human nature. This is good and valid for 
an ethics done in the third person, valid for a generic human being1. 
While this is good and important, it is not sufficient for a personalist 
ethics that considers each person as someone different from anyone 
else, for a particular ‘who’, son or daughter of a particular mother and 
father, living in a particular historical situtation.  
The first objection that comes to mind is that science is of uni-
versals, not of particulars. One cannot do science of this particular 
stone, or this particular person. Nevertheless we can study the general 
rules of behaviour that require each people to face their destiny what-
ever that destiny specifically is. We are not specifying each destiny 
but we might be able to say that every person has the capacity and duty 
to seek and follow his own destiny, and this applies to all persons. 
These are general rules, that each has to apply to one’s particular life. 
We are in the realm of applied science, and one cannot ask more pre-
cision than applied or practical sciences can give, as Aristotle warned2; 
necessary events can give necessary sciences, contingent events, only 
contingent sciences, and free decisions can only give general rules or 
advice according to the circumstances and wishes of each person. 
The initial question “whether Polo’s proposal regarding syn-
deresis is accurate and whether it can be a good approach for a personal 
view of ethics” has to be answered in two subsections because it is 
actually double; whether Polo’s proposal for synderesis is adequate; 
and whether it can be a good approach for a personalist view of ethics. 
 
1st. Polo’s synderesis view is adequate 
We understand that Polo’s proposal of synderesis comprises all 
previous traditionally-accepted functions of synderesis plus new ones 
related to the triadic structure of the man, personal transcendentals and 
superior innate habits. It also explains better than previous theories the 
                                                 
1 The different approach needed for ethics and morals is highlighted by several 
authors, among them Bauman: “Desde un punto de vista ético, la moralidad es 
antes que el ser, aunque ontológicamente, no hay nada antes del ser, ya que tam-
bien ontológicamente, el ‘antes del ser’ es otro ser. La moralidad es ‘antes que el 
ser’ sólo en su propio sentido moral de ‘antes’; esto es, en el sentido de ser "mejor”. 
Bauman, Z., Ética Posmoderna, op. cit., 88. 




natural will and first act of the intellect. So it is adequate, though it has 
to be developed further to explain how the act of being influences the 
will in deciding or not on its initial agreement with God’s will through 
synderesis, and how education affects moral conscience. 
As we shall show briefly below, it is also very powerful in show-
ing how a complete ethics requires three elements, the goods, norms 
and virtues in a positive way, explaining the necessary interaction be-
tween them and by showing the insufficiency of ethics that are partial 
by considering either one or two of the elements with neglect of the 
others3. This is well explained in his book Ética: hacia una versión 
moderna de los temas clásicos4, the only one translated into English 
so far5.  
 
2nd. Synderesis as Foundation of Personalist ethics 
The second question requires first to know what we mean by a 
personalist ethics. 
A personalist-based ethics would be one that adequates the uni-
versal ethical principles and norms to the personal characteristics 
common to all persons. Which are those characteristics? The ones that 
refer to the common nature of the man, that is, the triadic structure of 
the man, and the distinction between the received and the added pow-
ers. 
From the point of the personal level they are: personal love, per-
sonal knowledge, transcendental freedom and coexistence. From the 
point of the essential level we have: synderesis, intelligence and will. 
From the point of view of the body they are: the internal and external 
senses and the body characteristics and needs. 
A personalist based ethics should first recognise and define 
properly what a person is. Ontologically the one proposed by Leo-
nardo Polo’s seems attractive. Transcendental anthropology, as a 
continuation of the findings of Aquinas regarding the distinction be-
tween the act of being and the essence looks promising. Leonardo Polo 
applies this distinction to the human being and places the final initia-
tive of free decisions at the highest personal level, which is the act of 
                                                 
3 “We said that ethics consists of virtues, goods and norms. These three di-dimen-
sions of ethics should not be considered decoupled. This dissociation involves 
unilateral, i.e. focusing ethics exclusively from the point of view of the virtues or 
norms or goods, leads to impovishering of each of the three”. “Decíamos que la 
ética consta de virtudes, bienes y normas. Estas tres dimensiones de la ética no 
deben considerarse disociadas. Dicha disociación lleva consigo unilateralidad, es 
decir, enfocar la ética exclusivamente desde el punto de vista de las virtudes o de 
las normas o de los bienes, lo que conlleva al empobrecimiento de todos ellos”. 
Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 169. 
4 Cfr. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit. 
5 Cfr. Polo, L., Ethics: a Modern Version of its Classic Themes, op. cit. 
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being6. He further develops four personal transcendentals that as such, 
apply to all spiritual creatures. In this he is original, though he takes 
the acting intellect from Aristotle. These transcendentals show what is 
personal love, personal knowledge (which has all the characteristics 
of the intellect ut actus of Aristotle, plus new ones), transcendental 
freedom and co-existence-with. These transcendentals are different 
ways of seeing the unique and unrepeatable act of being of the each 
person, of each ‘who’, who cannot be reduced to a general term ‘per-
son’, and the two transcendental innate habits wisdom and first 
principles. As they are at the personal level –act of being level– they 
can access the inner being of the person (wisdom) and the being of the 
external realities (the habit of the first principles). So far there is no 
ethics based on these transcendentals, though Leonardo Polo has given 
some ideas as to how to develop it. 
A personalist based ethics has to explain how a person is happy, 
and how this happiness depends on the four transcendentals; how from 
them through synderesis one directs one’s will and intelligence to 
achieve objective happiness. Though this is a common goal for all peo-
ple, it depends on the characteristics and capacities of each one. 
Happiness is tailored for each person in a different way. Happiness, 
once known directs the specific virtues and goods to be developed. 
“Happiness opens the issue of the good; if man could not be happy, 
that is, if there were no goods then ethics would not make sense”7.  
Good morals, which are the right relationship between virtues, 
norms and goods is acquired and developed from the core of the per-
son from the act of being. Leonardo Polo says that is done through the 
innate habit of synderesis. The ‘I-see’ is the one who proposes norms 
that apply the first principles coming from the synderesis to the partic-
ular decisions. The ‘I-want’ takes care of the development of the moral 
‘virtues’ and the synderesis again takes care of seeing whether a par-
ticular good is in line or not with the final end.  
Polo says he took the concept of synderesis from Aquinas, 
though he develops it farther than Aquinas, for whom it was just the 
repository of the moral principles. He adds that synderesis is the only 
link between the root of all one’s actions –the act of being– with all 
other potencies. Synderesis is the constitutive and integrating habit of 
the spiritual faculties: will and intelligence, in their first habit, subse-
quent actions and acquired habits. The acquired habits of the 
intelligence, to which he gives each a specific name in the four books 
of Curso de teoría del conocimiento and the habits of the will which 
are the moral virtues. The development of the habits depends on the 
                                                 
6 We agree with the view that freedom as a radical of the person already carries with 
it the ethical component, as suggested by Peña: “la libertad lleva consigo, insepa-
rablemente, una intrinseca dimensión ética que la marca desde dentro”. Peña Vial, 
J., Ética de la libertad (Santiago de Chile: Instituto Respública, 2013), 147. 
7 “La felicidad abre el tema del bien; si el hombre no pudiera ser feliz, es decir, si no 
existiera el bien, la ética tampoco tendría sentido”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Ver-
sión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 111. 
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capacities received through the body, so those who by birth have con-
genital defects will not be able to develop all of them, or those who 
during life have some accident will be incapacitated to use some of 
them8. 
We see then that synderesis is vital to know the norms through 
the first principles or morals are known, and which is the one who 
knows, to regulate and develop the moral virtues needed to acquire the 
goods required to progress in life, which is done through the practical 
knowledge and application of it in daily life.  
Synderesis is involved in knowing the human nature, but it does 
not reach the existence of God, nor God as a person. This one is done, 
first, through Metaphysics based on the the habit first principles; sec-
ond, through the habit of wisdom based on the impulse of the agent 
intellect that reaches Him in a personal way. Properly speaking then, 
synderesis is not giving one’s response to God, which is proper of the 
personal level. Nevertheless, synderesis is entrusted to align all acts to 
this reference to God’s desire for each person, which, as a personal 
relationship, communicates its unique relationship with each person, 
what traditionally is called God’s call, and from the received person 
one’s vocation. So personalist ethics can also be called vocational eth-
ics. The term vocation is used in lay terms to speak of professional 
vocation, but it is more commonly used for religious matters, so phi-
losophers tend to avoid using this term9. 
So to the question whether synderesis as understood by Polo 
could be the ultimate foundation of a personalist ethics, my answer 
will be no; the ultimate foundation is the concept of the person as act 
of being because of its intrinsic orientation to God through love, love 
that has to be accepted, subsequently donated, and made effective on 
a daily basis in the actions performed. Synderesis, though is the nec-
essary link between the acceptance, donation and gift. This necessary 
link is the one we are directly aware of, and the one in which our nor-
mal decisions are taken, because consciousness depends on it. Morals 
depend on synderesis because the material object of ethics is the free 
decisions, and the use of the transcendental freedom passes necessarily 
                                                 
8 “All human beings are, in principle, intelligent. But another thing is that we can 
use the intelligence or not, use it more or use it less, which is proof that we are 
animals endowed with reason; the human biological basis does not determine, but 
conditions its use. However, intelligence is not a matter of heredity and therefore 
of specification”. “Todos los seres humanos, por principio, somos inteligentes. 
Pero otra cosa es que podamos usar o no, o más o menos, la inteligencia, lo cual 
es una prueba de que somos animales dotados de razón; la base biológica humana 
no es determinante pero sí condicionante. Con todo, la inteligencia no es cuestión 
de herencia y por tanto de especificación”. Ibid., 70. 
9 According to Crespo, in Husserl papers on conscience there are indications that 
from an intellectualist view of ethics he in his later years was inclined on a personal 
look for a foundation of ethics in the priority of love over intellingence: “Este ideal 
de la razón seria, en última instancia, demasiado formal y desconocería una di-
mensión más profunda de la persona, el amor. En el amor la persona sigue su 
vocación individual entendida esta como su tarea ética y ‘abre’ sus ojos a nuevas 
valores subjetivos”. Crespo, M., El Valor Ético de la Afectividad, op. cit., 39. 
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through synderesis on its way, so to speak, to our body. Synderesis is 
the one in charge of corroborating the alignment of any action towards 
the final end. This is properly done through the will enhanced by the 
virtue of prudence. This may help to understand why virtues are a me-
dium between extremes, not in a spatial fixed way as is usually 
represented, but a diversion of the path towards the final end; one can 
deviate because it is too much to the right or to the left, or even going 
backwards in the process of personalization. 
 
3rd. Development of a personalist ethics 
While discussing the characteristics of a personalist ethics based 
on Polo’s proposal is beyond the scope of the initial question, it is in-
teresting to sketch what we have discovered in his works, which may 
show the effectiveness of his proposal10. 
A key text comes from a conference Polo gave in Sevilla in 1994 
which we have already quoted: “This is how the problem of duty, of 
obligation, appears. Man is obliged. But obligation relates to action: 
You must find your vital project your vocation in the deepest sense of 
the word, what kind of acts you are committed to do according to your 
upbringing, your skills, and your fitness. This issue of duty has been 
formulated by the moral philosophers”11. 
Polo speaks of a duty to act, and this is congruent with his view 
of synderesis as the impulse of action, to do, not to remain inactive. 
Human beings are active, are made to act, and to improve themselves 
by acting. It is an obligation. It is nevertheless a free obligation, not in 
the sense of not being obliged, but in the sense of being able to look 
and choose the best way to act according to one’s understanding and 
will. Polo speaks of ‘vital project’ or ‘vocation in the deepest sense of 
the world’. An obligation is something general, a vital project is par-
ticular of each individual, and a vocation adds to the vital project the 
                                                 
10 The notion that man has no essence but is just an existence that makes his own 
essence, is a common topic of most existentialist philosophers. What is new in 
Polo is that he gives an ontological foundation with the triadic structure of man. 
An exponent of the existencialist claim has been studied by Dorronsoro with re-
gards to Rahner: “con la categoría de símbolo esencial, Rahner sintetiza la 
dinámica existencial de la persona humana como sujeto que, a través de su propia 
actividad, alcanza una identidad que no posee originariamente en acto y a la que 
tiende”. Díaz Dorronsoro, R., “La Noción De Símbolo Esencial Rahneriana Revi-
sada a Partir de la Antropología Trascendental De Leonardo Polo”, Miscelanea 
Poliana, 46 (2014) p. 1. For Polo the identity comes before the essence because it 
comes from the personal level, and develops it later; morals is the personalization, 
not the creation, of the essence, and the essence is just to dispose of something that 
is given before, what is at its disposition. 
11 “Así es como aparece el problema del deber, de la obligación. El hombre está 
obligado. Pero la obligación se refiere al actuar: debes encontrar tu proyecto vital, 
tu vocación en el sentido profundo de la palabra, aquel tipo de actos que de acuerdo 
con tu educación, tus habilidades, con tu idoneidad, pues debes hacer. Esta cues-
tión del deber ha sido formulada por los filósofos morales”. Polo, L., “Socratic 
Ethics and Christian Moral”, Appendix 1, op. cit., paragraph 40. 
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characteristic of being a “call”, somebody calls. This vital project has 
to be in line with one’s “upbringing, skills, fitness”, so it is particular 
to what one has received. One has the duty to add to what one has 
received but one can only do this according to his or her initial possi-
bilities, which one has received through his inherited DNA, education 
and situation. On this one can build in different ways, that’s one’s 
choice, but one has a duty, and obligation to do, to contribute.  
An important ontological point is that the call for a vital project 
one has to choose is not something external, a kind of accident but it 
constitutes the very act of being of the person and not only as an indi-
vidual but one’s individuality has a task that involves contribution, 
because he has to take care of his family –mankind– and his home –
the world–. As Polo says: “Man is called; meaning that its vocation is 
indistinguishable with his being, it cannot be said that one’s call is 
something extrinsic. Man has a place in the cosmos and is obvious that 
the cosmos is his home. That makes it perfecter of the universe”12. 
So, in some sense, what one has received physical body, educa-
tion, culture from society, historical moment, living circumstances, i.e. 
all that one cannot control but affect one’s capacities can be used in 
different ways, but it has to be used, and furthermore it has to be used 
to contribute. This can be the beginning of the specification of the 
principles of the personalist morality; seek your final end in the per-
sonal God, discover your talents, enhance them, and contribute with 
them to those around you. 
Synderesis is the impulse to act and this impulse has the task to 
look for what is convenient for us, what is the truth of our being, start-
ing with the truth of the will13. Leonardo Polo explains that synderesis 
is the one that constitutes the natural will –voluntas ut natura– as ex-
plained in the chapter seven. The voluntas ut natura then is the one 
that pushes the will to look for what is good, but being blind it has to 
seek the help of the intelligence. Synderesis as ‘I-want’ requires the 
intelligence to act because by itself the theme of the intelligence is the 
truth, not the good. For the intelligence to be able to present goods 
synderesis has to give the intelligence the templates, so to speak, of 
what is good for a person. The intelligence then becomes practical –
the practical intelligence– and presents to the will what thinks more 
                                                 
12 “El hombre está llamado, en cuanto que su vocación se confunde con su ser, no se 
puede decir que alguien es llamado a algo extrínseco. Que el hombre tiene un 
puesto en el cosmos es obvio y el cosmos es su casa. Eso le hace perfeccionador 
del universo”. Ibid. 
13 “Therefore, even if the will can deviate from the good, initially synderesis dis-
closes the truth of the will: which is its transcendental relationship with the good. 
… the installation of the truth in the first voluntary act is so intrinsic that it is 
equivalent to its constitution”. “Por eso, por más que la voluntad puede apartarse 
del bien, inicialmente la sindéresis descubre la verdad de la voluntad: relación tras-
cendental con el bien… la instalación de la verdad en el primer acto voluntario es 
tan intrínseca que equivale a su constitución”. Polo, L., La Voluntad y sus Actos I, 
op. cit., 66.  
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convenient, and the will, exercising the freedom received from the per-
son, chooses. “But precisely because to Aristotle the will is basically 
desire, the will be only launched, only waked up, if it is preceded by 
knowledge. The famous aphorism nihil volitum nisi praecognitum ex-
presses exactly what is the will is for Aristotle. The will depends on 
the intelligence, the will is preceded by the intelligence, because the 
will cannot wake up if the intelligence does not show it something, or 
because ultimately, no matter how warm it is, it is passive with respect 
to the intelligence, because as appetite, goes to get what the intelli-
gence shows”14. 
It is interesting to see this process in detail, because, it is the core 
of the human free action and it includes the three elements that Leo-
nardo Polo assigns to a proper, complete study of ethics: the goods, 
the norms and the virtues15. The goods are the goods to obtain and they 
are mainly at the natural level, though the spiritual goods like friend-
ship belong to the personal level and science to the essential level. The 
norms are the realm of the intelligence and the virtues fall into the 
realm of the will. Both at the essential level and all under the activation 
and integration of synderesis which is the ‘I’ we believe we are. “Eth-
ics is formally a type of organization. It considers that everything 
should to be classified, from the standpoint of perfection. Ethics does 
this based on three major issues that are the dimensions of man through 
which one organizes life: virtues, norms and goods”16. 
We can briefly see what can be said regarding each of the three 
elements starting with the goods. 
a) Goods. Perhaps it could be helpful to distinguish five types of 
goods, two entitative and three operational. The transcendental good, 
                                                 
14 “Pero, precisamente porque la voluntad para Aristóteles es deseo, la voluntad so-
lamente se pone en marcha, solamente se despierta, si es precedida por el 
conocimiento. El famoso aforismo nihil volitum nisi praecognitum expresa exac-
tamente lo que es la voluntad para Aristóteles. La voluntad depende de la 
inteligencia, es precedida por ella, porque no puede despertarse si la inteligencia 
no le presenta algo, o porque, en definitiva, por muy ardiente que sea, es pasiva 
respecto de la inteligencia, pues como apetito, se dirige a conseguir lo que la inte-
ligencia presenta”. Polo, L., Presente y Futuro del Hombre, op. cit., 47. 
15 “The global scientific consideration of ethics has three dimensions. First of all, 
two main themes: the goods and virtues. We must consider the ethics of virtues 
and ethics of ethical goods not as two, but two dimensions of the same ethics. A 
third dimension of ethics is the law, the moral norm. So we can also speak of an 
ethics of norms. The complete ethics must be an ethics of goods, norms and vir-
tues”. “La consideración científica global de la ética consta de tres dimensiones. 
Ante todo, dos grandes temas: los bienes y las virtudes. Debemos tener en cuenta 
que la ética de virtudes y la ética de bienes no son dos éticas, sino dos dimensiones 
de la ética. Una tercera dimensión de la ética es la ley, la norma moral. Por tanto, 
también cabe hablar de ética de normas. La ética completa ha de ser una ética de 
bienes, de normas y de virtudes”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de 
los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 112.  
16 “La ética tiene valor formal, de organización. Considera todo en cuanto ordenable, 
desde el punto de vista de la perfección. Eso lo establece la ética según tres grandes 
temas que son dimensiones del hombre y por las cuales organiza su vida: virtudes, 
normas y bienes”. Polo, L., Lecciones de Ética, op. cit., 137. 
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is the traditional ‘good’ as transcendental. It means that whatever ex-
ists has the most important of goodness; reality, existence. The second 
entitative good is the natural good that consists in being as complete 
as one’s nature demands; so, blind or crippled people do not have the 
natural level goodness. At the operational level we have health which 
is the good working at the natural level, which is lost when we have 
some sickness or a bad digestion; this is when things do not work well. 
Up to the next level these type of goods normally are not voluntary so 
Polo will consider them as ‘life received’ unlike the next two. The first 
is the technical good –poesis, facere– and the last one the moral good-
ness –praxis, agere–. Of these five types of goodness only the 
transcendental is absolute, the others are relative transcendentals, rel-
ative to some standard, and their mis-match brings with it some due 
deficit which we normally label as bad. The standard for the entitative 
natural good is the nature of each animal or person. If the absence is 
big, especially those at birth are called ‘freaks’ or ‘monsters’ like a 
goat with two heads. In human beings we speak of ‘malformed, or 
‘disabled’. A person whose body does not work properly is ‘unwell’ 
or ‘sick’, and the standard is a healthy body. The technical goodness 
is usually contrasted with the ‘best practice’ in that particular skill, 
which actually keeps on improving continuously, and the lack of a due 
skill is an ‘unskilled’ or ‘shoddy’ piece of work.  
Finally, we reach the question that brought in this discussion: 
what is the model or standard for good moral decisions? There are ob-
jective goods17 that are those that are based on the natural moral law, 
and apply to all humans, and are those which apply to a particular 
group of humans due to age, sex, e.g. the special care children require, 
women who are expecting or taking care of their babies, elderly peo-
ple, people with a particular type of sickness etc. And finally are those 
                                                 
17 When talking about goods Polo refers to real goods, not abstract goods. The same 
has been pointed out by Gotzon Santamaría who also quotes another autor, Do-
rronsoro: “This has been clearly seen by Dorronsoro: Therefore, it is necessary to 
dig deeper in the very heart of that good that is called freedom to seek for a stronger 
foundation. This is important either for starting a dialogue or for the understanding 
and performing the good that is calling us and that makes us human. Thomas Aqui-
nas analysis gives us a firm foundation to further the understanding of freedom and 
of the good that appeals to freedom. The error can only be overcome when the 
metaphysical method and analysis goes beyond the scope of the essence, to hit 
directly the real being, where there is nothing clear and distinct, but has the ad-
vantage of being real. An analysis of the real act as it is in itself, not an analysis of 
the differences of essences as they are trimmed to be clear and manageable, in our 
abstract knowledge’. “This has been clearly seen by Dorronsoro: Por eso, es nece-
saria una ulterior profundización en el núcleo mismo de ese bien que llama a la 
libertad para encontrar una base más sólida, sea para el diálogo, sea para la com-
prensión y realización de ese bien que nos llama y nos hace humanos. El análisis 
de Tomás de Aquino nos ofrece una base firme para seguir ahondando en la com-
prensión de la libertad y del bien que se presenta ante ella. De ese error solo se sale 
cuando el método y análisis de la metafísica supera el ámbito de la esencia, para 
morder directamente en el ser real, que no tiene nada de claro y distinto, pero tiene 
la ventaja de ser real. Un análisis del acto real tal y como es en sí, no un análisis 
de las diferencias de esencias tal y como son recortadas, claras y manejables, en 
nuestro conocimiento abstracto”. Gotzon Santamaria, M., “Otra Vuelta de 
Tuerca”, op. cit., 212. 
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personal goods that are specific to each ‘who’, each person, depending 
on the strictly personal circumstances, so what could be good for an 
engineer may not be good for a dentist, and this is just in reference to 
the professional vocation, but the same applies to free choices one has 
taken or a special call from God that one may feel. Polo clearly states 
that the good is a relative transcendental, and that it is subordinated to 
love, to personal love18.  
Leonardo Polo speaks of goods, sometimes referring to material 
or external goods, sometimes to what can be possesed. In this second 
way he speaks of the three types of human ‘having’: ‘the predicamen-
tal’, which is to have something external, attached to one but not 
forming part of oneself; then the two types of essential having, the 
habits of the intellect in which he includes the knowledge acquired, 
and the most intimate of the three, the habits of the will: the virtues or 
vices. In the hierarchy the virtues are the highest, and therefore the 
ones that should be sought first, then the habits of the intelligence, and 
lastly the external goods. Not that any of them are not necessary, but 
external goods and the intellectual are means to develop the highest 
ones that are the virtues, which make us better persons. Among the 
virtues there is also a hierarchy but this belongs to another section. 
Polo also explains how the ethics based exclusively on the con-
sideration of the good is not complete, and therefore not properly 
human: “The ethics of goods is reductionist and distrusts norms; there 
is no choice but to accept rules, but not because they have an ethical 
value, but simply because they are useful. Virtues have no room here 
because the virtues serve to structure life; but if what one cares for are 
the immediate goods, structuring life is superfluous: immediate grati-
fication dispenses from organizing life. While virtues are stable 
dispositions, with which one faces the future, the pleasures are ephem-
eral”19.  
Though, more can be said on this issue, we leave it here to speak 
about the norms. 
                                                 
18 “Moral virtues strengthen the will: they are perfective habits of the will, and there-
fore, strengthen the adhesiveness of the will, that is, the capacity to love; however, 
the vices will impoverish the will, and thus reduce the capacity to love. So he who 
has vices cannot be happy, or very little because he can also love very little”. “Las 
virtudes morales fortalecen la voluntad: son hábitos perfectivos de la voluntad y, 
por serlo, fortalecen la capacidad de adhesión de la voluntad, es decir, la capacidad 
de amar; en cambio, los vicios empobrecen la voluntad, la estropean, y por tanto 
disminuyen la capacidad de amar. Por eso, el que tiene vicios no puede ser feliz, o 
lo es muy poco porque puede amar también muy poco”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una 
Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 114.  
19 “La ética de bienes es una ética reduccionista que desconfía de las normas; no hay 
más remedio que aceptar normas, pero no porque tengan un valor ético, sino sim-
plemente porque tienen un valor útil. Las virtudes no tienen nada que hacer aquí 
porque las virtudes sirven para estructurar la vida; pero si lo importante son los 
bienes inmediatos, estructurar la vida está de más: el goce inmediato prescinde de 
la organización del tiempo de la vida. Mientras que las virtudes son disposiciones 
estables, con las cuales se encara el futuro, los placeres son efímeros”. Ibid., 124. 
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b) Norms. The norms are an essential constitutive of morals. We 
have natural laws which apply to all material creatures, which are the 
physical, chemical laws for example, some that apply to living crea-
tures such as the biological laws, and we have moral laws which are 
completely different because they apply only to free beings, and be-
cause of this, and unlike the previous ones, can be flouted, can be not 
obeyed. Obedience is a moral term and therefore it only applies to free 
beings, though it can be analogically applied to other beings as well. 
Moral laws imply therefore, that a task has to be accomplished, and 
whether the actions to achive it are aligned or not to the task to be 
accomplished; these are the criteria that decide wheter something is 
good or evil. “Ethics comes into being because men have to direct their 
own existence. That task, insofar as subject to alternatives, can only 
come from freedom, which allows us to speak of a peculiar norma-
tivity: the moral norms; and of a peculiar difference which we call 
good and evil, and of a modification of the moral subject which are the 
virtues and vices”20. The norms also refer to responsibility which 
comes from an obligation to do, to act in a particular way, but again, 
they suppose the possibility of not fulfilling the obligation, to be irre-
sponsible: “Moral norms bring about obligations, and obligation is to 
link, a link that can be accepted or not”21. Obligations that cannot be 
skirted are natural, and therefore accompany all humans by the mere 
fact of being human: “The ethical standard is, so to speak, natural in 
the sense that it is proper to the human being and arises from his ra-
tional and free nature”22.  
Naturally, as well, there are different types of norms. As we have 
mentioned, in a personalist ethics, the levels of norms have to be 
clearly stated, so as to distinguish what is just personal, because the 
proper end of all norms and regulations is the person, what is essential, 
this is valid to all humans, and what is corporeal which is not under 
the control of the person. The norms are meant to help the persons be 
more personal. To the point that the whole purpose of ethics, which is 
eminently personal, is to personalise the essential and natural levels23, 
and through this contribute to the personalisation of all persons, which 
means making a society in which each person can develop his or her 
personality to the outmost: “For example, the natural law is necessary, 
but certain consequences that are formulated in positive law are not. 
                                                 
20 “La ética surge porque el hombre tiene que conducir su propio existir. Ese condu-
cirse, en cuanto que sujeto a una alternativa que sólo puede venir de la libertad, 
nos permite hablar de una peculiar normatividad: la norma moral; de una peculiar 
diferencia que llamamos bien y mal, y de una modificación del sujeto moral que 
son las virtudes y los vicios”. Ibid., 61. 
21 “La norma moral comporta obligación, y obligación viene de ligar, una vincula-
ción que puede ser aceptada o no”. Ibid., 63. 
22 “La normatividad ética es, por así decirlo, natural en el sentido de que es propia 
del ser humano y surge de su carácter racional y libre”. Ibid., 58. 
23 “Ethical norms, which governs interpersonal relationships and controls the domin-
ion one has over its received essential potencies”. “La normatividad ética, que rige 




They are consistent ex supposito, because though they convey natural 
law precepts, they could be expressed in other ways. The difference 
between primary and secondary natural precepts has to do with this”24. 
Leonardo Polo states that reducing ethics to norms is a charac-
teristic of modern philosophers and ends up in subjectivism. 
Subjectivism bases moral norms on subjective sentimental feelings. 
Values are not objective but the individual’s appreciation of goods, 
and this explains the attraction of the value ethics25. In this passage 
Leonardo Polo expresses both the insufficiency of an ethics based only 
on norms and how it survives in the form of negative ethics, and ethics 
without its radiant impulse, which is what he calls a bureaucratic atti-
tude: “Ethical normativism if considered alone has no foundation. 
Without virtues, compliance is inhumane and ethically insufficient. 
Doing without the moral growth and trying to govern the conduct by 
fixed reasoning degrades the norms transforming them into a code. 
Naturally, this attitude had to collapse –in fact it already has col-
lapsed–; yet somehow it remains in what may be called bureaucracy, 
giving a restrictive view of ethics”26. 
Norms are not the most important, though necessary part of eth-
ics, because to be able to fulfil them one needs moral strength and this 
                                                 
24 “Por ejemplo, la ley natural es necesaria, pero ciertas consecuencias en las que se 
formula positivamente no lo son. Son coherentes ex supposito, pues a través de 
ellas se vehicula la ley natural, pero se podría vehicular de otro modo. La diferencia 
entre el Derecho natural primario y el secundario tiene que ver con esto”. Polo, L., 
Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento I, op. cit., 24. 
25 “It is characteristic of the modern age to reduce the notion of virtue to the decision 
to adhere to rational norms and nothing else. The goods are delinked from the 
norms and are transformed into what is often called vital values (modern man does 
not give up goods, but is trapped by his view of rationality, which is rather emo-
tional). The concept of value is then born”. “Es característico de la edad moderna 
reducir la noción de virtud a la decisión de atenerse a normas racionales y nada 
más. Los bienes se desligan de las normas y se trasforman en lo que se suele llamar 
los valores vitales (el hombre moderno no renuncia a los bienes, pero su acción 
está atrapada por su interpretación de la racionalidad, cuya apreciación es más bien 
emocional). Aparece la noción de valor”. Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Mo-
derna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 122. Some authors distinguish values from 
goods in a different way, e.g. they consider values as the objective goodness ex-
ternal to man, and good as what one should do in a particular situation: “¿Y por 
qué yo experimento esa llamada a realizar esos «valores»? ¿Simplemente porque 
son valiosos? No. No basta que sean valiosos. No es su valor en sí mismo lo que 
los convierte en «lo que hay que hacer», sino el hecho radical –obvio y quizás por 
eso no contemplado– de que no se hacen solos, sino que están «por hacer» ante mí, 
como tarea mía personal. Esto es lo que hace que un «valor» adquiera el carácter 
de «bien»: que es lo que, aquí y ahora, está ante mí, reclamando mi implicación 
personal”. Gotzon Santamaria, M., “Otra Vuelta de Tuerca”, op. cit., 212. 
26 “Aislado, el normativismo ético es una petición de principio. Sin virtudes, el cum-
plimiento de normas es inhumano y éticamente insuficiente. Prescindir del 
crecimiento moral y regir la conducta por una razón fija degrada la norma convir-
tiéndola en un reglamento. Naturalmente, dicha actitud se tenía que derrumbar –
de hecho, se ha derrumbado–; sin embargo, de alguna manera se mantiene en lo 
que cabe llamar burocratismo, del que emana una visión restrictiva de la ética. 
Polo, L., Ética: Hacia una Versión Moderna de los Temas Clásicos, op. cit., 121. 
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comes from the virtues, the most important element of ethics27. With-
out moral strength one will find it difficult to follow the norms and 
this will prevent one from getting to the important and necessary 
goods. The full meaning of the norms can only be understood from the 
virtues, naturally only if the norms are proper norms, not arbitrary de-
cisions of a leader28. And virtues need the backing of love, 
transcendental love that reaches them through synderesis as the ‘I-
want’: “Ethics is neither unilateral knowledge of good nor just an ethic 
of norms which is merely instrumental; ethics also addresses love, that 
is, the adherence to good: ‘goods be not missing, and do not miss doing 
good’. But if it is necessary not to neglect the good; compliance to the 
norms cannot be necessarily fastidious, as if they were product of an 
arbitrary will. The rules themselves are also kind, so Thomas Aquinas 
says; but one can only know this if one have virtues”29. 
Leonardo Polo has an interesting addition to the traditional view 
of virtues which we shall see in the next section.  
c) Virtues. “Virtue and vice are what are most intrinsic of eth-
ics”30. We have already seen how Leonardo Polo explains that virtues 
are acquired habits of the will that are morally good. The contrary hab-
its of the will that are morally wrong are called vices31. Virtues 
constitute, as quoted above, the most important part of Polo triadic 
view of ethics. While some norms and goods can be external to man, 
all virtues are part of man, they are not just attachments but ontologi-
cally they are new capacities of the same person. It is not that one 
                                                 
27 “Ethics is encouraging. Therefore, an ethic of restrictive rules of human action is 
incorrect. Ethics stimulates. Thus the virtues are its central theme, as they reinforce 
the power and therefore facilitate action and increase it”. “La ética es animadora. 
Por eso una ética de normas restrictiva de la acción humana es incorrecta. La ética 
estimula al hombre. De ahí que las virtudes sean su tema central, ya que fortalecen 
la facultad y, por tanto, facilitan la acción y la aumentan”. Ibid., 177. 
28 “The man who is not virtuous fulfils the norms reluctantly. Instead Thomas Aqui-
nas says that who is virtuous follows them easily because, strictly speaking, the 
rules are for freedom. The virtues increase the capacity to exercise of freedom”. 
“El hombre que no es virtuoso cumple las normas a regañadientes. En cambio –
dice Tomás de Aquino– el que es virtuoso las cumple con facilidad porque, en 
rigor, las normas son para la libertad. Las virtudes aumentan la capacidad de ejer-
cicio de la libertad”. Ibid., 114. 
29 “La ética no es unilateralmente la ciencia del bien; tampoco es sólo ética de normas 
o meramente instrumental; la ética también se ocupa del amor, es decir, de la ad-
hesión al bien ‘que no falte el bien y que yo no le falte al bien’. Pero si es preciso 
no faltarle al bien, el cumplimiento de las normas no puede ser puramente fasti-
dioso, como si fueran producto de una voluntad arbitraria. Las normas ellas 
mismas también son amables, y así lo dice Tomás de Aquino (S. Th., 1-2, 107, 4 
ad 2m et 3m); pero esto sólo se sabe cuando se tienen virtudes”. Ibid. 
30 “Lo más intrínseco de la ética son la virtud y el vicio”. Polo, L., Ethics: a Modern 
Version of its Classic Themes, op. cit., 86. 
31 “The determination by the acts can be negative or positive, i.e. a vice or a virtue. 
Vice is a detriment of nature and virtue is growth and improvement”. “La determi-
nación por los actos puede ser negativa o positiva, es decir, un vicio o una virtud. 
El vicio es un detrimento de la naturaleza y la virtud un crecimiento y una mejora”. 
Polo, L., Nietzsche como Pensador de Dualidades, op. cit., 130. 
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deserves praise and rewards because one has done something good that 
benefits society and oneself, this being true, it is not the most important 
part of developing virtues, what is most important is the ontological 
change that takes place in the person: he becomes a better human be-
ing, a better person32. His faculties have acquired new powers, which 
make the person freer, cleverer, more loving, and stronger in the line 
of the acts performed33. “Virtue is the point where having made con-
tact with human’s being, the meeting between the dynamic with the 
constitutional. Man does not always theorize; however, virtue is per-
manent, it is stably incorporated”34.  
This is the reason why Polo says that human beings are more 
than nature, they are not of the world but above the world, because 
there is no limit to growth in the spiritual faculties, because they grow 
as they exercise new good acts, and this growth gives them the capac-
ity to do new types of acts which before they were not capable of35.  
                                                 
32 “A person is specified as human by virtues and un-specified, degraded, falling into 
a state of stoppage which is a destruction of all internal order and all self-control, 
if one acts wrongly and becomes vicious. Humans are beings capable of doing and 
growing, has this double entry: an exterior and an inner result. To think that the 
importance of the action is what is produced, that is what the modern activism 
leads us to believe, and this leads to the loss of the ontological value of virtue”. 
“El hombre se especifica como hombre por sus virtudes y se desespecifica, se de-
grada, cae en una situación de continencia que es como una destrucción de todo 
orden interior y de toda capacidad de autocontrol, si actúa mal y se hace vicioso. 
El hombre es un ser capaz de hacer y de hacerse, tiene esa doble entrada: un resul-
tado exterior y uno interior. Creer que lo importante de la acción es lo que se 
produce, eso, que es a lo que el activismo moderno nos inclina, lleva consigo la 
pérdida del valor ontológico de la virtud”. Polo, L., “Socratic Ethics and Christian 
Moral”, Appendix 1, op. cit., paragraph 9.  
33 “Freedom is above all self-control. The one who owns himself has virtues; and the 
one who lacks them is not his own master for one simple reason: because he has 
vices. And that’s unfailingly. The alternative is not elective, it is ontological, it 
affects the actual nature of man: one becomes good or bad”. “La libertad ante todo 
es el autodominio. Es dueño de sí el que tiene virtudes y no es dueño de sí el que 
no las tiene por una razón sencilla, porque tiene vicios. Y eso es impepinable. La 
alternativa no es electiva, es ontológica, afecta al ser mismo del hombre: uno se 
hace bueno o se hace malo”. Ibid. 
34 “La virtud es el punto en que el tener toma contacto con el ser del hombre, la 
conjunción de lo dinámico con lo constitucional. El hombre no teoriza siempre; en 
cambio, la virtud es permanente, queda incorporada de manera estable”. Polo, L., 
La Esencia Humana, op. cit., 51. 
35 “Aristotle, who is the one who matures more the notions, admits that being the act 
is previous and superior to the potency, then the potency has to be limited because 
it becomes the substance. And this is the nature; nature means that potency is finite. 
Well, the man has no nature because his potency is not finite and does not have it 
because it makes its potency infinite, but not as infinite action in the modern un-
derstanding, but because it makes it infinite by acquiring virtues. Man is capable 
of unrestricted development and that is the infinity of his potency. This is why man 
is not a natural being”. “Aristóteles que es el que madura más las nociones, admite 
que siendo el acto anterior a la potencia y superior a ella, la potencia tiene que ser 
finita porque el acto le sucede como sustancia. Eso es la naturaleza; naturaleza 
significa potencia finita. Pues bien, el hombre no tiene naturaleza porque no tiene 
potencia finita y no la tiene porque infinitiza su potencia, pero no según la acción 
infinita en sentido moderno, sino que la infinitiza en la manera de adquirir virtudes. 
El hombre es capaz de un perfeccionamiento irrestricto y eso es la infinitud de su 
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This means that good morals rather than constraining, increases 
the powers, gives more freedom because it increases the possibilities 
and gives more control over the faculties and therefore the acts of those 
faculties: “It must be held that morality does not constrain but enables 
man to increase his freedom. In effect, to be in control causa sibi 
means to strengthen sufficiently one’s own capacities. The feedback 
of the action in the faculty is virtue. The two higher faculties of the 
soul, intelligence and will, are not fixed allocations. This is why they 
are more than nature”36. 
The acquisition of virtues is not an exclusive task of the will, 
because the will is blind, it needs direction, and that direction comes 
from synderesis which impulses the intelligence, to what is good, this 
is, what is aligned to the ultimate end or not, in general, and through 
the practical reason in each particular case, and doing this well is what 
is the task of the most important and first of the virtues, which there-
fore, like synderesis itself, sits in between the intelligence and the will: 
prudence37. This is why the classics call it a dianoetic virtue and the 
charioteer and, at other times, the origin of all other virtues as quoted 
before: “The first acquired virtue, which expresses the link between 
the will and the intelligence, is prudence. So prudence is genitrix vir-
tutum, and without it one cannot acquire any other virtue. The exercise 
of acts must refer to the simplex velle and also to prudence as acquired 
by the will. Prudence marks the relationship of the will to reason, but 
not the knowledge of transcendental relationship. Only considered as 
a duality with synderesis, the natural will ascends to the level of the 
velle”38. 
Synderesis is the innate link, upper link, between the virtue of 
prudence and the transcendental good, that is, the outside real goods, 
and whether they are in line with the final end, otherwise it will not be 
                                                 
potencialidad. Por eso no es un ser natural”. Polo, L., “Socratic Ethics and Chris-
tian Morals”, pro manuscrito as translated in Appendix 1, op. cit., paragraph 11.  
36 “Se debe sostener que la moral no constriñe, sino que permite al hombre aumentar 
su libertad. En efecto, ser causa sibi comporta fortalecer suficientemente las pro-
pias capacidades. El feedback de la acción en la facultad es la virtud. Las dos 
facultades superiores del alma, la inteligencia y la voluntad, no son dotaciones fi-
jas. Por eso son más que naturaleza”. Polo, L., “Ética Socrática y Moral Cristiana”, 
op. cit., 553. 
37 Posada has a felicitous way of expressing the interconnection between the intellect 
and will within synderesis the “habit of synderesis inasmuch it includes not only 
intelligence but also the intellection embedded in the willing”. El “hábito de sin-
déresis en tanto que comporta no sólo inteligir solo, sino además intelección inserta 
en el querer”. Posada, J. M., Voluntad de Poder y Poder de la Voluntad, op. cit., 
54. 
38 “La primera virtud adquirida, que expresa el enlace de la voluntad con la inteli-
gencia, es la prudencia. Por eso, la prudencia es genetrix virtutum, y sin ella no se 
puede adquirir ninguna otra virtud. El ejercicio de actos se ha de referir al simplex 
velle y también a la prudencia en cuanto que adquirida por la voluntad. La pruden-
cia marca la relación de la voluntad con la razón, pero no es el conocimiento de la 
relación trascendental. Sólo considerada en su dualidad con la sindéresis, la volun-




prudence, but a vice, which is called ‘shrewdness’ which has all the 
characteristics of prudence except for the right orientation towards the 
final end, which is the most important. In a pithy text Leonardo Polo 
expresses this and the link between prudence and the virtues under it 
as follows: “Through the moral virtues one can see that synderesis is 
the source and precedes them. It is especially clear in prudence. This 
is why prudence (of ‘pro-videre’) is described as monitoring the 
means. Similarly, justice highlights what is righteous in synderesis. 
Fortitude and temperance show the harmony synderesis introduces 
into human life”39. This is supported by Aquinas texts interpreted by 
Sellés, which shows how synderesis is the link, through prudence, be-
tween the person and the actions the person performs: “The practical 
habit of prudence is, according to Thomas, linked to synderesis; as the 
theoretical habit of science is to the habit of the theoretical first prin-
ciples. The role of prudence, therefore, is medial, because it leans on 
its work on synderesis, and directs the moral virtues of the will to act. 
It is illuminated by synderesis and applies the universal principles to 
particular conclusions to of act”40. 
To complete the section on the virtues we would like to highlight 
the subordination of all virtues, and norms to synderesis. Synderesis 
links the will to love at the personal level, and wanting to the final end. 
Wanting is love at the essential level. The orientation to the final end 
that permeates from the personal level, trough synderesis, continues 
through prudence and through it reaches the moral habits (virtues or 
vices) that guide all human free actions.  
The following two Polo’s texts show how a personalist-based 
ethics requires a good understanding of synderesis and the personal 
decision to orientate life to the objective final end: “The prudent per-
son tries to make permeable the considerations to the primary moral 
principles, which are the ones that synderesis invites us to open on its 
course towards practice. Knowing how to stick to them is to be pru-
dent. A level of virtue what is dianoetic is prudence that is also the 
nexus of synderesis with active use. In this way virtue connects with 
the norms. It is also seen how a norm without virtues is a norm that is 
imperfectly open to prudence. This is the most important content of 
                                                 
39 “En las virtudes morales se advierte su procedencia por la sindéresis que las pre-
side. Es especialmente claro en la prudencia. Por eso la prudencia (de ‘pro videre’) 
se describe como vigilancia sobre los medios. A su vez, en la justicia destaca lo 
que la sindéresis tiene de rectitud. En la fortaleza y en la templanza se nota el 
equilibrio que la sindéresis introduce en la vida humana”. Polo, L., Epistemología, 
Creación y Divinidad, op. cit., 137. 
40 “El hábito práctico de la prudencia está, según Tomás de Aquino, vinculado a la 
sindéresis, como el hábito teórico de ciencia lo está al hábito de los primeros prin-
cipios teóricos. El papel de la prudencia, en consecuencia, es medial, porque está 
inclinado en su obrar por la sindéresis, y a la vez inclina a obrar a las virtudes 
morales de la voluntad. (Cfr. Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3). Es ilumi-
nado por la sindéresis y a la vez aplica los principios universales a conclusiones 
particulares en el orden del obrar. (Cfr. Q.D. De Virtutibus, q. 1, a. 6.). Sellés, J.F., 
Los hábitos Adquiridos: las Virtudes de la Inteligencia y la Voluntad según Tomás 
de Aquino, (Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 
2000), 112.  
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prudence: to make more intimate the connection between conscience 
and synderesis”41. 
In this second text one has to be aware that it is the only place in 
which Polo calls synderesis a ‘virtue’. Probably he says it to highlight 
that it is eminently moral, can grow and is the ultimate source of all 
proper virtues. “All the already discussed virtues that integrate pru-
dence, look for a high purpose which is synderesis. Prudence (that 
unifies justice, fortitude and temperance –that are one system–) is 
simply a dimension of synderesis. So to limit oneself to the cardinal 
virtues is a moral error, and to dismiss them is also a moral error, be-
cause in this life they are means”42. 
While we have seen that virtues are the core of ethics, an ethical 
theory based only on virtues cannot sustain itself. It requires the 
knowledge of what is the true good and the means to reach it (whether 
they are aligned or not to the true good) and the norms that facilitate 
reaching it (the right paths, which indicate objectively the correct 
alignment). “An ethics based exclusively on virtues is only illusory 
because virtue loses its meaning and is reduced to a rigid attitude, 
where one takes refuge. But, in turn, an ethic based only on norms 
eliminates the notion of virtue and simply says to the man: behave in 
a particular way. However, without virtues it is not possible to freely 
comply with moral norms”43. 
4) Quick review to problems raised. We could continue describing 
more elements of the possible development of a personalist ethics, but 
we are far beyond the length and theoretical limits of the initial pro-
posal and we have to finish by seeing whether we have also answered 
the questions posed regarding the problems this research could eluci-
date which can be answered as follows: 
                                                 
41 “El prudente trata de hacer permeables las consideraciones a los principios mora-
les primarios, que son los que la sindéresis nos invita a abrir en su cauce hacia la 
práctica. Saber atenerse a ellos es ser prudente. A nivel de virtud lo dianoético es 
la prudencia, también es el nexo de la sindéresis con el uso activo. Así la virtud 
conecta con la norma, y se ve también como una norma sin virtudes es una norma 
que se abre a la prudencia de modo imperfecto. Ese es el contenido más importante 
de la prudencia: hacer más íntima la conexión entre conciencia y sindéresis. Polo, 
L., Lecciones de Ética, op. cit., 178. 
42 “Toda las virtudes vistas, que integran la prudencia, tienen que ver con fines de 
gran altura, pero no son el Fin Último. Existe una virtud más cardinal todavía que 
es la virtud de la sindéresis. La prudencia (que unifica la justicia, la fortaleza y la 
templanza –constituyen un sistema unitario–) no es más que una dimensión de la 
sindéresis. Por tanto, quedarse sólo con las virtudes cardinales es un error moral, 
y quedarse sin las virtudes cardinales es también un error moral, porque ellas son 
para esta vida que es medial”. Polo, L., “La Conexion de las Virtudes”, (unpublis-
hed manuscript, Piura: Universidad de Piura, August 15,1995). 
43 “Una ética sólo de virtudes es ilusa porque la misma virtud pierde su sentido y 
queda reducida a una actitud rígida, donde uno se refugia. Pero, a su vez, una ética 
sólo de normas elimina la noción de virtud y se limita a decir al hombre: compór-
tate de determinada manera. Ahora bien, sin virtudes es imposible cumplir 
libremente las normas morales”. Polo, L., Ética, Versión Moderna de un Tema 
Clásico, op. cit., 118. 
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What is Polo’s conception of synderesis as an innate habit? This 
was answered in the chapter: ‘Knowledge of Synderesis’. 
How does synderesis act according to Polo? This was answered 
in the chapter: ‘Synderesis’ Dynamics’. 
How do Polo’s proposals fit with the proposals of previous phi-
losophers?  
In the historical section we have seen the development of syn-
deresis up to our days. We did not comment on how they related to 
Polo’s proposal because we had not explained it at that stage. We can 
do it summarily now. 
As we have seen through the many references to Aquinas in 
Polo´s quotations, the main influence comes from Aquinas44; from 
him he takes the term, its ontological status as an innate habit, as the 
source of the practical first principles of action, the primary enunciated 
as: ‘do good’ and secondarily ‘avoid evil’, and above all the ontologi-
cal distinction between esse and essence. He improves on Aquinas’ by 
distinguishing the personal level, the human act of being –the esse–
from the essence; and both from the corporeal level. Then Polo intro-
duces the four personal transcendentals and gives synderesis new 
functions, not foreseen by Aquinas. By this distinction and the method 
of overcoming the mental boundary Polo can be more precise in the 
understanding of the explanation of the personal structure in three lev-
els, –triadic– which helps to understand much better the reality of love, 
happiness, freedom and the dynamics of the practical action with re-
spect to the theoretical reason. This is done by integrating the root of 
both, intelligence and will, within synderesis and distinguishing in it 
two sides: the I-see and the I-want, which are the habit as it activates 
the intelligence and the will respectively. The distinction between the 
personal and essential level in humans also allows him to give a better 
ontological position to the active intellect, personal freedom, personal 
love, and explain why they cannot be explained in terms of causality 
as the modern and classic philosophers tried to do. It is worth men-
tioning that Aristotle’s influence is great, but it is somehow included 
in the comments made to what we have said about Aquinas, in the 
topics Aquinas took from Aristotles, which Polo frequently acknowl-
edges e.g. the acting intellect, the distinction between the practical and 
theoretical knowledge, the theory of habits and the guidelines of eth-
ics. 
We can trace a secondary influence from Bonaventure in the dis-
tinction between the faculties and its acts, but this is based on a single 
comment on Polo’s works and will require further research. 
                                                 
44 “Los filósofos de la tradición en los que Leonardo Polo se basa son fundamental-
mente dos: Aristóteles y Tomás de Aquino¨. Sellés, J. F., “Review, La Voluntad y 
sus Actos”, Studia Poliana, 1 (1999) p. 122. 
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In a nutshell Polo’s proposal fits, as he says, withing the classic 
philosophy and expands it in a direction congruent to the realistic prin-
ciples that support it, albeit with some corrections needed to proceed 
and incorporate the findings of modern and contemporary philosophy, 
of which he is part. Nevertheless we have to hightlight again his orig-
inality as Pía Tarazona does: “the meaning Polo gives to synderesis 
cannot be found in traditional philosophy”45. 
How does Polo’s proposal compare with contemporary philoso-
phers?  
Modern and contemporary philosophy had no room for syn-
deresis and had forgotten the capacity of the habits as a way to permit 
the knowledge of the intimacy of the subject and its indefinite progress 
which they sought. So there is no possible direct comparison regarding 
synderesis, as we discussed in Chapter 5. Nevertheless there are clear 
indications of the need to develop synderesis to solve the problems 
created by the radical immanentism and voluntarism of modern phi-
losophy, which, according to Polo, lead to a dead end: “After six 
centuries, we are in a position to say that they have been employed in 
a badly conducted philosophical research. This modern project re-
quires to be thought again”46. 
Polo studied in depth modern philosophy from which he bor-
rowed the use of language that has many similarities with Heidegger’s 
and Zubiri’s styles with whom he also shares some views and terms47; 
mostly in theory of knowledge from Zubiri and on human ‘co-exist-
ence’ from Heidegger48.  
In his works one can see that Polo is in frequent dialogue with 
Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche in his works. Nevertheless none of them 
deal with synderesis, as mentioned above. Polo has similitudes with 
Kierkegaard and the existentialist philosophers but considers that they 
do not have an ontological foundation to their intuitions, which are 
mostly based on a psychological approach, while his approach is on-
tological. The lack of consideration of synderesis in modern 
philosophy is part of a neglect of the consideration of habits in general, 
as Polo states: “I repeat that what I propose about habits is not clear in 
modern philosophy, which ignores habitual knowledge and is an ob-
jectivist philosophy but also in traditional philosophy is not clear. 
                                                 
45 Piá Tarazona, S., “Sobre las Dualidades Intelectuales Superiores”, op. cit., 151. 
46 As we quoted before in note 32. 
47 On top of the quotations found in Polo´s work on Zubiri, especially in the 1st Vol-
ume of his Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento, it is interesting to note the personal 
testimony and the data given by Isabel Aísa regarding the common themes in 
Zubiri, Heidegger and Polo. Aísa, I., “Leonardo Polo: la Persona y el Maestro que 
Conocí”, Thémata, 50 (2014) p. 335. 
48 Cfr. Castilla y Cortazar, B., “En Torno a la Díada Transcendental”, op. cit., 397. 
This article is good to see some similitudes between Polo, Zubiri, Heidegger and 
other contemporary authors. 
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Husserl himself, who once used the notion of habit, does it superfi-
cially. If the works of the great modern philosophers are analyzed, one 
can see how that the notion of habit is missing”49. 
Polo’s interests are more distant from the hermeneutics or ana-
lytical philosophers, though he knew them, because their approach, 
being mainly logic and linguistic was not fundamental and they did 
not deal either with synderesis.  
5th. The last question was: Whether Polo’s proposal can explain 
in a better way human actions, especially with regards to ethics. And 
this is what is being discussed in this Chapter 11. 
6th. Final remarks 
As with works of art, in philosophical research we are told that 
dissertations are never completely finished, they have to be just 
stopped and presented at a particular moment. It is time to close this 
dissertation by summarising the advantages of Leonardo Polo’s pro-
posal and pointing out at topics that may need further development as 
possible lines of research.  
6a. Advantages 
We already mentioned that the triadic structure of the man, 
linked to the method of overcoming the mental boundary is a great 
novelty and a powerful instrument to understand ethics and be the 
foundation of a personalistic ethics. It helps also to understand the four 
levels of love, of happiness and of freedom, and how the personal de-
cisions permeate the unity of the person in every action through 
synderesis. It also helps to understand why freedom, personal love, 
personal knowledge and coexistence cannot be objectivised, or in 
other words that the objective approach to these realities is just ‘objec-
tive’ not real. It also explains well the natural common knowledge 
based on the innate habits which explains why common people, with-
out further knowledge can know God, others, the world love them, and 
direct their lives according to their religious and ethical beliefs, or de-
liberate going against the innermost tendencies they have because 
wrong rationalizations. Further, but far beyond this dissertation, the 
works of Polo are great to analyse and understand in a personalistic 
way the proposals of most philosophers which Leonardo Polo is in a 
continuous dialogue through his works. 
 
6b. Points that need further research 
                                                 
49 “Repito que lo que sostengo sobre los hábitos no está claro, no digo ya en la filo-
sofía moderna, que ignora el conocimiento habitual y es una filosofía objetivista, 
sino también en la filosofía tradicional. El mismo Husserl, que emplea alguna vez 
la noción de hábito, lo hace de manera superficial. Si se analizan las obras de los 
grandes filósofos modernos, se observa que la noción de hábito ha desaparecido”. 
Polo, L., El Conocimiento Habitual de los Primeros Principios, op. cit., 10. 
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We feel that some points of Leonardo Polo’s proposals will need 
further study of which he was aware. For example to clarify the dis-
tinction between sentiments, affections and notices will help to give a 
bit more objectivity to the ethical analysis of synderesis. All of them 
are an un-objective way of knowing something about ourselves, but if 
we do not distinguish them properly we can fall into a sentimental ap-
proach to ethics and reduce happiness to merely ‘feeling good’.  
While Leonardo Polo has a whole course in which he dealt with 
the ‘I’ his development of conscience and consciousness can be further 
developed, especially taking into account that synderesis for him is the 
‘I’. He probably did not devote much time to this because of fear to 
get into a psychological or phenomenological approach which for him 
was not sufficiently deep.  
Leonardo Polo’s new way of doing anthropology opens a new 
door to philosophical research in most of the branches of philosophy 
because he is giving new instruments to anthropology, metaphysics 
and theory of knowledge. It can amply fulfil what Messner required in 
proper ethics: “The three fundamental questions that constitute the 
great ethical systems: the foundation, the essence and the criteria of 
morality”50. We hope that this short opening of his thought will whet 
the appetite of English speaking researchers to look deeper into Polo’s 
valuable proposals.  
***
                                                 
50 “Las tres cuestiones fundamentales que constituyen el objeto de preocupa-
ción de todos los grandes sistemas éticos: la cuestión del fundamento, la de la esencia 
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Socratic Ethics and Christian Morals 
Seville, July 1994 
First Session 
The best way to know what morals is could be to approach the great 
geniuses who have dealt on this topic and who have a strong moral 
sense because, as Aristotle warns, moral is not learned in books, but 
in good men. You can learn it in good men because moral reality is the 
good men and reality is known where it is. Books are neither moral 
nor immoral, they are a few pieces of paper that collect some experi-
ences which with empathy or understanding one can assimilate. But 
the main core, the real core of morality, is in the being-human. 
If things are like this, the best way forward is to look into the 
main topics, that the great men who discovered ethics –some of whom 
gave their lives by living their moral principles to the end. I look firstly 
into Socrates’ legacy. Socrates, according to Plato, who in a great di-
alogue, raises the question: what is worse, to suffer an unjust act, for 
example, being beaten without any reason whatsoever, or to commit 
oneself the wrongful act? The answer to this question shows if one has 
understood what morality is about. If one thinks the worst that can 
happen to someone is to be killed by another or beaten by another, and 
that nothing other than the physical exertion happens to the one who 
has committed the crime, then we do not actually understand morals, 
and this is the opinion that common sense seeminly leads us to. Morals 
are based on the opposite answer. The worst consequence of a wrong-
ful act is that it affects the one who commits it. The argument that 
Socrates gives is deeply ontological: the sufferer of an unjust act is 
extrinsically subjected to the consequences of the act, but the one who 
acts unjustly; the actor of the act, becomes unjust by doing it. 
Our language says it clearly: in a murder there is the person mur-
dered and a murderer, what is worse: to be killed or to be the murderer? 
What does makes one worse human being, to be the murderer or to be 
the victim? The ethical answer is clear; committing murder makes one 
worse. And the same goes for good deeds. There is something para-
doxical in talking about virtue. To become a murderer is to acquire a 
vice; to do a good act is to acquire a virtue. It is not possible that a man 
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does a good act without his very nature acquires an intrinsic good char-
acteristic. When the act is a good one, this intrinsic characteristic is a 
virtue. 
Aristotle starts from this: where is morals? In the virtuous man. 
Where is the immoral reality? In the vicious man. Aristotle takes this 
to its logical conclusion and says that a vicious man is one who cannot 
control himself, the wanton; the incontinent. An incontinent is a victim 
of its own acts to the point that he cannot control them and to such 
extent that he loses his freedom. For the great classical tradition up to 
Thomas Aquinas, freedom is being able to control one’s behaviour, to 
be cause of himself; sibi cause. Sometimes this is taken at the psycho-
logical level of choices, etc., but freedom, above all, is self-control. 
The one who has virtues is his own master and the one who is not his 
own master is for the simple reason that he has vices. And that is un-
failingly. The alternative is not elective, it is ontological; it affects the 
actual nature of man: one becomes good or bad. How does one become 
good or bad? Through one´s actions. This is the way the classics see 
it. This is important because the nucleus of morality is in the acts and 
the acts are determined by their objects; so the moral object must be 
studied. 
John Paul II is interested in the moral object in the encyclical 
Veritatis Splendor. But that is only the beginning of the issue. Then 
comes the ontological construction of morals, which is to become a 
good man or diminished man: the man growing, who increases his ca-
pacities, the man who is capable of self-control, of freedom, or on the 
contrary the man who starts declining. All this starts in the acts, they 
are the starting point, but they do not terminate in the act but in the one 
who acts. Therefore, moral without virtues is not a Socratic moral. 
Socrates restates the theme of virtue, ‘arête’. Arête was one of the ma-
jor constituents of morals in the pre-classical Greek era. Arête is the 
eagerness man has of immortality that ephemeral man has to endure in 
the memory of posterity. Arête ultimately comes down to fame. Who 
has arête? The one who is not forgotten. 
Although this meaning of virtue can be maintained, added within 
the philosophical approach, by going deeper we find that we must in-
ternalize arête; that arête is more than doing glorious deeds to ensure 
that when one dies one is remembered. Sappho, who was a great 
woman, said in splendid verses: “dead I will be eternally buried, no 
memory left of me and posterity will ignore my name”. This is the 
human drama: being forgotten, being reduced to a being who is born 
and dies and that is it. You can be born, you can die, but you can also 
live on. As Sappho continues: “I will wander without shadow on the 
house of Hades”. Wander without shadow means to be incapable of 
exercising any action, is an inactive survival that for Greeks was the 
greatest disgrace. The dead live a ghostly life, an inactive life. The 
dead have hands, but cannot do anything, but that does not mean they 
do not live on. Moreover, to move to Hades the river Eteo has to be 
crossed; it is the river of forgetfulness (‘ether’ means forgetfulness). 
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The dead are in a tragic situation, a situation of utter helplessness, 
where they can do nothing. 
One way to live on is to be inspiring to those who come after, 
that is arête. As I said, this is a first approach to the theme of virtues 
that Socrates intensified to the ultimate point. One can follow this di-
rection: having virtue is to grow as living. If one follows this direction 
one will escape Hades. Socrates’ immortality is already the one of a 
soul that is active, and Plato develops further this understanding of 
immortality. Plato’s theory of the soul is inspired by this Socratic ap-
proach. 
Being better is not an extrinsic denomination; to be better is a 
strengthening of the human nature that frees one from the devouring 
nature of time, of the ephemeral nature of a being. This is unlike what 
Alcmaeon of Crotone mentioned as what distinguishes gods and men: 
the gods can join the beginning to the end. Men on the contrary cannot 
unite birth to death. Man is a being who acts but has an end. To over-
come this, one grows such density to go through death ensuring a post-
mortem activity. This is the way Socrates understands arête and this is 
just true. Man is a type of being able to improve or degrade on its own 
terms, as a human being. Man is not a being already done, a being 
specified beforehand. 
Man is specified as a man by his virtues and un-specifies him-
self, degrades, falls into a state of stoppage that is like a destruction of 
all internal order and all self-control, if he acts wrongly and becomes 
vicious. Man is a being capable of making things and making himself, 
his making has double output: an outer and an inner result. To believe 
that the importance of the action is what is produced, that is what the 
modern activism inclines us to think, but this entails the loss of the 
ontological value of virtue. It is one of the most important things to 
recover the true meaning of virtue. Human actions always have this 
double result: when a shoemaker acts, he produces shoes, but what 
happens to the shoemaker who makes the shoes? The shoemaker does 
not remain unchanged when he acts, the action flows back into him 
and makes him better, this is for certain. This is the Socratic finding 
whose loss destroys morality and makes it a matter of opinion or an 
obsession. Morals is not to be constrained, but gaining freedom pro-
gressively, to be causa sibi. Who is causa sibi? The one who has 
strengthened his capacities sufficiently, strength that is the feed-back 
of the action in the faculty. 
Man is not a being with fixed faculties. Intelligence and will are 
the great faculties of the soul. These two faculties are not fixed powers 
and therefore are not nature, strictly speaking. The man is not only a 
natural being, a being who has operational principles and nothing else; 




I explained this in a doctoral course in Pamplona as follows: I 
often say that there are two ways of understanding potency. The mod-
ern thinkers usually put potency before the act, and that is an infinity 
interpretation of potency: Man is an infinite dynamism. Hegel, for ex-
ample, speaks of the infinite action and infinite action is the self. If the 
self is infinite action, then the self is the infinite potency. This was 
preceded by the flip over that Greek philosophy experienced by the 
Neoplatonism. Plotinus’ first hypostases is like this. The classics on 
the contrary, and particularly Aristotle who is the one who matures 
notions more, admits that the act precedes and is superior to the po-
tency. Then potency has to be finite because the act follows as 
substance. And this is nature; nature means finite power. Well, man 
has no nature because his potency is not finite, but does not have infi-
nite potency as modern philosophy understands it. Man makes 
infinitude by acquiring virtues. Man is capable of unrestricted devel-
opment and that is the infinity of its potential. Because of this he is not 
merely a natural being. 
If we consider man before the exercise of his actions and, there-
fore before achieving virtues, man is not endowed with infinite 
potential and can be considered as a natural being, both at the level of 
the spirit and of the body. If man does not acquire virtues he is merely 
a natural being that has finite potencies. The reason why modern think-
ers do not accept the notion of nature is because they do not accept the 
finitude of the potencies. I too do not accept the finitude of the poten-
cies, but we must rectify the modern understanding of potency because 
the infinity of the potencies is something different, it is the growth of 
the same potency. The growth of the potencies is in the virtues, in the 
habits. Without the habits man is a purely natural being and therefore 
is not yet strictly human. This is why the poet Rilke can say that man 
is a being beyond the end, yes, because being subordinate to the end is 
characteristic of nature and to be beyond any end is characteristic of 
virtue. Characteristic of the potencies infinitude well interpreted, not 
as in the modern meaning, because an infinite action that does not im-
prove the agent is a useless infinity. Modern thinkers considered the 
infinity of the potency in a wrong way. If they had been more Socratic, 
if they had not forgotten the notion of virtue they would not have fallen 
into that wrong direction. Now, those who settle for a finite power do 
not know what ‘morals is’. The one who is satisfied with his natural 
being and reduces morals to nature, falls into the naturalistic fallacy 
which is not to know what morality is. It is not that morals disagree 
with nature, it is much more than that, it is that morality is the devel-
opment of nature. But not just an extensive deployment in the same 
direction in the sense of pure exercise, no, it is the intensification of 
nature. Humans who have intensified their nature are good men, and 
from them we can learn morality. Aristotle says that morality is in 
them and it must be sought there. 
I dare to think that Socrates, when he said this, said it under the 
action of the Holy Spirit. The action of the Holy Spirit is not limited 
to the people of Israel and later to the Catholic Church; the Holy Spirit 
blows where he wills. For how can a man say that it is better to be 
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killed than be a murderer? This means that the acts of man will inher-
ently affect him; usually I say that man is a being that intrinsically 
rewards or punishes himself. St. Augustine also repeats: what is the 
punishment of a disordered mind? His own disorder. What is the pun-
ishment of one who has done wrong? That he becomes bad, or as an 
old Castillian saying expresses: God punishes without pain or stick. A 
cluttered mind, a soul torn by his actions; that is the punishment. 
Plato retakes the matter up to higher levels, he says that it is clear 
and that from this comes the feeling of guilt. Notice that the whole 
sense of responsibility for the acts is here: what does it mean to be 
responsible for an action? That the act is attributed to you. From the 
point of view of the judge, there is an external judgement that attrib-
utes the act, but there is an internal trial, a trial in an ontological sense: 
one judges oneself, one punishes himself for becoming evil. Evil is not 
a vague term, evil is to become less, to deprive oneself of being. 
Thomas Aquinas says that the condemned is proper nihil, is as close 
to nothing as possible; one is not annihilated, but one is as if annihi-
lated. Is he a condemned a man? It was a man, but does he remain as 
one? He does not, he is the remaining ashes of a man, an ember without 
fire. That’s worse than the Hades. What can a condemned person do? 
Nothing, he cannot even speak, says Thomas Aquinas. Those con-
demned can speak only of themselves, they are not interested in 
anything else, they are entangled in an inner tragedy, and dialogue in 
hell is pure rumour, no dialogue. Nobody exchanges ideas, nobody 
cares for others, there everyone takes care of each himself; they have 
killed language. 
This is a development that can be made based on Socrates and 
include it in the Christian vision of life. I say that Socrates hits the nail 
on the head and that it is right to think this is not easy for the fallen 
human being to get it right. The fallen human being normally thinks 
that it is better to hit than to be hit, because the worst is to receive the 
blow. But Socrates says that the worst is to give the blow. Evil affects 
firstly and more intensely than anyone to the one who gives the blow. 
This is revolutionary and in our culture, which is in a deep moral crisis, 
that has lost this meaning, this revolution is still to be done. Our culture 
has a more or less obscured conscience, but the worst moral crisis is 
to lose the sense of virtue. We do not know what virtue is; instead we 
want external goods at any price. We do not know what happens to us 
when we acquire external goods; nor do we care to know. Therefore, 
we lack self-control and we are building a disorganized society; we 
have lost the meaning of society, we are in a very deep crisis. 
Without knowing it, there are people who acquire virtues and are 
progressing. Thanks to that, society has not collapsed. We leave aside 
now the Catholic Church or Revelation which is the second source of 
morality that considers the same topics but in a more serious angle, or 
more intensely seen, that is, that man puts in line his life as regards to 
God. That is, if it does good he is more like God, he is making his 
image and likeness and if not, he becomes a lie and is risking the judg-
ment of God: I know you not. How can God say that he does not know 
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the man whom he has created in his image and likeness? Only if you 
have deleted that image. Come to me, blessed of my Father: this is 
image of recognition. Come unto me, you are like me and you have 
increased your likeness. Increasing similarity is to be virtuous and to 
be virtuous is to increase the similarity. Now we take another key of 
what Socrates said, when speaking of a soul that looked at itself, the 
soul that can survive being active or the one in the situation of Hades. 
Man is immortal, but how is he immortal? St. Augustine also asks this 
question; you know that you are immortal; would this suffice? Well, 
not so, because immortality has two meanings. [Augustine indicates 
that the immorality of the bleesed is the true immortality; that of the 
condemned is a different type of inmortality that is not fit for men] 
Well, the island of the blessed, which is the Platonic heaven, is 
a very, very small heaven where the souls just contemplate ideas. 
Some people say that the Christian vision is platonic. No, being the 
image and likeness of God is something more serious, it is to increase 
the similarity. To be more like God to the point of putting on Christ to 
be ipse Christus [the same Christ], that’s the key. Aristotle spoke of 
the good man, but we say that the one who reveals man is Jesus Christ. 
 
First Session Answers; the questions were not recorded. 
Human power cannot be saturated. God is not, cannot be, op-
posed to ‘nothingness’; he creates what he wants. That is an 
unfortunate fixity. We speak of divine nature because we adopt a ter-
minology to understand ourselves, but God has no nature because he 
is not a substance. To say that God is substance is blasphemy, this is 
what Saint Augustine says. God is the absolute intimacy; he is the orig-
inal, the absolute increasing. To say that, that is a thing, a substance 
with nature… 
Metaphysics, says that God is either absolutely original and that 
he is no substance in any way, or is a fiasco. How is God going to be 
an operating principle? There is nothing in God that originally was not 
in him? In God there is no deployment whatsoever. In God we cannot 
speak of distinction between essence and esse says Thomas Aquinas, 
but to the point of its ultimate conclusion that there is no divine es-
sence; of God we can only speak of esse. The essence has absolutely 
nothing to do with the personal Trinity. 
 
Second Session 
Let’s have a look at Genesis, where there is something that can 
be put in parallel with the Socratic approach. There it says that man is 
made to dominate the earth and this is in a context in which the world 
is good (God saw that it was good), but when God created man he saw 
it was very good. So one can say that the relationship man has with the 
universe is to the active; strictly active: the relationship of the very 
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good with the good. But that relationship is obviously the improve-
ment of the good by the very good. Saint Augustine alludes to this 
when he says that God has reserved to man the work of beautifying 
the universe. 
The man is not the creator of the universe, but the universe has 
been made so that it is not incompatible with man. The man would be 
incompatible with the universe if he had nothing to do with it. It would 
have been inconsistent and would have no relationship with him. The 
theory of evolution that can be taken as correct. Another thing is how 
it is understood or described, but man is in a very close relationship 
with the universe, because of his origin in the universe; he is made of 
clay. However, this does not make man an intra-cosmic being, but he 
is the ruler of the universe in the sense that his relationship with the 
world is predominantly active. Therefore, man is called —as his voca-
tion merges with his being, because one cannot say that someone is 
called to something extrinsic— to have a place in the cosmos and that 
it is obvious that the cosmos is his home. That makes it the perfecter 
of the universe. 
This idea can be seen as problematic today because some may 
think that the action of man over things is not perfecting, but disturbing 
them. This is proven by the ecological problem. But the emergence of 
the ecological problem, which is undeniable and also its ethical char-
acterization, makes us see to what extent there has been a disturbance. 
It makes no sense to think that God has created man and the universe 
in a conflicting relationship. If the conflict happens, it is because man 
has not been true, because man has betrayed his relationship with the 
universe. This must have taken place at the very beginning of history. 
The emergence of the phenomenon of the ecological problem is dis-
played: Adam was already told that his relationship with the land will 
be difficult, that they will have to earn their bread by the sweat of their 
brow, that there will be thorns that the world will not be in a com-
pletely harmonious relationship. Here we already have the ecological 
problem. Man has to do some violence to things. Also Paul says: crea-
tures suffer vanity. And this vanity is because they are waiting for the 
manifestation of the glory of the children of God. This is because man 
has failed, has distorted, what he had to do. Men’s mission in the uni-
verse has been broken in some way. 
That does not mean that man is completely spoiled, that man has 
a corrupt nature, as Luther says. Man’s relationship with things is pro-
ductive, is inventive, and as it is also said creative. Man is God’s 
collaborator and what is radical of his personal being is not to separate 
from God. Man is done in this way and is provided with powers and 
capacities, which in the same measure that have not been corrupted, 
are beautifying work even if there are some failures. Man cannot re-
nounce work. One cannot say that if I work I am spoiling the world. 
Nevertheless it is clear that man is ontologically made to perfect 
the universe. Man’s place in the cosmos is to add reality to the cosmos, 
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add something that the cosmos cannot give itself. That mediating char-
acter is constitutive of their being created, this is what specifies man. 
This is expressed in a simple formula: man is perfectible perfecter. 
That perfectibility refers to virtue: man when perfecting, perfects him-
self and cannot continue perfecting more if he does not perfect himself 
more. This is the dynamics of virtue. So we have to see it in this way: 
first of all, that man is placed in the universe, but not as a being who 
follows the rhythms of the universe or a being that has nothing to do 
with the universe. No, first of all man is a doer, he is a perfecter by his 
activity. 
Here is the subject of the action and as I already said it is the 
basic theme of ethics because through it ethics begins, virtues are ac-
quired by acting and through action one acquires goods. I think that 
this is not sufficiently clear in the classical interpretation. The idea that 
the man tends to the good with his will is not enough; man with his 
will does good, perfects. This, on the other hand, makes a distinction 
that Thomas Aquinas suggests when he says that good in a proper 
sense is ethical good, the goodness of the action. One can speak of the 
good transcendentally, but goodness is in the action. And that action, 
if it is good is perfective, has a result… thus is productive, it is not 
sterile. Producing is more than what the universe can do. The physical 
universe cannot produce, it can cause, has an influence, its own effec-
tiveness; one can even speak of the natural history of the universe, but 
the appearance of man in the universe introduces an innovation over 
the universe that rebounds in the universe. This has probably to do 
with the new heaven and the new earth. We probably are missing 
something, no matter how hard we try. The doctrine of progress shows 
awareness of the value of human action, and I do not renounce to this 
because in the modern conception, although not well oriented, there is 
an increasing awareness of the value of the human action. Modernity, 
in fact, appears with the Newtonian mechanics that is an interpretation 
of the universe that says that man can influence it; it is a technical 
interpretation of the universe. 
Newton did not manage to construct a cosmology; his theoretical 
study of the universe is classical, modern physics is rational mechanics 
and in the preface to the Principia, Newton says: we need to under-
stand the universe in this way because what the vetere, the old, called 
mechanical was an art, now one has to apply this to all the universe. 
Behind this deep desire to produce is one of the things we have inher-
ited from the modern age. This productive way leads to perverse 
effects today, not to perfect the world, but to spoil it. The attitude of 
postmodernism is reluctant to human action, criticism of the technical. 
But the technical today covers everything. Medicine, for example, is 
also production; biology: genetic engineering. Everything is interpre-
tation of the universe as something that man can already handle and to 
which he can add something. And the knowledge of the universe, tech-
nique, has a practical meaning. 
Perhaps there are some neglects in stressing this aspect. To con-
sider man as productive asserts that man is perfecter, but there’s a lack 
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of care that environmentalists point out. I do not share the environ-
mental stance; I think it points out an abuse, but it is not a solution. 
The point is not to reduce the activity of beautifying, but to give more 
emphasis to it and eliminate what spoils the world, but not declare that 
man is by nature a spoiler. That is false anthropology. No, man is not 
made to spoil, but to improve. 
The relationship with the universe can be applied also to the re-
lationship between man and man, relationship that is also perfectible. 
Here we discover another dimension of human action. Aristotle, when 
he comes to this, distinguishes two types that he calls dominion, not 
technique. The despotic rule is a relationship between man and the 
universe in which the universe is passive; that is how the man is a 
craftsman or a technician and this is the first dimension: the dimension 
of the arts. But then there is the political dominion that is characterized 
as being established between beings, that all of them are active and 
this is the appearance of collaboration. This is a structure for action 
that is sometimes forgotten and political action is also forgotten. Po-
litical action has nothing to do with the current idea we have of 
politics; for Aristotle it is the action that is established among humans. 
The structure of the relationship between two human beings has 
double entry: there is a double input and output in each of the subjects. 
Furthermore each input and output are correlative but different since 
action between men is inter-action. This has a number of implicits that 
would be difficult to expand now. This is well developed by Pérez 
López, but it is basically Aristotle’s political action. So, man is always 
‘perfectible perfecter’ to the universe and ‘perfectible perfecter’ in the 
relationships with other men. And when it comes to other men the 
character of ‘perfectible perfecter’ is more intense, more engaging. 
The extent to which a man can improve or damage another is much 
greater than the technical application of man to things. The domain of 
politics is higher than the domain of the despotic. 
However, environmentalists refer to an abuse of despotic action: 
we are spoiling the universe in biblical terms, we are located in the 
universe incorrectly and we extend it, we do not stop it nor correct it. 
Aristotle says that the characteristic of these practices is that they are 
actions that can be corrected. The issue of correcting the practical rea-
son is essential in the philosophy of Aristotle, and Aristotle himself 
admits that we always make mistakes. However, in the origin it was 
not, in the beginning it was not so. That is, as the Bible shows us, the 
first man exerted an action that is not correctable and when we wanted 
to correct it we made a great mess. The correction of human action 
from Adam and Eve tempted by the serpent; that is the original sin. 
Why was Adam’s action strictly correct? Why by practical reason 
Adam was not correctable? Because it had to do with good and do 
more good; It had to do with good and improving. The first action de-
scribed in the Bible was to name things. Naming things was something 
I could do; things cannot name themselves. In short, the primary ac-
tion, thanksgiving, is the language par excellence. Language is not 
theory, it is action. What political relationship existed between Adam 
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and Eve? The Bible gives us no other reason than that they talked. 
Talking is adding, is perfecting. Talking is the most perfective of all 
human actions. Therefore, from the point of view of the action the 
worst thing that can happen is the corruption of language. Wrong lan-
guage about things tears things apart; people using language wrongly 
destroys society. We should take utmost care with language. The main 
concern is to take care of man’s language. There are banned expres-
sions; you cannot call your brother a rat. You should not shock and 
scandal, which is linguistic. Impoverishment of language is the decay 
of a society. Deceit, abuse of language, is strictly prohibited. These 
standards are in the Decalogue, to lie is inherently wrong. To say foul 
brood is contrary to our own thinking; it is intrinsically bad and that is 
a standard for all, we should never lie. That affects our highest action: 
our highest mode of action is to speak. 
To develop this would take many hours, we would have to see 
how man has altered language. The father of lies is the devil. The orig-
inal temptation consisted of cheating, saying that God had not given 
to man the knowledge of good and evil. Because of this Thomas Aqui-
nas says that original sin is a sin of science. What I am saying is a gloss 
on that thesis. A sin of science as a practical science is science, it has 
to do with the beautifying of the universe and has to do with the action 
and reaction among humans. The despotic action at the end is linguis-
tic, it is a form of language; political action is strictly linguistic. The 
denial of information, the silence, is bad, is unethical. What is human 
is to talk. The short and and larger silence; are not silence, who under-
stands it in this way does not know what it is; those silences are for 
talking, not with others but to talk to God and to establish a linguistic 
relationship, without which one cannot work. But staying silent is anti-
human. To remove linguistic communication is a moral fault of the 
first order, and a lie is an extension of silence, i.e. a vacuum of com-
munication. The error is also unethical, a vice of intelligence, 
according to Thomas Aquinas; not only the will can sin, intelligence 
also has its errors, it is to dare to say what one does not know. Thinking 
is always stopping, rushing into thinking goes against thinking. 
Morals are like this, they have an ontological foundation. You 
can have moral sense, but when it comes to understand the issue, one 
either comes down to the ontological foundation, or one does really 
understand it. The most radical thing man can do with his being is to 
admit that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to him, because the 
science of good and evil is the original sin. As I have already said, to 
determine the right and wrong is not for man. Imagine we have the 
knowledge of good and evil. What is evil? Whatever I declare. What 
is good? Whatever I declare. Man is not made for that. Unfortunately 
or fortunately, because we have been redeemed, we have unleashed 
evil and we have to deal with it, by trying to drown evil in an abun-
dance of good. What does it mean to do good so that evil is drowned 
in an abundance of good? It means to do so much good as to banish 
evil. Catholics are committed, redeemed from the original sin which 
is the knowledge of good and evil that man robbed from God, but to 
the perfecter, perfecting should belong the science of the good and the 
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best, and nothing more than that. In no way corresponds to him the 
science of evil as an alternative; that is not human. Just as God does 
not give his glory to anyone, he did not give the knowledge of good 
and evil because man’s place in the cosmos is to increase the good and 
in doing so man becomes better, he is increased in order to the good, 
he acquires virtues. And that is the only thing that legitimately belongs 
to man. 
Thomas Aquinas says that original sin is the very essence of sin. 
What happens when the idea of evil appears after one has acquired the 
knowledge of good and evil? What comes first is a lie of believing that 
there is something evil; there is nothing evil because all that God has 
done is good. But as it is a sin of science, it entails that if there is 
something bad I have to sort it and I have to repair it alone; thus man 
becomes a mender. The primary vocation of man is not that of a 
mender, but when he runs into evil it needs to be fixed: this is the his-
torical situation. But in the same measure as there is evil, that 
something is seen as bad, there are two very serious implicits of sin: 
the first is that one believes that God is clumsy, which is a blasphemy 
‘as big as a house’. God the creator is not a clumsy God. This is the 
essence of Gnosticism which is a line of thought that runs through all 
mankind and that, besides, is the essence of heresy; all heresy is gnos-
tic. I thought that the only heretic who was not a gnostic was Luther 
until I read his commentary on Philippians 2:5-11, which is a gnostic 
interpretation. Redemption is the self-justification of God. That is Lu-
ther’s thesis of the abasement and even the glorification of Christ; truly 
monstrous. But all gnosis contains is this idea: a savior God that comes 
to make up for the mistake of God the Creator. If God created a being 
that can be radically corrupted, whose nature is corrupt, God was 
wrong. So redemption is merely correcting the error on the part of God 
and man’s justification is extrinsic because whoever is justified is God. 
Even in heaven man is still as sinner; God does not take away the sin, 
he just covers it. 
This is a blasphemy as big a castle because it denies divine om-
niscience and the negation of Gods’ omnipotence is in original sin. If 
there is evil, God has done wrong, he has done bad things. When the 
Bible says that God saw that it was good, evil does not appear any-
where. In this situation to admit that something is evil is an insult to 
God. But as science works, we have to remedy this evil and when man 
separates himself from God, he demands to act without collaboration. 
Man no longer works with God, but corrects God. This interpretation 
of God as a God who is mistaken runs throughout history. Nietzsche 
says this in a remarkable way: ‘the great boldness of German idealism 
is to put evil in God’. But such courage is not only found in the German 
idealism; it appears throughout history, as Gnosticism. Gnosis is radi-
cally to establish that God is evil, or that evil comes from God. 
 





Let’s see, I think it is clear that the original sin is a pretty big sin, 
which contains all elements of sin, as Thomas Aquinas says; it is pride, 
lack of hope, the claim of autonomy, blasphemy, lying, doing what 
should not be done, and not accepting what needs to be done. 
I believe that this view of original sin, apart from looking like 
the only one that has to do with the biblical vision of man as one that 
is made to work and accomplish the work of embelishment, has a num-
ber of historical corroborations; one of the most notable is the 
understanding of the structure of Gnosticism. 
We can say now that this is the way evil is triggered. That orig-
inal sin has efficacy because man, being a creature, is extremely active 
and acts in either way. God allows it (let us say man’s sin is not as 
intense as the Angel’s), but evil penetrates history and can spread and 
there is a struggle between good and evil. This implies that the moral 
order changes. Here we have an issue that never would have existed 
without the original sin, and that is the origin and deployment of a 
number incorrect attitudes that make legislation necessary; they have 
to be forbidden. The first prohibition is that man should not have the 
knowledge of good and evil. Once this was broken, a series of wrong-
ful acts appeared. A provident God, A God who cares for humanity 
tells man what he cannot do. I think that this is the origin of what are 
called the negative norms, whose universal value has historically be-
ing emphasized. It is like this: you cannot kill, you cannot lie, you 
cannot fornicate, you cannot steal. But these are consecutive prohibi-
tions, prohibitions on the situation post pecatum (after the original sin) 
when it is possible for man to commit such acts because it has been 
disorganized. Evil appears in many ways and all this has to be banned. 
Moreover, the original sin does not totally corrupt man, he realizes that 
there are evils. Here appears the issue of moral conscience, and this is 
the way man has lived in his state of post pecatum trough history. 
But beneath the moral conscience that captures the prohibited 
nature of such misconduct there is a more important thing and that is 
that man maintains his status as an active being and this is shown to 
him by a deeper source than conscience, which is synderesis. Syn-
deresis is the human beings innate understanding of the first moral 
principles, not only of the negative rules. In the same way that if we 
disregard the moral virtues morality collapses, if we do not take into 
account synderesis the perception of morality would also be very lim-
ited. Here is a deeper understanding of the core of actions, of the value 
of actions as such, since man is a being made to act. Now comes the 
problem of how to formulate what is captured with synderesis: do 
good and avoid evil; that is the great moral principle. I would say 
"avoid evil", yes, but synderesis has more a character of an impulse 
that indicates more what is positive than what is negative: do good. 
Synderesis indicates that good should be done: do not settle! do not 
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get out of the way! do not be useless! Why? Because even though this 
situation of violated or incomplete status, of not having moral integ-
rity, nevertheless, in spite of all this, what is paramount in man is still 
valid; it has not been erased; man has to do! man must act! I think this 
is the moral obligation, the moral duty. 
The moral duty is not to avoid evil; that is already assumed; the 
moral duty is that one cannot inhibit himself. One can express it as 
follows: do not be afraid to take responsibility, you have to take com-
mand on issues to the possibilities you have; you cannot be coward, 
timid; you have to act. What is implicit in this that if one does good 
works, one improves. Do! You have no choice but to act because oth-
erwise you cannot improve. I think the development of the imago Dei 
(image of God) is the indication that emerges from synderesis, of the 
understanding of the first moral principle. 
This is how the problem of duty, of obligation, appears. Man is 
obliged. But obligation relates to action: You must find your vital pro-
ject, your vocation in the deepest sense of the word, that kind of acts 
you are committed to do according to your upbringing, your skills, 
your fitness. This issue of duty has been formulated by the moral phi-
losophers. One of the more drastic approaches is the Kantian 
formulation. Kant proposed that the will exudes a categorical impera-
tive. That imperative is categorical in the sense that it obliges by itself 
and precisely that it obliges by itself means that it is not due to other 
reasons: the advantages, pleasures, conveniences or results. In short, 
the Kantian approach is anti-hedonist. I am required to never act below 
the level of my own will. As Kant puts it: what is holy in the world is 
a good will. This means that Kant exalts the will, which is above eve-
rything. Where it is subordinated to something somewhat lower, it will 
not be kept at its own level. Fichte, following the same approach puts 
it another way; I know who you are, do not allow yourself to be dom-
inated by anything because if you let it dominate you, you have 
somehow been diminished. Anything that is not pure will, acting in 
response to sheer will, is degraded; it is a decline, since what is holy 
is a good will. 
There is no doubt that Kant’s formulation seems plausible, there 
is moral greatness on it. However, the approach is inadequate because 
firstly, it is fixed. To act in accordance with the law, not to particular-
ize it by empirical interests, shows that the imperative has a static 
formulation. There is no progress. Actually the categorical imperative 
replaces virtue and, in fact, is not practical, because it does not say go, 
it is not the synderesis, but a replacement. Because synderesis does not 
say what you have to do but: ‘you have to do’. Synderesis has the form 
of an impulse. Being true to yourself is not to maintain in the order of 
one’s own will, it is not that, but that you have to give, that’s synderesis 
The categorical imperative seems to be practical but it is not because 
it is not an invitation to do. From the categorical imperative does not 
come out any impulse to do, but is rather what should be or how it 
should be, but it does not say by what types of acts? It’s actually rather 
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an incentive not to act, because of this it eventually degenerates basi-
cally into a moral formalism, which is actually the history of Kantian 
morality as it has been understood. That itch for absolute purity which 
is equivalent to an uncontaminated will makes it impossible to take 
any action. Because if some action is exerted contamination seems in-
evitable. Rather it is there I do not know how to put it across; you 
should act in a way that you are completely pure. In this Socrates and 
Fenelon have been found, and this is acknowledged by Kant. The in-
fluence of Fenelon would be very revealing for the meaning of Kant’s 
categorical imperative. Fenelon says that man must act out of pure 
love; this is the famous theme of pure love. To act of pure love is too 
much to ask, to start with. Can one act out of pure love? Perhaps after 
acquiring many virtues, but pure love, pure love, I would say no; there 
is something that you cannot remove from love and that is hope. An 
act of pure love, perhaps it may be, but to maintain moral life in terms 
of pure love does not seem possible, because that would end in the 
failure of doing nothing. 
There is some stiffening in Kant. The categorical imperative is 
not a good interpretation of synderesis. Synderesis says go ahead, you 
have to do. From your acts you will be providing, increasing, because 
your performance, if it is not contravening the negative norms, will 
result in something good for others, and also an improvement of your 
own will. This means that the pure will is not the highest, not the holy. 
There is a theological error here. Saints believe that God is Holy and 
what God wants is most lovable, it is his will, because what is primor-
dial holiness and human holiness should not aspire to be equivalent to 
God’s holiness. Holiness is God himself, God is holy, thrice holy. That 
would take a long time to expose. The will of God is holy because God 
is the holy of holies. So talk of a pure and holy will who is the tran-
scendental subject and that it will determine the duty, I think it is 
taking the wrong end of the stick. No, man has to improve.  
Precisely because man can improve he can resemble God in ho-
liness, but is a similar holiness, not the pure holiness of God that is 
unique. The moral from synderesis is seen as an incentive to improve 
and act: that is your destiny, you have to destine yourself to be holy, 
you have to realize that what is in you is a seed of holiness, and that is 
your ability to act because that capacity is to contribute. So instead of 
the categorical imperative, act, contribute! Then no longer is the will 
is taken as the centre but the person, because the person can be de-
scribed as being that contributes, who expands reality. Something new 
will come if I decide to act. I do not have to take care obsessively of 
the holiness of my will, firstly because there is no such thing, and sec-
ondly, because if I worry of that, I do nothing. 
Goodness is in the action because the action by itself contributes 
and is also the condition of an improvement, an acquisition of virtues. 
I think these are two different ways of understanding morals, without 
denying the Kantian grandeur. But the high demand Kant proposes is 
not possible, there is a mistake; he does not realize that man has to do 
more and has to want better. This second view, wanting better, I think, 
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is a better deployment, and is implicit in this issue of acting. You 
should not only want the thing you want but you want to improve your 
want. This is in Thomas Aquinas in a short manner, but dominates his 
ethical approach: it is what he calls the curvature of the will. The cur-
vature of the will can be described as follows: that the will is curve 
means that our wanting involves our subjectivity, in a partial manner, 
but yes, and this is an observation that has been discovered in modern 
times, that unlike what happens when one thinks, when the will wants, 
the ‘I’ has to support the will and if not, the want does not exist. There 
is a sentence of Nietzsche that is profitable; it is a riddle that is already 
seen in Thomas Aquinas’ curvature of the will. Nietzsche said that I 
cannot despise if I did not accept myself as despiser. I can not perform 
the act of contempt if I do not accept myself as the one who despises. 
When one thinks, one does not have to accept oneself as a thinker be-
cause the person does not constitute the act of thinking. That will be 
nonsense, because the person does not constitute the act of thinking, 
this would be silly, it will be superfluously and uselessly transfering 
the real way of thinking, but that is characteristic of the will. The 
thought unfolds because it unfolds, because we have sufficient power. 
We do not have to make ourselves as the thinker or to accept ourselves 
as thinking to accept the thought, but we have to do it for wanting, 
because if not, the voluntary act cannot be exercised. The voluntary 
act drags, commits the human subject. Without that kind of recogni-
tion of the human subject in the voluntary act there is no voluntary act. 
This is more than the categorical imperative of Kant because it occurs 
in every voluntary act and not in the categorical imperative that is like 
a norm, not an act. 
Let us remind ourselves what Socrates said: Whoever commits 
murder becomes a murderer. Nietzsche says: to despise one has to ac-
cept himself as the despiser, otherwise one actually does not despise. 
And I would have to say it all times; if I do not accept as the one who 
actually wants, I do not want. If I do not accept myself as the one who 
wants to eat, I do not eat, if I do not accept myself as the one who 
wants to kill, I do not kill. And that goes for all deeds, good and bad, 
and that means that the will is curved, that the ‘I’ is in the will, that is, 
the will is reflexive while the intelligence is not. But then there is a 
mismatch: if I accept myself as the one who wills, I do not accept my-
self completely, I realize that I am not my want, that the want is not 
the same as the ‘I’ who wants. The ‘I’ lends his assistance, but at the 
same time perceives that accepting himself in that particular wanting 
is not enough for him and that therefore the person aims to want more, 
to do more, which is also proper of synderesis. 
In that improvement we realize how virtues arise, how this hap-
pens, because man cannot settle for any of his wants, viewed from the 
point of view of the reflexivity of the will. Man is dissatisfied with all 
his wants and therefore the issue of the holy will cannot be accepted, 
because the will can improve and have to improve because the wants 
involve the ‘I’, but they do not exhaust the ‘I’. The imperative can be 
expressed like this: want better, want more; do not want more things 
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but want better, want more. I think this is the right approach. There-
fore, in the intention of the voluntary act has two sides; what is wanted 
(loved), and the ‘I’ who by getting involved in what is wanted, is not 
totally satisfied. The will says, I have to want more; it’s wanting to 
want. The voluntary act is not simply to want what one wanted, but 
wanting to want. But that wanting to want aspires to want more, to 
better want. Here we find what is primary in man: a knowledge of good 
and only of good. A knowledge of good and only good is the science 
that comes from synderesis: by engaging man in love; the superiority 
of the person with respect to any act of the will, is what that drives a 
person to look for a better voluntary act. 
I think we have seen enough ethic’s dimensions and that the eth-
ics of virtues is coming from the person, from that personal 
connotation that is constitutive of the voluntary act, but that it does not 
exhaust it and that the person always requires a better love. Therefore, 
there is no an act of pure love, but something better, an act entirely 
generous: I am not satisfied with this, I want to want better. This has 
an ontological value and what Kant says, no. 
 
 
Answers to 3rd Session Questions 
 
The person prevails over his actions. The person is imago Dei, 
and satisfaction arises when the person can no longer want better. I 
think here we must apply what St. Paul says: then ye shall know as 
known. What happens is that without the Holy Spirit this is impossible. 
Man’s fate with regard to his will is to be dissatisfied and who says 
I’m already satisfied, and I already want enough; no! The person im-
poses its non-homeostatic character with respect to the will because if 
the person does not consent to the voluntary act, that act does not exist. 
But for the person for whom the voluntary action is insufficient, un-
satisfactory, because the voluntary act does not entirely express it, 
what the person does is to demand constantly more from his will. This 
is what can be discovered from synderesis and confront Kant. 
The will reflects that the person is more than the intelligence, 
which does a poor job of this. When the limit is overcome is when the 
person appears to the intellect. Because of this overcoming the limit is 
much like a voluntary act, because it gets to the other, it no longer 
works by assimilation, but it has access to what is radical without an 
objective possession. I’m on the other by distinction, but when it is an 
act of love there is congregation, joining yourself to the other, realizing 
that this union with the other commits yourself but that it is not yet 
enough. There is a dimension of overcoming the limit that is the hu-
man essence. To remain at the human essence is just to remain in what 
is available. That is the fourth dimension of overcoming the mental 
limit. In it one captures what the will is, and that is the human essence. 
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This is the finding of insufficiency of the voluntary acts. Overcoming 
the limit has four dimensions; this is the last, the fourth. First one aban-
dons the being that one is not, and then (2) overcomes the limit of the 
essence of the being that one is not, (3) then the limit of what one is 
not, and (4) then the limit of one’s essence. When overcoming the limit 
of one’s essence, the essence appears as pure independence of the per-
son and that is the notion of arranging and the real distinction is that 
to want does not identify one in a way that wanting to want be one’s 
exclusive fulfilling. That is the real distinction between the essence-
esse. 
Why is the human essence described as arranging? Because it 
depends on the transcendental freedom. What depends on the first 
principle is the causal analytics, which is the essence of what is extra-
mental. What depends on freedom is what is available. Freedom ar-
ranges, but one should not confuse ‘to arrange’ with ‘what is 
arrangeable’. I cannot arrange myself, I can want to increase my ca-
pacity of arranging but I cannot increase what is available to be 
arranged. What is available is the culture. Willing is not identical to 
the person. 
In the beatific vision arranging will no longer be interesting. The 
will and intelligence depend on the person, so when the person exer-
cises love of God, this is not proper of the will, which a priori means 
that it is the person; the radical nature of the will and not at its essential 
character. This love also rebounds to the essence, but it never happens 
in the will as distinct where the beatific vision takes place but in its 
personal root. This is because both the intelligence and the will are 
primarily in the person. Therefore, in the person both are indistinguish-
able. One can talk about personal transcendentals and that will 
rebound in the essence, but that is not the fulfilling of the person; the 
person is fulfilled by God, the person is fullfiled by his co-existence 
with God; but not in identity. 
Duty is compatible with happiness as happiness is the possession 
of goodness, which Kant does not take into account even if he postu-
lates it. In the Critique of Practical Reason there is a oscillation when 
speaking of the will as ratio-essendi (reason to be) of the categorical 
imperative and when he says that it begets merit and that it will be 
rewarded. Then what is eudemonic must be eliminated because it is of 
low standing, but that begets merit and if merit is engender this will 
lead to eternal happiness, and therefore God must exist. That’s the pos-
tulate. But if begets merit this means that he is not the highest, God is 
higher because he is the one who rewards merit. If happiness is in God 
then it begets merit. There is a final happiness got on the merit of main-
taining a will, but this is a postulate, that there is happiness that has to 
correspond with that; and that happiness does not reside on the imper-
ative. Man cannot be happy, but God can make him happy, and that 




I have to want to increase the amount of good and for that I have 
to increase my love. The big problem is that, one does not know what 
happiness is. Happiness is the vaguest notion that exists and why 
Thomas Aquinas says that if we identify happiness to frui (fruition) 
then all kind of errors come along, when man places happiness in in-
ferior goods. A man can enjoy food and believe that is happiness, but 
that according to the curvature of the will he will remain as an eater. 
So I say that what we have here is within one’s control because when 
I want to enjoy eating I realize that does not satisfy my ‘I’. To bring 
good to one’s being is necessary to take the willing to the highest level 
through the curvature of will. In the event that ‘good’ be an absolute 
transcendental, although I think it is not then ‘good’ is reduced to what 
is nice and that someone is nice; the good is then reduced to love which 
is a personalist understanding of good. The tendency towards happi-
ness leads the will to act and this is fruition, but the will cannot 
determine whether that act is good or evil. So we can speak of voluntas 
ut natura and if it were not for the person, that cannot be straightened 
and understand that, with fruition alone, one does not want enough. 
The voluntas ut natura does not have a culminating act. A culminating 
act regarding God cannot be known and this is why desiderium natu-
rale videndum Dei is not proof of the existence of God. The person 
cannot fill this desire, but knows that there is un-satisfaction. But in 
order to talk about this, we should have explained that one cannot tell 
which is the act of the will that has to do with the supreme act; we have 
no knowledge about which is the act that fills the will. You can say 
what it is the act that set the will to rest, but then you have to under-
stand the will as orexis. That is also what Thomas Aquinas attempts to 
prove when he says that the good that leads to happiness is an unfailing 
good. Nevertheless we need also another thing, and that is that the 
firmness of the good is corresponded with the firmness of adherence 
to the good. This adherence can only be achieved with virtue because, 
if not, the will is fickle. It is not enough the indefectibility of the good 
but also that one’s commitment is firm. 
The semina virtutum intelectualis is the agent intellect and here 
in the will has to be something similar. The starting point is synderesis. 
Love, as a transcendental, is to go out to the other. The other is already 
brought in by the intelligence and due to the initiative of the other. It 
could happen otherwise, this is the Holy Spirit, which is the mediator. 
The one who pushes to go to the other is the Spirit, who is the Com-
forter, because he is the mediator, because he it is the gift, the third 
dimension of the gift; giving is the first, the second is to accept, and 
the personal gift that has a mission which is the improvement. As the 
Spirit is unitive, he says do not separate, do not keep yourself in sepa-
ration. But one has to think this over much longer. Another person is 
the only thing that eliminates loneliness, the monadic character of the 
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Para saber lo que es la moral quizá lo mejor sea ir a los grandes 
genios que se han ocupado y han tenido un fuerte sentido moral, por-
que como advierte Aristóteles, la moral no se aprende en los libros, 
sino en los hombres buenos. Se aprende en los hombres buenos porque 
la realidad moral es el hombre bueno y la realidad se conoce ahí donde 
está. Los libros no son morales ni inmorales ni nada, son unos trozos 
de papel donde hay expresión de algunas experiencias y por empatía o 
comprensión lo puede uno asimilar. Pero el bloque, la realidad en blo-
que de la moral, está en el ser humano. 
Si es así, lo mejor es acudir a los puntos centrales, a los grandes 
descubridores que alguno de ellos lo ha vivido hasta la muerte. Me 
referiré en primer lugar a Sócrates. Sócrates, según narra Platón en un 
gran diálogo, plantea la siguiente pregunta: ¿qué es peor: sufrir un acto 
injusto, ser apaleado por ejemplo sin motivos, o cometer el acto in-
justo? Según sea la respuesta que se dé a esta pregunta se capta la 
respuesta de la moral o no se capta. Si se entiende, y parece que el 
sentido común nos inclina a ello, que lo que peor le puede ocurrir a 
alguien es ser matado por otro o apaleado por otro y que el que apalea 
no le pasa nada, le pasa menos, tiene que ejercer un esfuerzo físico a 
base de pegar latigazos, pues si aceptamos eso no podemos entrar en 
la temática moral porque la moral se basa en la respuesta contraria. La 
peor consecuencia de un acto injusto es la que afecta al que lo comete. 
El argumento que da Sócrates es profundamente ontológico: el que 
sufre un acto injusto es sometido extrínsecamente a las consecuencias 
del acto, pero en cambio, quien ejerce el acto injusto ese es actor del 
acto y al hacerlo le constituye de manera que él mismo se hace injusto. 
El lenguaje lo dice claramente: en un asesinato hay un asesinado 
y un asesino, ¿qué es peor, ser asesinado o ser asesino? ¿qué afecta 
más al ser humano en sentido defectivo, cometer el asesinato o ser 
víctima del asesinato? La respuesta ética es justamente cometerlo. Y 
lo mismo pasa con los actos buenos. Aquí se mostró una cierta extra-
ñeza al hablar de la virtud. Ser asesino es adquirir un vicio; ejercer un 
acto bueno es adquirir una virtud. Es imposible que un hombre ejerza 
un acto bueno sin que en su misma índole de hombre adquiera un ca-




Por eso Aristóteles parte de aquí: ¿dónde está la moral? En el 
hombre virtuoso. ¿Dónde está la realidad inmoral? En el hombre vi-
cioso. Aristóteles lo lleva a sus últimas consecuencias y dice que el 
hombre vicioso es el que no se puede controlar a sí mismo, el acrásico, 
el incontinente. Incontinente, el que es de tal manera víctima de sus 
propios actos que ya no los puede controlar y en esa medida pierde su 
libertad, pues para la gran tradición hasta Tomás de Aquino, la libertad 
es ser capaz de controlar la propia conducta, es ser causa sibi. A veces 
esto se lleva al plano psicológico de la elección, etc., pero la libertad 
ante todo es el autodominio. Es dueño de sí el que tiene virtudes y no 
es dueño de sí el que no las tiene por una razón sencilla, porque tiene 
vicios. Y eso es impepinable. La alternativa no es electiva, es ontoló-
gica, afecta al ser mismo del hombre: uno se hace bueno o se hace 
malo. ¿Cómo se hace bueno o se hace malo? A través de sus actos; así 
lo ven los clásicos. Por eso es importantísimo puesto que el origen de 
la moralidad está en los actos y como los actos se determinan por los 
objetos, pues hay que estudiar el objeto moral.  
El objeto moral es lo que le interesa a Juan Pablo II en la Veri-
tatis Splendor. Pero eso no es más que el principio del asunto, luego 
bueno, la construcción ontológico de lo moral que es el hombre bueno 
o el hombre disminuido: el hombre creciente que aumenta en sus po-
sibilidades, el hombre que es capaz de autocontrol, de libertad, o el 
hombre que entra en pérdida. Eso se origina en los actos, ahí está su 
punto de partida, pero no se consuma en los actos sino en el ser que 
los ejerce. Por eso, una moral sin virtudes no es una moral socrática. 
Sócrates replantea el tema de la virtud, de la areté. La areté tal como 
aparece en la época griega preclásica como uno de sus grandes cons-
tituyentes. La areté es el afán que tiene el hombre de inmortalidad, que 
tiene el hombre, ser efímero, de perdurar en la memoria de la posteri-
dad. En definitiva la areté se reduce a la fama. ¿Quién tiene areté? El 
que no es olvidado. 
Si intensificamos, aunque ese sentido de la virtud se puede man-
tener, recoger, dentro del planteamiento filosófico del asunto, nos 
encontramos con que la areté hay que interiorizarla, que la areté no es 
simplemente el hacer hechos gloriosos que aseguren que uno cuando 
se muera su memoria sea viva. Safo, que era una gran mujer, dice en 
unos versos espléndidos: muerta seré eternamente sepultada, ninguna 
memoria quedará de mí y la posteridad ignorará mi nombre. Ese es el 
drama humano: el ser olvidado, el ser reducido a un ser que nace y 
muere y sanseacabó. Se puede nacer, se puede morir, pero puede per-
vivir. Como sigue diciendo Safo: vagaré sin sombra en la mansión de 
Hades. Vagar sin sombra quiere decir ser incapaz de ejercer ninguna 
acción, es una pervivencia inactiva que para el griego es una suma 
desgracia. Los muertos llevan una vida fantasmal, una vida incapaz. 
El muerto tiene manos, pero no pueden hacer absolutamente nada, 
aunque eso no quiere decir que no sobrevivan. Por otra parte, para pa-
sar al Hades hay que atravesar el río Eteo, el río del olvido (el eter es 
el olvido). El muerto está en una situación trágica, en la situación la de 
la impotencia absoluta, del que no puede hacer nada. 
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Bien, pues una manera de mantenerse es ser inspirador de los 
que vienen después, eso es la areté. Ya digo que esta es una primara 
captación del tema de la virtud que Sócrates intensifica hasta el ex-
tremo por donde se puede llegar en esta dirección: tener virtud es 
acrecentarse como viviente, lo cual suguiere que ese crecimiento como 
viviente le libra a uno del Hades. El sentido de la inmortalidad que 
tiene Sócrates ya es el de un alma activa y ese sentido de la inmortali-
dad de alma activa es el que Platón recoge. La teoría del alma de Platón 
está inspirada en el planteamiento socrático. 
Ser mejor no es una denominación extrínseca, ser mejor es un 
fortalecimiento de la condición humana que le libra a uno de ese ca-
rácter devorador del tiempo, de ese carácter efímero de un ser que no 
puede, como decía Alcmeón de Crotona que la diferencia entre los 
dioses y los hombres es que los dioses pueden unir el principio con el 
fin; en cambio el hombre no puede unir el nacimiento con la muerte. 
El hombre es un ser que transcurre y acaba. El librarse de eso, consti-
tuir uno mismo una densidad que atraviese la muerte y que asegure 
una actividad postmortem es la areté como la intelige Sócrates porque 
esto es verdad simpliciter. El hombre es un ser capaz de perfeccionarse 
o de degradarse en sus propios términos, como ser humano. El hombre 
no es un ser enteramente hecho, un ser especificado. 
El hombre se especifica como hombre por sus virtudes y se 
desespecifica, se degrada, cae en una situación de continencia que es 
como una destrucción de todo orden interior y de toda capacidad de 
autocontrol, si actúa mal y se hace vicioso. El hombre es un ser capaz 
de hacer y de hacerse, tiene esa doble entrada: un resultado exterior y 
uno interior. Creer que lo importante de la acción es lo que se produce, 
eso, que es a lo que el activismo moderno nos inclina, lleva consigo la 
pérdida del valor ontológico de la virtud. Es una de las cosas más im-
portantes recuperar ese sentido. La acción humana tiene siempre ese 
doble resultado: cuando un zapatero actúa produce zapatos, pero ¿qué 
le pasa al zapatero cuando hace zapatos? El zapatero no queda inva-
riado cuando actúa, la acción refluye en él y eso le hace mejor 
impepinablemente. Esto es la averiguación socrática cuya pérdida des-
hace la moral y la transforma en una cuestión opinable u obsesiva. La 
moral no es estar constreñido, sino ir adquiriendo la libertad, ser causa 
sibi. ¿Quién es causa sibi? El que tiene sus capacidades suficiente-
mente fortalecidas y ese fortalecimiento es el feed-back de la acción 
en la facultad. 
El hombre no es un ser de facultades fijas. La inteligencia y la 
voluntad, las grandes facultades del alma, esas dos facultades no son 
dotaciones fijas y por eso no son naturaleza en sentido estricto. El 
hombre no es sólo un ser natural, un ser que tiene unos principios ope-
rativos y nada más, no, es un ser que tiene unos principios operativos 
realimentables.  
Esto lo plantea en un curso de doctorado en Pamplona de la si-
guiente manera: suelo decir que ha dos interpretaciones de la potencia. 
Los modernos suelen poner la potencia antes que el acto, y esa es una 
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interpretación infinitista de la potencia: el hombre es un dinamismo 
infinito. Hegel, por ejemplo, habla de la acción infinita y la acción 
infinita es el yo. Si el yo es la acción infinita, el yo es la potencia infi-
nita. Eso está antecedido en un vuelco que sufre la filosofía griega en 
el neoplatonismo; la primera hipóstasis de Plotino es así. En cambio, 
los clásicos, en concreto Aristóteles, que es el que madura más las no-
ciones, admite que, siendo el acto anterior a la potencia y superior a 
ella, la potencia tiene que ser finita porque el acto le sucede como sus-
tancia. Eso es la naturaleza; naturaleza significa potencia finita. Pues 
bien, el hombre no tiene naturaleza porque no tiene potencia finita y 
no la tiene porque infinitiza su potencia, pero no según la acción infi-
nita en sentido moderno, sino que la infinitiza en la manera de adquirir 
virtudes. El hombre es capaz de un perfeccionamiento irrestricto y eso 
es la infinitud de su potencialidad. Por eso no es un ser natural. 
Considerado antes del ejercicio de sus acciones y, por tanto, an-
tes la consecución de las virtudes no está dotado de infinitud potencial 
y se le puede considerar como un ser natural tanto en el orden del es-
píritu como del cuerpo. Si el hombre no adquiere virtudes no es más 
que un ser natural porque es de potencia finita. Por eso los modernos 
no aceptan la noción de naturaleza porque no aceptan la finitud de la 
potencia. Yo tampoco acepto la finitud de la potencia, pero hay que 
rectificar a los modernos porque infinitud de la potencia significa otra 
cosa, significa el crecimiento de la potencia misma. Pero el creci-
miento de la potencia está en la virtud, en los hábitos. Sin los hábitos 
el hombre es un ser puramente natural y por lo tanto no es todavía 
humano en sentido estricto. Por eso el hombre es un ser que está más 
allá del fin, como dice Rilke, sí, porque estar subordinado al fin es lo 
característico de la naturaleza y estar más allá de todo fin es lo carac-
terístico de la virtud, de la potencia infinita bien interpretada, no en el 
sentido moderno, porque una acción infinita que no mejora al que ac-
túa es una infinitud inútil. Los modernos han buscado la infinitud de 
la potencia por un camino equivocado. Si hubiesen sido más socráti-
cos, si no se hubiesen olvidado de la noción de virtud no habrían caído 
en esa desviación del planteamiento. Ahora bien, quien se conforme 
con una potencia finita no sabe qué es la moral. El que se conforme 
con su ser natural y reduzca la moral a la naturaleza, cae en la falacia 
naturalista que es el desconocimiento de la moral. No es que la moral 
no esté de acuerdo con la naturaleza, es mucho más, es que la moral 
es el desarrollo de la naturaleza. Pero no el despliegue en un sentido 
extensivo o en un sentido de puro ejercicio, no, es la intensificación de 
la naturaleza. Los seres humanos que tienen intensificada su naturaleza 
son los hombres buenos y en ellos se puede aprender la moral. Aristó-
teles dice que la moral se encuentra en ellos y ahí hay que buscarla. 
Creo que, me atrevo a pensarlo, que Sócrates cuando dijo esto lo 
dijo bajo la acción del Espíritu Santo. La acción del Espíritu Santo no 
se limita al pueblo de Israel o después a la Iglesia católica, el Espíritu 
Santo sopla donde quiere. Porque ¿cómo un hombre puede acertar a 
decir esto, que es preferible ser asesinado que ser asesino? Es decir 
que los actos del ser humano le afectan intrínsecamente a él; suelo de-
cir que el hombre es un ser que se premia o se castiga intrínsecamente 
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a sí mismo. También San Agustín lo repite: ¿cuál es el castigo de un 
ánimo desordenado? Su desorden. ¿Cuál es el castigo del que ha co-
metido el mal? Que se hace malo o como decía un viejo refrán 
castellano: Dios castiga sin pena ni palo. Un ánimo desordenado, un 
alma destrozada por sus actos, eso es el castigo. 
Platón retoma el asunto hasta puntos enormes, dice que, claro y 
aquí surge el sentido de culpa. Fijaos que todo el sentido de la respon-
sabilidad de los actos está aquí: ¿qué quiere decir ser responsable de 
un acto? Que el acto se le achaca a uno. Desde el punto de vista del 
juez, hay un juicio externo que le imputa el acto, pero hay un juicio 
interno, un juicio en sentido ontológico: uno es juez de sí mismo, uno 
se castiga a sí mismo haciéndose malo. Malo no es una denominación 
vaga, malo es ser menos, desrealizarse. Tomás de Aquino dice que el 
condenado es proper nihil, está lo más cerca de la nada posible; no 
está aniquilado, pero es como si estuviese aniquilado. ¿Es un hombre 
un condenado? Ha sido un hombre, pero ¿lo sigue siendo? ¿no es una 
ceniza de hombre, un carbón ya no encendido? Eso es peor que el Ha-
des. ¿Qué puede hacer un condenado? Nada, no puede ni hablar, dice 
Tomás de Aquino, los condenados no pueden hablar más que de sí 
mismos, no se interesan por nada, están sumidos en la tragedia interior 
y el diálogo en el infierno es puro rumor, no hay diálogo. Nadie inter-
cambia ideas, nadie se interesa por los demás, ahí cada uno se ocupa 
de sí, han matado el lenguaje. 
Este es un desarrollo que se puede hacer a partir de Sócrates me-
tiéndolo en la visión cristiana de la vida. Ya digo que Sócrates acierta 
de un modo tajante y creo que acertar a decir esto no es propio del ser 
humano estropeado. El ser humano estropeado suele pensar que mejor 
le pegan el estacazo a otro, porque lo peor de un estacazo es que se lo 
peguen a uno. Pero Sócrates advierte que lo peor del estacazo es pe-
garlo. El mal afecta antes que a nada y más intensamente que a nadie 
es a quien pega el estacazo. Esto es revolucionario y en nuestra cultura 
que ha perdido esto, que está en una profunda crisis moral, esta es una 
revolución pendiente. Nuestra cultura tendrá la conciencia más o me-
nos oscurecido, pero perder el sentido de la virtud es la crisis moral 
más gorda que cabe. No sabemos qué es la virtud y queremos bienes 
exteriores a costa de lo que sea. No sabemos qué nos ha pasado al 
adquirir bienes exteriores ni nos interesa, no lo tenemos en cuenta. Por 
tanto, carecemos de autocontrol y estamos construyendo una sociedad 
desorganizada, hemos perdido el sentido social, estamos en una situa-
ción de fortísima crisis.  
Gracias a que aun sin saberlo hay gente que adquiere virtudes y 
va progresando; gracias a eso, la sociedad no se ha hundido. Prescin-
dimos ahora de la Iglesia católica o de la revelación que es la segunda 
fuente de moral que considera lo mismo pero de una forma más seria-
mente vista, o más intensamente visto, es decir, que el hombre con sus 
acciones se juega su vida respecto de Dios. Es decir, si se hace mejor 
se parece más a Dios, se está jugando su imagen y semejanza y si no, 
se convierte en mentira y se está jugando el juicio de Dios: no os co-
nozco. ¿Cómo puede decir Dios que no conoce al hombre al que ha 
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creado a su imagen y semejanza? Solamente si ha borrado su imagen 
y semejanza. Venid a mí benditos de mi Padre: el reconocimiento de 
la imagen. Venid a mí porque sois semejantes y habéis aumentado 
vuestra semejanza. Aumentar la semejanza es ser virtuoso y ser vir-
tuoso es aumentar la semejanza. Ahora cogemos en otra clave lo que 
decía Sócrates, que hablaba del alma más bien referida a sí misma, el 
alma pudiendo sobrevivir activamente o en una situación de Hades. El 
hombre es inmortal, pero ¿cómo es inmortal? Esta pregunta que tam-
bién hace San Agustín: sabes que eres inmortal ¿y eso te basta? Pues 
no te basta porque la inmortalidad tiene dos sentidos. 
Bueno, la isla de los bienaventurados, que es el cielo platónico, 
es un cielo muy pequeñito: son las almas que contemplan las ideas. 
Hay gente que dice que la visión cristiana es platónica. No, ser imagen 
y semejanza de Dios es algo más serio, es aumentar esa semejanza. 
Parecerse más a Dios hasta el punto de revestirse de Cristo de ser ipse 
Cristus, ahí está la clave. Aristóteles hablaba del hombre bueno, pero 
nosotros decimos que quien revela al hombre es Jesucristo. 
 
Preguntas de la primera sessión  
La potencia humana no es saturable. Dios no se diferencia de 
nada, crea lo que le da la gana. Eso es un fijismo lamentable. Hablamos 
de naturaleza divina porque adoptamos una terminología para enten-
dernos, pero Dios no tiene naturaleza porque no es sustancia. Decir 
que Dios es sustancia es una blasfemia, eso lo dice San Agustín. Dios 
es la intimidad absoluta, es el incremento absoluto originario. Decir 
que eso es una cosa, una sustancia con naturaleza. 
La metafísica, o dice que Dios es absolutamente originario y no 
es sustancia de ningún modo, o es un churro. ¿Cómo Dios va a ser un 
principio operativo? ¿qué tiene que hacer Dios que originariamente no 
lo sea? En Dios no hay despliegue ninguno. En Dios no se puede ha-
blar de distinción esencia esse y lo dice Tomás de Aquino, pero hasta 
el punto que llevado a sus últimas consecuencias no hay esencia di-
vina; en Dios sólo se puede hablar de esse. La esencia no tiene 




Vamos a ver si nos fijamos en el Génesis, ahí hay algo que puede 
ponerse en paralelo con el planteamiento socrático. Se dice que el 
hombre está hecho para dominar la tierra y eso está dentro de un con-
texto en el que el mundo es bueno (vio Dios que era bueno), pero 
cuando creó al hombre vio Dios que era muy bueno. De manera que 
habría que decir que esa relación que el hombre guarda con el universo 
es activa, estrictamente activa: es la relación de lo muy bueno con lo 
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bueno. Pero esa relación es obviamente el mejoramiento de lo bueno 
por lo muy bueno. A esto alude San Agustín cuando dice que Dios ha 
reservado al hombre la obra de ornato del universo.  
El hombre no es el creador del universo, pero el universo ha sido 
hecho de tal manera que el universo no sea incompatible con él. El 
hombre sería incompatible con el universo si no tuviera nada que hacer 
con él. Sería incompatible o no tendría ninguna relación con él. La 
teoría de la evolución que se puede tomar como acertada, otra cosa es 
como se conciba o describa, pero el hombre está en una relación muy 
estrecha porque parte de su procedencia es del universo, está hecho de 
la arcilla. Sin embargo, eso no lo hace un ser intracósmico, sino que 
es el dominador del universo en el sentido de que su relación con él es 
predominantemente activa. Por tanto, el hombre está llamado a, en 
cuanto que su vocación se confunde con su ser, no se puede decir que 
alguien es llamado a algo extrínseco. Que el hombre tiene un puesto 
en el cosmos es obvio y el cosmos es su casa. Eso le hace perfeccio-
nador del universo. 
Esta idea puede hacerse problemática hoy porque se puede pen-
sar que la acción del hombre sobre las cosas no es perfeccionadora, 
sino perturbadora. Está el problema ecológico para demostrarlo. Pero 
la aparición del problema ecológico, que es innegable y también su 
caracterización ética, nos hace ver hasta qué punto ha habido una per-
turbación. Carece de sentido pensar que Dios ha creado al hombre y al 
universo estableciendo entre ellos una relación conflictiva. Si eso ocu-
rre es porque el hombre no ha sido fiel, porque el hombre ha 
traicionado su relación con el universo. Esto debió tener lugar en el 
origen mismo de la historia. La aparición del fenómeno del problema 
ecológico lo visualiza, ya estaba dicho a Adán, que su relación con la 
tierra será difícil, que tendrá que ganar el pan con el sudor de su frente, 
que habrá abrojos, que el mundo no estará en una relación completa-
mente armónica. ¡Ahí ya está el problema ecológico! El hombre tiene 
que hacer cierta violencia a las cosas. También lo dice San Pablo: las 
criaturas sufren vanidad. Y esa vanidad es porque están esperando la 
manifestación de la gloria de los hijos de Dios porque el hombre ha 
omitido, ha desvirtuado, lo que tenía que hacer. Su misión en el uni-
verso la ha estropeado de cierta manera. 
Eso no significa que el hombre se haya estropeado totalmente, 
que tenga una naturaleza corrupta como dice Lutero, pero la relación 
del hombre con las cosas es productiva, es inventiva y se dice también 
que creadora. Si el hombre es el colaborador de Dios y lo radical de su 
ser personal es no separarse de Dios, está hecho así y está dotado de 
unos poderes y unas capacidades, las cuales en la misma medida en 
que no se ha corrompido, siguen añadiendo la obra de ornato aunque 
sea con quiebras. Al trabajo no se puede renunciar. No se puede decir, 
no es que si trabajo estropeo. 
Y sin embargo es patente ontológicamente que el hombre está 
hecho para perfeccionar el universo. El puesto del hombre en el cos-
mos es añadir realidad al cosmos, añadir algo que el cosmos no puede 
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darse a sí mismo. Ese carácter mediador es constitutivo de su ser 
creado, eso es lo que le especifica. Esto lo expresé en una fórmula 
fácil: el hombre es el perfeccionador perfectible. Esa perfectibilidad 
alude a la virtud: el hombre cuando perfecciona se perfecciona a sí 
mismo y no puede seguir perfeccionando más que si sigue perfeccio-
nándose. Esa es la dinámica de la virtud. De manera que, antes que 
nada, hay que verlo así: el hombre está colocado en el universo, pero 
no es un ser que siga los ritmos del universo o que no tenga nada que 
ver con él. No, antes que nada el hombre es un hacedor, es un perfec-
cionador a través de su actividad. 
Aquí aparece el tema de la acción que ya dije que era el tema 
básico de la ética porque con él se inicia la ética, se adquieren las vir-
tudes a través de la acción y con la acción se consiguen bienes. Creo 
que en la interpretación clásica no se ve de modo suficientemente 
agudo. Esa idea de que el hombre con su voluntad tiende al bien no es 
suficiente, el hombre con su voluntad hace el bien, perfecciona. Esto, 
por otra parte, marca una distinción que Tomás de Aquino lo indica 
cuando dice que lo bueno en un sentido más propio es lo bueno ético, 
la bondad de la acción. Se puede hablar del bien en sentido trascen-
dental, pero el bien está en la acción. Y esa acción en cuanto que es 
buena es perfectiva, tiene un resultado, por tanto produce, no es estéril. 
Producir es más que lo que el universo puede hacer. El universo físico 
no puede producir, puede causar, tiene una influencia, una efectividad 
propia, se puede hablar incluso de una historia natural del universo, 
pero la aparición del hombre en el universo instaura una novedad res-
pecto del universo que redunda en el universo. Esto tiene seguramente 
que ver con ese cielo nuevo y esa tierra nueva. Seguramente hemos 
omitido algo, por mucho que nos esforcemos, que la doctrina del pro-
greso muestra la conciencia de la acción humana, y yo no renuncio a 
ello porque en la modernidad, aunque no esté bien orientado hay un 
aumento de la acción humana. La modernidad, en rigor, aparece con 
la mecánica de Newton que es una interpretación del universo tal que 
el hombre pueda influir en él; es una interpretación técnica del uni-
verso. 
Newton no consigue una cosmología, el estudio teórico del uni-
verso es clásico, la física moderna es mecánica racional y en el prólogo 
a los Principia, Newton dice: tenemos que entender al universo de esta 
manera porque así lo que los vetere, los viejos, llamaban mecánica, 
que era un arte, eso hay que extenderlo a todo. En el fondo este pro-
fundo sentido productivo es una de las cosas que hemos heredado de 
la edad moderna. Este sentido productivo que da lugar hoy a efectos 
perversos, a no perfeccionar, sino a estropear. La actitud de la postmo-
dernidad es reluctante a la acción humana, crítica de lo técnico. Pero 
lo técnico hoy lo cubre todo. La medicina, por ejemplo, también es 
producción; la biología: ingeniería genética. Todo es interpretación del 
universo como algo que el hombre puede manejar y a lo que puede 




Esa acentuación de ese aspecto, quizá en ella haya olvidos. Con-
siderar al hombre como ser productivo recoge el que el ser humano es 
perfeccionador, pero ahí hay una falta de cuidado que los ecologistas 
sacan a relucir. No comparto la postura ecologista, me parece que es 
una detectación de un abuso, pero no es una solución. No se trata de 
reducir la actividad de ornato, sino de insistir más en ella y eliminar 
aquello que estropea, pero no declarar que el hombre estropea de suyo. 
Eso es una falsa antropología. No, el hombre no está hecho para estro-
pear, sino para mejorar. 
Eso después de la relación con el universo se extiende a la rela-
ción del hombre con el hombre que también es perfectible. Ahí se 
descubre otra dimensión de la acción humana. Aristóteles, cuando se 
refiere a esto, distingue dos tipos que no llama técnica sino dominio. 
El dominio despótico es una relación del hombre con el universo en la 
que el universo es pasivo; así es como el hombre es un artesano o es 
un técnico y eso es la primera dimensión de la técnica. Pero luego está 
el dominio político que se caracteriza por ser establecido entre seres 
que todos ellos son activos y ahí aparece la colaboración, una estruc-
tura de la acción que a veces se olvida y no se considera la acción 
política. La acción política no tiene nada que ver con la idea política 
actual, sino que para Aristóteles es la acción que se instaura entre seres 
humanos. 
La estructura de relación entre dos seres humanos es de doble 
entrada: hay una entrada y una salida doble en cada uno de los sujetos 
y cada entrada y salida son correlativas y diferentes puesto que la ac-
ción humana entre hombres es interacción. Esto tiene una cantidad de 
implícitos que ahora sería difícil entrar. Esto lo desarrolla muy bien 
Pérez López, pero no es más que la acción política de Aristóteles. De 
manera que el hombre es siempre perfeccionador perfectible respecto 
del universo y perfeccionador perfectible en su relación con otros 
hombres. Y cuando se trata de los demás este carácter de perfecciona-
dor perfectible es más vinculante, más intenso. La medida en que un 
hombre puede perfeccionar o estropear a otro es mucho mayor que la 
aplicación técnica del hombre a las cosas. El dominio de lo político es 
más alto que el dominio de lo despótico. 
Sin embargo, los ecologistas se refieren a un abuso de la acción 
despótica, estamos estropeando el universo en términos bíblicos, esta-
mos situados en el universo de manera incorrecta y eso lo propalamos, 
no lo paramos ni lo corregimos. Aristóteles dice que lo característico 
de estas acciones prácticas es que son corregibles. El tema de la co-
rrección de la razón práctica es esencial en la filosofía de Aristóteles 
y Aristóteles admite que siempre se cometen errores. Sin embargo, en 
el origen no fue así, en el principio no era así. Es decir, tal como nos 
muestra la Biblia al primer hombre, el primer hombre ejerce una ac-
ción que no es corregible y cuando la quiso corregir se armó el cisco 
padre. La corrección de la acción humana por parte de Eva y Adán 
tentados por la serpiente, eso es el pecado original. ¿Por qué la acción 
de Adán era estrictamente correcta? ¿Por qué la razón práctica de 
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Adán no era corregible? Porque tenía que ver con el bien e ir aumen-
tando el bien; tenía que ver con el bien y mejorar. La primera acción 
que se describe en la Biblia era poner nombre a las cosas. Poner nom-
bre a las cosas era algo que las cosas no podían hacer, las cosas no se 
nombran a sí mismas. En definitiva, la acción primaria, la acción por 
antonomasia es el lenguaje. El lenguaje no es teoría, es acción. ¿Qué 
hacían Adán y Eva, qué relación política existía entre ambos? La Bi-
blia no nos da más razón que esa y es que hablaban y hablar es añadir, 
es perfeccionar; entre todas las acciones perfectivas humanas, hablar 
es la más perfectiva que existe. Por eso, desde el punto de vista de la 
acción lo peor que le puede pasar es la corrupción del lenguaje. Un 
lenguaje equivocado respecto de las cosas estropea las cosas, pero un 
lenguaje equivocado respecto de las personas destroza la sociedad. El 
cuidado que hay que tener con el lenguaje es enorme. La preocupación 
esencial del hombre es cuidar el lenguaje. Hay lenguajes prohibidos, 
no se le puede llamar rata al hermano. No se puede escandalizar y el 
escándalo es lingüístico. El empobrecimiento del lenguaje es el decai-
miento de una sociedad. La mentira, el abuso del lenguaje, está 
terminantemente prohibida. Entre esas normas que aparece en el decá-
logo mentir es intrínsecamente malo. Decir lo que es contrario al 
propio pensar es intrínsecamente malo y eso es una norma para todos: 
nunca se puede mentir. Eso afecta a nuestra acción más alta: nuestro 
modo más alto de actuar es hablar. 
Desarrollar esto llevaría horas y horas, tendríamos que ver cómo 
el hombre ha alterado el lenguaje. El padre de la mentira es el diablo, 
la tentación consistió en un engaño respecto de aquello que Dios no 
había entregado al hombre que es la ciencia del bien y del mal. Por eso 
Tomás de Aquino dice que el pecado original es un pecado de ciencia. 
Lo que estoy diciendo es una glosa de esa tesis. Un pecado de ciencia 
en tanto que la ciencia es ciencia práctica, tiene que ver con el ornato 
del universo y tiene que ver con la acción y reacción entre seres hu-
manos. La acción despótica en el fondo es lingüística, es una forma de 
lenguaje; la acción política es estrictamente lingüística. La negación 
de información, el silencio, es malo, es antiético. Lo humano es hablar. 
El silencio menor y el silencio mayor no son silencios, quien lo en-
tienda así no sabe lo que es; eso es para hablar, no para hablar con los 
demás, sino para hablar con Dios y para establecer una relación lin-
güística sin la cual no se puede trabajar. Pero quedarse mudo es 
antihumano. Eliminar la comunicación lingüística es una falta moral 
de primer orden y la mentira es una explanación del silencio, es decir, 
el vacío de verdad hablado. El error es antiético, un vicio de la inteli-
gencia, dice Tomás de Aquino; no sólo la voluntad peca, la 
inteligencia también tiene sus errores, es atreverse a afirmar lo que no 
sabe. Pensar es siempre pararse, precipitarse en el pensar atenta contra 
el pensar. 
La moral es así, la moral tiene una base ontológica. Se puede 
tener sentido moral, pero si se trata de entender el asunto, o llegamos 
a lo ontológico o no entendemos. Lo más radical que puede hacer el 
hombre con su propio ser es admitir como propia la ciencia del bien y 
del mal, porque la ciencia del bien y del mal es el pecado original. 
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Hoy, ya lo he dicho, determinar el bien y el mal no corresponde al 
hombre. Nos hemos apoderado de la ciencia del bien y del mal. ¿Qué 
es malo? Lo que yo declaro. ¿Qué es bueno? Lo que yo declaro. El 
hombre no está calculado para eso. Desgraciadamente y afortunada-
mente porque hemos sido redimidos, hemos desencadenado el mal y 
tenemos que ver con él, pero tratando de ahogar el mal en abundancia 
de bien. ¿Qué quiere decir ahogar el mal en abundancia de bien? 
Quiere decir imponer el bien de manera que se destierre el mal. Esta-
mos comprometidos los católicos, redimidos del pecado original que 
es la ciencia del bien y del mal que el hombre le robó a Dios, pero al 
perfeccionador perfectible le corresponde la ciencia del bien y lo me-
jor, y nada más que esa. De ninguna manera le corresponde la ciencia 
del mal como alternativa, eso no es humano. Lo mismo que Dios no 
da su gloria a nadie, no le dio la ciencia del bien y del mal porque su 
puesto en el cosmos es incrementar el bien y al hacerlo él mismo se 
hace bueno, se incrementa en orden al bien, adquiere virtudes. Y eso 
es lo único que al hombre le corresponde legítimamente. 
Tomás de Aquino dice que el pecado original es la razón misma 
de pecado. ¿Qué pasa cuando aparece la idea del mal porque uno se ha 
hecho con la ciencia del bien y del mal? Lo que aparece primero es la 
mentira cuando estima que hay algo malo; no hay nada malo porque 
todo lo que Dios ha hecho es bueno. Pero como es un pecado de cien-
cia, eso conlleva a que si hay mal lo tengo que resolver … y lo tengo 
que resolver solo; el hombre se transforma en un arreglador. La voca-
ción primaria del hombre no es la de un arreglador, aunque cuando se 
topa con el mal hay que arreglar: esa es la situación histórica. Pero en 
la misma medida en que existe el mal, se aprecia algo como malo apa-
recen dos razones de pecado gravísimas: la primera es decir que Dios 
es torpe, una blasfemia como una casa. El Dios creador es un Dios 
torpe. Esto es la esencia de la gnosis que es una línea que atraviesa 
toda la humanidad y es por otra parte la esencia de la herejía; toda 
herejía es gnóstica. Yo creí que el único hereje que no era gnóstico era 
Lutero hasta que leí el comentario a Filipenses 2, 5-11, esa interpreta-
ción es gnóstica. La redención es la auto justificación de Dios. Esa es 
la tesis de Lutero sobre el anonadamiento y la glorificación de Cristo. 
Verdaderamente monstruoso. Pero en toda la gnosis está esa idea: un 
Dios salvador que remedie la torpeza de Dios creador. Si Dios ha 
creado un ser que se puede pervertir radicalmente, cuya naturaleza está 
corrupta, Dios se ha equivocado. Entonces la redención no es más que 
la subsanación del error por parte de Dios y la justificación del hombre 
es extrínseca porque quien se ha justificado es Dios, en el cielo el hom-
bre sigue siendo igual de pecador; Dios no salva el pecado, lo tapa. 
Eso, que es una blasfemia como una casa, es negar la omniscien-
cia y la omnipotencia divina, está en el pecado original. Si existe el 
mal, Dios se ha equivocado, ha hecho cosas malas. Cuando la Biblia 
dice que Dios vio que era bueno, el mal no aparece por ninguna parte. 
En esa situación admitir que hay algo malo es un insulto a Dios. Pero 
como la ciencia funciona, tiene que ir a remediar ese mal y entonces 
el hombre se separa de Dios, recaba una acción sin colaboración. El 
hombre ya no colabora con Dios sino que le enmienda la plana. Esa 
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interpretación de Dios como un Dios que se equivoca está a lo largo 
de toda la historia. Nietzsche lo dice de una manera notable: que la 
gran osadía del idealismo alemán es poner el mal en Dios. Pero esa 
osadía no está solo en el idealismo alemán está en toda la historia, es 
la gnosis. La gnosis consiste radicalmente en establecer que en Dios 
está el mal o que el mal procede de Dios. 
 
No hubo preguntas en la segunda sesión 
 
Tercera session 
Vamos a ver, me parece que es claro que el pecado original es 
un pecado bastante gordo, que tiene todas las razones de pecado, como 
dice Tomás de Aquino; está la soberbia, la falta de esperanza, la pre-
tensión de autonomía, la blasfemia, la mentira, está hacer que no hay 
por qué hacer y no admitir lo que hay que hacer.  
Esta manera de entender el pecado original creo que, aparte de 
que parece la única que tiene que ver con la visión bíblica del hombre 
como aquel que está hecho para trabajar y cumplir la obra de ornato, 
tiene una serie de comprobaciones históricas cuya característica más 
neta es la gnosis, la estructura de los planteamientos gnósticos. 
Lo que se puede decir ahora es que de esa manera se desenca-
dena el mal, que el pecado original tiene una eficacia porque el 
hombre, siendo una criatura, es sumamente activa y desarrolla de una 
manera o de otra, Dios se lo permite (digámoslo así, su pecado no es 
tan intenso como el del ángel), pero el mal está en la historia y puede 
cundir y hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal. Esto comporta que el 
orden moral cambia. Aquí hay un asunto que no hubiera existido nunca 
sin el pecado original y es la aparición de una serie de despliegues de 
actitudes incorrectas del hombre que exigen una normativa, ser prohi-
bidas. La primera prohibición es que se haga con la ciencia del bien y 
del mal, pero una vez se ha hecho con ella, aparecen una serie de con-
ductas incorrectas que Dios providente, Dios que cuida a la humanidad 
le dice que no puede hacer. Me parece que aquí está el origen de las 
llamadas normas negativas en las que tanto se ha insistido en su valor 
universal histórico. Es así: no se puede matar, no se puede mentir, no 
se puede fornicar, no se puede robar. Pero eso son prohibiciones con-
secutivas, prohibiciones que en la situación post pecatum aparece la 
posibilidad de que el hombre cometa actos de ese tipo porque se ha 
desorganizado. Aparece el mal de muchas maneras y todo eso tiene 
que ser prohibido. Por otra parte, como no por el pecado original el 
hombre queda totalmente corrompido, se da cuenta de que existen ma-
les, ahí está el asunto de la conciencia moral, así lo ha vivido el hombre 
histórico en su estado post pecatum. 
Pero por debajo de la conciencia moral que capta el carácter 
prohibido de esas conductas malas hay otra cosa más importante y es 
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que el hombre sigue manteniendo su condición de ser activo y es aque-
lla sobre la que está desvelada para el hombre un carácter más 
profundo que la conciencia moral y es la sindéresis. La sindéresis es 
la comprensión innata por parte del ser humano de los primeros prin-
cipios morales, no ya de las normas negativas. Así como si se 
prescinde de las virtudes la moral se deerrumba, también la percepción 
de la moral quedaría muy limitada si no se tuviera en cuenta la sindé-
resis. Hay una comprensión de lo radical en la acción o del valor de la 
acción como tal, puesto que el hombre es un ser hecho para actuar. 
Viene ahora el problema de cómo se puede formular lo que se capta 
con la sindéresis: haz el bien y evita el mal; ese es el gran principio 
moral. Yo diría que "evita el mal", sí, pero tiene un carácter más im-
pulsor, que indica más lo positivo que lo negativo la sindéresis: haz el 
bien. La sindéresis indica que hay que hacer el bien, no te conformes, 
no te quites de en medio, no seas inútil. ¿Por qué? Pues porque a pesar 
de esa situación vulnerada o no completa, no íntegra moralmente, pues 
a pesar de eso sigue vigente lo primordial en el hombre: eso no ha sido 
borrado; el hombre tiene que hacer, tiene que actuar. Yo creo que esa 
es la obligación o el deber moral.  
El deber moral no es hacer el mal, eso ya se da por supuesto, 
sino que el deber moral es que uno no se puede inhibir. Se podría for-
mular así: no tengas miedo en asumir responsabilidades, tienes que 
hacerte cargo de asuntos en la medida en que sea posible, no puedes 
ser cobarde, tímido, tienes que realizar obras. En esto va implícito que 
si se realizan obras buenas se mejora. Haz, no tienes más remedio que 
hacer porque si no, no puedes mejorar. Creo que el desarrollo de la 
imago Dei es la indicación que se desprende de la sindéresis, de la 
captación del primer principio moral. 
Así es como aparece el problema del deber, de la obligación. El 
hombre está obligado. Pero la obligación se refiere al actuar: debes 
encontrar tu proyecto vital, tu vocación en el sentido profundo de la 
palabra, aquel tipo de actos que de acuerdo con tu educación, tus ha-
bilidades, con tu idoneidad, … pues debes hacer. Esta cuestión del 
deber ha sido formulada por los filósofos morales. Uno de los plantea-
mientos más drásticos es la formulación kantiana. Kant propone que 
la voluntad emana un imperativo categórico. Ese imperativo es cate-
górico en el sentido de que obliga por sí mismo y precisamente que 
obligue por sí mismo es que no obedece a otros motivos: a las ventajas, 
a los placeres, a las conveniencias, los resultados. En definitiva, el 
planteamiento kantiano es anti hedonista. Estoy obligado a no actuar 
nunca por debajo del nivel de mi propia voluntad. Kant lo expresa así: 
lo que hay de santo en el mundo es una buena voluntad. Eso significa 
que la voluntad se exalta, se pone por encima de todo y lo que sea una 
subordinación a algo es algo inferior y así la voluntad no se mantiene 
en su propio nivel. Fichte lo formula de otra manera en la misma línea; 
sé el que eres, no te dejes dominar por nada porque si te dejas domina 
por algo has decaído. Todo aquello que no sea la pura voluntad, actuar 
en atención de la pura voluntad es degradarse, es un descenso, puesto 
que lo santo es una buena voluntad. 
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No cabe duda de que la formulación kantiana parece plausible, 
hay ahí una grandeza moral, sin embargo, el planteamiento es insufi-
ciente porque en primer lugar es fijista. Eso de actuar de acuerdo con 
la ley, de no particularizar por intereses empíricos, bueno, pues esa 
formulación muestra lo que tiene el imperativo de estático. Ahí no hay 
progreso. Realmente el imperativo categórico sustituye a la virtud y en 
rigor no es práctico, porque no dice haz, no es la sindéresis, sino una 
sustitución de la misma porque la sindéresis no dice lo que uno tiene 
que hacer, sino que uno tiene que hacer. La sindéresis tiene un carácter 
de impulso. Ser fiel a uno mismo no es mantenerse en el orden de la 
propia voluntad, no es eso, sino da de tú, eso es la sindéresis. El impe-
rativo categórico parece que es práctico, pero no lo es porque no es 
una invitación a hacer, no sale de ahí ningún impulso a hacer, sino que 
es más bien lo que debería ser o lo que debe ser, pero ¿qué tipos de 
actos? En realidad, es más bien una incitación a no actuar, porque en 
el fondo eso degenera hacia un formalismo moral, que es la historia 
del moralismo kantiano y así ha sido entendido. Ese prurito de pureza 
absoluta equivalente a la voluntad no contaminada hace que no se 
pueda ejercer ninguna acción. En cuanto se ejerza alguna acción la 
contaminación de la voluntad parece inevitable. Más bien hay ahí, no 
sé cómo decirlo, tendrías que actuar de tal manera que fueses comple-
tamente puro. Se ha detectado una influencia confesada por Kant, que 
se refiere a Sócrates y una influencia de Fenelón. Esa influencia de 
Fenelón sería muy reveladora del sentido del imperativo categórico 
kantiano. Fenelón dice que el hombre debe actuar por puro amor; el 
famoso tema del amor puro. Eso de actuar por puro amor es mucho 
pedir de entrada. ¿Se puede actuar por puro amor? Quizá después de 
adquirir muchas virtudes y puro amor, puro amor, yo diría que no, hay 
algo que no se le puede quitar al amor y es la esperanza. Un acto de 
puro amor, quizá lo pueda haber, pero mantener la vida moral en tér-
minos de puro amor no parece posible, porque eso terminaría en la 
imposibilidad de no hacer nada.  
Hay en Kant una crispación. El imperativo categórico no es una 
buena interpretación de la sindéresis que dice lánzate, tienes que hacer. 
De ese hacer surgirá que estarás aportando, incrementando, porque tu 
actuación si no se hace conculcando las normas negativas dará lugar a 
algo bueno para los otros, pero también un perfeccionamiento de tu 
propia voluntad. Eso significa que la pura voluntad no es lo más alto, 
no es lo santo. Ahí hay un error teológico. Creo que los santos, que 
Dios es el santo y lo que Dios quiere es amabilísimo, es su voluntad, 
pero es porque lo primario es la santidad y la santidad no hay que ha-
cerla equivalente a la santidad en Dios, sino que la santidad es Dios 
mismo, Dios es el santo, el tres veces santo. Eso llevaría mucho tiempo 
exponerlo. La voluntad de Dios es santa porque Dios es el santo de los 
santos. De manera que hablar de una pura y santa voluntad que es el 
sujeto trascendental y que eso determine el deber, me parece que es 
coger el rábano por las hojas. No, el hombre tiene que mejorar. 
Justamente porque el hombre puede mejorar puede parecerse a 
Dios en la santidad, pero es una santidad parecida, no la pura santidad 
que es exclusiva de Dios. La moral desde la sindéresis se ve como una 
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incitación a mejorar y a actuar: ese es tu destino, tienes que destinarte 
a lo santo, tienes que darte cuenta de lo que hay en tú de semilla de 
santidad y eso es tu capacidad de actuar porque esa capacidad es apor-
tativa. De manera que, en vez del imperativo categórico, haz, aporta. 
Entonces ya no se toma como centro la voluntad sino la persona, por-
que la persona se puede describir como el ser que aporta, que 
incrementa la realidad. de que yo me decida a hacer depende que algo 
nuevo sea. No tengo que ocuparme obsesivamente de la santidad de 
mi voluntad, en primer lugar porque no hay tal cosa y en segundo por-
que si me preocupo de eso no hago nada. 
Lo bueno está en la acción porque de la acción de suyo es apor-
tante y es también la condición de una mejora, de una adquisición de 
virtudes. Me parece que son dos modos de entender la moral distintos, 
sin negar la grandeza kantiana. Pero esa mira de altura que Kant pro-
pone no es posible, hay una equivocación, no se da cuenta de que el 
hombre tiene que hacer más y tiene que querer mejor. Esto segundo, 
el querer mejor me parece que es el despliegue, está implícito en este 
asunto del haz. No sólo tienes que querer lo que quieres sino tu querer 
para mejorarlo. Esto está en Tomás de Aquino de una manera breve, 
pero domina su planteamiento ético: lo que llama la curvatura de la 
voluntad. La curvatura de la voluntad se puede describir del siguiente 
modo: que la voluntad es curva significa que nuestro querer compro-
mete a nuestra subjetividad, la compromete de una manera parcial, 
pero sí, y esta es una observación que se ha descubierto moderna-
mente, y es que a diferencia de lo que pasa cuando el ser humano 
piensa, cuando quiere, el yo tiene que apoyar el querer y si no, el que-
rer no existe. Hay una frase de Nietzsche que es aprovechable, es una 
adivinanza que ya está en la curvatura de la voluntad de Tomás de 
Aquino1. Nietzsche dice que yo no desprecio si no me acepto como el 
que desprecia. El acto de despreciar no lo puedo llevar a cabo si no me 
acepto como el que desprecia. Cuando pienso, no tengo que aceptarme 
como ser pensante porque la persona no es constitutiva del acto de 
pensar, eso es una tontería, eso es trasladar superfluamente e inútil-
mente la verdadera marcha del pensamiento, pero eso sí es 
característico de la voluntad. El pensamiento se despliega porque se 
despliega, porque tenemos una dotación suficiente. No tenemos que 
ponernos como el que piensa para pensar, ni tenemos que aceptarnos 
como el que piensa para aceptar, pero sí para querer porque si no, el 
                                                 
1 Another way of presenting the same fact, the involvement of the intimacy, or the 
person in any voluntary decision is given by Guardini. “This good can only be 
percibed, the decision regarding it can only be taken, only the conscience can cap-
ture it and translate it into action, in the intimacy of the person. No one can decide 
on the good for me, I have to do it myself. The good is done in as much as I myself 
is the one –and no one else– get involved in that particular act of the will, i.e. 
inasmuch as my person is present in that decision”. “Pero este bien sólo puede 
percibirse, la decisión ante su presencia sólo puede tomarse, sólo puede captarlo la 
conciencia y traducirlo en acción, en la soledad interior de la persona. Nadie puede 
querer el bien en mi lugar, tengo que hacerlo yo mismo. El bien se realiza en la 
medida en que yo —yo mismo y ningún otro— me implico en ese acto de voluntad, 
es decir en la medida en que mi persona se hace presente en esa volición”. Guar-
dini, R., Etica. Lecciones en la Universidad de Munich, op. cit., 161. 
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acto voluntario no se puede ejercer. El acto voluntario arrastra, com-
promete al sujeto humano2. Sin esa especie de reconocimiento del 
sujeto humano en el acto voluntario no hay acto voluntario. Esto es 
más que el imperativo categórico de Kant porque ocurre en todo acto 
voluntario y no en el imperativo que es como una norma, no un acto. 
Recordemos lo que decía Sócrates: quien comete un asesinato se 
convierte en asesino. Nietzsche dice: el que desprecia si no se acepta 
como el que desprecia, no desprecia. Y habría que decirlo de todo, si 
no me acepto como el que quiere, no quiero. Si no me acepto como el 
que quiere comer no como, si no me acepto como el que quiere matar, 
no mato. Y eso ocurre con todos los actos, buenos y malos, y eso sig-
nifica que la voluntad es curva, que en la voluntad está el yo, es decir, 
la voluntad es reflexiva, la inteligencia no es reflexiva. Pero entonces 
ahí se ve una inadecuación: si me acepto como el que quiere no me 
acepto del todo, me doy cuenta de que ese querer no es exactamente 
lo mismo que el yo. El yo presta su asistencia, pero percibe a la vez 
que ese aceptarse en ese querer no es suficiente para él y, por tanto, la 
persona tiene como objetivo, cosa que también está en la sindéresis, 
querer más, hacer más. 
Esa mejora, desde el punto de vista de la reflexividad de la vo-
luntad, nos damos cuenta de cómo surgen las virtudes, cómo eso tiene 
lugar, porque el hombre no puede conformarse con ningún querer 
suyo. Es un insatisfecho con todos sus quereres y por tanto eso de la 
voluntad santa no se puede aceptar, porque la voluntad puede mejorar 
y tiene que mejorar porque compromete al yo, pero no lo realiza ex-
haustivamente. El imperativo va dirigido así: quiere mejor, quiere 
más; no quieras más cosas, sino quiere mejor, quiere más. Eso sí que 
me parece que es un enfoque acertado. Por tanto, en la intención del 
acto voluntario hay dos instancias, lo amado o .lo querido y el yo que 
al comprometerse respecto de lo amado se insatisface y dice: tengo 
que querer más, es un querer querer. El acto voluntario no es simple-
mente un querer lo querido, sino un querer querer. Pero ese querer 
querer aspira a querer más, a querer mejor. Aquí nos encontramos con 
lo primario en el hombre, una ciencia del bien y sólo del bien. Una 
ciencia del bien y sólo del bien es esa ciencia que sale de la sindéresis: 
al comprometerse el hombre en el querer, la superioridad de la persona 
respecto de cualquier acto voluntario hace que la persona exija un acto 
voluntario mejor. 
Creo que hemos visto bastantes dimensiones de la ética y queda 
ratificada la ética de virtudes desde la persona, desde esa connotación 
personal que es constitutiva del acto voluntario, pero no la agota y por 
eso la persona siempre exige un querer mejor. Por tanto, no hay un 
acto de amor puro, sino algo mayor, un acto enteramente generoso: no 
                                                 
2 The same idea is expressed by Zubiri in a different way: “El acto de voluntad con-
siste en darme a mí mismo mi propia condición. Por consiguiente, el problema está 
en la condicionalidad interna de la voluntad, y no simplemente en el objeto sobre 
que recae”. Zubiri, X., Sobre el Sentimiento y la Volición, (Madrid: Alianza Edi-
torial, 1992), 271. Found in Ferrer, U., El Principio Antropológico de la Ética: en 
Diálogo con Zubiri, (Sevilla: Thémata, Plaza y Valdés, 2010). 
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me satisfago con este querer, quiero querer mejor. Esto tiene un valor 




La persona impera respecto de sus actos. La persona es imago 
Dei, y la satisfacción es cuando la persona ya no puede querer mejor. 
Creo que aquí hay que trasladar lo que dice San Pablo: entonces cono-
ceréis como sois conocidos. Lo que pasa es que esto sin el Espíritu 
Santo es imposible. El destino del hombre respecto de su voluntad es 
estar insatisfecho y el que diga ya estoy satisfecho, ya quiero bastante, 
no, la persona impone su carácter no homeostático respecto de la vo-
luntad porque si la persona no consiente en el acto voluntario, ese acto 
no existe. Pero para la persona ese acto voluntario es insuficiente, in-
satisfactorio, porque el acto voluntario no la traduce enteramente y la 
persona lo que hace es requerir a su voluntad constantemente a más. 
Esto es lo que se puede descubrir desde la sindéresis y oponer a Kant. 
La voluntad indica a la persona más que el entendimiento, pero 
la indica mal. Cuando se abandona el límite es cuando la persona apa-
rece en el entendimiento. Por eso abandonar el límite se parece mucho 
a un acto voluntario porque llega a lo otro, ya no funciona por asimi-
lación, sino que accede a lo radical sin posesión objetiva. Yo estoy en 
lo otro distinguiéndome, pero cuando se trata de un acto de amor ahí 
hay congregación, únete a lo otro, pero date cuenta de que esa unión 
con lo otro según la estás realizando te compromete pero no es sufi-
ciente. Hay una dimensión del abandono del límite que es la esencia 
humana: detenerse en la esencia humana es disponer. Esa es la cuarta 
dimensión del abandono del límite en la que el abandono del límite 
llega a la captación de lo que es la voluntad, eso es la esencia humana. 
Eso es el descubrimiento de la insuficiencia del acto voluntario. El 
abandono del límite tiene cuatro dimensiones; esta es la última, la 
cuarta. Primero se abandona respecto del ser que no soy, se abandona 
el límite respecto de la esencia del ser que no soy yo, se abandona el 
límite respecto del ser que soy yo, y se abandona el límite respecto de 
mi esencia. Al abandonar el límite respecto de la esencia, aparece la 
esencia como pura independencia de la persona y eso es la noción de 
disponer y el disponer es querer el disponer, y la distinción real está 
en que el querer no me identifica de manera que el querer querer es mi 
realización exhaustiva, eso es la distinción real esencia-esse. 
¿Por qué se describe la esencia humana como disponer? Porque 
depende de la libertad trascendental. Lo que depende del primer prin-
cipio es la analítica causal y es la esencia extra mental; lo que depende 
de la libertad es el disponer. La libertad dispone, pero no hay que con-
fundir el disponer con lo disponible. Yo no puedo disponer de mí, 
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puedo querer aumentar el disponer pero hacer del disponer lo disponi-
ble. Lo disponible es la cultura. El querer no es idéntico del ser 
personal. 
En la visión beatífica el disponer ya no interesa. La voluntad y 
la inteligencia radican en la persona por tanto cuando la persona ejerce 
el amor de Dios no es de la voluntad en cuanto cuyo a priori es la 
persona, ahí es la voluntad en su carácter radical no en su carácter 
esencial. Eso redunda también en la esencia, pues bien, pero nunca es 
en la voluntad en cuanto distinta donde se puede producir la visión 
beatífica sino en el arranque personal. Es que la inteligencia priorita-
riamente es persona y la voluntad también. Por tanto, en la persona no 
se distinguen. Se puede hablar de trascendentales personales y eso re-
dundará en la esencia, pero eso no es el colmarse de la persona sino 
que la persona se colma hacia Dios en su coexistencia con Dios; no 
hay identidad. 
El deber se compatibiliza con la felicidad en cuanto que la feli-
cidad es la posesión del bien, cosa que Kant no tiene en cuenta aunque 
lo postula. En la Crítica de la razón práctica hay una oscilación 
cuando habla de la voluntad como ratio essendi del imperativo cate-
górico y cuando dice que eso engendra mérito y será premiado. 
Entonces lo eudemónico hay que eliminarlo porque es bajo, pero eso 
engendra mérito y si engendra mérito dará lugar a la felicidad eterna, 
por tanto Dios tiene que existir. Ese es el postulado. Pero si engendra 
mérito no es lo más alto, es más alto Dios que es el que otorga mérito. 
Si la felicidad está en Dios engendra mérito. Hay una felicidad final a 
base del mérito de mantenerse en la voluntad, pero eso está postulado, 
que tiene que haber una felicidad que se corresponda con eso y que en 
el imperativo no reside la felicidad. El hombre no puede ser feliz, pero 
Dios sí puede hacerlo, y eso hay que postularlo. Ese es el carácter no 
representativo que tiene este planteamiento. 
Yo tengo que querer aumentar la cantidad de bien y para eso 
tengo que aumentar mi querer. El gran problema es ese, que no se sabe 
qué es la felicidad. La felicidad es la noción más vaga que existe y por 
eso dice Tomás de Aquino que si se toma el frui como la felicidad ahí 
cabe todo tipo de errores y el hombre pone la felicidad en bienes infe-
riores. Un hombre puede disfrutar de la comida y creer que ahí está la 
felicidad, pero para eso según la curvatura de la voluntad tiene que 
quererse como el que come. Por eso digo que ahí está el control porque 
si me quiero como el que disfruta comiendo me doy cuenta de que eso 
no colma mi yo. Para llevar el bien al ser es menester llevar el querer 
hacia lo más alto a través de la curvatura de la voluntad. En el supuesto 
de que el bien es un trascendental absoluto, aunque yo creo que no, 
que el bien se reduce a bueno y que alguien es bueno; el bien se reduce 
al amor es una captación personalista de la captación del bien. La ten-
dencia a la felicidad lleva a la voluntad a un acto que es la fruición, 
pero ella no puede determinar si ese acto es el adecuado o no. Por eso 
se puede hablar de voluntas ut natura y si no fuera por la persona, eso 
no se puede enderezar y ver que con esto no quiero suficientemente. 
La voluntas ut natura no tiene un acto culminante. Un acto culminante 
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respecto de Dios no se sabe por eso el desiderium naturale videndum 
Dei no es prueba de la existencia de Dios. La persona tampoco lo 
puede colmar, pero sabe que hay insatisfacción. Pero para hablar de 
esto habría que haber explicado que no se puede decir cuál es el acto 
de la voluntad que tiene que ver con el acto supremo; no se sabe qué 
acto es el que colma la voluntad. Se puede decir que es el acto en el 
que la voluntad descansa, pero entonces hay que entender la voluntad 
como orexis. Eso es también lo que intenta demostrar Tomás de 
Aquino cuando dice que el bien que lleva a la felicidad es un bien in-
defectible, pero hace falta también otra cosa y es que a la firmeza del 
bien corresponda la firmeza de la adhesión al bien y eso sólo se puede 
lograr con la virtud porque si no, la voluntad sería voluble. No basta 
la indefectibilidad del bien sino que mi adhesión sea firme. 
El semina virtutum intelectualis es el intelecto agente y aquí en 
la voluntad tiene que haber algo parecido. El primer punto de camino 
es la sindéresis. El amor como trascendental es un salir al encuentro 
del otro porque el otro ya está metido por la inteligencia y por la ini-
ciativa del otro. Podría ocurrir otra cosa, eso es el Espíritu Santo, eso 
es el carácter mediador. Quien empuja a ir hacia otro es el Espíritu, es 
el Consolador, porque es mediador porque es el don, la tercera dimen-
sión del don; el primero el dar, el segundo el acoger y el tercero el don 
personal que tiene una misión que es el mejora. Como es unitivo, pues 
dice no te separes, no te mantengas en la separación. Pero a eso hay 
que darle más vueltas. Otra persona es lo único que elimina la soledad, 







Two examples of real life 
 
It may not be proper for a doctoral thesis to bring exercises into 
the dissertation. It may be more appropriate for a school textbook. 
Nevertheless, it will be interesting in this case to bring the reader down 
to earth. Philosophy is a matter of life, of living well, not just a theo-
retical exercise, especially when dealing with ethical topics. The 
purpose of this subsection is to bring us down to reality and see 
whether what is being said, is real: as the youth say these days, ‘man, 
get real!’ The two cases will test the present understanding of syn-
deresis and open a door to map out how one uses synderesis without 
being aware of it on a daily basis. 
Waking up 
As we wake up in the dark, we retake our live stream. How? By 
knowing that we are awake. Is this objective knowledge? Not really, 
we just know. We may later objetivize it if we want to do philosophy 
first thing in the morning. Most people just wake up and automatically 
take notice of themselves and their environment. Sometimes, when 
one sleeps in a new place, this awakening to the new environment 
takes a bit more time, because – and this is habitual knowledge– we 
automatically tend to take the customary environment for granted.  
Now, suppose the case of a student who has just been employed 
in a fantastic job and wants to excel in it. The first condition is to be 
punctual, that usually is to be at work ten minutes before the actual 
starting time. Up to now he could wake up at ten o’clock. Now he has 
to get up at 6.30 a.m. to be able to get to work on time. 
On normal days we tend to have a little, or big, struggle with our 
body and psyche that want more comfort, more sleep. Who are the 
contestants of the struggle? At the natural level, the body, the will and 
the intelligence. The intelligence tells us that the best for us is to wake 
up early and overcome the impulses of the body. The will tries to fol-
low, but the battle is there. Now synderesis appears as the one that 
knows about this internal battle, the will does not know the intelli-
gence, nor does the body, the intelligence does not know the will nor 
the passions. So to speak, the control centre is the habitual knowledge 
of synderesis. Who wins will depend on the will but how? By the per-
son sticking or not with the previous decisions on good or bad 
behaviour and the actual capacity of doing so. Sometimes one decides 
to wake up but the body has already shut up, it has placed us into deep 
sleep. Normally though, if there has been a succession of victories, 
there is a habit at the essential level that helps to put into practice what 
we have decided. 
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We have the following elements in this morning’s example. The 
personal level, root of all we are, synderesis as control centre, the in-
telligence, the imagination, the will, the habits of the will, and of the 
intelligence, the body and its passions. 
Partnership 
A couple of friends propose that you start a business in partner-
ship for the next 10 years. It will mean investing half of your savings 
and moving with your family to another country. What will be the in-
ner working of the decision as explained by the triadic structure of the 
person? And, what is the working of synderesis in this process? 
I know I am the one to take the decision. It is my responsibility. 
I am a married person, so I have to count on my spouse’s opinion and 
agreement. I know my spouse as a person, that is to say, by connatu-
rality. Though I know one is very different from the other, we must 
share the same future.  
I know I have a duty to maximise the betterment of both of us as 
well as that of our children, and even of the possible employees and 
society in which the business will be started. 
I know the track record of the partners’ personal and business 
skills and of their honesty, but naturally these can change, the same as 
the actual conditions, once the business develops. 
The business plan seems technically correct and the risk acepta-
ble. 
It will imply a long-term commitment which will affect the ed-
ucation and future of our children. 
The climate, health and living conditions seem to be adequate, 
though a bit less developed to the present country, but if the business 
works well we shall have the opportunity to enjoy even better condi-
tions. 
I know my spouse and I have the character, stamina and skills to 
be able to do the job.  
I have the gut feeling to go ahead. 
Now to test the knowledge acquired so far what will be your 
three levels of knowledge: personal, habitual and sensible, in this de-
cision. 
How will you know the notices given by the habits of wisdom, 
first principles, synderesis, intelligence and will while taking the deci-
sion? 
What would be the function of the intelligence and of the will 
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